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New Public Management and Strategic Change  
in the European Railways  
A critical study on the EU governance of megaprojects 
 
Giovanni ESPOSITO 
Over the last five decades, European public sectors have undergone a profound process of 
organizational change, where managerial tools and principles from the private sector have 
permeated through governments and administrations of many countries. New Public 
Management (NPM) reform ideas were crucial to this change. Mainstream studies on NPM 
reforms commonly see it as a mere pragmatic and apolitical framework of reform to downsize 
State bureaucracies and render public service delivery more efficiently and effectively 
responsive to users’ demands. Following the Critical Management Studies tradition, this PhD 
dissertation questions this taken-for-grantedness of NPM and denaturalizes the mainstream idea 
of NPM reforms as a technical, rational analytic and evidence-based domain. It rather presents 
them as the result of a historical process marked by politics and power. 
We choose the European rail industries as empirical context of analysis. Firstly, we examine 
the EU-driven implementation of NPM reforms in this sector. Secondly, we narrow the focus 
on the governance of TEN-T, an EU-level investment program in transport infrastructures 
designed on the basis of key NPM principles. This program is of crucial importance for the full 
accomplishment of NPM reforms in the national rail industries of the EU.  
The dissertation is structured in two parts. The first part investigates how NPM ideas developed 
throughout the political agendas of European national parties and were transformed into actual 
reform plans by governments. The second part examines how NPM ideas translate into 
managerial action. Our analysis suggests that the top-down performance-based design of NPM 
models leads to effectiveness and efficiency improvements in the functioning of public sector 
organizations which, under certain circumstances, contrast with the most fundamental 
democratic values of State institutions. These models might thus turn constitutional 
democracies into technocracies. We conclude by discussing alternatives to NPM, such as the 
Public Value paradigm.   
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New Public Management: a critical perspective 
History is in perpetual motion. Our opinion on historical events evolves as new 
discoveries unfold and, especially, according to our standpoint in society. In the 
late 18
th
 century, during the American War of Independence, the British regarded 
the settlers revolting against them as ‘rebels’ while these defined themselves as 
‘patriots’. Later on, in Europe, during the French Revolution, King Louis XVI 
called ‘rioters’ those who fought side by side under the name ‘citizens’. In most 
recent times, the Iraq war is, for some, a ‘liberation war’ in the name of 
democracy and, for others, an ‘illegitimate invasion’ intended to seize oil 
resources. The facts are the same but the interpretations change radically 
according to the points of view and interests at stake.  
When dealing with such contested events, social scientists are required to be 
critical and use their intellectual capacities to discern facts and interpretations, by 
taking into account the multiple viewpoints and interests at stake of all the actors 
involved. The term critique derives from the Greek kritikē (κριτική), meaning 
"the art of discerning". In the field of management and organization science, 
Critical Management Studies (CMS) scholars often refer to this art with the word 
‘unpacking’ (Alvesson and Wilmott 2012).  
Unpacking the partiality of shared interests and unpacking the asymmetrical 
power relations are both key aspects of the CMS project (Alvesson and Wilmott 
1992). CMS scholars draw attention to latent social conflicts. They thus bring the 
focus on the fact that management is a societal process taking place in plural 
environments, populated by diverging stakeholder groups whose dynamic 
interactions generate contradictions at the level of society and organizations. The 
idea is that managerial élites and other groups in society (e.g. workers, citizens) 
might have competing interests and objectives which may generate disagreements 
and, eventually, conflicts. In so doing, these scholars acknowledge the political 
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nature of management techniques and attempt to shed light on the domination 
structures and processes thanks to which managerial élites “[are] routinely 
privileged in decision-making and agenda-setting and in defining and shaping 
human needs and social reality” (Alvesson and Wilmott 1992: 12).     
Contrary to CMS, most traditional approaches to management overlook the 
problem of domination and produce a typology of knowledge that assists 
management. As suggested by Klikauer (2015), this typology of knowledge is 
linked to what Habermas (1968: 290) calls “a cognitive interest in technical 
control over objectified processes” and can be said “auxiliary science”, supporting 
and stabilizing domination (Anderson 2009). It is used either to set labor power in 
motion while dominating it (e.g. Smith 2010) or to establish and expand the 
power of direct, technical, bureaucratic, coercive, cultural, normative and 
internalized  control (e.g. Fleming et al. 2010). In sum, this traditional managerial 
knowledge analyses management from ‘within’ a self-invented techno-
instrumental rationality constructed as problem solving and put at the service of 
managerial élites (Klikauer 2015). 
In this PhD dissertation, we adopt a critical stance to study New Public 
Management (NPM). NPM is an approach to running public services 
organizations based on the belief that the public sector can work better if it takes 
on market and private-sector management as key organizing principles. NPM 
supporters claim that market-like structures and greater managerial pragmatism 
within the government can improve the cost-effectiveness of public services 
provision. They minimize – the most radical of them deny - any difference 
between public and private management. They call for a pragmatic approach to 
problems and a better division of roles between the level of steering - the political 
power making the strategic decisions and setting the objectives -, and the level of 
execution - the administrative and managerial power making the operational 
decisions and implementing objectives. Since the late-1970s, NPM reforms have 
been spreading worldwide in many countries regardless of the domestic 
administrative traditions. 
Most conventional studies on NPM see it as a technical, rational analytic and 
evidence-based domain. From this perspective, the implementation of NPM 
reforms is considered as a mere technical and apolitical process aimed at 
downsizing state bureaucracies and rendering public service delivery more 
efficiently and effectively responsive to users’ demands (i.e. Scott, Bushnell and 
Sallee 1990; Hood 1991, 1995). In this context, reforms are seen as a pragmatic 
solution to offer public services of the same quality but at lower cost or better 
services at the same cost. These conventional studies on NPM make sense of it by 
using a techno-instrumental rationality constructed as problem solving and 
uncritically put at the service of inexplicit, taken-for-granted managerial and 
political interests. They seem to hastily consider the re-structuring of traditional 
state bureaucracies as a ‘rational shopping for reform elements’ (i.e. Christensen 
and Lægreid 2013) rather than a political process driven by reform ideology.  
NPM, politics and power: combining the macro and meso levels of analysis 
As a first step of this PhD thesis, we unpack the ideology underneath NPM and 
contribute to its ‘denaturalization’ (see Alvesson and Wilmott 1992). In so doing, 
we question the taken-for-grandness of NPM reforms by opening up what about 
NPM has become seen as given, unproblematic and natural. In other words, we 
denaturalize the mainstream idea of NPM as a technical, rational analytic and 
evidence-based domain and rather present it as the result of a historical process 
marked by politics and power.  
In one view, power can be defined at the macro level in terms of social structures 
where dominant groups seek to substantiate and legitimize their dominant 
position through ideology. From this point of view, power refers to systems of 
15 
 
ideas forming the basis of economic and political theory, and policy. However, it 
can be also defined at the meso level in terms of technologies and institutions that 
mold deviant behaviors into the political and managerial agenda of dominant 
groups. Power at this level is more about the techniques, rules, regulations and 
inter-organizational ties that shape collective action. 
Therefore, as a second step of this PhD thesis, we look at the NPM-related 
structures and processes that allow dominant groups (e.g. governments, industry 
and supra-national authorities) to administer society (e.g. citizens, civil society 
organizations). Our objective here is not only to unpack the control mechanisms 
underneath NPM models, but also to draw attention to the social conflicts that go 
hand in hand with the use of these mechanisms. Therefore, at the meso level we 
focus, firstly, on the technological and institutional mechanisms that enable 
political and managerial élites to impose their agenda on society; and, eventually, 
on the conflicts that arise from the use of these mechanisms.       
As far as the macro level is concerned, we first look at the relationship between 
NPM reforms, political ideology, and public expressions of support for these 
reforms by political parties. Secondly, we adopt a political economy perspective 
and look at the interaction of political and economic forces within a society. We 
therefore bring the focus on the social welfare effects of NPM reforms by 
measuring how much value these reforms create for society. For this second step 
of analysis, we choose as empirical context the European rail sector. We choose 
this sector because over the last decades this has been profoundly restructured on 
the basis of the NPM model. Until the 1980s, rail services in Europe were a 
considered as a public service and were thus provided by vertically integrated 
state-owned monopolies. Then, throughout the 1980s, many European 
governments came to frame them as market services. Stated-owned enterprises 
were thus progressively dismantled under the pressures of liberalization policies 
driven by the European Union (EU). 
Through the intense use of regulation (Directive 91/440 and four regulatory 
packages in 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2016), EU liberalization policies were aimed at 
reforming the national transport systems with the purpose of opening existing 
state-owned monopolies to international competition. A core aspect of this reform 
process has been the promotion of interoperability across national transport 
networks. Interoperability is crucial because Europe has many national transport 
systems that have evolved each in their own way over the past years. Their 
technical standards are different, and this is clearly an obstacle to cross-border 
traffic. Therefore, this is also an obstacle to cross-border competition. 
For example, with international trains it is usually the case that the engine has to 
be changed at the frontier station. In especially difficult cases passengers must 
change trains or goods must be reloaded. There is also a need to harmonize 
infrastructure because of, for example, differences in platform heights or 
command and signaling systems. In the railway sector different gauge widths, 
electrification standards and safety and signaling systems made it more difficult 
and more costly to run a train from one country to another. In this situation, the 
European transport market is fragmented - and no liberalization initiative could be 
really effective - because each national transport network could be used only by 
those operators having a rolling stock apparatus complying with the national 
market standards. 





program, an EU-level investment program 
providing financial resources and legal rules to realize a list of infrastructure 
projects representing the backbone of the future trans-European transport 
                                               
1 A list with the most frequent acronyms of the case study is provided in ANNEX II. 
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network. TEN-T goal was to interconnect national infrastructure networks and 
ensure their interoperability by setting standards which could remove 
transnational technical barriers, such as incompatible standards for railway traffic. 
It was designed to promote and strengthen seamless transport chains for passenger 
and freight, while keeping up with the latest technological trends such as High-
Speed Railway (HSR) technology in the rail sector. 
In terms of performance, a number of major problems (e.g. planning, construction 
and financing of listed projects) emerged since the first phase of implementing 
TEN-T starting in 1996. “The completion of the originally defined TEN-T fell 
behind the optimistic development plans” (Schade et. al., 2013: 19) and, as a 
consequence, the deadline for the accomplishment of planned projects was 
delayed several times. In 1996 the deadline was 2010. Then, in 2001 it was 
delayed to 2020. In 2014 it was further delayed to 2030. 
Following the NPM philosophy of a greater emphasis on results, the European 
Commission introduced a number of managerial innovations to improve the 
program performance. For example, EU-level criteria for the selection of projects 
to be funded by the TEN-T budget became stricter. An EU-level manager (so 
called European Coordinator) was introduced to supervise and facilitate the 
accomplishment of funded projects at the national level. Tools to manage the 
performance of funded projects (e.g. TENtec system) were adopted to assure the 
timely achievement of planned objectives.  
NPM models are indeed based on the belief that the public sector works better 
when public administrative bodies are oriented toward results (outputs), rather 
than processes (inputs). Nevertheless, a growing body of empirical literature 
criticizes them because of their: (1) inappropriate likening of the public sector to 
the private one (e.g. DeLeon and Denhardt, 2000; Hefetz and Warner, 2004; 
McCabe and Vinzant, 1999; Rocha and De Araujo, 2007) and (2) negative effects 
equity, citizenship, and accountability (Boyne, 1998; Kettl, 1993; Morgan and 
England, 1988; Romzek, 2000). Some of these studies have pointed out the 
disciplinary characteristics of the NPM models whose style of management is 
essentially designed, monitored and imposed from the top (Hood, 2000; Ryan et 
al., 2008), with little involvement of concerned stakeholders. 
In a similar vein, the managerial innovations introduced by the EU to improve the 
performance of TEN-T-funded projects have been accompanied by the increasing 
opposition of local stakeholders in several Members States: Italy and France 
(Lyon-Turin project), Germany (Stuttgart project), Spain (Basque Y project), UK 
(HS2 project). This has led some commentators (Schade et. al., 2013, 2014) to 
remind the European Commission that, not only the accomplishment of planned 
objectives, but also the participation of local stakeholders to project decision-
making should be duly considered in the management of the program. 
The Lyon-Turin (LT) project is certainly the most emblematic of existing 
opposition movements. For more than 20 years, the local communities of the Susa 
Valley (near Turin), backed by the local authorities, have blocked the project 
implementation with “a protest of epic tenacity and occasional violence” (Hooper, 
2012). Since 2012, protests have developed also in France (departments of Rhône, 
Isère and Savoie). The core argument of Italian and French oppositions was that 
the project is useless - because many studies other than those produced by the 
project promoters showed that rail traffic flows between Italy and France are 
decreasing – and undemocratic - because it has been imposed from the top by the 
European Commission and the national governments without any adequate 
involvement of local communities. In 2012, as oppositions showed no sign of 
decreasing the Italian government approved Law 183 which, among others, 
declared LT a project of strategic priority to be realized in the name of national 
interest. In so doing, it created the juridical conditions to militarily occupy the 
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construction site of the base tunnel and prevent any future protest which could 
delay further the accomplishment of the project. At the same time, in both 
countries Lyon-Turin Ferroviaire (LTF) – the constructor company in charge of 
the geognostic works of the planned infrastructure - pressed charges against local 
activists to discourage any future opposition to LT.   
In this PhD thesis, we choose the organization of the LT project as empirical 
context to understand how at the meso level NPM-oriented structures and 
processes allow dominant groups (e.g. governments, industry and supra-national 
authorities) to administer society (e.g. citizens, civil society organizations and 
local communities). Our objective here is to unpack the - technological and 
institutional - control mechanisms underneath NPM models and to unravel the 
social conflicts that arise with the use of these mechanisms.  
The LT project is a very rich empirical context. Firstly, it is a transnational 
project, meaning that this case study is comparative in essence and provides the 
opportunity to examine two “polar types” (Pettigrew 1990: 275): the Italian site of 
the project illustrating low performance and very strong local opposition, and the 
French one illustrating high performance and moderate local opposition. More in 
detail, LT allows us to observe how the NPM logic underneath the managerial 
mechanisms of the TEN-T program intertwines – or hybridizes - with the national 
institutional systems where the project is implemented. Secondly, it is a multilevel 
project, meaning that it allows us to observe how decision making disperses and 
articulates across different government levels (supra-national, national and sub-
national). Thirdly, it is a pluralistic project, meaning that it allows us to observe 
how stakeholders with competing views of the world relate to each other through 
disputes and agreements.  
In the following two sections, on the one hand, we present the theory background 
for our analysis of the NPM ideology. On the other, we provide the theoretical 
framework enabling us to unravel the functioning of NPM control mechanisms 
and the conflicts that arise with their use.     
Unpacking the NPM ideology 
Unveiling the ideological foundations of a knowledge domain is a key CMS 
aspect (Alvesson and Sandberg 2011). On this regard, more critical scholars (e.g. 
Clarke and Newman 2004, Davies 2017) have spotlighted the relationship 
between NPM and political ideology. They have argued that NPM reforms to 
government are part of a neoliberal attempt to dismantle the welfare state. These 
reforms are driven by a powerful managerialist ideology believing that (1) a 
society - or a nation - is nothing more than the summation of the decisions and 
transactions which have been made by the managements of the organizations 
(Enteman 1993), and (2) all organizations can only work properly if decision-
making is put in the hands of professionally trained and objective managers 
(Parker 2002). 
This PhD thesis follows on from this critical studies tradition. It brings the focus 
on the relationship between NPM reforms, political ideology, and public 
expressions of support for these reforms by political parties. NPM reforms to the 
machinery of government are indeed led by elected ministers who are themselves 
leading members of political parties. Ministers are elected on the basis of a party 
manifesto which contains collective commitments and aspirations, which can be 
seen as an important document for analysis. Therefore, we start our analysis by 
focusing on these manifestos and asking whether NPM reforms the past decades 
have been construed as a technical, rational analytic and evidence-based domain, 
disconnected from party political life; or, conversely, these reforms have been 
characterized by a growing political profile over time.   
We know from the literature (e.g. Bauby 2008, Bognetti and Obermann 2008, 
Clifton et al. 2011, Florio 2013) EU’s institutions have played a key role in the 
21 
 
diffusion of NPM ideas across the domestic contexts of the Member States. In 
more detail, the European Commission has chosen to transpose the NPM values 
into the Member States’ institutional systems without establishing binding pan-
European rules. It has rather used instruments of soft regulation
2
 (Mény 1993, 
Page and Wouters 1995, Spanou 1998, Della Cananea 2004, Eichengreen 2008). 
These instruments have aimed at ‘re-orienting the direction and shape of politics 
to the extent that [EU] political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy making’ (Ladrech 1994: 69). 
Vis-à-vis these instruments of soft regulation, national political parties have 
played a crucial role by: (1) absorbing EU-level NPM ideas in their ideological 
platforms (party manifestos); and - once in power – (2) transforming them into 
national administrative reform plans (Gafney 1996, Ladrech 2001). We therefore 
continue our analysis on party manifestos by focusing on the domestic context of 
the EU’s Member States. Precisely, we investigate in which political, economic 
and institutional contexts European national parties have used NPM ideas to 
compose their manifestos. In so doing, we aim to shed some light on the political 
economy of NPM reforms.  
From a political economy perspective, NPM reforms of the public sector 
economy are more than technical, rational analytic and evidence-based changes. 
Political economists rather spotlight the interaction of political and economic 
                                               
2 A number of instruments of soft regulation have been progressively produced at the EU 
level to invite the Member States to modernize their national administrations through 
private-sector management and market-based strategies. The declared purpose of these 
strategies was to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the economy of the public sector. 
For instance, in a 2010 communication (COM(2010)2020 final), the European 
Commission encouraged the Member States to promote internal structural reforms 
designed to render national public administrations more efficient and effective. Other 
instruments of soft regulation (i.e. DG ECFIN 2008, COM(2014)902 final) consider these 
structural reforms as an important EU priority area, crucial to promote growth in the 
European economy, and improve both efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. 
Reform of public sectors should thus be high up on the political agendas of the MSs’. 
processes within a society and bring the focus on the distribution of power and 
wealth between different groups, as well as the processes that create, sustain and 
transform these relationships over time (Collinson 2003).  
Until the mid-1970s, a Keynesian policy environment of macroeconomic 
intervention prevailed in the majority of Western democracies. Within this 
context, policy-makers saw public sector organizations as strategic players to 
redress market failures and protect national interests (Fecher and Lévesque 2008). 
Then, the 1974–1975 stagflation cast doubt on the relevance of Keynesian 
policies (Aharoni 1976, Androsch 1977). As a consequence, the concept of 
State’s failures grew under the influence of alternative theoretical currents, such 
as monetarism and public choice (Fecher and Lévesque 2008). By the early-
1980s, the mainstream paradigm was shifting attention from State interventionism 
to supply-side economics (Goodwin et al. 2015). In many Western democracies, 
the political élites changed their mind about the role of the State in the economy. 
They came to consider the Keynesian welfare state as the major cause for the 
increased size, functions and power of public bureaucracies. As explained by 
Larbi (1999), a key role was played by the emerging ideas of New Right 
neoliberals who criticized the size, costs and functioning of government bureaus 
by depicting them as ridden with inefficiencies when compared with private 
businesses. Drawing on Mises’ (1936) and Hayek’s (1944, 1948, 1960 and 1988) 
philosophical ideas, New Right thinkers became more and more influential 
(Dunleavy 1986). These thinkers increasingly called for alternative ways of 
organizing public services where the role of state administrations had to be 
reduced to give more prominence to market institutions (e.g. liberalization 
policies, deregulation of areas shielded from competition and privatization). To 
this end, legislatively driven initiatives to create quasi-markets increasingly 
diffused in many Western countries as a major development in public service 
provision. Reformers called for the rolling back of bureaucratic coordination in 
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the provision of public services and the implementation of NPM reforms. As 
explained by Ferlie et al. (1996) in their study on the UK – a leading NPM 
jurisdiction -, the official line of these reforms was that public services were to 
become more business-like. A stronger general managerial spine in the 
organization of public sector organization was, in fact, a key theme of NPM 
reforms. Indeed, particular attention was given to the importance of management 
by hierarchy, a ‘command and control’ mode of working, clear target-setting and 
monitoring performance, a shift of power to senior management and some 
empowerment of more entrepreneurial management, but still with tight 
retrospective accountability requirement upwards (Ferlie et al. 1996).   
When studying NPM from a political economy perspective, economists not only 
want to understand how reform measures impact on cost structures and 
organizational outputs, but they also want to be able to calculate how much value 
reforms create for society. Florio (2013, 2017) follows this approach and studies 
the social welfare effects of the adoption of NPM models in the provision of 
network services in Europe. Networks (e.g. transport, energy and 
telecommunication) are crucial factors of economic well-being as they offer 
society the opportunity to coordinate, over time and space, large and complex 
flows of essential goods, people or services. Therefore, as referred by Florio 
(2013), governments may have good reasons to consider these services as 
essential to society and give priority to economic accessibility of these services 
for their citizens. Governments may thus commit to ensure that household 
expenditures for these services do not exceed a given share of their income. But 
they may also commit to stimulate new investments to improve the quality of the 
service.  Following this political economy tradition, we focus on the welfare 
effects of NPM reforms in the railway network sector. Precisely, we investigate 
the effects that EU-driven NPM reforms have on the prices, quality and 
investments in the rail services sector.  
Focusing on this aspect is a form of post hoc fact-checking, aimed at 
understanding to which extent reforms of the public sector inspired to the NPM 
ideology have a positive effect on society. The focus here is on what can be 
discovered regarding the effects of NPM reforms on household bills, service 
quality and infrastructure investments in the rail sector: ‘Is liberalization 
beneficial to the poor?’, ‘Does market opening to competition lower the prices 
paid by rail services users and have a positive impact on household income?’ ‘Do 
citizens get a better quality of service?’ Indeed, the common sense belief is often 
that through competition society benefits with lower prices, better quality and 
more innovation due to higher investments in research and development. Through 
this ex-post evaluation of NPM reforms, we want to contribute to a wider political 
debate about NPM and lay down the basis for a broader reflection about its social 
suitability.  
Unpacking the NPM control mechanisms and conflicts 
Daily life requires people to decide constantly how they ought to act. Sometimes 
they may decide to act without appealing to reason and, thus, responding to 
emotion or habit. Sometimes they may also decide to act after reasoning. They 
may thus reason about (1) the means to achieve their ends, or (2) the ends they 
ought to pursue (Weber 1971). Actions inspired by reasoning about means are 
often called ‘instrumentally rational’ and are supposed to be efficient means or 
tools to achieve some predetermined ends. Actions inspired by reasoning about 
ends are often called ‘value rational’ and are actions that put into practice 
people’s convictions. Actions oriented by value rationality are marked by a belief 
in the value for its own sake, independent of its prospects of success. 
CMS scholars (Fournier and Grey 2000) say that traditional management studies 
have a performative intent, in the sense that the knowledge they produce is 
inscribed within the logic of means-ends calculation. As referred by Spicer et al. 
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(2009), according to Benhabib (1984: 104), performativity involves an attempt to 
use science to improve the technological control of a phenomenon by 
“minimizing risk, unpredictability, and complexity”. Drawing on Austin (1962), 
Lyotard (1984) uses the word ‘performativity’ to problematize a part of what he 
identifies as the postmodern condition, that is, the taken for grantedness of 
‘performance’, here in the sense of effectiveness and efficiency.  
As explained by Gond et al. (2016), Lyotard’s key message in problematizing 
performativity is not that we should completely avoid contributing to the 
efficiency of systems. His message rather invites us to be critical of the effects 
that the overriding importance attached to efficiency in the postmodern condition 
might have, especially for the provision of important services such as education. 
In a similar vein, Grey and Wilmott (2005: 7) argue that CMS “should not involve 
an antagonistic attitude towards all forms of ‘performing’, only to forms of action 
in which there is a means-ends calculus that pays little or no attention to the 
question of ends” 
In this PhD research, we look at the NPM performativity in the empirical context 
of the TEN-T program. Particularly, we focus on the performance management of 
the LT project and, more precisely, we narrow the analysis on LT implementation 
process. We mean by implementation process all those activities which result 
from the execution of planned goals, including both the managerial initiatives and 
the opposition to these initiatives by external stakeholder groups. While analyzing 
the LT implementation process, we pay particular attention to the interactions 
between the multiple value rationalities which populate our empirical context. 
Therefore, we draw particular attention on the moral conflicts which result from 
the contradicting ends pursued by the LT project team and stakeholders outside 
the team.      
As mentioned before, the organizational settings of the LT project are multilevel, 
transnational and pluralist. Therefore, as a first step, we will look at (1) the 
performance management mechanisms used by the European Commission to 
ensure that planned goals are consistently being met across the different 
government levels structuring LT implementation. As a second step, we will look 
at (2) the institutional mechanisms that, within the national contexts of Italy and 
France, enact this EU-level performance management system and contribute to 
the implementation of LT. As a third step, we will focus our analysis on (3) the 
stakeholders’ competing views of LT and their impact on the project 
implementation. 
While looking at these three dimensions of LT, we adopt a critical stance and, 
instead of narrowly focusing on efficiency and effectiveness dynamics, we focus 
on power and control. Our concern is thus on understanding: (1) how supra-
national performance management systems exert disciplinary power on state-level 
stakeholders and, in so doing, make collective behavior consistent with the 
achievement of planned goals; (2) how different national institutional mechanisms 
control collective decision-making and contribute to the implementation of 
planned goals; and, (3) how conflicts between local communities and managerial 
and political groups influence the implementation of planned goals.  
For this critical analysis, we mobilize three different theoretical lenses. Each of 
these lenses will bring our attention on different – albeit interdependent - aspects 
of LT and, in so doing, will enable us to unpack NPM-style control mechanisms 
and conflicts.           
The European public sectors and NPM: the dual face of neoliberalism 
The public sector plays a key role in the European economy. It acts as regulator, 
service provider and employer. According to the European Commission (2013), it 
accounts for more than 25% of total employment in the European Union (EU) and 
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a significant share of the economic activity in the EU-27 Member States. 
Government expenditures in the EU amount on average to 45% of GDP – in 
States like Denmark, Finland, France and Sweden even more than 55% - whereas 
public procurement is about 19% of GDP.  
Historically, the public sector has developed differently from the private sector. 
Efficiency and economic performance were always central to the latter, whereas 
the public interest and adherence to legal norms were more important for the 
former. However, as noticed by the European Commission (2013: 4), “financial 
austerity is changing the rules of the game”, and public sector efficiency and 
performance are increasingly becoming central to governmental reforms in order 
to address budgetary constraints. Since 2009, the term austerity has been used to 
describe policies aimed at reducing government budget deficits by means of 
spending cuts and tax increases, or a combination of both (Alesina et al. 2015). 
Nevertheless, it was between the late-1970s and early-1980s that the roles, 
structures and missions of the public sector started changing significantly. 
As we explained above, NPM reform ideas played a key role in this process of 
change by advocating a restructuring of public sector organizations on the basis of 
private-sector managerial concepts and tools. Overt advocacy of these ideas was 
primarily due to a conservative neo-liberal economic movement responding to the 
economic and fiscal problems which damaged many Western countries in the 
1970s and 1980s (Mascarenhas, 1993; Deakin and Walsh, 1996). These problems 
led to a rethinking of state-led development: “by the late 1970s there was 
increasing criticism by the New Right neoliberals of the size, cost and the role of 
government, and doubts about the capacity of governments to rectify economic 
problems. The Keynesian welfare state was seen as a monopoly provider of 
services and as fundamentally inefficient.” (Larbi 1999: 13).  
What do we mean by neoliberalism?  
Neoliberalism is commonly understood as the “free-market ideology” (Block and 
Somers 2014). Key neoliberal ideas are free trade, deregulation, public services 
liberalization and privatization, austerity, and reductions in government spending 
in order to increase the role of the private sector in the economy and society. 
Neoliberalism refers primarily to the 20
th
-century re-emergence of 19
th
-century 
ideas of laissez-faire economic liberalism.  
Nevertheless, according to Michel Foucault, this definition of neoliberalism is 
partial and misleading. In his lectures at the College de France of the late-1970s, 
he explains that the main problem of neoliberalism was not how to cut out or 
contrive a free space of the market within an already given political society, as in 
the liberalism of Adam Smith and the 19
th
 century. He rather believes that the 
problem of neoliberalism was how the overall exercise of political power could be 
modeled on the principles of a market economy. In his own words: 
“[Neoliberalism] is not a question of freeing an empty space, but of taking the 
formal principles of a market economy and referring and relating them to - or 
projecting them onto - a general art of government. This, I think, is what is at 
stake, and I tried to show you that in order to carry out this operation, that is to 
say, to discover how far and to what extent the formal principles of a market 
economy can index a general art of government, the neo-liberals had to subject 
classical liberalism to a number of transformations” (Foucault 2008: 131).  
As explained by Foucault, one essential transformation was the dissociation 
between the market economy and the political principle of laissez-faire. From his 
point of view, this uncoupling of the market economy and laissez-faire policies 
was achieved when the neo-liberals put forward a theory of pure competition in 
which “competition was not presented as in any way a primitive and natural 
given, the very source and foundation of society that only had to be allowed to 
rise to the surface and be rediscovered as it were. Far from it being this, 
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competition was a structure with formal properties, and it was these formal 
properties of the competitive structure that assured, and could assure, economic 
regulation through the price mechanism.” (Foucault 2008: 131). From this 
perspective, the core problem of neoliberal policy was precisely to develop the 
concrete and real space in which the formal structure of competition could 
function. An example of this formal structure is competition law, which promotes 
or seeks to maintain market competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct 
by companies. Another example is quasi-markets, a public sector institutional 
structure that is designed to reap the efficiency gains of free markets without 
losing the equity benefits of traditional systems of public administration. Based 
on these arguments, Foucault concludes that neoliberalism should not be 
identified with laissez-faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity, and 
intervention.  
Foucault is suggesting that while at the ideological (discursive) level 
neoliberalism advocates freedom and autonomy, at the organizational (practical) 
level it entails economic regulation and rules enforcement. In this PhD thesis, we 
go through this emerging paradox and look at NPM in the European context by 
focusing on both its ideological and organizational components. The coalescence 
of these ideological and organizational elements into the NPM paradigm leads us 
to position our study both at the macro and meso levels of analysis.  
Some studies analyze the implementation of NPM reforms in the European 
context by connecting the macro and meso levels. For example, Ferlie et al. 
(2016) suggest considering these reforms not only as an effect of micro and meso 
level factors of public-sector organizations, but also as a result of long-term 
structural changes happening at the macro level of the political economy. At this 
level of analysis, NPM reforms can be explored in reference to the regimes of 
politics or economic values that emerge primarily at the level of states, with a 
focus on the distribution of power and wealth between different groups in society. 
This macro perspective is important as it complements existing meso level 
explanations of NPM reforms, which examine the diffusion processes at the 
middle level of the organizational field – e.g. the field of healthcare organizations 
examined by Ferlie et al. (2016).  
A ‘political economy’ perspective on NPM is fundamentally different from the 
most traditional ‘neoclassical economics’ perspective of NPM. Neoclassical 
economics is an essentially rationalist discipline which commonly rests on three 
key assumptions (Weintraub 1993): (1) people have rational preferences between 
outcomes that can be identified and associated with values; (2) individuals 
maximize utility and firms maximize profits; and, (3) people act independently on 
the basis of full and relevant information. Public choice theory – a cornerstone of 
NPM – elaborates upon these assumptions by representing society as the 
aggregate of rational utility-maximizing individuals, and collective utility as the 
sum of individual utilities.  As Margaret Thatcher – a leading NPM reformer in 
Europe - said in a 1987 interview given to the magazine Women's Own: “[T]here's 
no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are 
families”. Following a deductive logic, above-mentioned assumptions were used 
by public choice theorists to develop highly-sophisticated mathematical models 
describing the functioning of bureaucracies in the context of public sector 
organizations (e.g. Niskanen 1971), the collective behavior of individuals in 
democratic systems (e.g. Down 1957, Olson 1971) and the definition of the public 
interest in decision-making processes (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock 1962). From a 
theoretical standpoint, these models allowed economists to extend market logics 
into every aspect of state and society. In so doing, they could expand their 
professional jurisdictions to new areas which, in the past, were usually considered 
of political science and sociological competence. From an organizational point of 
view, these models allowed NPM reformers to reconstruct the state and the 
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society in ways that were amenable to market-based techniques of evaluation 
(Davies 2017). In so doing, they could treat political communities as quasi-firms 
to be measured, managed and controlled in a business-like fashion. 
The objective of this dissertation is twofold. First, it aims to reconnect NPM to its 
broader political economy. We do that by observing it as an historical process 
issued from the interplay of political and economic forces. Second, it aims to 
unravel the NPM’s rationalist assemblage by unveiling the control mechanisms 
and latent social conflicts. We thus observe its organizational practices and show 
that the passage from individual to collective utility is not a linear and 
straightforward process as neoclassical economists claim. It is rather a non-linear 
and contradictory process which dialectically unfolds over time as a result of 
conflicting interests, politics and culture. All at the same time, these forces make 
public-sector management a social process, meandering and developing in ways 
which – as we will show - challenge the validity of the rationalist assumptions at 
the basis of the NPM model. 
Research design  
NPM can be better defined as a policy paradigm to reform public sector 
organizations. Historically, this paradigm has spread since the late 1970s 
throughout the European States, in the form of a market ideology consisting of a 
rationalist assemblage of theoretical economic models and professional 
management techniques. The term ‘New Public Management’ was first 
introduced by academics from UK and Australia (e.g. Hood 1991, 1995; Hood 
and Jackson 1991), who were working in the area of public administration. This 
new term was coined to describe the new models of public-sector organization 
developing during the 1980s as part of a policy effort to make the public services 
provision more "businesslike" and to improve its efficiency by using private 
sector management models. 
What do we mean by policy paradigm? The word paradigm refers first of all to a 
representation of the world - a way of seeing things - by a civilization living 
within a specific age. It is similar to what early-20
th
 century German philosophers 
called a Weltanschauung (Welt, tr. world; and Anschauung, tr. vision, opinion, 
and representtation). Hall (1993: 279) explains that a policy paradigm acts as an 
interpretive framework of reality that guide actors in policy-making: 
“policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used 
to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing. Like a «Gestalt», this framework is embedded in the very terminology 
through which policymakers communicate about their work, and it is influential 
precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as 
a whole. I am going to call this interpretive framework a policy paradigm.” The 
process whereby one policy paradigm comes to replace another is likely to be 
more political than scientific. Indeed, as Hall (1993: 280) says: “although the 
changing views of experts may play a role, their views are likely to be 
controversial, and the choice between paradigms can rarely be made on scientific 
grounds alone. The movement from one paradigm to another will ultimately entail 
a set of judgments that is more political in tone […]. Faced with conflicting 
opinions from the experts, politicians will have to decide whom to regard as 
authoritative, especially on matters of technical complexity, and the policy 
community will engage in a contest for authority over the issues at hand.”  
We design our research following this definition of paradigm (see Table I.1). 
Research steps 
As a first step, this PhD research looks at the way how the NPM paradigm 
penetrates the political discourse of European national parties on public sector 
reform. In line with the critical perspective underneath this study, we analyze 
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Performance management mechanisms 
ensuring that EU-level goals are 
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government levels involved in the TEN-









Qualitative State-level institutional mechanisms 
contributing to the governance of the 
TEN-T program  
Interactions among competing 
stakeholders concerned by the 
implementation of the TEN-T program 
NPM as a form of ideology and focus on: (1) its diffusion across the electoral 
manifestos of European national parties over the past fifty years; and, (2) the 
political, economic and institutional factors which might have influenced this 
diffusion process. Party manifestos are important texts for analysis. We interpret 
them by adopting a longitudinal perspective, involving repeated observations of 
the same variable over a long period of time. As we explain further in this 
chapter, this variable is the number of statements that, in each party manifesto, 
enshrine NPM ideas. 
As a second step, this PhD research looks at the way how the NPM paradigm is 
translated into a policy framework reform. Florio (2017) defines a Policy 
Framework Reform (PFR) as a set of new rules that public authorities introduce 
as a part of a wider reform effort - for example, a ‘package’ of EU directives and 
their implementation laws at national level. According to Florio (2017: 9), PFR 
changes are related to “an even more comprehensive shift, a change of the policy 
paradigm that is of the theory (sometimes of the ideology) supporting in general 
the way a government thinks about its policy”. In line with the critical perspective 
underneath this study, we analyze the welfare effects of NPM-oriented PFR 
changes. The idea here is to evaluate whether a public services reform movement 
inspired to the NPM paradigm is welfare improving or not. As mentioned before, 
we choose rail services as the empirical context of this evaluation exercise. Over 
the last three decades, the European rail service sector has made the object of a 
profound re-structuration process inspired to the NPM paradigm. Four packages 
of EU directives (so called “Railway packages”) have been approved at the supra-
national level and implemented through legislative acts at the national levels by 
the Member States. Regulatory provisions are important texts for analysis. As 
suggested by Florio (2017), Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
This database summarizes regulatory provisions in seven sectors: telecoms, 
electricity, gas, post, rail, air, and road. It contains a large amount of information 
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on regulatory structures and policies that is collected through a questionnaire sent 
to governments in OECD and non-OECD countries. The ETCR indicators refer to 
the textual content of laws and regulations and, thus, capture the ‘de jure’ policy 
framework. These indicators cover entry regulation, public ownership, vertical 
integration as well as market structure and range between 0 and 6. Higher values 
imply tighter regulation (OECD, 2016). Additionally, these indicators have been 
estimated in a long-time series and are therefore well suited for historical analysis. 
As a third step, this PhD research looks at the way how the NPM paradigm is 
translated into organizational practices. We choose as empirical context the TEN-
T program. We explain this choice by two main arguments. Firstly, as we 
extensively explained in section 1 of this introductory chapter, TEN-T is strictly 
intertwined with the implementation of the NPM-style PFR in the European rail 
service sector. Secondly, when looking at the organizational design of TEN-T 
(rules, roles, and tools), we find a clear compliance with the NPM paradigm
3
. In 
line with the critical perspective underneath this study, we analyze the TEN-T 
organization by unpacking existing control mechanisms and conflicts. In fact, as 
we explained above, the implementation of this program has been characterized 
by the increasing opposition of local stakeholders in many EU’s Member States: 
Italy and France (LT project), Germany (Stuttgart project), Spain (Basque Y 
project), UK (HS2 project). LT project is certainly the most emblematic of 
existing opposition movements. Thanks to an in-depth case study of this project, 
we explore different aspects related to the governance of TEN-T projects. The 
governance of these projects takes place in highly complex empirical settings 
characterized by (a) multilevel, (b) transnational and (c) pluralist environments. 
Therefore, our analysis will pay attention to the following aspects: (a) the 
performance management mechanisms used by the European Commission to 
                                               
3 More details about relationship between the NPM paradigm and the organizational design 
of TEN-T are provided in the introduction of Part 2 of this PhD dissertation. 
ensure that planned goals are consistently being met across the different 
government levels involved in the governance of TEN-T projects; (b) the 
institutional mechanisms that, within the national contexts of the Member States, 
enact EU-level performance management mechanisms and contribute to the 
governance of TEN-T projects; and, (c) stakeholders’ competing views of TEN-T 
projects and their impact on the project implementation. As we explain further in 
this chapter, data concerning the TEN-T program, and the LT project, are based 
on semi-structured interviews and documents that the author has personally 
collected between 2014 and 2016.    
Following the above-mentioned steps, we divided this dissertation in two parts. In 
Part 1, we present the NPM paradigm from a macro-level perspective. The focus 
at this level is on how this paradigm develops through the electoral discourse of 
European national parties and is translated into actual reform plans by 
governments, in the context of railways. In this part we mainly use quantitative 
methods of analysis and lay down the bases for a broader reflection on the 
political economy approach to NPM. In Part 2, we present the NPM paradigm 
from a meso-level perspective. The focus at this level is on how this paradigm is 
translated into action within the multilevel, transnational and pluralist settings of a 
TEN-T project. In this part we mainly use qualitative methods of analysis and 
study the strategic organization of an NPM project at the field level. 
Epistemological positioning 
The objective of this dissertation is to shed light on the political economy and 
organization of NPM. From an epistemological point of view, historicity is a 
shared concern of both political economists and organization scientists.   
Political economists believe that the truth about economic phenomena does not lie 
merely in abstract mathematical logics. They rather think that it is also very 
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important to observe economic processes in their settings through a combination 
of economic history and history of economic thought (Varoufakis 2016). The 
former allows researchers to understand these processes by locating them 
historically, whereas the latter allows them to reconnect economic theories about 
these processes to the institutional environments that have favored their rise and, 
eventually, their fall. Based on this perspective, the first step of this PhD 
dissertation is to look at the way how NPM paradigm has unfolded over time in 
connection to its politico-economic context.      
Time is also an important aspect for organization scientists, namely for those who 
are interested in the study of organizational change. By definition the word 
‘change’ refers to a difference in a state of affairs at different moments in time. 
According to the Cambridge dictionary, this word describes the act
4
 of becoming 
different. Action and time are thus key factors to understand organizational 
change. These two factors can be jointly considered in the study of organizations 
by adopting a processual perspective, designed to investigate how organizational 
change takes place through a series of stages. In this processual tradition, the 
word process refers to a sequence of events whose interpretation allows 
understanding how things change over time (Van de Ven 1992) in their 
organizational, societal and political context (Pettigrew 1985, 1987, Van de Ven 
et al. 1999). Based on this perspective, the second step of this PhD dissertation is 
to look at the way how the NPM paradigm is translated into contextualized action. 
Because of the importance we give to the history of contextualized events, we 
draw on interpretivism as epistemological posture. Unlike inert objects in natural 
                                               
4 The English word act comes from Latin actus whose meaning is: action, deed, delivery, 
performance; but also a doing, a driving, a setting in motion or a part in a play. This noun 
has clear roots in the Latin verb ăgĕre whose meaning is: to set in motion, to drive, to 
drive forward, to do or to perform. This is a verb with a broad range of meaning in Latin, 
including "act on stage, play the part of; plead a cause at law; chase; carry off, steal;" 
sciences, the NPM paradigm is a social construction made and used by actors 
(e.g. politicians, managers, lobbyists, citizens, voters) in specific space-time 
conditions. These actors have consciousness and subjective motivations which 
influence the way they make sense of reality. To access this subjective dimension 
of reality, we adopt an interpretivist epistemology. This considers all facts as 
social actions (artifacts) occurring inside a context that is part of a social-
historical continuation (e.g. Klikauer 2015). From this perspective, any access to 
such complex arti-facts is mainly through the language, consciousness and shared 
meanings of all concerned actors (Meyers 2008). All knowledge, thus, is formed 
inside a living context that is part of a socially constructed framework.  
Following this historical-interpretivist epistemology, this PhD research focuses, 
firstly, on the history of the NPM ideology in Europe and, secondly, on the 
history of a European public project inspired to NPM ideas. In both cases, we 
draw on information coming from the actors directly involved in the observed 
phenomenon. On the one hand, we use documents produced by political parties 
and governments to retrace the history of the NPM ideology. On the other, we use 
semi-structured interviews and documents - that the author collected between 
2014 and 2016 – to retrace the history of a NPM project. 
Dissertation structure 
Following the above-mentioned research design, this PhD dissertation is 
structured in two parts (see Figure I.1).  
In Part 1, we present the NPM paradigm from a macro-level perspective. The 
focus at this level is on how this paradigm develops through the electoral 
discourse of European national parties and is translated into actual reform plans 
by governments, in the context of railways. In Part 2, we present the NPM 
paradigm from a meso-level perspective. The focus at this level is on how this 
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paradigm is translated into action within the multilevel, transnational and pluralist 
settings of the LT project. While Part 1 aims to shed light on the political 
economy of NPM reforms, Part 2 wants to deepen our understanding of the 
organizational practices associated with the NPM model. Additionally, in line 
with the critical perspective of this dissertation, Part 1 focuses on the ideology 
underneath NPM reforms whereas Part 2 focuses on the control mechanisms and 
latent conflicts underneath the NPM model in the context of the LT project. 
Part 1 consists of three essays. On the one hand, essays 1 and 2 analyze the 
relationship between NPM reforms, political ideology, and public expressions of 
support for these reforms by political parties. On the other, essay 3 analyzes the 
implementation of these reforms in the context of European railways. These three 
essays are built upon the following research questions:  
(RQ1): Have NPM reforms been construed as a technical, rational analytic and 
evidence-based domain, disconnected from party political life; or, 
conversely, have these reforms been characterized by a growing 
political profile over time?  
(RQ2): In which political, economic and institutional contexts have European 
national parties used NPM ideas to compose their electoral manifestos? 
(RQ3): What is the effect of EU-driven NPM reforms on prices, quality and 
investments in the rail services sector? 
Part 2 consists of 3 essays. Essay 4 analyzes the organization of LT by 
considering its multilevel settings. It explores how supra-national performance 
management mechanisms influence stakeholders interactions within the national 
institutional contexts where LT is implemented. By analyzing the use of these 
mechanisms, this essay explains how intellectual technologies can be used to 
shape collective behavior in the public arena.  
Essay 5 analyzes the organization of LT by considering its transnational settings. 
It explores how different institutional mechanisms, in Italy and France, affect 
differently the implementation of LT, in the national contexts involved. By 
analyzing these mechanisms in different national contexts, this essay explains 
how institutions shape the conduct of complex public initiatives.  
Essay 6 analyzes the organization of LT by considering its pluralist settings. It 
explores how we explore how stakeholders’ competing views of LT influence its 
implementation. By analyzing how different stakeholders develop competing 
views of LT, this essay explains how different groups in society may come to 
collide and affect the conduct of complex public initiatives. Essays 4, 5 and 6 ask 
are built upon the following research questions: 
(RQ4): How do supra-national performance management systems influence the 
interactions between LT stakeholders at the national levels?  
 (RQ5): How do national institutions influence LT implementation in Italy and 
France? 
 (RQ6): How do stakeholders with divergent views about LT interact and 
influence LT implementation at the national levels? 
Finally, essay 7 provides a meta-analysis analysis of essays 4, 5 and 6. Drawing 
on Pettigrew’s contextualism, this essay opens a general reflection on the strategic 
organization of LT and, more generally, on the governance of the TEN-T program 
and NPM model. 
At the end of Part 1 and 2, we provide a critical discussion of our main findings in 
each of these parts. The concluding chapter contributes to this discussion by 




Figure I.1 – Research questions and work structure
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Gruening (2001) provides a historical overview of the development of public 
administration theory from its classical approach (Weberian bureaucracy) to the 
most recent NPM paradigm. His analysis starts in the 1930s, when the USA – 
under the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt - adopted the New Deal in 
response to the Great Depression. This was a series of federal programs, public 
works, financial reforms and regulations whose implementation dramatically 
expanded the scope of government activity and the principles of public 
administration. Its focus was on the three Rs of relief, recovery, and reform: relief 
for the unemployed and poor, recovery of the national economy, and reform of 
the financial system to prevent a repeat depression (Berkin et al. 2015). As 
referred by Văduva (2016), the government became more involved in private 
lives: it regulated more activities; it followed social-democratic ideals; it seemed 
to be built on scientific objectivity; and it promised material freedom (Egger, 
1975; Waldo, 1948; Van Riper, 1987). Gruening (2001) calls this set of 
organizational patterns - and the closely related ethos of orderly government - an 
active state, and label the belief in objective knowledge that serves to control the 
social and physical environment classical public administration. From a 
theoretical point of view, this classical model has its roots in Max Weber’s 
“Economy and Society”. In this work the author presents not only the key features 
of modern bureaucracies - whether public or private - but also the political 
economic conditions which have favored their emergence. Following Kenneth 
(2005), we resume these conditions as follow: the external pressures of a 
monetary economy requiring a more efficient administrative system; the ongoing 
democratization and rationalization of culture which produced a political demand 
for equal treatment of administrative staff; an increase in the amount of space and 
population being administered, as well as an increase in the complexity of the 
administrative tasks being carried out.  
As explained by Gruening (2001), after World War II, academics began to 
reassess and question the principles of classical public administration. One of the 
most rigorous critics was Herbert A. Simon (1976), who said that the principles of 
classical public administration were not scientific, but inconsistent proverbs 
drawn from the common sense. He suggested re-founding public administration 
theory on the basis of rigorous scientific methods exploring the fundamental laws 
of human behavior. In his work, he defined rational decision making as a process 
where individuals – characterized by bounded rationality - select the alternative 
that results in the more preferred set of all the possible consequences. From his 
perspective, two key parameters to measure the correctness of administrative 
decisions were the effectiveness and efficiency with which desired objectives 
were achieved. Simon’s (1976: 82) aim was to grasp the techniques and 
behavioral processes enabling individuals and organizations to achieve 
approximately the best result given limits on rational decision making: “The 
human being striving for rationality and restricted within the limits of his 
knowledge has developed some working procedures that partially overcome [real 
world] difficulties. These procedures consist in assuming that he can isolate from 
the rest of the world a closed system containing a limited number of variables and 
a limited range of consequences”. Simon employed the theoretical underpinnings 
of welfare economics and decision theory (Gruening 2001). He therefore 
described organizational behavior by adopting an economic framework adjusted 
to inherent human cognitive limitations (human bounded rationality). His major 
contribution was to provide a model of human behavior capable of serving as the 
micro-level foundation for organizational and policy studies. 
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Economic rationalism in public sector reasoning 
In the 1960s, public-choice theorists drew on Simon’s micro-level perspective of 
collective behavior and developed their own approach to the study of the public 
sector organizations. As explained by Gruening (2001), the main event of the 
institutionalization of this approach was the creation of the Thomas Jefferson 
Center for Studies in Political Economy and Social Philosophy at the University 
of Virginia. This was founded by James Buchanan and Warren Nutter with the 
aim of creating a platform for all those scholars who were interested in a society 
based on individual freedom (Buchanan 1986). By using methodological 
individualism, their research sought to explain social phenomena by aggregating 
the behavior of individuals. The key assumption of this approach was that 
individuals pursue their own aims and act according to their preferences. 
However, as highlighted by Gruening (2001: 5), this assumption was based upon 
a different concept of rationality than Simon did: “From the public-choice 
perspective, rationality is not bounded compared with a theoretical optimum; 
rather, rational behavior is when a person acts to pursue his or her aims according 
to his or her knowledge of the situation.” Gruening (2001) provides as example 
the work of Tullock (1965) – a public-choice theorist known for the application of 
economic thinking to political issues – explaining that a Native-American who 
believes that rain-dancing produces rain and who begins to dance in a severe 
drought is behaving rationally. This way, public-choice theorists could 
deductively develop highly-sophisticated mathematical models explaining social 
phenomena from a set of assumptions about individuals’ aims and their 
information about their situations. In tandem with the Chicago School of Law and 
Economics, public choice theory contributed to analyze legal and bureaucratic 
decisions in terms of the private interests that they served, and to assess their 
impact on aggregate efficiency (Davies 2017).  
Based on these new theoretical premises, in the late-1970s American (e.g. R. 
Reagan) and European (e.g. M. Thatcher) politicians initiated a new era of 
reforms whose aim was to reinvent the public sector organizations along private 
sector managerial lines. This reform movement will have later taken the name of 
“New Public Management” (Hood 1991, 1995). The three Rs of relief, recovery, 
and reform that had dominated Western political programs in the early-20
th
 
century disappeared by the late years of this century and were replaced by “the 
three Es of economy, effectiveness and efficiency” (Hendriks and Tops 2003: 
319).  
In Part 1 of this PhD dissertation, we investigate: (1) how NPM reforms have 
spread across the political programs of European parties since the 1950s; (2) the 
political, economic and institutional factors which have led European politicians 
to formulate their programs on the basis of NPM principles; and (3) the ex-post 
impact of NPM reforms in a selected case of public service sector, namely the 
case of European railways.  
The case of European railways 
Network services such as electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, transport 
and water are crucial factors of economic well-being as they offer society the 
opportunity to coordinate large and complex flows of essential goods, people or 
services (Florio, 2013). Until the 1980s, most of these services in Europe were 
provided by vertically integrated state-owned monopolies. Then, following the 
wave of NPM reforms in the organization of national public sectors, many 
governments dismantled stated-owned enterprises: “Europe has been at the 
forefront of change. Elsewhere, in the USA, Latin America, Asia, and in formerly 
planned economies, there have been similar reforms, but perhaps nowhere have 
they been so consistently implemented as in the European Union. In the past two 
decades, first in the UK, then subsequently in all the other EU member states, 
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governments have increasingly moved away from the direct provision of public 
services, from ownership of utilities, and from franchised monopolies. Ministries 
and independent regulators have shown a greater reliance on market mechanisms, 
and now consider the network service providers as market players” (Florio 2013: 
5). 
Among all the network services, we select the case of European railways. We 
chose this case because over the last decades the rail sector has been profoundly 
restructured on the basis of the NPM model. Until the 1980s, rail services were a 
considered as a public service and were thus provided by vertically integrated 
state-owned monopolies. Then, throughout the 1980s, many European 
governments came to frame them as market services. Stated-owned enterprises 
were thus progressively dismantled under the pressures of EU-driven 
liberalization policies.  
At the national levels, a key role in the re-organization of national railways was in 
fact played by the innovations introduced by the EU regulations. Thanks to the 
commitment of the European Commission, new regulatory instruments (Directive 
91/440 and four railway packages in 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2016) altered the 
organization of national industries within the Member States of the EU. These 
instruments led national governments to ensure open access to railway 
infrastructures and fair competition between railways undertakings for freight and 
international passenger services. The overall objective was the creation of a single 
European market for the free circulation of rail services across all the Member 
States of the EU.  
In this regard, a key policy document is the European Commission’s (1996: 3) 
white paper ‘A Strategy for Revitalising the Community’s Railways’, stating that: 
‘the railways have been largely insulated from market forces. Governments have 
a certain responsibility in that as they often did not allow sufficient managerial 
independence and imposed obligations without compensating fully for the costs 
involved; they also failed to set clear financial objectives but subsidized losses or 
let debt pile up […] A new kind of railway is needed. It should be first and 
foremost a business, with management independent and free to exploit 
opportunities, but answerable for failure. For this it should have sound finances, 
unencumbered by the burden of the past. It should be exposed to market forces in 
an appropriate form which should also lead to a greater involvement of the private 
sector. A clear division of responsibilities is required between the State and the 
railways, particularly for public services.’  
Through the use of regulation, the EU has prompted liberalization policies 
intended to: (1) allow new entrants to compete with each other and, mainly, with 
incumbent operators; (2) create the proper market conditions compelling 
companies to adopt price competition systems. However, beside regulatory 
instruments, a key role was also played by economic instruments. These were 
mobilized to finance the EU-level investment policy in Trans-European Networks 
(TENs). The TENs policy was aimed to support the interoperability of national 




Interoperability is crucial for the creation of a single European market because in 
the EU there many different national transport systems that have evolved each in 
their own way over the past years. Their technical standards are different, and this 
is clearly an obstacle to cross-border traffic. Therefore, this is also an obstacle to 
cross-border competition. For example, with international trains it is usually the 
case that the engine has to be changed at the frontier station. In especially difficult 
cases passengers must change trains or goods must be reloaded. There is also a 
                                               




need to harmonize infrastructure because of, for example, differences in platform 
heights or command and signaling systems. In the railway sector different gauge 
widths, electrification standards and safety and signaling systems made it more 
difficult and more costly to run a train from one country to another. In this 
situation, the European transport market was fragmented - and no liberalization 
initiative could be really effective - because each national transport network could 
be used only by those operators having a rolling stock apparatus complying with 
the national market standards. 
It is worth noticing that, from the EU perspective, the implementation of the NPM 
model – by means of both regulatory and economic instruments – was of strategic 
importance to improve railways competitiveness. On the one hand, the above-
mentioned regulation was introduced by the EU to enhance the business 
environment of rail sector undertakings and, by doing so, lowering costs. On the 
other, the economic instruments provided by the TENs’ policy were aimed at 
stimulating state-level investments in modern railways systems, such as High-
Speed Rail (HSR) systems. These systems were aimed at rendering railway 
services more competitive than those provided by roads and airways. In fact, 
before the arrival of HSR services, railways were constantly losing market share 
in favour of roads (mostly for freight traffic) and air (mostly for passengers). 
Then, in 1981 the introduction of HSR services in Europe with the inauguration 
of the Paris-Sud-Est line was a break point for air, road and rail market share. 
HSR technology paved the way for the modernization of rail transport systems. 
Both the EU and national rail industries came to consider it as a strategic asset to 
make railways more competitive than roads and airways on medium and long 
distance trips. For this reason, in 1994, the EU established the Trans-European 
Network – Transport (TEN-T) investment program, the most important EU 
financial framework to support state-level investments in new railway 
infrastructures and, namely, HSR.
6
 
Data collection and methods 
NPM reforms to government are led by elected ministers who are themselves 
leading members of political parties. Ministers are elected on the basis of a party 
manifesto which contains collective commitments and aspirations, and which can 
be seen as an important text for analysis. The relationship between NPM reforms, 
political ideology and public expressions of support for these reforms by political 
parties has been relatively under-explored in the literature and is the gap we 
address here. We therefore adopt electoral manifestos as units of analysis and 
retrieve data from the Comparative Manifesto Database (CMD - Budge et al., 
2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). The CMD classifies the information included in 
electoral programs into 56 categories that represent parties’ positions on several 
policy issues (i.e. external relations, political system, economy, welfare, migration 
etc.). It measures to what extent a specific position on a policy issue is salient for 
parties during a particular election; saliency is measured by looking at the share of 
quasi-sentences in each electoral program which are devoted to that specific 
position. In recent years, CMD data have been extensively used by political 
scientists and economists (i.e. Cole, 2005; Netjes and Binnema, 2007; Kluver, 
2009; Facchini et al., 2017).  One variable in the CMD can be used to empirically 
investigate the saliency of NPM reforms in national parties’ political programs. 
This is the CMD’s Per303 variable which measures the shares of quasi-sentences 
in party manifestos which are devoted to the following topics: “the need for 
efficiency and economy in government and administration, cutting down civil 
                                               
6 This became particularly clear in 2004 when TEN-T investment guidelines funded the 
realization of 30 priority projects: of these 30 projects, 18 related to rail and, of these 18 




service, improving governmental procedures or making the process of 
government and administration cheaper and more effective” (CMD codebook: 
10). We analyze this variable – and the relationship it has with external political, 
economic and institutional factors - by means of two key statistical techniques: a 
one way analysis of variance (ANOVA); and, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
(further methodological details are available respectively in essays 1 and 2 of this 
PhD dissertation). 
We conclude Part 1 by assessing the impact of NPM reforms in a selected case of 
public service reform. We choose European railways as a case for analysis in 
order to investigate how the implementation of NPM reforms has influenced the 
level of prices, quality and investments of rail services. The aim of this section is 
to investigate whether the introduction of NPM-style regulations in a country is 
associated with an improvement of user prices and quality, as well as investment 
in new infrastructures. More specifically, we merge several datasets from the 
ETCR database (OECD 2016), European Commission (2014, 2016) and DICE 
Database (2014) to analyze the relationship between (a) rail sector regulatory 
regimes and (b) consumer prices for rail passenger services, (c) quality of the 
service as perceived by users and (d) railway infrastructure investments. We use 
OLS to analyze the relationship between these four variables. 
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1.  A spreading managerialist ideology of public sector 
organization: NPM reforms in the European party 
manifestos (Essay 1) 
 
Abstract 
During the past 50 years, European public sectors have undergone a profound 
process of organizational change, where managerial tools and principles from the 
private sector have permeated through governments and administrations of many 
countries. A substantial amount of academic literature has now been devoted to 
public management reforms. Many scholars have associated them with the 
diffusion of a managerialist ideology. However, the relationship between public 
management reforms, political ideology, and public expressions of support for 
these reforms by political parties has been a relatively under-explored topic within 
the literature and is the gap we address in this article. Using a longitudinal 
framework of study, our analysis shows how issues surrounding managerialist 
reforms have evolved across the electoral manifestos of European parties during 
the past 50 years. Our findings reveal that these reforms have enjoyed a growing 
political profile over time in many countries within Western and Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, we also examine and discuss the differences and similarities of these 
reforms across countries.  
 
Keywords:  electoral programme, managerialism, New Public Management, 
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 century Burnham (1941) asserted that, as of the early years of this 
century, American state agencies came progressively to be dominated by a new 
ruling class of managerial professionals. This “managerial revolution” occurred in 
the wave of the opposition against the extension of government ownership and the 
setting up of new bureaus and governmental bodies. These were object of a 
constant stream of propaganda which depicted them as ridden with inefficiencies 
compared with private businesses (Burnham, 1941; Preston and Post, 1974).  
During the past fifty years, European public sector organizations have 
experienced the same process of change where private sector managerial tools and 
principles have spread across both central and local governments with the aim of 
improving effectiveness, efficiency and economy (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1995; 
Walsh, 1997; London, 2002). Many scholars have associated this process of 
change with the diffusion of managerialism (Clarke and Newman, 2004; Saint-
Martin, 1998; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).  
Managerialism differs from management. The latter defines a set of practices in 
organizations involving the definition of objectives and the linking of appropriate 
resources and work structures to their pursuit, whereas the former refers to a set of 
ideas based on the assumption that organizations can only work properly if 
decision-making is placed in the hands of professionally-trained managers 
(Enteman, 1993; Parker, 2002). In the context of public sector organizations, 
managerialism is synonym of New Public Management (NPM) (Pollitt, 1990; 
Hood, 1991; Hood and Peters, 2004) and is based on the belief that the public 
sector would work better if it takes on private sector management as an 
organizing principle. Taking as a basis the NPM model, many national 
governments have implemented managerial reforms that have introduced private 
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sector values of efficiency and productivity in the administration of public bodies, 
on the assumption that the former are superior to the latter (Lynch et al., 2012; 
Pollitt, 2013). 
A substantial amount of academic literature has now been devoted to the topic of 
managerialist reforms. Ferlie et al. (1996) have focused on the managerial logic 
behind these reforms in the context of the UK, a leading NPM jurisdiction. 
Aucoin (1990) and Hood (1991) suggest that a key declared purpose of NPM 
reforms is to move from the traditional Weberian/bureaucratic model to a more 
customer-oriented and flexible management style which is grounded in private 
sector approaches. Some scholars (Pollitt, 1990; Clarke and Newman, 2004) have 
rather focused on the normative foundations of NPM reforms and have noticed 
that these are the outcome of a neoliberal ideology believing that greater 
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services could be achieved 
through the use of management practices derived from the corporate world. 
Following this perspective, Enteman (1993) has investigated the managerialist 
conception of society, and Parker (2002) its core beliefs with regards to the 
organization of human interactions in society. Other studies have focused on the 
consequences of managerialism by highlighting its impact not only in the 
provision of basic public services (i.e. Trowler, 1998), but also the extent to 
which public decision-making processes are independent from external private 
actors (i.e. Saint-Martin, 1998).  
NPM reforms to government are of course led by elected ministers who are 
themselves leading members of political parties. Ministers are elected on the basis 
of a party manifesto which contains collective commitments and aspirations, and 
which can be seen as an important text for analysis. The relationship between 
NPM reforms, political ideology and public expressions of support for these 
reforms by political parties has been relatively under-explored in the literature and 
is the gap we address here.  
Recent studies suggest that national parties are key players for the promotion of 
NPM reforms: they are important to secure voters’ support to managerialist values 
and – once in power – are crucial to effectively transform values into national 
reform plans (Esposito et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the primary focus of this 
research was mainly party manifestos released in Europe between a relatively 
short time period (1997-2011) and has not provided any comprehensive historical 
picture about the spread of NPM across national party manifestos.  
This paper is the first to systematically map political party commitments to NPM 
reforms over a much longer time period. The Comparative Manifesto Database 
(CMD - Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006) is used to collect data on 
political parties, and more specifically quantitative information on the content of 
parties’ electoral programs. By studying national parties’ political rhetoric from a 
longitudinal perspective (Pettigrew, 1990), this article offers a new angle on an 
old research topic.  It explores the evolution of the importance of NPM reforms 
across national parties’ manifestos in Europe during the last six decades. It 
answers the following question:  have NPM reforms been construed as a 
technical, rational analytic and evidence-based domain, disconnected from party 
political life; or, conversely, have these reforms been characterized by a growing 
political profile over time?     
The paper is structured as follows. Section two examines the relevant literature on 
public-sector managerialism and formulates a number of hypotheses with regards 
to how NPM reforms have evolved across national parties’ manifestos in Europe 
during the last six decades. Section three describes the process of data collection 
and the methodology used in order to test the theoretical conjectures. Section four 
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presents the findings of our empirical tests, which are then extensively discussed 
in section five. Finally, section six provides the overall conclusions. 
1.2 Managerialism in European party manifestos: insight from the literature 
In the context of public sector organizations, NPM is the best-known and most 
important manifestation of managerialism (Pollitt, 1990, 2014). As we explore 
further below, a great amount of scientifically accredited publications have 
focused on the country-level implementation of NPM reforms. Nevertheless, 
theory development continues to be insufficient for those who wish to learn more 
about the importance devoted to this topic by national parties. On the basis of 
existing literature, a number of theoretical hypotheses can be formulated with 
regards to the evolution of these reforms across national party manifestos in 
Western and Eastern Europe.  
1.2.1 Western Europe 
In many Western European countries, managerialist values have increasingly 
dominated the societal discourse of the 21st century and NPM reforms have 
become increasingly important across many electoral programs (Klikauer, 2013). 
Many authors (Aucoin, 1990; Dunsire, 1995; Gruening, 2001) hold that these 
values coalesced into a homogeneous system of beliefs during the 1950s and 
1960s with the rise of new institutional economics and public choice theory 
(Downs, 1957; Niskanen, 1971; Buchanan, 1972). They came to fruition in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, when a “striking international trend” (Hood, 1991) of 
reform initiatives took place in several Western countries with the aim of 
modernizing the public sector through the use of private sector techniques and 
market based strategies grounded on efficiency and effectiveness (Pollitt, 1990; 
Ridley, 1996). Throughout the 1990s, NPM was widely accepted as the "gold 
standard for administrative reform" (Peter, 1997: 71). These theoretical elements 
suggest that NPM ideas consolidated to form a set of homogenous reform beliefs 
during the 1950s and 1960s and became increasingly prominent after the 
1980s.The first hypothesis is thus formulated as follows:     
H1. The 1950s saw an increasing importance of NPM reforms in party manifestos 
in Western European countries, which have become even more prominent after 
the 1980s.  
An abundant stream of the literature (Pollitt et al., 2007; Green-Pedersen, 2002; 
Goldfinch and Wallis, 2009) states that NPM reforms were introduced primarily 
in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian economies and subsequently in other Western 
European countries – i.e. France (Cole and Jones, 2005) Germany (Reichard, 
2003), Italy (Ongaro, 2009), Spain (Barzelay and Gallego, 2010). However, 
Southern European countries were laggards in the adoption of the NPM model 
because clientelism – instead of managerialism – was the driver for the 
distribution of resources in the public sector (Ongaro, 2008; Ongaro et al., 2013).  
Based on these theoretical elements, it could be expected that managerialist 
reforms were more important in Northern European party manifestos than in 
Southern European ones. Therefore, the second hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
H2. The importance of NPM reforms in party manifestos was higher in Northern 
European rather than in Southern European countries. 
NPM reforms were pursued by both right-wing and left-wing governments in 
Westminster democracies (Hood, 1995). However, overt advocacy of NPM ideas 
was primarily due to a conservative neo-liberal economic movement responding 
to the economic and fiscal problems which damaged many European countries in 
the 1970s and 1980s (Mascarenhas, 1993; Deakin and Walsh, 1996). These 
problems led to a rethinking of state-led development: “by the late 1970s there 
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was increasing criticism by the New Right neoliberals of the size, cost and the 
role of government, and doubts about the capacity of governments to rectify 
economic problems. The Keynesian welfare state was seen as a monopoly 
provider of services and as fundamentally inefficient.” (Larbi, 1999: 13). 
Following the above-mentioned theoretical elements, the third hypothesis is 
formulated as follows:  
H3. The importance of NPM reforms was significantly higher in right wing rather 
than in left wing party manifestos after the 1970s. 
1.2.2 Eastern Europe  
Eastern European countries embarked on transforming national public 
administrations following the fall of the Soviet Union. During the 1990s, the 
World Bank (1996) strategy in this region supported a number of reform 
measures with a strong emphasis on macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization 
and privatization. European integration policies have also played a key role given 
that  the European Union’s (EU) conditionality in public-administration 
development was particularly emphasized during the two Eastern enlargements in 
2004 and 2007 (Drechsler and Randma-Liiv, 2014). However, the EU’s coercive 
pressures cannot alone explain the transition towards the managerialist model of 
public administration as their requirements are usually much softer than 
traditional NPM reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Toonen (1992) indicates a 
wider process of acculturation during which the centralized socialist model was 
discredited in favour of decentralization and privatization. Hughes et al. (2005: 
13) refer that “the rhetoric surrounding enlargement and EU conditionality was 
strongly imbued by a mission civilisatrice approach of ‘Europeanization’.” As 
argued by Breckner et al. (2000), everything that was coming from the West - 
namely Europe – was considered a model to be imitated in order to favour 
integration into the Western world.    
Because of supranational and international pressures on this region, one would 
expect that since the adoption of democratic institutions in the 1990s, Eastern 
European parties would devote high importance to NPM reforms. Moreover, one 
would also expect that ongoing Europeanization processes might have reduced 
the ideological differences between right-wing and left-wing political positions 
and have resulted in the homogenization of party supply with regards to NPM. 
Therefore, the fourth and fifth hypotheses are respectively formulated as follows:   
H4. Since the 1990s the importance of NPM reforms in party manifestos of 
Eastern European countries has grown rapidly.  
H5. In Eastern European countries there are no significant differences between 
right- and left-wing party manifestos in terms of the importance given to NPM 
reforms. 
1.3 Data and analysis 
This study adopts a longitudinal analytical framework (Pettigrew, 1990) to 
uncover patterns of change in the way in which NPM ideas have spread across 
European party manifestos during the past fifty years. We have adopted electoral 
manifestos as units of analysis and we have retrieved data from the CMD 
database (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). The CMD classifies the 
information included in electoral programs into 56 categories that represent 
parties’ positions on several policy issues (i.e. external relations, political system, 
economy, welfare, migration etc.). It measures to what extent a specific position 
on a policy issue is salient for parties during a particular election; saliency is 
measured by looking at the share of quasi-sentences in each electoral program 
which are devoted to that specific position. In recent years, CMD data have been 
extensively used by political scientists and economists (i.e. Cole, 2005; Netjes 
and Binnema, 2007; Kluver, 2009; Facchini et al., 2017).   
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One variable in the CMD can be used to empirically investigate the saliency of 
NPM reforms in national parties’ political agendas. This is the CMD’s Per303 
variable which measures the shares of quasi-sentences in party manifestos which 
are devoted to the following topics: “the need for efficiency and economy in 
government and administration, cutting down civil service, improving 
governmental procedures or making the process of government and 
administration cheaper and more effective” (CMD codebook: 10). This variable 
adequately describes the core values of NPM. Indeed, according to many scholars 
(Hood, 1991; Clay, 1994; Trowler, 1998; Hendriks and Tops, 2003), NPM can be 
described through the three e’s of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. In 
addition, academic studies on NPM reforms have already used Per303 to quantify 
parties’ rhetoric on this topic (Esposito et al., 2016).  
During the process of data collection, we have limited our sample to the EU-28 
countries – minus Cyprus and Malta which had to be excluded due to the very 
limited data availability. Table 1.1 shows the electoral years considered for each 
country in our sample. For Western European democracies data is available since 
the year 1950, whereas for Eastern European countries only the post-communist 
period was surveyed; restrictions also apply to Spain, Portugal and Greece, for 
which the CMD only covers the post-dictatorial years (respectively from 1974, 
1975 and 1977). 
This research provides evidence about Per303’s over-time trend during the last six 
decades (1950-2010). By using the Per303 variable, we are able to observe the 
average presence of NPM declarations in parties’ manifestos in each country 
during the elections held in every decade following the year 1950. Indeed, the 
CMD Per303 data allows us to measure the share of quasi-sentences devoted to 
NPM-related topics in the electoral manifestos that were released before every 
Sweden 1952 1956 1958 1960 1964 1968 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006  2010         
Denmark 1950 1953 1957 1960 1964 1966 1968 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2007 2011 
Finland 1951 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1972 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
      Belgium 1950 1954 1958 1961 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010 
    Netherlands 1952 1956 1959 1963 1967 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010 
     Luxembourg 1951 1954 1959 1964 1968 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 
          France 1951 1956 1958 1962 1967 1968 1973 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997 2002 2007 
        Italy 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 
       Spain 1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011 
            Greece 1974 1977 1981 1985 1989 1990 1993 1996 2000 2004 
             Portugal 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2005 2009 2011 
         Germany 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 2013 
      Austria 1953 1956 1959 1962 1966 1970 1971 1975 1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 2002 2006 2008 
     Great 
Britain 
1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
       Ireland 1951 1954 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1982 1987 1989 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
      Bulgaria 1990 1991 1994 1997 2001 2005 2009 
                Croatia 1990 1992 1995 2000 2003 2007 2011 
                Czech 
Republic 
1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 
                Estonia 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
                 Hungary 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
                 Latvia 1993 1995 1998 2002 
                   Lithuania 1992 1996 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
                Poland 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 
                Romania 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
                 Slovakia 1990 1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2012 
               Slovenia 1990 1992 1996 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011                               
Table 1.1 - Elections considered by country (1950 – 2010).  
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national election. We took the average of these elections per country and per 
decade. This means that for each decade and country we know the average 
importance of NPM in the electoral manifestos released by the parties that took 
part in national elections. Data are organized by decade following Jackobi (2011); 
this allows preventing fluctuations due to one particular election under 
observation. 
In order to support or reject H3 and H5, this research investigates whether the 
saliency of public-sector managerial reforms was higher in right-wing party 
manifestos rather than in left-wing party manifestos from 1950 until 2010. The 
CMD original dataset defines the political orientation of parties by considering 
the following categories: Ecologic, Communist, Social Democratic, Liberal, 
Christian Democratic, Conservative, Nationalist, Agrarian, Ethnic/Regional, and 
Special-Issue Parties. Starting from this classification, and following Facchini et 
al. (2017) and Esposito et al. (2016), we aggregated parties in two broader 
categories: right-wing and left-wing parties. For each country and decade under 
inspection we calculated a variable measuring the difference between the average 
saliency of managerialist statements in left-wing parties as well as in right-wing 
parties. Results show that this variable (labelled sxdxgap) has a negative 
(positive) value when right-wing (left-wing) -oriented parties dedicate more space 
to NPM reforms than left-wing (right-wing) parties. Finally, in order to verify the 
statistical significance of the differences between left-wing and right-wing parties 
in terms of NPM saliency in their manifestos, a one way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was performed by using data for all countries and for every decade. 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Western Europe 
Figure 1.1 provides the mean value - and the related standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation values - of the over-time saliency of NPM reforms in the 
party manifestos issued in two groups of countries: Western European countries 
with democratic institutions since the 1950s and Western European countries with 
democratic institutions since the 1970s (Greece, Portugal and Spain) – for which 
data are available since the 1970s.  
 
Figure 1.1 - Average saliency of NPM reforms in party manifestos of 
Western European countries  
(μ = Mean , σ =  Standard Deviation, cv = coefficient of variation) 
In Western European countries having democratic institutions since the 1950s, the 
average saliency of NPM has almost quadrupled over the period under 
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examination. Indeed, in the first decade (1950-1960) it represented only 1.45% of 
party manifestos, while in the last decade (2000-2010) it reached 5.16%. Saliency 
of NPM also sharply increased from the 1970s to the 1980s (Figure 1). Indeed, 
the highest growth rate (83%) was experienced from the third (1970-1980) to the 
fourth decade (1980-1990). During the last two decades it grew less dramatically 
however: 28% from the fourth (1980-1990) to the fifth decade (1990-2000) and 
3% from the fifth to the sixth decade (2000-2010).  
When looking at Greece, Portugal and Spain it can be noticed that, right after the 
adoption of democratic institutions, the average saliency of NPM reforms (3.75%) 
was two times higher than that of other Western European countries (2.16%) 
observed in the same decade (1970-1980). This has then accelerated between 
1980 and 1990. Indeed, it rapidly increased (34%) from the fourth (1980-1990) to 
the fifth decade (1990-2000) and, subsequently grew slowly (6%) from the fifth to 
the sixth decade (2000-2010).  
Moreover, variation coefficients decrease over time in both groups of countries. 
This means that between 1950 and 2010, differences among party manifestos 
have reduced and national parties have consistently paid increasing attention to 
NPM in their political agendas. 
These findings support H1 according to which Western European countries have, 
since the 1950s, witnessed an increasing importance of NPM reforms in party 
manifestos, which has become even more important after the 1980s. Three 
periods can more specifically be observed. Period 1 (1950-1960), which we term 
incubation, was characterized by the emergence of party rhetorical support for 
NPM reforms. Period 2 (1970-1990), which we term growth, was characterized 
by parties’ fast-growing rhetorical support. Period 3 (2000-2010), which we term 
maturity, was characterized by a stable rhetorical support of national parties for 
NPM. 
 Figure 1.2 – Average saliency of NPM 
reforms in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian 
countries (1950-2010)    
H2 suggests that the importance of NPM reforms in party manifestos was higher 
in Northern European countries rather than in other Western European countries, 
especially when compared with the Southern European region. Figure 1.2 shows 
the over-time evolution of the average saliency of these reforms in Scandinavian 
and Anglo-Saxon party manifestos. The declared support of Scandinavian parties 
has varied over time within a range that has an upper and lower margin of 2.06% 
and 0.59% respectively. As such, in these countries, national parties have 
consistently devoted little attention to managerialism. On the other hand, the 
graph shows that the importance of NPM has continuously increased in Anglo-
Saxon party manifestos during the period under observation. Moreover, when 
comparing these party manifestos with those issued from Scandinavian countries 
















on average devoted more attention to NPM than the latter (Sweden: 0.8%, 
Finland: 1% and Denmark: 1.7%). 
 
Figure 1.3 (a) and (b) – Average saliency of NPM reforms in other Western 






























Data clearly show that the average saliency of NPM (5.1%) in party manifestos 
released in Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) is higher than the 
one corresponding to Northern Europe - Anglo-Saxon (3%) and Scandinavian 
countries (1.6%) -. These findings do therefore not support H2.   
According to H3, since the 1970s the importance of NPM reforms was 
significantly higher in right-wing rather than in left-wing party manifestos. Table 
2 reports the difference between the average saliency of these reforms in left-wing 
and right-wing party manifestos (sxdxgap values) for each country and decade 
under investigation. 
Table 1.2 shows the results of an ANOVA analysis that compares the mean of 
NPM saliency in left-wing party manifestos with the one calculated for right-wing 
manifestos. The stars in the table highlight those country/decades for which a 
statistically significant difference between left- and right-wing party manifestos is 
observed9. The analysis reveals that the difference in NPM saliency between left- 
and right-wing party manifestos is statistically significant for most of the 
countries/decades under scrutiny. More specifically, a higher engagement of 
right-wing parties than left-wing parties is found, especially from the 1980s. From 
1970 to 1990 thirteen observations out of thirty (43%) highlight a statistical 
significant predominance of NPM reforms in right-wing party manifestos. From 
1990 to 2010 sixteen observations out of thirty (53%) show a statistically 
significant difference between left- and right-wing party manifestos. Except for 
                                               
9
Stars represent the p value statistics. This value indicates the probability of obtaining the 
observed or more extreme result, given that the null hypothesis is true. Low p-values 
indicate that there is a low probability of observing a difference between left- and right-
wing party manifestos as extreme as the one reported, assuming that there is actually no 
difference between parties in terms of NPM saliency in their manifestos. A non-technical 
introduction to the p value statistics is provided by Figueiredo Filho et al. (2013). 
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Spain, all observations reveal a higher engagement of right-wing parties than left-














Sweden -1.17 0.02** -1.24** -0.50 -1.15 -1.08** 
Denmark -0.72*** -1.93** -1.00** -1.99** -1.49* -1.13 
Finland 0.17 1.44 -0.64* -7.29 0.17 0.37 
Belgium -1.76* -3.72 -2.18 0.72 -1.60 -4.85*** 
Netherlands -0.48 0.20 -2.17* -1.98 -3.78** -2.02** 
Luxembourg -0.65 -0.45 -1.34* -3.34 -1.67** -4.05* 
France -0.14 -0.33 -1.64* -1.55 -1.87** -2.16 
Italy -3.52 -2.24 -0.67 -6.14* -2.37 0.78 
Germany -1.54* -1.10 -1.08 -2.26* -4.25** -5.45*** 
Austria -1.42 0.78 -1.21 -7.74** -1.90 -3.87*** 
Great 
Britain 
-2.00** -1.65 -1.51 -2.94 -0.89 -2.69* 
Ireland 3.30 0.67 0.50 -5.50** -2.51* -1.97 
Spain 
  
-4.00 -3.20** 0.90** 0.78*** 
Greece 
  
-2.65 1.18 -0.37 -3.68 
Portugal 
  
-1.19 -3.41** -4.89*** -4.04 
Table 1.2 - sxdxgap values calculated per country and per decade. The stars 
indicate the statistical significance of the difference in saliency of NPM 
reforms between left-wing and right-wing party manifestos as resulting from 
ANOVA.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
1.4.2 Eastern Europe 
In the wake of the adoption of democratic institutions in early-1990s, NPM 
reforms have rapidly spread across Eastern European party manifestos. In fact, the 
average saliency of this topic has tripled between the 1990s and the 2010s: from 
1.70% in the decade 1990-2000 to 4.93% in 2000-2010 (Table 1.3). Moreover, 
variation coefficients decrease. This means that from 1990 to 2010 differences 
between party manifestos reduced and national parties consistently paid 
increasing attention to NPM reforms in their political agendas.   
 
    1990-2000 2000-2010 
Eastern Europe 
μ 1.70 4.93 
σ 2.24 4.74 
cv 1.3 0.9 
Table 1.3 - Saliency of NPM reforms in party manifestos in Western 
European countries   (μ = Mean , σ =  Standard Deviation, cv = 
coefficient of variation) 
 
These findings support H4 as they show that since the 1990s the importance of 
NPM reforms in party manifestos of Eastern European countries rapidly grew. 
However, as shown in Figure 1.4, differences exist among countries. There is one 
country (Latvia) where party manifestos experienced no relevant increase during 
the 2000s as the growth rate of the saliency of this topic was equal to -0.002%. 
Conversely, in a second group of countries – Bulgaria (3.1%) Romania (3.4%), 
Poland (4%) and Slovenia (5.2%) – the importance of NPM in party manifestos 
experienced a very positive growth compared to the rest of the countries (where 




Figure 1.4 – Average saliency of NPM reforms in party 
manifestos of Eastern European countries (1990-2010)  
H5 suggests that in Eastern European countries there are no significant 
differences between right-wing and left-wing party manifestos in terms of 
importance devoted to NPM reforms. Table 1.4 reports sxdxgap values. 
According to the ANOVA outcomes (Table 1.4), during the 1990s only Poland 
shows a statistical significant predominance of right-wing party manifestos in 
support of NPM initiatives. During the 2000s, three countries (Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Romania) out of eleven show a statistically significant difference 
between left-wing and right-wing party manifestos in terms of saliency of NPM 
reforms. Hungary and Czech Republic are characterized by a higher engagement 
of right-wing parties than left-wing parties in support of these reforms, whereas 





















 1990-2000 2000-2010 
Bulgaria -0.30 -3.11 
Croatia 0.73 2.66 
Czech republic -1.14 -3.26** 
Estonia -0.71 -3.40 
Hungary 0.27 -2.23** 
Latvia 0.20 -2.04 
Lithuania 1.76 -3.97 
Poland -1.48** -3.41 
Romania 0.74 0.66* 
Slovakia 0.05 -1.52 
Slovenia 0.00 -2.17 
Table 1.4 - sxdxgap values calculated per country and per decade. 
The stars indicate the statistical significance of the difference in 
saliency of NPM reforms between left-wing and right-wing party 
manifestos as resulting from an ANOVA analysis.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
1.5. Discussion  
The empirical study conducted in the previous sections provides useful empirical 
evidence to explain the evolution of the importance of NPM reforms across 
national parties’ manifestos in Europe during the past fifty years. These findings 
reveal two different stories in Western versus Eastern European countries.  
1.5.1 Western Europe 
As shown in our findings, from the 1950s onwards managerialist ideas have 
spread in the political agendas of European parties by following a stage model of 
incubation (1950-1960), growth (1970-1990) and maturity (1990-2010). During 
the 1950s and the 1960s, the theoretical contributions of new institutional 
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economics and public choice theory organized these ideas into a homogeneous 
system of beliefs centred on two key concepts: market and management. 
Transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1985) played a key role by seeing social 
institutions “as being shaped by efficiency considerations more than as a result of 
social or political action” (Ferlie et al., 1996: 70). These ideas had no appeal for 
political parties’ agendas until the 1970s when Keynes’ economic theory came to 
be considered outdated as it could not explain stagflation, a combination of 
inflation and long-term unemployment (de Vries, 2010). This critical economic 
situation was the starting point to a rethinking of state-led development. Drawing 
on Hayek’s and Mises’ economic philosophy – ancestors of the Austrian school 
of thought –, “a rage of influential new right thinkers” (Dunleavy, 1986: 15) 
increasingly advocated the primacy of market institutions over state 
administrations in the economy of the public sector. They called for the rolling 
back of bureaucratic coordination in the provision of public services and 
supported managerial reforms. Ferlie et al. (1996: 6) refer that “as the balance of 
power shifted during the 1980s so a new political economy of the public sector 
emerged”. The findings of this study confirm that right-wing parties were the 
main promoters of this new vision of the public sector as the importance of NPM 
reforms was significantly higher in their manifestos than in left-wing party 
manifestos.  
During the 1990s, with the EU’s Maastricht Treaty functioning as an external 
pressure for budget restrictions (Pollitt et al., 2007), these reforms were 
increasingly present in the political programs of European parties. Subsequently, 
as shown by our findings, at the end of the 1990s their appeal decreased. This is 
consistent with the idea that the peak of NPM reforms is in the past and that it is 
indeed in decline since the late 1990s. This decline is due to the rise of a new 
logic in public-sector reasoning which takes complexity as its theoretical 
background (Cilliers, 1998). In fact, criticisms have been directed towards 
mangerialism because of (1) its inappropriate likening of the public sector to the 
private sector (McCabe and Vinzant, 1999; deLeon and Denhardt, 2000; Hefetz 
and Warner, 2004; Rocha and de Araujo, 2007) and (2) due to the fact that NPM 
reforms have led to not only positive outcomes such as gains in effectiveness and 
efficiency, but also to negative outcomes such as losses of equity, citizenship, and 
accountability (Morgan and England, 1988, Kettl, 1993; Boyne, 1998; Romzek, 
2000).  
Perhaps the most interesting findings derive from the empirical test of H2 
showing that the importance of NPM reforms in party manifestos was higher in 
Southern Europe compared to Northern Europe, in Scandinavian countries 
particularly. This is in contrast with the literature on the actual process of reforms 
according to which managerial concepts and techniques are arguably used more 
frequently in Northern Europe compared to other European regions (Hansen, 
2011). Christensen and Lægreid (2013) help interpreting these outcomes by 
suggesting that NPM reform rhetoric and actual practice are not always aligned 
and might be characterized by a controversial relationship. Our findings suggest 
two relevant situations of misalignment, respectively in Southern Europe and in 
Scandinavian countries.  
In Southern European countries, notwithstanding the high political support 
declared by national parties in their manifestos, NPM ideas have struggled to find 
their way in the actual organization of the public sector. In this context, reformers 
might have followed a decoupling strategy – as emphasized in myth theory 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977) or double-talk theory (Brunsson, 1989) – and have 
composed their electoral manifestos in order to present themselves in a better 
light without really intending to implement their promises if elected to 
government. This could be, for example, the case of Italy which is the Southern 
European country with the highest saliency of NPM ideas in national parties’ 
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manifestos. Even if these ideas feature high in Italian party manifestos since the 
1950s, concrete reforms only started in the early 1990s. However, as explained by 
Ongaro et al., (2013: 10), mixed results were achieved because of a pact of 
reciprocal self-restraint between top civil servants and politicians: “This pact was 
based on an exchange between job security and political power: public managers 
renounced an autonomous proactive role in decision-making processes, while 
political elites refrained from intervening in the management of bureaucratic 
careers”.   
In Scandinavian countries, notwithstanding the weak declared support of national 
parties, NPM changes were easily implemented. This situation may refer to a 
pragmatic approach to NPM where specific measures were adopted as specific 
solutions to technical problems: in other words, reforms were not ideologized but 
rather were brought about by mechanisms such as “rational shopping for reform 
elements” (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011). This might be, for example, the case 
of Sweden which is the Scandinavian country with the lowest saliency of NPM 
ideas in national party manifestos. Major changes in Sweden have occurred since 
1982 when the incumbent Social Democratic government launched a special 
public administration policy with the purpose of downsizing state bureaucracy 
and rendering public service delivery more efficient and more responsive to users 
(Gustafsson, 1987; Pierre, 1993; Premfors, 1991). In this context, reforms were 
weakly politicized as they were not presented as part of a neoliberal attempt to 
dismantle the welfare state. Rather, they were supported by left-wing parties as a 
possibility of offering services of the same quality but at lower cost or better 
services at the same cost. This is also consistent with Hood (1995) who argues 
that there is not always a straight right/left split in receptivity to NPM reforms. 
The case of Great Britain – a “fast-mover” in the implementation of NPM (Ferlie 
et al., 1996) – is different given that, according to our findings, since the 1970s 
parties’ declared support for NPM reforms occurred along with the actual 
implementation of reform measures. A number of changes had already been 
introduced in the mid-1970s: “the concerns about the efficiency of the public 
sector prompted a wide-ranging review of the structure of the local government 
system that led to a radical reorganization in 1974, when almost a thousand local 
governments across England and Wales were abolished” (Andrews et al., 2013: 
8). However, the pace of change accelerated with the election of the Conservative 
government led by Margaret Thatcher in 1979. She launched an administrative 
revolution aimed at reducing the size of the public sector and opening it to market 
forces through liberalization and privatization. 
1.5.2 Eastern Europe 
According to our findings, managerialist reforms have rapidly spread across 
Eastern European party manifestos after the collapse of Soviet Union. Regardless 
of their political orientation, national parties have consistently declared increasing 
support for these reforms. This homogenization of party supply can be explained 
by two reasons. First, vis-à-vis the uncertainty generated by the transition from 
socialism to capitalism, political and economic models of the EU’s member states 
were seen as normatively ‘superior’ and readily transferable to displace ‘inferior’ 
models in Eastern European countries (Hughes et al., 2005). Secondly, in the 
context of EU enlargement policy to the East a speedy substitution of values by 
candidates and their compliance with EU norms was equated with the quality of 
their commitment and ‘Europeanness’ (Hughes et al., 2005). In fact, accession 
countries from Eastern Europe had to systematically demonstrate their 
administrative capacity to effectively apply EU regulation in order to obtain their 
EU membership (Dimitrova, 2002; Meyer-Sahling, 2011). Following Ladrech’s 
(2002) and Mair’s (2000), one can consider managerialism in Eastern Europe as 
issuing from a Europeanization process given that  EU’s accession requirements 
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might have constrained national parties’ positioning on public sector reform and 
may therefore have reduced the scope of proposals that could be offered during 
election periods.    
The only country in this sample which has experienced a reduction of the 
importance of NPM reforms in national party manifestos is Latvia. Drawing on 
country-specific literature (Reinholde, 2006), this might have happened because 
in the mid-1990s the actual implementation of these reforms resulted in numerous 
scandals related to performance contracts and uncontrolled proliferation of public 
agencies. Vis-à-vis this situation, the national Bureau of Public Administration 
and incumbent government decided to invite external experts from the SIGMA 
programme. Politicians thus withdrew from this field of policy and let external 
experts reorganize the national public sector.       
1.6. Conclusion 
This article has addressed the relationship between NPM reforms, political 
ideology and public expressions of support for these reforms by political parties 
in Europe. Our analysis is based on a database of texts of party manifestos. We 
acknowledge that, at least in certain countries, any such commitments may only 
be loosely coupled with political action and implementation that was undertaken 
at a later stage. However, there is so much space in a manifesto so that various 
political issues are fighting for attention and for text. If a certain political issue 
(here public management reform) is given an adequate amount of space in the text 
of the manifesto, it suggests that this issue won some political priority.  
Our research reveals that an increased attention was given in the examined texts 
to public managerial issues in Western Europe in the 1980s (loaded to right-wing 
parties) and in Eastern Europe in the 1990s (more bi-partisan). It is possible that 
the first phenomenon was orientated to NPM neoliberal ideas imbued with post-
Keynesian economic philosophy; while the second was linked to the decline of 
socialist ideas and the adoption of EU models. The analysis has revealed a 
multifaceted process of reform implementation taking place across Western 
European countries. Furthermore, we have suggested some regional patterns.  In 
the North, NPM reforms might have not been ideologized and have been 
implemented as mere technical frameworks. In the South, we suggest that national 
reformers might have followed a decoupling strategy – as emphasized by 
institutional theorists (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, Brunsson, 1989). The 
managerialist rhetoric was adopted in order to conform symbolically to external 
institutional pressures (i.e. European integration, macro-economic stabilisation, 
liberalisation and privatisation) without really implementing it if elected to 
government. More qualitative analysis is certainly needed in the future to 
investigate these emergent propositions.  
What does our analysis have to say more broadly about the saliency of public 
management reform at the party political level? Public management reform might 
(in one view) be construed as a technical, rational analytic or evidence based 
domain, disconnected from party political life. Such low profile reforms to the 
machinery of government may be difficult to ‘sell’ to electors when compared to 
more vivid issues such as the economy, security or immigration. Yet the 
quantitative analysis of the texts of manifestos suggests that these public 
management reform issues enjoy a growing political profile over time. 
Scholars from a wide range of research domains – political science, management 
and organisation studies - should increasingly think about the politics of public 
management reform by not only considering it as a technical or managerially-
dominated activity. Pollitt (2013) suggests that there are ‘narratives’ of public 
management reforms constructed by ministers and civil servants (amongst others) 
who promise citizens better government in the future.  
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Esposito et al. (2016) delineate a political economy of NPM reform narratives in 
Europe between 1997 and 2011. They show that right-wing parties operating in 
national contexts of fiscal stress and ineffective governmental policy actions were 
the most committed heralds of these narratives. These parties were responding to 
the demands of a new majority of tax-conscious voters with increasingly high 
revenues, who urged their governments to decrease public spending and downsize 
centralized administrations. 
Some aspects of the wider political economy of ‘reforming’, together with the 
variety of actors involved, have been delineated in the context of the UK health 
care sector by Ferlie et al. (2016). As well as considering the strategic actions of 
ministers (for example, ministers of public administration), there is a need to 
consider internal party politics and to analyse trajectories of public management 
reforms together. How are proto narratives of public management reform 
constructed and sold to the party before they land at government level? Who are 
the actors involved in this process? There is much work to do in the future on 
these questions but we hope to have made a start here. 
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2. Toward a political economy of NPM reforms in the EU: a 




Framed within the NPM paradigm, structural reforms in the EU aimed at 
modernizing the public administrations of Member States (MSs) have long since 
been a priority area of the EU’s economic policy. Since the 1990s, these reforms 
have been sharply intensified across European countries with the declared 
purpose of enhancing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in their national 
public sectors’ organizations. In line with the European Commission’s recent 
research initiatives in search for novel quantitative data on NPM in the EU, this 
paper studies European parties’ NPM reform rhetoric. More specifically, it 
investigates the MSs’ institutional, economic and political context within which 
parties have declared their intention of reforming national administrative systems. 
Thus, it sheds light on the MSs’ domestic factors that are associated with the 
diffusion of the NPM values across the political discourse of the EU’s national 
parties.  
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2.1 Introduction 
The modernization of public sector organizations has long since been a priority of 
EU economic policy (i.e. DG ECFIN, 2008; DG ENTR, 2012, 2013; DG RTD, 
2013; COM(2014)902 final). Framed within the paradigm of New Public 
Management (NPM), structural reforms in the EU aimed at modernizing the 
public administrations of Member States (MSs) have sharply intensified during 
the 1990s due to the reinforcement of market integration processes and 
liberalization policies (Bauby, 2008; Bognetti and Obermann 2008; Clifton et al., 
2011; Pollitt and Dan, 2011; COCOPS, 2013). Following NPM’s principles, these 
reforms have attempted to introduce market logics and business-style practices 
imported from the private sector into public sector organizations. The purpose has 
been to maximise organizational performance and to optimise public spending by 
cutting costs and using professional management (Pollitt, 1990; Clarke and 
Newman, 1997; Saint-Martin, 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Christensen and 
Lægreid, 2011). Recent studies (Ladi, 2014) have shown that the European 
Commission has struggled to enact these reforms at MSs’ national level without 
the support of national political parties. Their support could play a crucial role in 
building electoral consensus around NPM’s values and in effectively transforming 
them into national administrative reform plans. 
This paper focuses on the process of NPM reforms in the EU which started in the 
1990s and studies the NPM reform rhetoric of national political parties. More 
precisely, it addresses the MSs’ domestic aspects which can be associated with 
the spread of the NPM values across the political discourse of national parties. 
This study thus elucidates the MSs’ contextual determinants of the parties’ NPM 
rhetoric by highlighting the institutional, economic and political contexts within 
which national parties have advocated NPM-style reforms in their countries.        
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The analysis relies on data drawn from the Comparative Manifesto Database 
(CMD - Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006) which provides quantitative 
information on the content of parties’ electoral programs. CMD’s data results 
from an in-depth scrutiny of the manifestos released by major political parties 
taking part in the national elections of a wide set of countries. 
The major contribution of this paper lies in providing empirical evidence of the 
patterns of diffusion of NPM values across the political manifestos of European 
parties. This contribution follows the ongoing research initiatives supported by 
the European Commission, seeking novel and systematic quantitative data on 
NPM across Europe (COCOPS, 2013). Hence, in the following sections we will 
be developing an econometric model enabling a systematic quantitative analysis 
of the economic, institutional and political factors that might have led European 
parties to embrace the NPM paradigm and adopt the NPM’s reform rhetoric in 
their countries.    
Academic literature is analysed in section two concerning the core values of the 
NPM rhetoric, emergent from the language of NPM reformers; by elaborating on 
this theoretical framework, a number of hypotheses are then formulated about the 
party- and country-level variables which are correlated with political parties’ 
rhetoric in support of NPM-style reforms. Following on, section three describes 
the process of data collection and the methodology to test the above-mentioned 
theoretical predictions. The findings of our empirical test are then presented in 
section four, which section five then extensively discusses. Finally, section six 
summarises the main arguments and contributions of this paper and announces 
possible forthcoming research directions. 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
This second section aims to build a comprehensive theoretical framework on the 
“striking international trend” (Hood, 1991: 3) of NPM reforms across the EU 
countries and lay down the conditions for the development of the econometric 
model that will be analytically presented in section 3. Section 2.1 goes through 
those contributions in the literature that have dealt with the concept of NPM and 
highlights the fundamental characteristics of its rhetoric as emerging from the 
language of NPM reformers. Then, section 2.2 explores the academic literature in 
public administration and develops a number of testable hypotheses about the 
economic, institutional and political factors that might have led national parties to 
adopt the NPM rhetoric in their domestic contexts.     
2.2.1 The rhetoric of NPM reformers 
It is very difficult to define the concept of NPM and link specific policy measures 
to it (Pollitt, 2007). Nevertheless, when analysing the spread of the NPM 
paradigm across the MSs of the EU, Pollitt and Dan (2011) state that the concepts 
of economy, efficiency and effectiveness have played a central role in the rhetoric 
of NPM reformers who have advocated them by pursuing specific goals. 
In their language, economy refers to the “simple reduction or lowering of inputs – 
in a word cost reduction” (Pollitt and Dan, 2011: 12). From the perspective of 
NPM reformers, economy can be then achieved through cutting down public 
spending and adopting competitive market arrangements in public sector 
organizations (Hood, 1991; OECD, 1995; Dunleavy et al., 2006). 
The concept of efficiency refers to the ratio between inputs and outputs. NPM 
reformers have argued that efficiency gains may be expected if either outputs 
increase for the same inputs; or if outputs are steady while inputs decrease (Pollitt 
and Dan, 2011). From the NPM perspective, efficiency can be then pursued 
through policies of deregulation and tax-breaks, which will enable the creation of 
appropriate conditions for highly competitive markets to develop in public sector 
economy (Hood, 1991; Hendriks and Tops, 1999, 2003; Clifton et al., 2011). 
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Thirdly, effectiveness has been usually conceived as “the degree to which the 
outcomes match the original goals or objectives set for the organization of 
program” (Pollitt and Dan, 2011: 12). From the NPM reformers’ perspective, 
effectiveness can be pursued by adopting professional managerial hierarchies 
instead of unskilled bureaucratic hierarchies. The argument is that, while the 
former disposes of human resources trained to manage competitive processes in 
market arrangements, the latter consists of human resources trained to execute 
administrative procedures in bureaucratic arrangements (Martin, 1983; Pollitt, 
1990; Hood 1991; Roberts, 2010). 
According to the rhetoric spotlighted by the above-mentioned literature, EU 
reformers have justified the introduction of NPM reforms in their countries as a 
means to enhance efficiency and economy in government and administration by 
cutting public spending; and to improve governmental procedures through 
increased effectiveness in government and administration processes.  
Based on these rhetorical elements, in section three we will go through the 
electoral manifestos released by national European parties and analyse the 
contextual factors that might have led these parties to support NPM reforms in 
their countries. Prior to that, however, we will need to further explore existing 
academic literature and formulate a number of hypotheses about the economic, 
institutional and political factors that might be associated with the national 
parties’ rhetoric in support of NPM reforms.   
2.2.2 The domestic determinants of national parties’ promise of introducing 
NPM reforms: insights from existing literature   
The research conducted over the last decades in the field of public administration 
has provided useful insights into the economic, institutional and political factors 
that might have been associated with parties’ ideological support for NPM 
reforms in their national contexts.   
Concerning the economic context, Hood (1991) argues that changes in income 
levels serving to weaken the Tocqueville coalition for government growth in the 
electorate - and laying the conditions for a new tax-conscious electoral coalition – 
might lead reformers to support an NPM model of public administration. In other 
words, it suggests that when the per-capita income level of a country increases, 
the electoral majority of low income voters – main beneficiaries of increasing 
public spending – decreases in favour of a new, tax-conscious, electoral majority 
of voters with higher levels of income. This new majority then demands reformers 
to reverse government growth and, de facto, adopt NPM reforms. Therefore, the 
first hypothesis we propose to test is the following: 
H1: national parties’ support for NPM-style reforms is likely to be positively 
correlated with countries’ per capita income.   
Dunsire and Hood (1989) argue that countries facing budgetary constraints are 
more prone to adopt the NPM model because their primary aim is to slow down 
or reverse government growth in terms of overt public spending and staffing. 
When discussing why the Netherlands adopted the NPM model to manage its 
public sector organizations, Hendriks and Tops (1999, 2003) argue that rising 
budget deficit, in a context of economic recession, encouraged the Dutch 
government to adopt NPM  “with its promises of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness (the three e’s)” (Hendriks and Tops 2003: 319). Hood (1995: 105) 
goes further claiming that the promise or hope of saving resources through the 
adoption of NPM measures is expected “to be proportionately higher in a context 
of fiscal stress associated with poor macroeconomic performance than in the 
context of slim-line government and/or strong macroeconomic performance”. The 
second hypothesis is therefore, proposed as: 
H2: national parties’ support for NPM-style reforms is likely to be positively 
correlated with countries’ fiscal stress and poor macroeconomic performance.   
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Another stream of the literature has focused on the pressure national institutional 
context exerts in the adoption of NPM-style reforms by investigating how the 
structure of the administrative systems - centralised vs decentralised governments 
(Pollitt & Summa, 1997; Minogue 2001) – and the quality of these systems – 
effectiveness of governmental policy action (Wolfgang, 2011) – have affected the 
implementation of such reforms.  
Indeed, as far as the structure of national administrative systems is concerned, it is 
worth remembering that, according to NPM reformers, administrative 
decentralization is to be preferred to centralization. The reason is because, 
according to NPM supporters, decentralization of national administrative systems 
favours a management by objectives (or by results) where performance targets are 
delegated to subordinate administrative levels (i.e. OECD 2003, 2008). By 
defining a limited number of administrative goals corresponding to different 
performance indicators for each administration level, efficiency and effectiveness 
in the policy implementation are expected to improve. NPM reforms are 
particularly recommended to centralised administrative systems in an effort to 
have these systems decentralised. Such decentralisation consists of creating 
subordinate administrative levels to which government objectives are delegated to 
improve policy implementation. It is thus plausible to hypothesise that the higher 
the country’s degree of administrative centralization, the stronger is their parties’ 
call for NPM-style reforms. Hence, the third hypothesis to be tested is formulated 
as follows: 
H3: national parties’ support for NPM-style reforms is likely to be negatively 
correlated with the decentralization of the administrative system. 
As far as the quality of national administrative systems is concerned, improved 
effectiveness in government is a high priority of NPM-style reforms (Aucoin, 
1990; Hood, 1995; Hughes, 2003; London, 2002; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). 
Indeed, NPM reformers yearn for improved responsiveness of public sector 
institutions and thus encourage a management by performance or results instead 
of formal compliance with bureaucratic procedures (OECD, 1994). Therefore, it 
seems plausible to hypothesise that the worse the country’s administrative 
performance, the higher the parties’ support for NPM-style policies promising to 
improve the responsiveness of public sector organizations. Therefore, the fourth 
hypothesis to be formulated is: 
H4: national parties’ support for NPM-style reforms is likely to be negatively 
correlated with government effectiveness in policy action. 
Another relevant NPM domestic determinant identified by the existing literature 
is the ideological orientation of the national political parties. Hood (1995: 100) 
believes that “the old structure has been subverted by the development of the 
“New Right” interests who stand to benefit in various ways from dismantling the 
[old administrative] model”. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis to be tested is the 
following: 
H5: right-wing national parties’ support for NPM-style reforms is likely to be 
higher than left-wing one. 
Based on these theoretical predictions, the following sections will provide an 
empirical test of the above-mentioned hypotheses and, by doing so, will unveil 
the party- and country-level variables which are correlated with national parties’ 
support for NPM-style reforms.  
2.3 Data and methodology 
The following two sections will present the data – section 3.1 - and the 
methodology - section 3.2 - used to conduct the empirical test of the hypotheses 




Information on parties’ concern for NPM-style reforms is drawn from the 
Comparative Manifesto Database (CMD - Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 
2006)
11
. CMD collects data resulting from an in-depth examination of the 
electoral manifestos issued by major political parties that took part in national 
elections in a wide set of countries from 1950 to 2011. Over the last years, this 
data has been widely used in empirical studies (De Simone and Sapio, 2013; 
Michallet et al., 2015).   
One variable in the CMD specifically records to which extent surveyed parties’ 
electoral manifestos deal with “the need for efficiency and economy in 
government and administration, cutting down civil service, improving 
governmental procedures or making the process of government and 
administration cheaper and more effective” (CMD codebook, p. 9). According to 
the definition of NPM provided in section 2.1, all these elements can be referred 
to the NPM reform rhetoric; therefore this variable can be adopted as a measure 
of the saliency of NPM values in parties’ electoral manifestos.  
This variable (hereafter labelled PER303) assumes values that range between 0, 
reported by parties who devote 0% of their manifesto to NPM-style reforms of the 
public sector, and 1, that corresponds to manifestos fully devoted to NPM-style 
reforms of the public sector. Higher values indicate that NPM-style reforms 
represent a salient feature of the electoral program released by the party under 
examination while, conversely, lower values indicate that NPM-style reforms are 
not relevant in the party’s program.  
The present study focuses on the major political parties that took part in national 
elections in 14 European countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, 
                                               
11
 See https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ for further details 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Germany, 
Austria, Great Britain, and Ireland) over a 14-year period that ranges from 1997 to 
2011. The complete list of countries and elections comprised in the analysis is 
provided in Table 2.1. The selection of countries and elections to be included in 
the analysis was significantly affected by the availability of data concerning 
several variables that, according to the literature review conducted in section 2.2, 
were essential for the empirical test of the hypotheses.  
 Election years during the considered period 
Sweden 1998 2002 2006 2010   
Denmark 1998 2001 2005 2007 2011 
Finland 1999 2003 2007 2011  
Belgium 1999 2003 2007 2010  
Netherlands 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010 
Luxembourg 1999 2004 2009   
France 1997 2002 2007   
Italy 1996 2001 2006 2008  
Spain 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011 
Greece 1996 2000 2004   
Portugal 1999 2002 2005 2009 2011 
Germany 1998 2002 2005 2009  
Austria 1999 2002 2006 2008  
Great Britain 1997 2001 2005 2010  
Ireland 2002 2007 2011   
Table 2.1 – Elections under scrutiny 
Nevertheless, since this paper focuses on the EU process of NPM reforms 
introduced over the 1990s, the electoral years considered in this study are 
particularly interesting. Indeed, since mid-1990s, Europe has taken the lead in 
opening markets, privatizing public assets and removing state monopolies from 
many public services; in fact,  between 1997 and 2011 the European Commission 
has addressed MSs several times, releasing numerous directives aimed at 
transposing the NPM model into some key areas of national public sectors:  postal 
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services (in 1997, 2002 and 2008), air transport (1997), rail transport (in 2001, 
2004 and 2007), electricity (in 1998 and 2004) and gas (in 1998 and 2004).  
The final dataset includes observations on 429 parties’ whose distribution by 
country and election is reported in Table 2.2. The PER303 variable has an average 
value of 0.05 (i.e. on average 5% of the considered parties’ manifestos was 
devoted to NPM-style reforms) and roughly 13% of the observations present a 
value of zero which means that parties did not make any reference to NPM-style 
reforms in their electoral manifestos. The maximum value reported by the 














































































Sweden   7       7       7       8   29 
Denmark   10     8       9   8       8 43 
Finland     8       8       8       8 32 
Belgium     10       10       13     11   44 
Netherlands   6       9 9     10       10   44 
Luxembourg     5         5         6     16 
France 7         6         6         19 
Italy         14         16   5       35 
Spain       11       12       11     13 47 
Greece       4       4               8 
Portugal     6     7     7       6   6 32 
Germany   5       5     5       5     20 
Austria     4     5       5   6       20 
Great 
Britain 
7       8       3         3   21 
Ireland           6         6       7 26 
Total 21 28 33 15 30 45 27 21 24 38 41 22 17 32 42 429 
Table 2.2 – Number of parties considered by electoral year and country 
Figure 2.1 shows the country-level average values reported by the PER303 
variable at electoral years and over the time span considered.  PER303 shows a 
considerable cross-country heterogeneity. On average, the support for NPM-style 
reforms is not particularly salient in the electoral manifestos issued by parties 
acting in Northern European countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Finland. 
The same applies in Greece. By contrast, it is particularly salient in programs 
issued by parties’ from Southern European countries such as Italy and Portugal. 
Finally, national trends show sizable variability for some countries such as Ireland 
and Italy. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Average saliency of NPM-style policies in party manifestos by 
country (1997-2011) 
Do the hypotheses presented in section 2 explain PER303 cross-country and 
within-country heterogeneity? With the purpose of answering this question, the 
PER303 variable was used as a dependent variable in a number of regression 
models where the following covariates were considered on the basis of the five 
hypotheses presented in section 2. 
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The first hypothesis (H1) states that national parties’ support for NPM-style 
reforms is likely to be positively correlated with their country’s per capita income.  
This hypothesis is tested by including the per capita GDP (GDPpc; data source: 
Eurostat) among the set of country-level covariates. 
According to the second hypothesis (H2), national parties’ support for NPM-style 
reforms is likely to be positively correlated with fiscal stress and poor 
macroeconomic performance. Two country-level covariates are used to measure 
fiscal stress: government debt expressed as GDP ratio (DEBT; data source: 
Ameco db) and government primary deficit (-) surplus (+) expressed as GDP ratio 
(PRIMARY; data source: Ameco db).  Furthermore, national GDP growth 
(GROWTH; data source: World Bank) is included among covariates in order to 
measure macroeconomic performance.  
As stated in our third hypothesis (H3), national parties’ support for NPM-style 
reforms is likely to be negatively correlated with decentralised administrative 
systems. With the intention of testing this hypothesis, we rely on a proxy of the 
degree of administrative decentralization based on the public expenditure realised 
at local level as percentage of total general government expenditure. This variable 
is labelled FEDERALISM (data source: OECD fiscal decentralization database) 
and is introduced among the country-level covariates used in the analysis. 
Coherently with our fourth hypothesis (H4), national parties’ support for NPM-
style reforms should be negatively correlated with government effectiveness in 
policy action. To empirically test this hypothesis, the vector of covariates used in 
our regressions includes one measure of national public administration quality 
that is the government effectiveness indicator (labelled GOV_EFF) which is 
provided by the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators project
12
. 
Finally, according to our fifth hypothesis (H5) right-wing national parties’ support 
for NPM-style reforms is likely to be higher than left-wing ones. In order to test 
this hypothesis one party-level categorical variable (hereafter labelled as 
POL_OR) is considered among the covariates. This variable may assume the 
following modalities: “left-wing”, “right-wing” and “other”. Parties were 
attributed to these categories according to the original data provided by the CMD 
and to authors’ elaboration based on the classification provided by Hellwig (2012) 
and Adams et al. (2006)
13. In all regression analyses, “left-wing” is set as the 
reference category. 
In order to avoid reverse causality issues, for all the above-mentioned country-
level variables, values reported in pre-electoral years were considered. Table 2.3 
provides a complete description of the whole set of country- and party-level 
variables employed in our empirical analysis. Summary statistics are also reported 
in the same table.  
In addition to the variables presented so far, some of the regression analysis run 
also included time-specific dummies and country dummies in order to control for 
non-stochastic differences among electoral rounds and among national contexts. 
                                               
12
 Unfortunately, this variable registers missing values for the years: 1997, 1999 and 2001; 
therefore, for these years, countries’ missing values were replaced by values representing the 
average of what was recorded in the previous and in the following year. 
13
 Starting from the CMD original data on parties’ affiliation to political families, Hellwig 
(2012) and Adams et al. (2006) were followed to classify nationalist, liberal, conservative and 
Christian democratic parties as right-wing oriented; ecology, communist, social-democratic 
parties as left-wing oriented. The residual category “other” includes all the remaining parties. 
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Variable DESCRIPTION SOURCE Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PER303 
Share of NPM-related purposes in 




429 0.051 0.049 0 0.26 
PARTY ORIENTATION  
Parties' ideological orientation 
according to Hellwig (2012) and 
Adams et al. (2006) 
own elaboration 
on data 
















429 0.177 0.382 0 1 





429 1.645 0.485 0.214 2.345 
GDPpc Per capita GDP (in Euro) Eurostat 429 27610.02 9773.786 10800 76400 
GROWTH 
Annual percentage growth rate of 
GDP 
World Bank 429 2.048 2.293 -5.17 6.491 
DEBT 
General government consolidated 
gross debt expressed as a share of 
GDP 
Ameco database 429 62.535 24.993 6.216 117.23 
PRIMARY 
General government Net lending (+) 
or net borrowing (-) excluding interest 
as a share of GDP 
Ameco database 429 1.324 5.047 -27.5 6.813 
FEDERALISM 
Share of local expenditure on 





429 26.931 15.526 4.59 63.738 




Our empirical analysis uses the data described thus far as pooled cross-section 
data. Indeed, building a panel dataset was not possible due to the following three 
reasons: i) parties’ significantly change over time (some simply disappear, others 
merge or change their name), ii) countries do not all hold elections in the same 
year and iii) national elections are not held annually. This unavoidable cross-
sectional treatment of data makes our analysis suitable for observing statistical 
correlations among the variables considered but any causal link among these 
variables could not be identified. 
The estimates that we carried out primarily rely on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
with standard errors clustered at country level in order to account for the within-
state correlation among observations. Nevertheless, the bounded (0-1) nature of 
the dependent variable used in our empirical analysis might bias the OLS results. 
Indeed, OLS predictions may fall outside the possible 0-1 interval and the 
existence of a floor and a ceiling may determine non linearity or 
heteroscedasticity. With the purpose of overcoming these potential biases and to 
check the robustness of our OLS results, we followed the approach adopted by De 
Simone and Sapio (2013). Alongside OLS, the regression coefficients were also 
estimated through the Fractional logit model (FRACLOG - Papke and 
Wooldridge, 1996), which allows to investigate both proportion dependent 
variables (Baum, 2008, p. 301), and the Zero-inflated Beta regression model 
(ZIBETA). The latter relies on logistic regression for estimating the probability 
that the dependent variable equals 0 alongside a Beta regression which is used in 
order to estimate values between 0 and 1. FRACLOG and the ZIBETA regression 
analysis also take consider standard errors clustered at country level. 
2.4 Results 
The following two sections present the results achieved by OLS – section 4.1 - 
and by the Fractional logit and Zero-inflated Beta estimates – section 4.2.       
2.4.1 OLS estimates 
Table 2.4 shows the results obtained by OLS. Four different specifications are 
presented. In the basic model (labelled OLS1) only dummies that identify 
political parties’ ideological orientation are included; in the second model (OLS2) 
this basic specification is augmented by including country-level covariates; the 
presence of collinearity among variables was checked through the calculation of 
the variance inflation factor (VIF), whose values are not reported but are available 
upon request, and always resulted to be lower than 2. In order to catch cross-year 
heterogeneity in our data, yearly dummies are added among covariates in the 
specification labelled OLS3; finally, model OLS4 also considers country 
dummies in order to account for unexplained cross-country heterogeneity. The 
details about the results are presented on the basis of the five hypotheses 
presented in the previous sections.  
According to the first hypothesis (H1) national parties’ support for NPM-style 
reforms is likely to be positively correlated with the countries’ per capita income. 
This hypothesis is confirmed by our regression results. Indeed, the GDPpc 
variable shows a positive correlation with the saliency of NPM values in the 
parties’ manifestos in all our OLS models. Nevertheless, only the model OLS3 
reports a statistically significant (p<0.05) coefficient for this variable. According 
to the coefficient size calculated by model OLS3, an increase of per capita GDP 
of 1000 euros would lead to an average increase of saliency of NPM principles in 
political parties’ manifestos of 0.8%. This result suggests that the higher the per 
capita income of a country, the higher the country’s political parties’ support for 




  OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 
  coeff.  s.e. coeff.  s.e. coeff.  s.e. coeff.  s.e. 
PARTY ORIENTATION  
(left-wing reference cat.) 
        
right-wing 0.019*** (0.01) 0.021*** (0.01) 0.021*** (0.01) 0.021*** (0.01) 
other 0.0014 (0.01) 0.0024 (0.01) 0.0071 (0.01) 0.0023 (0.01) 
GDPpc   0.00000052 (0.00) 0.00000087** (0.00) 0.00000098 (0.00) 
GROWTH   -0.00019 (0.00) 0.0016 (0.00) 0.00030 (0.00) 
DEBT   0.00049* (0.00) 0.00049** (0.00) -0.000075 (0.00) 
PRIMARY   0.00050 (0.00) -0.00038 (0.00) -0.00075 (0.00) 
GOV_EFF   -0.034** (0.01) -0.042** (0.02) 0.011 (0.02) 
FEDERALISM     -0.00042 (0.00) -0.00041 (0.00) -0.0015* (0.00) 
Yearly dummies no no yes yes 
Countries' dummies no no no yes 
Obs. 429 429 429 429 
  
Table 2.4 – OLS estimates, coefficients and standard errors clustered at country level. Dependent variable: saliency of 
NPM-style policies in party electoral manifestos 
 of a country increases, As argued by Hood (1995), when the per-capita income 
level of a country increases, the electoral majority of voters having low income - 
and standing to benefit from increasing public spending financed from income 
taxes - may decrease, replaced by a new tax-conscious electoral majority of 
voters. “NPM can be represented as the approach to public management which 
fits this new tax-consciousness in a marginal electorate; for example by keeping 
the overall public-sector pay bill down by means of performance pay rather than 
by across-the-board pay rises in the traditional style” (Hood, 1995: 103). 
According to the second hypothesis (H2) national parties’ support for NPM-style 
reforms is likely to be positively correlated with countries’ fiscal stress and poor 
macroeconomic performance. This hypothesis is partially confirmed by the OLS 
estimates. The variables that were included to test the existence of a significant 
correlation between countries’ fiscal stress and the NPM spread over the national 
political debate show mixed results. In fact, according to our findings, the 
correlation of the PRIMARY variable with the dependent variable shows non 
consistent results as the sign is negative in some specifications and positive in 
others; nevertheless, this covariate is never statistically significant at p<0.1 or 
lower. Conversely, the DEBT covariate reports a positive and significant 
correlation with the dependent variable in specifications OLS2 and OLS3 (p<.1 
and p<.05 respectively) whereas in OLS4 it turns out to be non-significant. It 
means that in countries where debt is higher, the saliency of NPM values in 
political parties’ manifestos is higher too. In more detail, an increase of country’s 
Debt/GDP ratio of 1% is correlated with an increase of 0.05% of saliency of NPM 
values in political parties’ electoral manifestos. This result supports the idea that 
the higher the country’s fiscal stress, the higher its parties’ appeal to NPM reform 
rhetoric. This confirms the propositions in the literature according to which the 
promise of resource saving from the adoption of NPM measures could be 
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expected to be proportionally higher in countries facing fiscal stress in a context 
of critical levels of public debt (Hood, 1995; Hendriks and Tops 1999, 2003).  
Moving on to the analysis of the correlation between macroeconomic 
performance and the spread of NPM-style reforms in political parties’ rhetoric, 
the empirical elaborations carried out provide results that are contrary to 
expectations. Indeed, coefficients calculated for the GROWTH variable are not 
statistically significant in all the OLS models considered; therefore, according to 
these estimates, a significant link between countries’ economic performances and 
parties’ concern for NPM does not exist.   
According to the third hypothesis (H3), national parties’ support for NPM-style 
reforms is likely to be negatively correlated with decentralization of the 
administrative system. This hypothesis is strongly confirmed by our findings 
since the estimates suggest that FEDERALISM is negatively correlated with the 
dependent variable. This result is robust across specifications but turns out to be 
statistically significant (p<0.1) only in the OLS4 specification, when countries’ 
dummies are taken into account. In more detail, in the OLS4 specification, an 
increase of the share of local expenditure on consolidated general government 
expenditure of 1% is correlated with a 0.15% increase of the saliency of NPM 
values in political parties’ manifestos. According to this finding, the higher the 
decentralisation, the lower the political parties’ concern for NPM-related policies. 
This result confirms our prediction according to which NPM reforms are 
particularly advocated by political parties operating in centralised administrative 
systems. Reformers seek to replace those centralised administrative systems with 
decentralised ones because, according to NPM reformers, to improve policy 
implementation it is essential to establish subordinate administrative levels to 
which government objectives are delegated. A further possible explanation of this 
result is that in more decentralised systems the political debate concerning NPM-
style reforms is presumed to shift from the national level to the local one.   
According to the fourth hypothesis (H4), national parties’ support for NPM-style 
reforms is likely to be negatively correlated with government effectiveness in 
policy action. This hypothesis is confirmed by our findings since results for the 
GOV_EFF variable are in line with the predictions made by the literature 
surveyed in section 2. Indeed, a negative and highly significant (p<.05) 
coefficient is reported by the OLS estimates in all the specifications where this 
variable is included, with the only exception being represented by model OLS4. 
According to these estimates, the more inefficient the national administrative 
systems are, the higher the saliency of NPM values in political parties’ programs. 
The magnitude of the OLS coefficient suggests that an increase of 1 point of the 
government effectiveness indicator used in the analysis is correlated with a 
decrease of 4% of the saliency of NPM values in political parties’ manifestos. 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis developed by the literature according 
to which NPM reforms are conceived as a response to ineffective governments 
and public administration (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1995; Hughes, 2003; London, 
2002; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). Indeed, our findings show that parties’ 
support for NPM-style reforms increases in those national contexts where 
governmental action is ineffective and the quality of public services is considered 
by citizens to be poor.  
According to the fifth hypothesis (H5), right-wing parties’ support for NPM-style 
reforms is likely to be higher than left-wing ones. This hypothesis is strongly 
confirmed by our findings. Indeed, the OLS coefficient calculated for the right-
wing dummy shows a significantly high (p<.01) positive sign which is robust 
across all the specifications considered, model OLS4 included. According to these 
estimates, the electoral propaganda in support of NPM-style reforms in the public 
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sector characterises right-wing parties more than left-wing parties (the omitted 
category). On average, our results suggest that right –wing electoral platforms 
devote 2% more space to NPM values than left-wing ones do. To be more 
concise, right-wing parties appeal to NPM principles and values in order to gain 
votes to a greater extent than left-wing parties which, therefore, consider this 
issue less salient. Conversely, findings for the other category of the 
PARTYORIENTATION variable reveal that no statistically significant difference 
exists between parties having other political orientations and left-wing parties. On 
the one hand, these results confirm the general hypothesis according to which 
ideological reasons contributed to the spread of NPM; as referred by Ferlie et al. 
(1996: 4), NPM reforms were driven by a “persistent political will” meaning that 
these were not “socially neutral, but reflect the rise of some constituencies and 
fall of others”, promoting a new political economy of the public sector. On the 
other hand, the results also suggest that NPM could be understood as issuing from 
a general ideological commitment of the right, revealing a “preference for a 
smaller public sector and a more extensive reliance on market mechanisms” 
(Boston et al., 1996: 6). More precisely, this shift to the right consists of a 
rejuvenation of the political right – the New Right, as referred by Hood (1995) – 
pursuing the objective of managerializing the public sector (Pollitt, 1990; Saint-
Martin, 1998). 
To summarise, the above-mentioned findings suggest that European parties’ 
support for NPM-style reforms is statistically significantly and positively 
correlated with right-wing ideological forces and with some country-level 
economic variables - income (as given by GDP per capita) and fiscal stress (as 
given by the debt/GDP ratio). With regard to the country-level institutional 
variables, it is negatively correlated with government effectiveness and 
decentralised administrative systems. The statistical significance of most of these 
results is robust across different model specifications and estimation strategies. 
Anyway, it is worth noting that when country dummies are included among 
covariates, most of these regressors turn out to be statistically non-significant (p 
values>0.1). This would suggest some caution in the interpretation of the results.  
2.4.2 Robustness checks: Fractional Logit and Zero Inflated Beta regression 
The same specifications which were run through OLS were replicated by means 
of the Fractional Logit and the Zero-Inflated Beta (ZIBETA) regression model. 
The estimates calculated through these two models are reported in Tables 2.5 and 
2.6 respectively. Like in the case of OLS estimates, results for countries’ and 
yearly dummies are not displayed for the sake of brevity and the same applies to 
the results obtained through the zero-inﬂation equation of the ZIBETA model. 
These omitted results are available upon request. In order to ease the 
comparability with the estimates resulting from the OLS models, in Tables 2.5 
and 2.6, instead of coefficients, marginal effects are reported. 
The Fractional Logit and the ZIBETA estimates strongly confirm the OLS results 
in terms of sign, significance and magnitude of the effect of the considered 
covariates on the dependent variable. Non-negligible differences only concern the 
statistical significance of the estimated effect of three regressors: DEBT, 
GOV_EFF and FEDERALISM. Indeed, comparing the results with OLS, the first 
two covariates exhibit a higher statistical significance in Fractional Logit and 
ZIBETA estimates. Furthermore, while FEDERALISM was barely significant in 
the fourth specification estimated with OLS,  it  turns out to be highly significant 
(p<0.01) in all the specifications run with the Fractional Logit and ZIBETA 









s.e. marg. eff. s.e. marg. eff. s.e. marg. eff. s.e. 
PARTY ORIENTATION  
(left-wing reference cat.) 
              
right-wing 0.019*** (0.01) 0.021*** (0.01) 0.022*** (0.01) 0.021*** (0.01) 
other 0.0016 (0.01) 0.0025 (0.01) 0.0086 (0.01) 0.0039 (0.01) 
GDPpc   0.00000035 (0.00) 0.00000071** (0.00) 0.00000069 (0.00) 
GROWTH   -0.00074 (0.00) 0.00072 (0.00) -0.00029 (0.00) 
DEBT   0.00040** (0.00) 0.00035** (0.00) 0.0000015 (0.00) 
PRIMARY   0.00038 (0.00) -0.00067 (0.00) -0.00034 (0.00) 
GOV_EFF   -0.027*** (0.01) -0.038*** (0.01) 0.021 (0.03) 
FEDERALISM     -0.00073** (0.00) -0.00085*** (0.00) -0.0017*** (0.00) 
Yearly dummies no no yes yes 
Countries' dummies no no no yes 
Obs. 429 429 429 429 
Table 2.5 – Estimates of Fractional Logit regression models, marginal effects and standard errors clustered at country 
level. Dependent variable: saliency of NPM-style policies in party manifestos 
 




s.e. marg. eff. s.e. marg. eff. s.e. marg. eff. s.e. 
PARTY ORIENTATION 
 (left-wing reference cat.) 
            
right-wing 0.019*** (0.01) 0.019*** (0.01) 0.019*** (0.01) 0.020*** (0.01) 
other -0.0012 (0.01) -0.00063 (0.01) 0.0020 (0.01) 0.00085 (0.01) 
GDPpc   0.00000027 (0.00) 0.00000057** (0.00) 0.00000080 (0.00) 
GROWTH   0.00051 (0.00) 0.0018 (0.00) -0.00033 (0.00) 
DEBT   0.00043*** (0.00) 0.00037*** (0.00) 0.000047 (0.00) 
PRIMARY   0.000040 (0.00) -0.00030 (0.00) 0.00041 (0.00) 
GOV_EFF   -0.019*** (0.01) -0.031*** (0.01) 0.085 (0.02) 
FEDERALISM     -0.00044** (0.00) -0.00048*** (0.00) -0.0013*** (0.00) 
Yearly dummies no no yes yes 
Countries' dummies no no no yes 
Obs. 429 429 429 429 
Table 2.5 – Estimates of Zero-Inflated Beta regression models, marginal effects and standard errors clustered at country 




In the latter half of the 20
th
 century, Europe experienced the creation of new 
supranational public powers – the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the EU - that co-existed alongside the national public 
powers of traditional nation states. These traditional national powers, which used 
to be wielded individually by European states as an exercise of sovereign 
prerogatives, came progressively to be shared at a supra-national level with other 
states through a liberal market process of institutional integration (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Ney, 2001). While the market was becoming a unifying 
benchmark, national barriers began to fall (Nizzò, 1999). Since the late 1970s, 
this process of supra-national integration has been advancing a progressive 
administrative convergence among the MSs’ and pushing for the implementation 
of similar institutional arrangements. The process has prioritised the regulation of 
European states’ public sectors through economic instruments, the adoption of 
pricing tools and taxation strategies aiming at further liberalization and 
privatization at national level. This administrative convergence was sustained by 
the wave of NPM reforms that, from the late 1970s onwards, has progressively 
penetrated the public sectors of European countries (Clifton et al., 2011).  
Since the 1990s, on the wake of the above-mentioned processes of market 
integration and liberalization, the EU institutions have intensified their effort to 
promote NPM reforms across the European administrative systems (Bauby, 2008; 
Bognetti and Obermann 2008; Clifton et al., 2011). In the framework of this 
reform process, the European Commission has chosen to transpose the NPM 
principles into the national public sectors without establishing binding pan-
European rules, but rather by using instruments of soft regulation
14
 (Mény, 1993; 
Page and Wouters, 1995; Spanou, 1998; Della Cananea, 2004, Eichengreen, 
2008). These instruments aim at “re-orienting the direction and shape of politics 
to the extent that [EU] political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy making” (Ladrech, 1994: 69). 
Vis-à-vis these instruments of soft regulation, national political parties have 
played a crucial role as they have been: i) absorbing the NPM values into their 
ideological platforms to build electoral consensus around them; and - once in 
power - ii) transform them into administrative reform plans (Gafney, 1996; 
Ladrech, 2001).  
Our empirical study focused on the above-mentioned phase of the EU’s 
intensification of NPM reforms throughout the MSs, and analysed the spread of 
the NPM values across the ideological platforms of the European parties. We 
proceeded to relate the adoption of such reforms to a number of economic, 
institutional and political factors that have been associated with the national 
parties’ rhetorical support for NPM organizational values. 
Concerning the economic factors, the outcomes of this empirical analysis have 
suggested that national parties have adopted the NPM reform rhetoric in a context 
of increasing per-capita income levels and fiscal stress. In other words, NPM 
reforms might have appealed to national parties because they responded to the 
                                               
14 A number of instruments of soft regulation have been progressively produced at the EU 
level in order to invite the MSs to modernise their national administrations through business-
style organizational practices and market-based strategies. These aimed at improving 
efficiency and effectiveness in the economy of the public sector. For instance, in a 2010 
communication (COM(2010)2020 final), the European Commission encouraged the MSs to 
promote internal structural reforms designed to render national public administrations more 
efficient and effective. As explained in other instruments of soft regulation (i.e. DG ECFIN, 
2008; COM(2014)902 final), according to the European Commission, the structural reforms 
of MSs’ public sectors is an important EU priority area, seen as vital to promote growth in 
the European economy, and improve both efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. 
Reform of public sectors should thus be high up on the political agendas of the MSs’. 
 131 
 
demands of a new tax-conscious electoral majority of voters asking for fiscal 
stability and lower taxes. With regard to the institutional factors, our findings 
suggest that the NPM reform rhetoric has been adopted by parties operating in 
public sectors characterised by centralised administrative structures and under 
national governments with ineffective policy actions. Thus, national parties might 
have been drawn to NPM reforms in order to decentralise national administrative 
systems and improve government effectiveness. Finally, results confirm that the 
NPM rhetoric has permeated national politics of MSs in reason of right-wing 
parties’ prevailing support.  
To summarise, political parties’ rhetorical support for NPM-style reforms has 
spread across EU MSs mainly due to the political commitment of right-wing 
forces operating in national contexts of fiscal stress. Right-wing parties were 
responding to the demands of a new tax-conscious majority of voters with 
increasing levels of revenues, who urged their governments to decrease public 
spending. Meanwhile, this support for NPM values has prevailed in countries 
characterised by centralised administrative systems and by a lack of effectiveness 
in government action.  
Even if the hypotheses tested in this study have only focused on parties’ 
ideological support for NPM reforms as declared in their political manifestos, 
useful insights into the actual process of parties’ adoption of reform plans emerge 
from the reading of our descriptive statistics of the PER303 variable. Indeed, 
when looking at these statistics we see that, on average, parties’ ideological 
support for NPM-style reforms is not particularly salient in the electoral 
manifestos issued by parties of Northern European countries, whereas in Southern 
European countries such reforms turn out to be quite relevant. This result 
contrasts with the findings issuing from country-specific literature on the actual 
process of NPM reforms across Northern and Southern European states stating 
that NPM systems are arguably used more frequently in Northern European 
public administrations by comparison to many other European countries (Hansen, 
2011). Vis-à-vis this puzzling situation, Christensen and Lægreid (2011) help us 
clarify these descriptive statistics and warn that NPM reform ideology and NPM 
actual reform practice are not always aligned and that their controversial 
relationship should be interpreted according to national arenas. Our findings 
suggest that there can be two different situations of misalignment between reform 
ideology and practice. The first one is the misalignment situation of Southern 
European countries where – coherently with the myth theory (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977) or the double-talk theory (Brunsson, 1989) – political parties may compose 
their electoral manifestos in order to present themselves in a better light without 
really intending to implement the policies proposed if elected to government. The 
second one is the misalignment situation of Northern European countries, where 
managerialist reforms were not ideologised and were introduced as mere technical 
and apolitical frameworks aimed at enhancing efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy in the functioning of old-style bureaucracies (i.e. Scott Bushnell and 
Sallee, 1990; Hood, 1991). 
2.6 Conclusions 
This paper has focused on the NPM reform rhetoric of the European national 
parties and has addressed MSs’ domestic factors associated with the diffusion of 
the NPM values across the ideological platforms of these parties. In line with the 
recent research initiatives of the European Commission searching for novel 
quantitative data on NPM, this study has thrown light on the spread of the NPM 
reform rhetoric across the European countries and has provided empirical 
evidence about the patterns of diffusion of NPM values across the national 
parties’ electoral programs.  
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We have focused on this topic because recent studies about administrative 
reforms in the EU countries have showed that the European Commission strives 
to enact these reforms in the domestic contexts of the MSs without the political 
support of the national parties that are required. Primarily, to build electoral 
consensus around the NPM values and, secondarily, to transform them into 
administrative reform plans once they are in power in the national legislators. By 
analysing the NPM rhetoric across national parties’ electoral manifestos, the 
findings of this paper elucidate the first phase of this process and suggest that the 
NPM-style reforms are likely to meet the ideological support of right-wing parties 
operating in national contexts. This context can be characterised by increasing per 
capita income levels, fiscal stress, centralised administrative structures and poor 
effectiveness of governmental action. As to the second phase, concerning the 
actual implementation of the NPM-style reforms, the descriptive statistics 
discussed in the fifth section invites us to undertake new research initiatives 
accounting for the different situations of alignment and misalignment. According 
to Christensen and Lægreid (2011), these situations are likely to occur between 
the NPM reform ideology and practice. Indeed, these authors alert that a 
controversial relationship might exist between the NPM reform ideology and the 
actual reform measures adopted in a country and that this relationship can be 
subjected to various interpretations. Thus, drawing on Christensen and Lægreid 
(2011), we suggest that the CMD data about the parties’ ideological support for 
NPM reforms undergo new research. In addition, we also suggest that it be cross-
checked with data about the actual adoption by parties of these reforms in order to 
create a large database where countries can be sampled on the basis of their 
alignment/misalignment characteristics. 
Moreover, the econometric model developed in this paper should be subjected to 
further investigation. First of all, the period under empirical examination should 
be extended in order to observe, if in the framework of a longer time span, 
phenomena of political convergence may be seen between right- and left-wing 
parties in their call for NPM-style reforms. Drawing on Fournier and Grey (2000) 
it should be investigated if, within a larger time span, left-wing parties in Europe 
have increasingly called for NPM reforms.The focus should be on how these 
parties have contributed to the managerialization of the public sector. One 
hypothesis is that they have equated modernization with managerialization as 
right-wing parties have done. Secondly, they have shared right-wing parties 
'preoccupation with “quality” and league table measurement. Indeed, Fournier and 
Grey (2000) suggest that left-wing parties have tended to see political issues as 
amenable to “technical” solutions. These solutions are based on professional 
management remedies aimed at improving economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
in government and public administration. 
Secondly, the availability of panel data should be enhanced in order to improve 
the robustness of the results concerning the impact of the institutional and 
economic variables on the spread of NPM rhetoric across the political parties’ 
manifestos included in the model.     
Finally, the study proposed in this paper has investigated NPM as a form of 
electoral supply responding to a specific configuration of the political, economic 
and institutional context. It would be interesting to investigate how the electoral 
demand – i.e. citizens’ opinion – has reacted to specific reform plans adopted in 
the wake of the NPM parties’ propaganda documented in this study. 
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3. NPM and the European railways: the welfare effects of 
EU-driven liberalization policies (Essay 3) 
 
Abstract 
Network services such as electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, transport 
and water are crucial factors of economic well-being as they offer society the 
opportunity to coordinate, over time and space, large and complex flows of 
essential goods, people or services. Until the 1980s, these services in Europe were 
mainly provided by vertically integrated state-owned monopolies. Then, 
following the wave of NPM reforms in the organization of national public sectors, 
many governments dismantled stated-owned enterprises. This section focuses on 
the European railway sector. After a brief explanation of the main transformations 
occurred in this sector, this study presents the EU regulatory milestones in support 
of liberalization and offers insights on the implementation status of these reforms 
in selected countries (France, Italy, Spain and Germany). It finally provides 
empirical evidence on the impact of railway-related regulatory regimes (market-
friendly VS monopolistic regulations) on prices, investments and quality of rail 
services.   
 
Keywords:  regulatory regimes, liberalization, network industry, EU reforms, 




This essay was written with Tobias KALOUD
15
, Jadwiga URBAN-
KOZŁOWSKA16 and Julia DOLESCHEL17. 
It was developed and presented at EUsers Network’s Summer School18 in 
‘Performance and Governance of Services of General Interest in the EU: Critical 
perspectives on Energy, Telecommunications, Transport and Water Reforms’ 
held on June 27
th
 – July 1st 2016 at the Department of Economics, Management 
and Quantitative Methods (DEMM) of the University of Milan. 
An updated version of this essay was published in Florio M. (eds.) The Reform of 
Network Industries: Evaluating Privatisation, Regulation and Liberalisation in 
the EU, Edward Elgar Publishing, with the title ‘The Changing Nature of 
Railways in Europe: Empirical Evidence on Prices, Investments and Quality’. 




                                               
15 Tobias Kaloud is researcher and lecturer in Economics at the Vienna University of 
Economics and Business. 
16 Jadwiga Urban-Kozłowska is researcher in European Law at the Jagiellonian University 
in Krakow and a Polish legal adviser. 
17 Julia Doleschel holds a University degree in Economics at the Vienna University of 
Economics and Business. 
18 The EUsers Network involves six European universities: Università degli Studi di 
Milano (Italy), Ǻbo Akademi University School of Business and Economics (Finland), 
University of Greenwich (UK), Universität Leipzig (Germany), Université de Rouen 
(France), and WU Wirtschaftuniversität Wien (Austria).  
The Summer School was organised in the framework of the project “Services of general 
interest in the EU: A citizens’ perspective on public versus private provision”, financed by 
the action Jean Monnet Networks of the Erasmus + programme. 
3.1 Introduction 
Network services such as electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, transport 
and water are crucial factors of economic well-being as they offer society the 
opportunity to coordinate, over time and space, large and complex flows of 
essential goods, people or services (Florio, 2013). Until the 1980s, these services 
in Europe were mainly provided by vertically integrated state-owned monopolies. 
Then, following the wave of NPM in the organization of national public sectors, 
many governments dismantled stated-owned enterprises: ‘Europe has been at the 
forefront of change. Elsewhere, in the USA, Latin America, Asia, and in formerly 
planned economies, there have been similar reforms, but perhaps nowhere have 
they been so consistently implemented as in the European Union. In the past two 
decades, first in the UK, then subsequently in all the other EU member states, 
governments have increasingly moved away from the direct provision of public 
services, from ownership of utilities, and from franchised monopolies. Ministries 
and independent regulators have shown a greater reliance on market mechanisms, 
and now consider the network service providers as market players … In Europe, 
the critical mass for the policy shift was achieved in the 1980s, after the social 
and political upheavals of the 1970s and the severe oil shocks that destabilized 
public finances.’ (Florio, 2013, pp. 5–8) 
At the European Union (EU) level, policies aimed at creating a well-functioning 
internal market have played a key role in the restructuring of national network 
industries. In fact, for many decades an exclusion clause subscribed in the Treaty 
of Rome (1957) by the six founders of the European Community (Belgium, 
France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) allowed them to 
exclude services such as telecommunications, transport, energy and water from 
some common market rules. Then, since the 1980s the EU’s efforts to create a 
unique internal market for those services intensified and, in 2009, the Lisbon 
Treaty abandoned this exemption by introducing competition rules and forbidding 
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state aid, except under special circumstances to be notified and approved by the 
European Commission.  
Within this context, over the last 20 years many changes have occurred in the 
structure, regulation and performance of European network industries. Florio 
(2013) provides a detailed analysis of how public ownership, vertical integration, 
entry regulation and market concentration have evolved across the EU 15’s 
network industries over the last two decades. Firstly, telecommunications, 
electricity and airlines, despite some differences, experienced an almost effective 
process of regulatory convergence from the standard industrial organization 
(state-owned monopoly) towards the NPM model: this is particularly evident in 
the telecommunications sector. Secondly, when looking at postal services and gas 
over the last two decades, in both sectors there is no clear convergence as 
countries show very different regulatory settings. Finally, the rail sector 
represents a sui generis case as only few countries have actually modified the 
initial state-owned monopolistic structure of the industry. Indeed, only the UK 
showed a mostly fully liberalized and privatized industry, with Denmark, Sweden, 
Germany and the Netherlands midway or fairly advanced in the reform process. 
Despite little progress, remaining countries still show the fundamental features of 
the traditional industrial organization of the rail sector. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2016) 
data about entry regulation, public ownership, vertical integration and market 
concentration provide detailed insights about the change process experienced by 
network industries over the last 20 years. Firstly, as to entry regulation, the data 
show that the rail sector has shown great resistance in improving terms and 
conditions of third party access (TPA), whereas all other sectors have been more 
accepting. Secondly, the OECD’s information on public ownership reveals that, 
except for telecommunications, all other network industries have shown some 
resistance in reducing the shares owned – either directly or indirectly – by the 
government in the largest firms in the sector. As far as vertical integration is 
concerned, telecommunications and – to a smaller extent – rail are the sectors 
demonstrating improved degrees of vertical separation among the different 
segments of the industry. Finally, concerning the market structure, 
telecommunications is the sector where network provision has evolved the most 
towards more competitive states of the market. In the majority of the other 
sectors, the market share of the largest company in the sector is between 50 per 
cent and 90 per cent. More specifically, rail and – to a smaller extent – gas 
industries are characterized by the highest number of countries where the market 
share of the largest company in the sector is above 90 per cent. 
The considerations above show that rail is among the sectors that have resisted the 
most to the changes the NPM paradigm has introduced in the organization and 
management of state-owned enterprises. This essay thus focuses on the 
transformations of the rail sector over the last two decades and is organized in two 
sections. Section 3.2 describes the change by providing a historical overview of 
the reform context and referring to the main aspects of the organizational change 
experienced by the European rail industries in the last decades; it also outlines the 
most important regulatory innovations introduced by the EU in this sector. 
Section 3.3 assesses change by empirically investigating the way regulatory 
innovations have influenced the price, investment and quality of European rail 
services, using OECD’s data from 1996 to 2013. We conclude this essay (Section 
3.4) by offering reflections on the development of railways in Europe.  
3.2 Reform context 
Over the last decades, European public sectors and state-owned enterprises have 
experienced a profound process of organizational change in which private sector 
managerial tools and principles have spread across many countries with the aim 
of improving effectiveness, efficiency and economy (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991, 
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1995; Stewart and Walsh, 1992; Walsh, 1997; London, 2002; Esposito et al., 
2016). This change occurred between the 1970s and 1980s when the striking 
international trend of NPM reforms introduced a new paradigm for the 
organization and management of public sectors. ‘These reforms sought to reduce 
the role of the State in production, as well as in service delivery and to encourage 
the deregulation of public enterprises. The emphasis was on maintaining macro-
economic stability, lowering inflation, cutting deficit spending, and reducing the 
scope and cost of government.’ (United Nations, 2001, p. 32) 
In the wake of NPM-style restructuring of national public sectors, many European 
network industries evolved from vertically integrated state-owned monopolies to 
market-friendly and competitive organizational schemes
19
.  
3.2.1 Rail Sector: Industrial Organization in Transition 
The traditional organizational structure of most European railways in the post-war 
period was that of a vertically integrated state-owned monopoly. During this 
period, the rail sector was managed as a natural monopoly because of the high 
fixed costs associated with providing infrastructure and the importance of offering 
affordable and attractive public transport to all income groups (Drew and 
Ludewig, 2011). Nevertheless, in the 1950s the market share of most railways 
began to decrease in many countries as they were unable to compete with roads 
and airways. Many rail companies – particularly their freight branches – ran into 
traffic decline and financial difficulties. According to Drew and Ludewig (2011), 
                                               
19 It is worth noting that NPM reforms and the liberalization of network-related Services 
of General Economic Interest (SGEI) do not refer exactly to the same thing. While NPM 
consists of a broad reform paradigm emphasizing the concept that ideas used in the private 
sector must be successful in the public sector, liberalization of SGEI refers to a specific 
model of providing network services. More specifically, before liberalization, the 
predominant model was vertical integration of network supply. Liberalization has allowed 
new entries in networks’ supply markets. 
2. See Directives 2016/797, 2014/106/EU, 2014/38/EU, 2013/9/EU 2011/18/EU, 
2009/131/EC, 2008/57/EC. 
two reasons were behind these competitiveness shortcomings. Firstly, railways 
were traditionally managed as part of a government ministry with few incentives 
for managers to meet market requirements. Secondly, politicians expanded 
railway infrastructures and services without necessarily paying for it but rather by 
accumulating debt. These two characteristics of the railway sector – politically 
driven management and debt-based investments – were the major causes that 
represented the driving force behind the reform process of this sector in the 
1990s.  
The EU has played a key role in this reform process by promoting several 
regulatory instruments (Directive 91/440 and four railway packages in 2001, 
2004, 2007 and 2016) aimed at: (1) establishing in the member states rules 
allowing for open access to railway infrastructure and fair competition between 
railways, undertakings for freight and international passenger services, in the 
context of a single European market for railways; (2) ensuring the financial 
viability of companies operating in the rail sector. The European Commission 
(1996, p. 3) highlighted both issues in the white paper, ‘A Strategy for 
Revitalising the Community’s Railways’, stating that: ‘the railways have been 
largely insulated from market forces. Governments have a certain responsibility in 
that as they often did not allow sufficient managerial independence and imposed 
obligations without compensating fully for the costs involved; they also failed to 
set clear financial objectives but subsidized losses or let debt pile up … A new 
kind of railway is needed. It should be first and foremost a business, with 
management independent and free to exploit opportunities, but answerable for 
failure. For this it should have sound finances, unencumbered by the burden of the 
past. It should be exposed to market forces in an appropriate form which should 
also lead to a greater involvement of the private sector. A clear division of 
responsibilities is required between the State and the railways, particularly for 
public services.’  
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Through the use of regulation, the EU has prompted liberalization policies 
intended to: (1) allow new entrants to compete with each other and, mainly, with 
incumbent operators; (2) create the proper market conditions compelling 
companies to adopt price competition systems. However, beside regulatory 
instruments, a key role was played by its investment policy in Trans-European 
Networks (TENs) contributing to the ongoing liberalization process through 
improved technical harmonization and interoperability across Europe.
20
 
It is worth noticing that regulatory instruments and TENs investment policy have 
been introduced by the EU not only to support liberalization efforts but also to 
improve competitiveness. On the one hand, the above-mentioned regulation has 
been aimed at enhancing the business environment of rail sector undertakings 
and, by doing so, lowering costs. On the other, TENs’ policy has prioritized 
member states’ investments in high-speed rail (HSR) systems with the purpose of 
rendering railway services more competitive than those provided by roads and 
airways. Before the arrival of HSR services, railways were constantly losing 
market share in favour of roads (mostly for freight traffic) and air. Then, in 1981 
the introduction of HSR services in Europe with the inauguration of the Paris-
Sud-Est line was a break point for air, road and rail market share. It paved the 
way for the modernization of rail transport and favoured the promotion of 
effective competition between railways, roads and airways in terms of medium 
and long distance trips. Therefore, supporting the rail mode became one of the 
main axes of the European transport policies. In 1994, the Trans-European 
Network – Transport (TEN-T) programme was established and provided the most 
                                               
20 See Directives 2016/797, 2014/106/EU, 2014/38/EU, 2013/9/EU 2011/18/EU, 
2009/131/EC, 2008/57/EC. 
important EU financial framework to support member states’ investments in 
railway infrastructures and, namely, HSR.
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3.2.2 EU Reform Framework: The Railway Packages 
The EU’s rationale behind the rail sector reforms was to create a single, efficient 
and competitive market for railways throughout Europe (the so-called ‘Single 
European Railway Area’). In order to achieve this goal, the following key reform 
aspects were identified and implemented by the European Commission through 
four legislative packages plus a recast: 
(1) unbundling of rail infrastructure and operating activities; (2) liberalization of 
access rights for railway undertakings; (3) commercialization of the incumbent 
railway companies; (4) technical standardization and improvement of 
interoperability; (5) introduction of independent national regulatory authorities 
(European Commission, 2001).  
The First Railway Package, adopted by the European Commission in 2001, was 
composed of four directives. Directive 2001/12/EC had the objectives of: (1) 
introducing the ‘open access’ principle for the international freight services; (2) 
creating an independent body responsible for guaranteeing fair and non-
discriminatory access to rail infrastructure; (3) avoiding cross-financing by 
imposing mandatory separation of balance sheets as well as profit and loss 
accounts for the infrastructure managers and train operators; and (4) defining 
infrastructure charging and licensing. Regarding the separation of infrastructure 
and operations, the directive allowed member states to achieve this either by 
creating distinct divisions within a single undertaking (the so-called ‘holding 
                                               
21 This became particularly clear in 2004 when TEN-T investment guidelines funded the 
realization of 30 priority projects: of these 30 projects, 18 related to rail and, of these 18 




company model’) or by setting up independent entities charged with infrastructure 
management (Asmild et al., 2008, p. 5).  
Another component was Directive 2001/13/EC, which stipulated the common 
criteria for granting the license to EU rail operators. The issue of capacity 
allocation was tackled under Directive 2001/14/EC. The deadline for 
implementing these legal instruments was 15 March 2003. The objective of 
Directive 2001/16/EC was to enhance the interoperability of the trans-European 
conventional rail system.  
Together with the previously issued Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability of 
the trans-European HSR system, these two legal instruments were designed to 
ensure a smooth and safe transit of trains from one member state’s rail network to 
another. They focused on crucial technical aspects, such as safety, control 
systems, signalling, freight wagons and training for staff engaged in international 
rail transport operations. 
In 2002 the European Commission proposed a new set of legal instruments 
(known as ‘the Second Railway Package’), which entered into force on 30 April 
2004. It encompassed three directives – scheduled to be implemented by 30 April 
2006 – and one regulation.  
The aim of Directive 2004/49/EC was to develop a common approach to rail 
safety.  
With a view to clarifying interoperability requirements, Directive 2004/50/EC 
amended and updated Directive 96/48/EC and Directive 2001/16/EC. As a result, 
the scope of Directive 2001/16/EC was extended to cover the whole of the 
European rail network. Such a modification was of great importance as the full 
liberalization of the rail network to national and international freight transport 
services was scheduled for January 2007 (Directive 2004/51/EC).  
Regulation 881/2004 (amended by Regulation (EC) 1335/2008) created the 
European Railway Agency (ERA), a body designated to coordinate safety and 
interoperability efforts. ERA has played a key role in the alignment of technical 
and safety regulations in different member states and, by doing so, has been a 
driving force in the modernization of European railways.  
The third step towards revitalization of the railways and the enhancement of an 
integrated European railway area took place in 2007 with the issuing of the so-
called ‘Third Railway Package’. It was composed of two directives and one 
regulation. The main objective of Directive 2007/58/EC was the liberalization of 
the rail market with regard to international passenger trains. The opening up of 
the international passenger services within the EU was scheduled for 1 January 
2010. As a result, cabotage to international rail services was introduced. Pursuant 
to Directive 2007/59/EC the European licensing system for train drivers was 
created: minimum requirements relating to medical fitness, basic education and 
general professional skills for train drivers were set out. Regulation 1371/2007 
stipulated minimum quality standards to be guaranteed to all passengers on all 
lines. One of its main innovations was the introduction of the compensation 
system in case of train delay – thanks to this instrument, passengers were granted 
the right to partial reimbursement of their ticket cost, depending on the extent of 
delay. 
In 2012 the European Commission launched a recast of the First Railway Package 
in order to simplify and consolidate various existing legal provisions. Directive 
2012/34/EU addressed the main shortcomings that had been identified by the 
European Commission.  
As regards competition issues, Directive 2012/34/EU aimed at improving 
transparency of access conditions in the rail market by requiring, for instance, 
more detailed network statements and providing better access to rail-related 
services. The power of national rail regulators was further strengthened through 
the extension of their competences to rail-related services and ensuring their 
independence from any other public authority. In order to enhance rail 
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investment, Directive 2012/34/EU called for smarter infrastructure charging rules 
to be adopted and obliged member states to develop long-term strategies 
regarding investment in rail infrastructure. 
The Fourth Railway Package was introduced in 2016 and consisted of two main 
parts: the so-called ‘Market Pillar’ and ‘Technical Pillar’. The former has aimed 
to recast the interoperability (Directive 2016/797) and rail safety directives 
(Directive 2016/798) as well as strengthen the role of ERA (Regulation 
2016/796). The latter will allow for open access for domestic passenger services 
from 14 December 2020.
22
 However, this regulatory package does not impose full 
institutional unbundling of train operations and infrastructure management. 
Moreover, the introduction of competitive tendering of public service contracts in 




Regarding all foregoing considerations, it turns out that not all of the EU’s targets 
have been fully achieved.
24
 It is also appropriate to note that most EU legal 
instruments were adopted in the form of a directive. This means that their 
transposition into national legal systems is required in order for them to be fully 
effective. In other words, the practical impact of the EU regulatory innovations 
has greatly depended on the cooperation of member states
25
 in implementing 
                                               
22 See Directive (EU) 2016/2370 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
December 2016 amending Directive 2012/34/EU as regards the opening of the market for 
domestic passenger transport services by rail and the governance of the railway 
infrastructure, OJ L 352, 23.12.2016, pp. 1–17. 
23 See Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 1370/2007 concerning the opening of the market for domestic passenger 
transport services by rail, OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, pp. 1–13, Article 1(5)(b). 
24 Compare European Commission, ‘White Paper – Roadmap to a Single European 
Transport Area – Towards a Competitive and Resource Efficient Transport System’, 
COM/2011/0144 and Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council – Fifth Report on Monitoring Development of the Rail Market, COM/2016/0780. 
25 regards Directive 2007/58/EC on the opening of the market of international rail 
passenger transport, none of the member states had notified its transposition on time. As a 
supra-national reform guidelines. With this in mind, we now consider the actual 
reform implementation in several member states. 
3.2.3 Actual Reform Implementation: Rail Passenger Sectors in Italy, 
France, Germany and Spain 
The status of reform implementation is measured by the ‘Rail Liberalization’ 
(LIB) Index. It depicts the degree of market opening among the EU member 
states as well as Switzerland and Norway. Specifically, the LIB Index considers 
legal entry barriers and practical market access possibilities for railway 
undertakings. However, it does not take into account market results like prices, 
quality and the degree of competition. Figure 3.1 reports data from the 2011 LIB 
Index and shows that the status of reform implementation varies across EU 
countries. While few member states (UK, Germany, Sweden and Denmark) 
presented an advanced stage of reform implementation (ahead of schedule), in the 
majority of countries reforms were on schedule or delayed. Following the 
enforcement of the EU’s four railway packages, positive achievements have been 
met with regard to the opening up of national freight and international passenger 
markets. Nevertheless, progress towards creating an integrated European railway 
area and a genuine EU internal market for railway services is still needed in the 
field of the national passenger market. 
The OECD’s Energy, Transport and Communications Regulation (ETCR) 
indicator provides additional data to compare the status of implementation of 
railway reforms across European countries. However, unlike the LIB Index, it 
                                                                                                                      
result, the Commission opened infringement procedures against 19 member states on 31 
July 2009 for failing to notify the measures taken to transpose Directive 2007/58/EC. See 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the 
provisions of Directive 2007/58/EC on the opening of the market of international rail 
passenger transport accompanying the Communication to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the fourth Railway Package, COM/2013/034. 
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only captures differences in terms of regulatory regimes. The overall indicator 
ranges between 0 (describing a condition of full liberalization) and 6 (describing a 
condition of non-liberalization) and comprises issues of entry regulation, public 
ownership, market structure and vertical separation.  
Figure 3.1: Rail reforms implementation status. Rail Liberalization Index 2011, 
rail passenger transport.  
 
Source: LIB-Index 
In a first step, it is important to observe the correlation between the LIB Index and 
the ETCR indicator in order to prove that both databases do not provide diverging 
information and, therefore, are equally reliable. We do find a significant and 
































































associated with increased liberalization, we conclude that both statistics yield 
similar results for our sample.  
In order to gain a deeper insight, we narrow the focus of the analysis down to four 
selected countries: Italy, France, Germany and Spain. We chose these four 
countries to account for the three different situations of reform implementation 
status presented in Figure 3.1: advanced status (Germany), on-schedule status 
(Italy) and delayed status (France and Spain). Figure 3.2 shows that between 1996 
and 2013 the reform process (as measured by the ETCR index) deepened in the 
four countries under examination: nevertheless, coherent with LIB Index, in 
France and Spain to a smaller extent than in Italy and Germany.  





The Italian state-owned company underwent major structural transformations 
between 1986 and 1992: the workforce was reduced to half and divisions were 
created to rationalize the management. The company was privatized in 1992 with 
the creation of Ferrovie dello Stato SpA (FS SpA), a joint stock company. 
However, the privatization was only formal, since shares were still owned by the 
Italian government. On 1 June 2000, the company’s two main divisions (service 
and infrastructure) were separated and two different independent companies were 
created: Trenitalia, responsible for transport service, and Rete Ferroviaria Italiana 
(RFI), responsible for the management of the rail infrastructure. Both companies 
are still subsidiaries of FS SpA.  
The French company Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF) – 
backed by national authorities – has shown resistance to the EU process of reform 
and over the years has intensively lobbied the European Commission to reduce 
the scope of EU regulation and push back the deadlines to comply with legal 
requirements (Drew and Ludewig, 2011). The implementation of EU reforms in 
France has been particularly slow and it was one of the last countries to transpose 
the European regulation into the national legal system. In fact, the separation 
between infrastructure management and operation management was introduced in 
1997 when Réseau Ferré de France (RFF) was created to manage the rail 
infrastructure. The legal separation between infrastructure and operations was 
introduced with an unusual condition according to which RFF was obliged to 
employ the services of SNCF’s technical infrastructure services (Drew and 
Ludewig, 2011). Moreover, rail freight competition was authorized only at the 
end of March 2006 and the opening of the international passenger transport 
market, along with the related cabotage, was introduced in early January 2010. 
RFF now operates again under the supervision of SNCF. On 1 January 2015, RFF 
became SNCF Réseau, the operational assets of SNCF became SNCF Mobilités, 
and both groups were placed under the control of SNCF. 
In Spain, in November 2003 the Law 39/2003 was approved by the national 
parliament and transposed the first railway package into legislation. This law set 
the rules for a new organizational model of the Spanish rail sector, the end of the 
monopoly held by Renfe and the market opening to competition. It separated the 
management of transport services from the management of infrastructure and 
assigned them to two independent organizations, Renfe Operadora and Adif, 
respectively. The law also defined the conditions regulating the access of railway 
undertakings to the rail transport market by establishing a licensing system 
subject to the compliance with certain requirements. According to these legal 
provisions, service operators should pay Adif a fee for infrastructure usage, as 
well as for the use of stations and other facilities. Moreover, Law 39/2003 
allowed the government to declare of public interest the provision of certain rail 
transport services financed by debt but necessary to ensure territorial cohesion in 
Spain. Finally, it establishes the gradual opening of the rail network to new 
transport companies introducing competition for the first time. From January 
2005, national and international freight were liberalized while the market opening 
for the passenger transport was postponed. In September 2015, Law 38/2015 was 
released and changed the existing track access charging system, as it was not 
considered encouraging for newcomers. With the aim of increasing use of the 
Spanish network, the new regulation abolished the annual access charge – as it 
was seen as a major entry barrier to competitors – and allowed operators to be 
charged only for capacity allocation, line usage and use of electrification systems. 
The law also set financial incentives for Public Services Obligations (PSO), and 
established separate charges for the use of gauge-changing installations, station 
and platform tracks, as well as freight terminals and other sidings.  
In Germany in 1994, two former state enterprises, Deutsche Bundesbahn and 
Deutsche Reichsbahn, were transformed into a single business enterprise 
(Deutsche Bahn AG) which – according to a new article of the German 
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constitution – was to be organized as a joint stock corporation with a privatization 
option (Drew and Ludewig, 2011). At the same time, German rail transport 
markets were opened to competition. Open access in both rail freight and 
passenger transport markets were based on provisions of the 1993 General 
Railway Act (Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz, AEG), offering open access in all 
German rail transport markets. Directive 91/440/EEC provided non-
discriminatory open access to the network infrastructure, not only for all German 
railway undertakings, but also for those coming from other EU member states. In 
April 2005, AEG was comprehensively revised by transposing the Second 
European Railway Package into the German law, also giving the Federal Network 
Agency (Bundesnetzagentur, BNA) new scopes of responsibility in the field of 
railway regulation. In 2010 the Third Railway Package entered into force and 
provided access rights for international cross-border passenger traffic. It was 
transposed into German law thanks to the fourth amendment to the General 
Railway Act, without seeking recourse from the possibility of restricting 
cabotage, and protecting parallel national public rail services – which are 
subsidized. 
Despite the formal opening of market regulation promoted by EU regulatory 
effort, the state is still a crucial actor in the four countries under examination 
(Beria et al., 2010). This is especially true for the rail passenger sector where the 
state is simultaneously the owner, planner, client and regulator. It follows that the 
transposition of EU directives often resulted in a formal process of organizational 
separation (also known as legal unbundling) based on the holding company 
model.  
In Italy, Rete Ferroviaria Italiana – network manager – and Trenitalia – service 
provider – both participate in Ferrovie dello Stato, the public holding company of 
the rail industry. A similar situation occurs in Germany where the federal state 
holds via Deutsche Bahn both DB Netz and DB Bahn. In France and in Spain – 
where the domestic market is open to competitors just for cross-border and freight 
traffic – the situation is the same: the state owns both entities.  
In France, as of 1 January 2015 SNCF and RFF merged together (and RFF was 
renamed SNCF Réseau) to form a single state-owned railway company ‘to 
strengthen and modernize the railway service in France’ (Ministère de 
l’Environnement de l’Énergie et de la Mer, 2013, p. 1). The intention is to have 
the system ready by 2019, when the network will be opened to competitors, 
including domestic traffic. 
As for planning, in all selected countries the state still represents the key player. 
Indeed, in all examined countries, investments in maintenance and network 
development often result from negotiations between the network manager and the 
public authority, with the latter determining price and investment funding. 
Germany represents a sui generis case as investments concerning the regional 
network are managed jointly with regions. 
Furthermore, in all selected cases, the state is also the client of railway 
companies. Indeed, regional traffic – which is a PSO – is subsidized everywhere 
by the states’ or regions’ budget. States’ or regions’ authorities negotiate standard 
service levels and prices with the provider. In Italy, the regulatory framework is 
stricter than anywhere else as there is no negotiation between regions and service 
providers about PSO. In this country the region can unilaterally determine the 
required service level and price that it is going to pay for the service. 
As to regulation, there are different arrangements in place between France and 
Spain, on the one hand, and Italy and Germany, on the other. Fixing prices for 
PSO is a prerogative of regional authorities in both Germany and Italy, whereas in 
France and Spain it is up to the central state. Concerning access of newcomers to 
the network, while in France and Spain the market is closed to new competitors, 
in Italy and Germany the state has the right to determine the access rules: 
particularly in Italy, the licensing rules are clearly in favour of newcomers. In 
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both Italy and Germany, slot allocation rules are still missing due to the fact that 
traffic congestion only occurs on certain links and never in profitable tracks. 
In a nutshell, in-depth insights for the selected countries show that despite formal 
improvement of market access regulation, the actual organization of the rail 
industry still relies on state-controlled structures. The state is still a crucial actor 
and is often the owner, planner, client and, eventually, the regulator. It follows 
that the EU objective of creating a single and competitive European railway 
market seems to be barely met by some member states which still prefer to 
manage rail sector-related services by using state structures instead of market 
arrangements. Beria et al. (2010) argue that this happens because national 
governments consider railways as a strategic sector playing a crucial role in the 
design and implementation of overall national industrial and economic policy. 
Nonetheless, some improvements are expected with the implementation of the 
Fourth Railway Package.  
3.3 Empirics 
In the preceding sections, we have described rail sector transformations and the 
process of opening up national state-owned monopolies through liberalization 
policies promoted by the EU. In addition, the regulatory effort through European 
legislation as part of several reform packages has been outlined in detail. We then 
focused on the status of reform implementation in Italy, France, Germany and 
Spain. 
The aim of this section is to conduct a quantitative analysis of the relationship 
between regulatory regimes prevailing in national railway sectors, on the one 
hand, and the price of rail passenger services, investment level in infrastructures 
and quality aspects, on the other. Prices and investments are addressed by an 
econometric strategy outlined below. 
3.3.1 Data and Estimation Strategy 
We merge several datasets from the OECD, European Commission and DICE 
Database to analyse the relationship between rail sector regulatory regimes and 
consumer prices for rail passenger services, as well as railway infrastructure 
investments.  
With regard to our data structure, we created a panel dataset that includes all EU 
member states (except for Malta and Cyprus as these countries do not have 
railways). Regarding the time dimension, our unbalanced
26 
dataset comprises the 
years from 1996 to 2013. Formally, we specify the following empirical estimation 
equation: 
yit = x’it β + ηi + μt + εit        
 (1) 
Subscripts i and t denote a country at a specific point in time. While yit depicts the 
dependent variable (e.g. prices for rail passenger services), x’it is a row vector that 
captures explanatory variables (e.g. regulation, passenger kilometres, consumer 
price level and gross domestic product) and β is a column vector of respective 
coefficients. The country-specific variable ηi summarizes unobserved individual 
components, μt captures time fixed effects and, finally, εit denotes the independent 
and identically distributed error term with its usual characteristics. In order to 
account for time-invariant country-specific factors, we apply the fixed effects 
                                               
26 As pointed out by Kwak (2011), missing values in a panel dataset could lead to biased 
and inconsistent results unless absence occurs completely at random. Formally, missing 
completely at random can be tested with Little’s MCAR test (Little, 1988). This test 
rejects the assumption of completely random absence in our data. Further investigation 
shows that concerns of non-random missing values arise for the group of countries 
comprising Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovenia. Although our general results are robust to the exclusion of these 
countries, prudence is necessary when applying our estimates on this group of countries. 
Further results are available upon request. 
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estimator by considering the variation within the countries over time 
(Wooldridge, 2014).  
The first dependent variable to take into account is the ‘Harmonized Consumer 
Price’ Index for rail passenger services extracted from Eurostat (European 
Commission, 2016a). This variable is crucial for our analysis as lower prices are 
commonly expected to be a result of deregulation. It should be pointed out, 
however, that estimation results relying on this harmonized price index should be 
interpreted with caution. Firstly, only a small sample of rail products that might 
not represent the general market is taken into account (European Commission, 
2016c). Secondly, railway prices at the regional level are often regulated and 
therefore largely independent from the degree of market liberalization. 
In our second model, railway infrastructure investments at current prices in 
million euros serve as the dependent variable (DICE Database, 2014). Without 
question, investments are of central importance as they are necessary for a reliable 
and competitive railway system and capture the firms’ long-term-decisions. 
Concerning our set of explanatory variables, we are primarily interested in the 
coefficients associated with the degree of regulation. The OECD’s ETCR 
indicators provide a quantitative measure of the regulatory regime in the railway 
market. These indicators cover entry regulation, public ownership, vertical 
integration as well as market structure and range between 0 and 6. Higher values 
imply tighter regulation (OECD, 2016). 
As further covariates, we add billions of travelled passenger rail kilometres, the 
overall Harmonized Consumer Price Index as well as the gross domestic product 
at current prices in billions of purchasing power parities (European Commission, 
2016a). While the former variable is included to control for demand effects, the 
latter two rule out possible endogeneity arising from the overall economic 




Table 3.1: OLS estimation of the relationship between regulatory policies and the 
price for rail passenger services
 
3.3.2 Estimation Results 
The aim of our first model is to identify the relationship between state-level 
regulatory regimes and the price for rail passenger services by including travelled 
passenger rail kilometres, the overall Harmonized Consumer Price Index as well 
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as the gross domestic product as covariates. Table 3.1 presents our results. While 
column 1 solely includes dummies for the sample of countries, column 2 also 
considers time-specific effects. 
The model presented in column 1 yields significant and negative coefficients for 
the regulatory variables of entry, public ownership and vertical integration. This 
implies that a looser regulation in these areas correlates with higher prices for rail 
passenger services. In addition, rises in the gross domestic product are also 
associated with price increases. 
When not only country but also time-specific fixed effects are considered, the 
significance and the magnitude of our coefficients change. Specifically, we find 
that the indicator for vertical integration drops to around one-quarter of its initial 
value, while the only other significant regulatory variable to remain is market 
structure – that positively correlates with the price for rail passenger services. In 
addition, travelled passenger kilometres are negatively associated with this price 
index. To summarize, we find no evidence that deregulation in the railway sector 
is associated with lower prices.  
One of the reasons for deregulating European rail sectors was the expectation that 
more competition would have increased investment expenditures (Kern et al., 
2010). Therefore, our second model examines the relationship between railway 
infrastructure investments and OECD’s regulatory indicators as well as our other 
covariates. Nevertheless, data are only available for the period between 1996 and 
2010 (DICE Database, 2014). Table 3.2 summarizes the regression results. Again, 
column 1 considers country and column 2 country as well as time-specific effects. 
The regression results show a similar pattern for both models. Specifically, lower 
levels of regulation in the fields of vertical integration, as well as market 
structure, are correlated with higher railway infrastructure investments. 
Quantitatively, a decrease in these two categories of the regulation index by one 
unit is associated with a rise in rail investments by around 360 and 175 million 
euros, respectively. In addition, decreasing overall price levels (columns 1 and 2) 
as well as a rising gross domestic product (column 2) are also associated with a 
growth in investments. These results lead to the conclusion that lower levels of 
regulation are indeed correlated with more investments. 
 
Table 3.2: OLS estimation of the relationship between regulatory policies and 





To summarize, this subsection has shown that the relation between regulation in 
the rail sector and prices for rail passenger services is far from clear, while it 
demonstrates that deregulation correlates with high levels of infrastructure 
investments. More importantly, the main finding is that there is no evidence that 
the regulatory innovations promoted by the EU are correlated with lower prices 
for final users in the member states. 
3.3.3 Quality Aspects 
Furthermore, it is important to consider differences in terms of quality of rail 
services across member states and the relationship between market liberalization 
and quality. One way of evaluating quality aspects is to measure customer 
satisfaction of rail services in general as well as actual punctuality and reliability 
in particular. These data are provided in the Flash Eurobarometer Survey FL382a 
on ‘Europeans’ Satisfaction with Rail Services’ conducted in 2012–13 (European 
Union Open Data Portal, 2015). As the Eurobarometer data on satisfaction are 
limited to the year 2012 the questions of interest can only be analysed in a static 
framework; however, we are confident that this still provides a useful insight to 
quality differences across member states.  
Figures 3.3a and 3.3b depict information on satisfaction with rail travel, service 
frequency and punctuality/reliability. 
On average, approximately half of the respondents report their level of 
satisfaction with rail travel as ‘high’ or ‘good’ (Figure 3.3a). However, one can 
notice a large variation across member states with Western European countries 
generally reporting higher levels of satisfaction. Also with respect to punctuality 
and reliability as well as service frequency, satisfaction scores vary substantially 
between member states (Figure 3.3b) (European Commission, 2016c). 
 
 
 Figure 3.3a: Satisfaction scores with rail travel and railway stations across the 
EU. Source: European Union Open Data Portal, 2015 
 
Figure 3.3b: Satisfaction scores with frequency and punctuality/reliability across 
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We also check if it is possible to find any relationship between the perception of 
quality and the state of market liberalization (Figure 3.4). While perceived 
punctuality and reliability differ considerably between countries, there is no 
significant correlation between them and the regulatory regimes as captured in the 
ETCR score. However, it should be considered that satisfaction levels might 
differ across countries for other reasons, thus not fully reflecting actual 
punctuality of train services. 
 
Figure 3.4: Correlation between ETCR and perceived punctuality and reliability 
 
In a next step, we considered the relationship between ETCR indicators and actual 
punctuality (Figure 3.5), as provided by the European Commission (2014b). 
Actual punctuality is measured as the percentage of regional and suburban trains 
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punctuality instead of perceived punctuality we find a similar relationship 
between quality and regulation as before. While the variation in actual punctuality 
across member states is less pronounced than the perceived value, once again we 
find no clear-cut correlation between punctuality and market-friendly regulatory 
regimes. It is also worth noticing that the European Commission (2016c) finds 
that punctuality and reliability rather depend on the size of the country and the 
number of passengers travelling on the line.  
 
Figure 3.5: Correlation between ETCR and actual punctuality and reliability 
 
The perception of the evolution of quality of rail services over the past years 
seems to be ambiguous on the aggregate European level. While 34 per cent of the 
surveyed persons report that the quality of rail transport has improved, 27 per cent 
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Commission, 2014a). However, this ambiguity may result from the aggregate 
perspective, as we have seen that quality, and potential changes in quality, differ 
considerably across countries.  
3.4 Conclusions  
This essay has attempted to explain and assess the process of change European 
railways have undergone over the last decades. After a brief explanation of the 
main transformations that occurred in these sectors, Section 3.2 presented the EU 
regulatory milestones in support of liberalization and offered insights on the 
implementation status of these reforms in the selected countries. Our major 
conclusion from this section is that, despite the formal improvement of market 
access regulation, in several European countries reforms achieved mixed results, 
as state-controlled structures still play a crucial role in the organization and 
management of railway industries. However, improvements could be expected for 
the future when member states will have fully transposed the Fourth Railway 
Package, adopted in 2016. In Section 3.3 we went a step further and undertook an 
empirical study of the relationship between regulatory regimes in national railway 
sectors, on the one hand, and the price of rail passenger services, investment level 
in infrastructures and quality of the service, on the other.  
As far as prices are concerned, our analysis could not find any evidence that 
liberalization reforms are correlated to lower prices for passengers. This last 
finding leads to a number of reflections. Firstly, the impact of inefficiencies on 
the prices of public- or private-led operations is not clear-cut and, drawing on 
Holmberg et al. (2009) and Florio (2013), one can assume that it largely depends 
in fact on (a) the quality of governance mechanisms in both environments and (b) 
the actual role of competition, rather than specific regulatory regimes. Secondly, 
one can suppose that reforms have not lowered prices because existing TPA 
regulations are not fully effective. This would be coherent with our findings on 
reform implementation status showing that, despite the formal improvement of 
market access regulation, in several countries the state still plays the role of 
owner, planner, client and regulator. Finally, there is a remark to be made 
regarding the political dimension of the reforms debated in this essay, as in the 
last 20 years they have not resulted in lower prices. Indeed, as noticed by Florio 
(2013), governments may have good reasons to consider rail services as essential 
to society and cast doubt on the social desirability and functioning of market 
mechanisms in the provision of these services. This is especially true for 
governments committed to ensure that household expenditure for railway services 
does not exceed a given share of their income. In this case, governments would 
consider economic accessibility of railway services a crucial political objective to 
which market logics could be eventually adapted.  
As for investments, our findings are coherent with the existing literature and 
confirm that market-friendly regulatory regimes are correlated with higher 
investment levels (Kern et al., 2010). Indeed, one of the major problems 
associated with state-owned monopolies was the low level of investments in the 
rail network: only when competition and market arrangements were introduced 
did investment flows experience new positive trends.  
Regards quality, because of data limitation, we could only analyse this aspect in a 
static framework by using 2012 Eurobarometer data on customer satisfaction of 
rail services as well as on actual punctuality and reliability. Our analysis could not 
find any significant correlation between these data and ETCR indicators on 
regulatory regimes. However, it is worth remembering that there might be other 
factors which influence customer satisfaction more clearly than regulatory 
regimes do (for example, cultural differences among countries may be associated 
with different conceptions of satisfaction). The same is true for actual punctuality 
and reliability, which rather depend on the size of the country and the number of 
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4. Synthesis: NPM reforms to national rail industries in 
Europe and the creation of one single EU market 
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The three essays presented in Part 1 of this dissertation examined how the NPM 
ideology developed through the political agendas of European national parties and 
was translated into actual reform plans by governments, in the context of 
railways. Table 1 summarizes our research questions and answers to them.   
Essays Research Questions Answers 
1 
Have NPM reforms 





party political life; or, 
conversely, have these 
reforms been 
characterized by a 
growing political 
profile over time? 
NPM ideas have been spreading in the 
electoral programs of Western European 
parties from the late-1970s onwards, mainly 
due to the commitment of New Right 
neoliberal forces. Later in the 1990s, 
following the fall of Soviet Union and the 
decline of socialist ideas, also Eastern 
European parties opened their electoral 
programs to NPM reforms. The commitment 
here was more bipartisan.   
2 




national parties used 
NPM ideas to 
compose their 
electoral manifestos?  
NPM ideas have been spreading across the 
electoral programs of EU’s national parties 
mainly due to the political commitment of 
right-wing forces operating in national 
contexts of fiscal stress and poor 
governmental action. These parties were 
responding to the demands of a new majority 
of tax-conscious voters with increasingly high 
revenues, who urged their governments to 
decrease public spending and downsize 
centralized administrations. 
3 
What is the effect of 
EU-driven NPM 
reforms on prices, 
quality and 
investments in the rail 
services sector?  
While NPM reforms to railways do not entail 
any clear-cut improvement in terms of 
welfare for the EU citizens (prices and 
quality), they have clearily contributed to 
generate new infrastructure investments.  
Table 1 – Part 1 - Findings summary 
In essay 1 and 2, we primarily focused on the relationship between NPM reforms, 
political ideology and public expressions of support for these reforms by 
European political parties. Then, in essay 3 we narrowed the focus on the 
implementation of NPM reforms in the rail sector by investigating their effects on 
user prices, service quality and infrastructure investments.  
4.1 ‘A spectre is haunting Europe’: NPM ideas across the European party 
manifestos 
Our findings in essay 1 show that, from the 1950s onwards, NPM ideas have been 
spreading in the political agendas of Western European parties by following a 
stage model of incubation (1950-1960), growth (1970-1990) and maturity (1990-
2010). We suggest that these values coalesced into a homogeneous system of 
beliefs during the 1950s and 1960s with the rise of new institutional economics 
and public choice theory (Downs 1957, Niskanen 1971, Buchanan 1972). 
Drawing on Hayek’s and Mises’ economic philosophy, these new economic 
disciplines increasingly advocated the primacy of market institutions over state 
bureaucracies in the economy of the public sector. However, these ideas had no 
appeal for political parties’ agendas until the 1970s when Keynes’ economic 
theory came to be considered outdated as it could not explain stagflation, a 
combination of inflation and long-term unemployment (de Vries 2010). These 
problems led to a rethinking of state-led development: “by the late 1970s there 
was increasing criticism by the New Right neoliberals of the size, cost and the 
role of government, and doubts about the capacity of governments to rectify 
economic problems. The Keynesian welfare state was seen as a monopoly 
provider of services and as fundamentally inefficient.” (Larbi 1999: 13). 
Therefore, in the 1980s, a “striking international trend” (Hood 1991) of reform 
initiatives took place in several Western countries with the aim of modernizing 
the public sector through the use of private sector techniques and market based 
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strategies grounded on efficiency and effectiveness (Pollitt 1990, Ridley 1996). 
From the 1990s onwards, the NPM paradigm was widely accepted as the "gold 
standard for administrative reform" (Peter 1997: 71) not only in the Western 
Europe but also in the Eastern one. Following the fall of Soviet Union and the 
decline of socialist ideas, Eastern European parties turned to the West and, 
namely, to the EU. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, they opened their political 
agendas to NPM reforms. Regardless of their political orientation, national parties 
in many Eastern European countries increasingly declared their support for these 
reforms. We explained this homogenization of party supply by two reasons. 
Firstly, vis-à-vis the uncertainty generated by the transition from socialism to 
capitalism, political and economic models of the EU’s member states were seen 
as normatively ‘superior’ and readily transferable to displace pre-existing 
‘inferior’ models (Hughes et al. 2005). Secondly, European integration policies 
also played a key role as EU’s conditionality in public-administration 
development was particularly emphasized during the two Eastern enlargements in 
2004 and 2007 (Drechsler and Randma-Liiv 2014). Accession countries from 
Eastern Europe were indeed requested to systematically demonstrate their 
administrative capacity to effectively apply EU regulation in order to obtain their 
EU membership (Dimitrova 2002, Meyer-Sahling 2011).  
4.2 Top-down pressures for change: the NPM model and the enactment of 
the EU’s soft regulation by national parties in the Member States 
In essay 2 we explain that the supranational pressures of EU integration policies 
have been crucial also for the diffusion of NPM ideas across the political agendas 
of Western European countries. Indeed, since the 1950s these countries have been 
experiencing the creation of new supranational powers – the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM), the European Economic Community (EEC) and, most recently, the 
EU - that have come to coexist with traditional powers of nation states. These 
traditional powers, which used to be wielded individually by the European nation 
states as an exercise of sovereign prerogatives, came progressively to be shared at 
a supranational level with other states through a neoliberal market process of 
institutional integration (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001, Ney 2001). While the market 
was becoming a unifying benchmark, national barriers began to fall (Nizzò 1999).  
Since the late 1970s, this process of neoliberal integration at the supranational 
level has been leading to a reorganization of national public sectors on the basis 
of NPM models. The aim was to (1) reduce the public expenditure, and (2) 
promote liberalization and privatization policies in the provision of public 
services. During the 1990s, with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty functioning 
as an external pressure for budget restrictions at the state level (Pollitt et al., 
2007), this restructuring process intensified and EU institutions strengthened their 
commitment to the diffusion of the NPM model across the Member States (Bauby 
2008, Bognetti and Obermann 2008, Clifton et al. 2011). The European 
Commission chose to transpose the NPM model into the national administrative 
systems without establishing binding pan-European rules, but rather by using 
instruments of soft regulation (Mény, 1993; Page and Wouters, 1995; Spanou, 
1998; Della Cananea, 2004, Eichengreen, 2008). These instruments were aimed at 
“re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the extent that [EU] political 
and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national 
politics and policy making” (Ladrech, 1994: 69).  
Vis-à-vis these instruments of soft regulation, national parties have been playing a 
crucial role by: (1) absorbing the NPM values into their ideological platforms and 
build electoral consensus around them; and - once in power – (2) transforming 
them into executive reform plans (Gafney, 1996; Ladrech, 2001). Our findings in 
essay 2 suggest that NPM reform ideas have been spreading across the national 
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political agendas of the EU’s Member States mainly due to the political 
commitment of right-wing parties operating in national contexts of fiscal stress 
and ineffective governmental action. These parties were responding to the 
demands of a new majority of tax-conscious voters with increasingly high 
revenues, who urged their governments to decrease public spending and downsize 
centralized administrations. 
4.3 Towards one single European rail market: NPM reforms to railways and 
the accomplishment of the trans-European transport network  
Over the past fifty years, NPM reforms to government have been encouraging the 
deregulation of public enterprises and, in so doing, have sought to reduce the role 
of the State in production and service delivery. As explained by the United 
Nations (2001: 32), the emphasis of these reforms has been “on maintaining 
macro-economic stability, lowering inflation, cutting deficit spending, and 
reducing the scope and cost of government”.   
In Europe, many state-owned enterprises have undergone a profound 
restructuration process due to liberalization reforms promoted at the supranational 
level by EU institutions. As explained by Florio (2013: 5–8), network industries – 
in the transport, energy and telecommunication sectors – have been at the 
forefront of change: “Elsewhere, in the USA, Latin America, Asia, and in 
formerly planned economies, there have been similar reforms, but perhaps 
nowhere have they been so consistently implemented as in the European Union. 
In the past two decades, first in the UK, then subsequently in all the other EU 
member states, governments have increasingly moved away from the direct 
provision of public services, from ownership of utilities, and from franchised 
monopolies. Ministries and independent regulators have shown a greater reliance 
on market mechanisms, and now consider the network service providers as 
market players […], the critical mass for the policy shift was achieved in the 
1980s, after the social and political upheavals of the 1970s and the severe oil 
shocks that destabilized public finances”.  
In essay 3, we have focused on EU-driven reforms of national rail industries. In 
the post-war period, the traditional organization of most European railways was 
that of a vertically integrated state-owned monopoly. During this period, the rail 
sector was managed as a natural monopoly because of the high fixed costs 
associated with providing infrastructure and the importance of offering affordable 
and attractive public transport to all income groups (Drew and Ludewig, 2011). 
Things started to change in the mid-1980s, when the new European Commission 
took place (on 7 January 1985) with the French Jacques Delors as President.  
Following a complaint from the European Parliament (supported by the European 
Commission), on 22 May 1985 a ruling of the European Court of Justice urged 
the governments of the Member to act on transport policy and support the 
liberalization of European transport markets. The Court insisted that national and 
international services – for both passengers and freight transport - be opened up to 
competition. The following year, on 17-28 February 1986, the governments of 12 
Member States
27
 signed the Single European Act (SEA), setting the objective of 
establishing a single market by 31 December 1992. Having the SEA as juridical 
basis, the European Commission planned to adopt around 300 directives to 
dismantle the physical, political and fiscal barriers to the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and people (so called “four fundamental freedoms” in the 
reformers‘ rhetoric). Rail transport services for passengers and freight were both 
part of this ambitious reform plan, which went a step further in 1992 with the 
approval of the Maastricht Treaty – aiming at the creation of a single transport 
market in the EU.  
                                               
27 Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, Greece, Spain and Portugal 
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Within this framework, from the early-1990s onwards, the EU committed to an 
intense regulatory production aimed at creating one single, efficient and 
competitive European market of rail services throughout Europe. These 
regulations had the threefold objective of: (1) unbundling infrastructure 
management and service operations; (2) opening the European market to 
competition by liberalizing the provision of rail services; and (3) promoting 
interoperability and technical harmonization to encourage the development of an 
integrated rail system acting as physical basis for a single European rail market.    
Essay 3 of this dissertation focused on the implementation of these regulations 
across the Member States, by estimating how much value these regulatory 
innovations have created for the European society. We thus examined to which 
extent the adoption of above-mentioned regulatory regimes by a country of the 
EU is associated with an improvement of user prices and quality of the service – 
on the one hand -, and investments in new infrastructures - on the other. In fact, as 
suggested by Florio (2013), governments may have good reasons to consider rail 
services as essential to society and adopt the NPM model by having in mind 
positive impacts on the national welfare (e.g. lower prices and better quality for 
citizens). According to our empirical analysis, there is no straight evidence that 
these reforms are correlated to lower prices and better quality. Conversely, we 
find a positive correlation with higher investments in railway infrastructures. Our 
results suggest that while NPM reforms to railways do not have any clear-cut 
positive effect in terms of welfare for the EU citizens, they have contributed to 
generate new infrastructure investments. More studies are needed in the future to 
investigate these emergent propositions.  
To better understand these findings, it is worth remembering that a key innovation 
of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was Article 129b, establishing the Trans-European 
Network – Transport (TEN-T) policy28. The governments of the Member States 
introduced this policy in the Treaty to enable new infrastructure investments 
(within their domestic contexts) for the creation of a single European rail area, 
without internal frontiers. TEN-T was crucial for the accomplishment of ongoing 
liberalization reforms. These were, in fact, strictly connected to the removal of 
physical and technical barriers between EU Member States to allow trains to 
travel frictionless across national borders. For example, with international trains it 
was usually the case that the engine had to be changed at the frontier station. In 
especially difficult cases passengers had to change trains or goods had to be 
reloaded. There was thus a need to harmonize the national infrastructure systems 
because of differences in platform heights and command systems. In the railway 
sector different gauge widths, electrification standards and safety and signaling 
systems made it more difficult and more costly to run a train from one country to 
another. In this situation, the European transport market was fragmented - and no 
liberalization initiative could be really effective - because each national transport 
network could be used only by those operators having a rolling stock apparatus 
complying with the national market standards. 
To remove these barriers, in 1996 the European Commission established the 
TEN-T program. Thanks to this program, the EU made available billions of euros 
to the governments of the Member States
29
 to construct new infrastructures, 
contributing to the creation of one single interoperable trans-European rail 
network.  
                                               
28 Article 129b of the “Treaty of Maastricht on European Union” (1992): “[…] the 
Community shall contribute to the establishment and development of trans-European 
networks in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures.” 
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Since the late-1970s NPM reforms have increasingly spread throughout the 
European public sectors. The logic underneath these reform efforts was based on 
the belief that the public sector works better when public administrative bodies 
are oriented toward outputs, rather than being focused on processes. A growing 
body of empirical literature have criticized the organizational practices introduced 
with these reforms because of: (1) their inappropriate likening of the public sector 
to the private one (DeLeon and Denhardt, 2000; Hefetz and Warner, 2004; 
McCabe and Vinzant, 1999; Rocha and De Araujo, 2007) and (2) the fact that 
NPM models have led to positive outcomes such as gains in effectiveness and 
efficiency but also to negative outcomes such as losses of equity, citizenship, and 
accountability (Boyne, 1998; Kettl, 1993; Morgan and England, 1988; Romzek, 
2000).  
A stream of the literature (Olvera and Avellaneda 2017) has focused on the 
Performance Management Systems (PMSs) which, riding the wave on NPM 
reforms, have spread in many countries, across various policy areas and at every 
level of government. However, Radin (2006) suggests that PMSs performance 
values conflict with the democratic values of a country because their evaluation 
criteria rely on simplistic, one-size-fits-all solutions that do not correspond to the 
dynamic reality of public organizations.  
Olvera and Avellaneda (2017) explain that PMSs are expected to improve the 
performance of government actions. But – as the authors point out - this 
expectation is based on a rational perspective of organizational performance, 
according to which organizational effectiveness has to do with the achievement of 
organizational goals through design and management (Rainey, 2014). The key 
rationalist assumption underpinning these systems is that PMSs can help improve 
performance by providing public managers with proper information about the 
level of goal achievement, so they can use this information to determine a strategy 
that would help accomplish their goals. Provided with this information, managers 
may opt for continuing, modifying, or terminating any organizational process or 
feature in order to improve performance. Strategy, goals, structure, resource 
allocation, and human resource reallocation are some of the organizational 
features that managers may target.   
However, already in the 1970s, behavioral scholars (e.g. Mintzberg 1979) 
criticized rationalism as a basis for strategy-making as, in the real world, strategy 
is rarely the result of one-off planned decisions. It is rather the outcome of a 
process shaped by conflicting interests, politics and organizational culture. They 
thus defined strategy as a ‘pattern in a stream of decisions’ in contrast with the 
earlier view of ‘strategy as planning’ (Miller and Friesen 1982, Mintzberg and 
Waters 1985). Their seminal works shifted the research focus from the strategy 
content (formulation of planned goals and performance measurement) to the 
strategy process. In their language, a process is a sequence of events that lead to 
an outcome (Peterson 1998, Sminia 2009) and has to be studied in its 
organizational, societal and political context (Pettigrew 1985, 1987, Van de Ven 
et al. 1999).   
In a similar vein, the most recent Strategy as Practice school has suggested that 
strategic decisions are not simply taken at the top of organizations and 
implemented down through hierarchies; rather, they are influenced by many intra- 
and extra-organizational members whose behaviors shape the process that gives 
rise to the strategy. From this perspective, March and Sutton (1997) have 
highlighted the heuristic dangers and limitations of studies which explain 
organizational performance in terms of unitary measures and by assuming 
causally related explanatory variables. Johnson et al. (2007) concur and argue that 
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it makes little sense to explain performance of organizations as wholes if we do 
not understand well the components of performance. They rather suggest looking 
at performance in conjunction with people behavior, the way they interact and 
enact institutional and organizational practices. They thus acknowledge that 
strategy is rarely the result of one-off planned decisions, but rather is the outcome 
of complex processes characterized by a plurality of levels of analysis, actors and 
dependent variables. Therefore, they suggest that it might be difficult to 
understand such an organizational complexity through singular theoretical lenses. 
We may need to employ multiple theoretical lenses. The lack of new research 
approaches integrating multiple theoretical traditions situates the study of strategy 
in a vacuum. From a theoretical standpoint, this proposal addresses this lacuna 
and explores the possibility of developing an interdisciplinary analytical 
framework enabling researchers to integrate multiple theoretical traditions to 
understand strategy. 
There exist few examples of research initiatives (Allison 1971; Addicott and 
Ferlie 2007) utilising multiple theories to study decision-making and strategic 
change. In this regard, Pichault (2013) stresses the need for integrated 
multidimensional models allowing researchers to mobilise multiple theories and 
grasp the multifaceted nature of strategic change. He considers that the 
contextualist research tradition developed by Pettigrew (1987) is well-suited to 
this end: “Contextualism is not an explanatory approach strictly speaking: rather, 
it proposes a general analytical framework which different approaches may fit 
into. It places the emphasis on three key concepts and their interrelations: content, 
context and process” (Pichault 2013: 68). 
Interpreting strategic change: the contextualist framework of analysis  
As pointed out by Pettigrew and Whipp (1991), when researchers apply the 
contextualist framework to study strategic change, their analysis must distinguish 
between three dimensions of change: content, process and context. The content 
refers to what is changed as expressed in terms of objectives, purpose and goals of 
change. The process refers to how change is implemented, whereas the context 
refers to the internal and external environment where change is implemented. 
Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) emphasize the continuous interplay between these 
dimensions and hold that change is an iterative and cumulative process. 
Therefore, in Part 2 of this PhD dissertation, we adopt three different theoretical 
lenses to interpret the different levels of content-context-process interactions 
(Figure P2I.1).     
 
Figure P2I.1 – Theoretical design of Part 2 of the PhD dissertation  
We use the lens of Foucault’s theory of power to study the context-process 
relationship. As suggested by Berdayes (2002), the Foucauldian theory provides 
useful insights into the nature of managerial power by shedding light on those 
inter- and intra-organisational ties which constrain individual and collective 
behaviour in organisations. For Michel Foucault power is never conceived as 
monolithic or autonomous, but rather is a matter of superficially stable structures 
emerging on the basis of constantly shifting relations underneath, caused by an 
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unending struggle between actors. He thus adopts an infinitely complex and open-
ended notion of power and asks how power is exercised and what its effects are, 
not why. As explained by McKinlay and Pezet (2017), Foucault’s intention is to 
redefine the object of study from the motives and politics of governing elites to 
their techniques of governing. A stream of this research tradition (Miller and Rose 
1990, Lemke 2001) suggests looking at ‘intellectual technologies’ as key 
mechanisms mobilized by governors to shape the behavior of a population. Miller 
and Rose (1990: 6-7) argue that “all government depends on a particular mode of 
‘representation’: the elaboration of a language for depicting the domain in 
question that claims both to grasp the nature of that reality represented, and 
literally to represent it in a form amenable to political deliberation, argument and 
scheming. […] Before one can seek to manage a domain such as an economy it is 
first necessary to conceptualize a set of processes and relations as an economy 
which is amenable to management. […] It is through language that governmental 
fields are composed, rendered thinkable and manageable”. According to these 
authors, language itself is a technology. It is indeed an ‘intellectual technology’ 
providing a mechanism for rendering reality amenable to certain kind of actions. 
Specifically, it allows governors to translate events and phenomena to which 
government is to be applied into information such as written reports, drawings, 
pictures, charts, graphs, and statistics. Plans and programs of government also 
depend on these devices used for the inscription of reality in a form that 
governors can debate and diagnose. 
We use the lens of neo-institutionalism (i.e. Di Maggio and Powell 1983, Powell 
and Di Maggio 1991) to study the context-content relationship. This theoretical 
framework focuses on why and how organizations behave in a certain way within 
a given context. Neo-institutionalism views organizations as institutions which 
operate in an open environment consisting of other institutions: this open 
environment is called the institutional field. Because of institutional peer pressure, 
every institution is influenced by the broader environment of the field. The main 
goal of organizations is to survive in this environment and, to do so, not only they 
need to succeed economically, they also have to establish legitimacy within the 
world of institutions. Nevertheless, while the initial focus of neo-institutionalism 
was on how institutions guide action, over time researchers have more and more 
showed that action is able to manipulate institutional parameters (Holm 1995). 
Therefore, the stream of institutional work theorists (e.g. Lawrence and Suddaby 
2006) has suggested shifting the focus of analysis on the work of actors as they 
attempt to create, maintain and disrupt the institutional environment. We thus 
suggest that mobilizing neo-institutionalist theories within the contextualist 
framework may help understanding how contextual roles shape change. 
We use the lens of Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1991) justification theory to 
investigate the process-content relationship. This theory provides a deep 
understanding of actors’ practices within organizational processes. It offers 
insights into situated disputes and the different forms of conflict which are likely 
to emerge among actors: it provides a very fine theorisation of the agreements, 
critiques and crises in which these actors may be involved. This lens is 
particularly important to understand the dynamics of disputes and agreements 
between collective entities with competing moral evaluations of the ongoing 
change project. On the one hand, this theory focuses on actors’ discursive 
justifications about their practices and, therefore, allows understanding the 
multiple moral stances which compete in a controversy. On the other, it provides 
a taxonomy of practices that actors may deploy to solve a controversy. Actors 
may either make agreements with actors espousing competing moral stances (tests 
and compromises) or just drop the dispute without making any agreement 
(domination, forgiveness and forgetting).  
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The TEN-T program 
We choose as empirical context the TEN-T program. We explain this choice by 
two main arguments. Firstly, TEN-T is strictly intertwined with the EU-driven 
implementation of NPM reforms to national rail industries in Europe. Secondly, 
when looking at the organizational design of TEN-T, we find several elements 










and ‘hard look' 
at objectives 
Strategic Action Plan (SAP) - the SAP is a project 
management document which identifies the objectives (in 
the sense of activities to be carried out by TEN-T funding 
beneficiaries) and the associated resources, timeline and 
dependencies. It is used to: 
1. Monitor performance, in the sense of project 
progress against the plan 
2. Provide decision-makers with all relevant 
information concerning deviation from plan, and 
their impact  
 
Mid-Term Review - it is a mid-term assessment of the 
performance of the TEN-T program. It aims to:  
1. Evaluate the methods of carrying out projects as 
well as the impact of their implementation taking 
into account the stated objectives of the TEN-T 
Programme.   
3. Formulate  overall conclusions  and  
recommendations  on  the  implementation  of  the  
TEN-T  Programme  with  a view  of  providing  
input  to  the  revision  of  the  TEN-T  Programme  






Annual Status Report (ASR) - the ASR is an annual report 
submitted by the organization implementing a TEN-T-
funded project to the INEA, an executive agency of the 
European Commission. It provides information on the 
technical progress of the project against the initial plan, and 
the associated budget consumption. It is the main document 
used by the INEA to assess progress. For multi-annual 
projects, the ASR serves as the basis for deciding whether 








European Coordinators - the European Commission 
nominated nine European Coordinators, each of them 
responsible for the implementation of one of the nine 
transport axes (so called ‘corridors’) composing the core of 
the trans-European transport network. European 
Coordinators are chosen based on their knowledge of issues 
related to transport and financing, as well as on their 
experience of European institutions. As a general rule, they 
are not nationals of Member States whose territory is 
directly affected by a project. They act in the name of the 
European Commission and on its behalf Their role is to 
supervise and ensure the timely implementation of the 
projects for which they are responsible. Their key tasks are:  
1. Drawing up the relevant corridor work plan   
2. Supporting and monitoring implementation of the 
work plan. 
More stress on 
discipline in 
resource use 
Use it or lose it principle - where projects are no longer 
meeting their planned objectives then EU funding must be 
cut and re-allocated so the European Commission makes 
best use of the limited resources. This rule is called "use it 
or lose it principle". Either TEN-T beneficiaries use the 
money as planned in agreement with the European 
Commission or they lose the money. 
Table P2I.1 – The NPM dimensions of TEN-T 
Transport services are very important as they provide for the movement of over 
700 million people and associated freight (United Nations 2009). Politically, 
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Europe is divided into about fifty sovereign states. This politico-geographical 
fragmentation - along with the increasing movement of people and freight due to 
the deepening process of economic integration - has led to a strong cooperation 
between European countries in developing and maintaining transport networks. 
Since the 1950s, the EU has put much effort to develop international standards 
and agreements that allow people and freight to cross the borders of Europe. The 
creation of the Schengen Area has enabled border control-free travel between 26 
European countries. Freight transportation has favored a high level of intermodal 
compatibility, whereas the European Economic Area has allowed for the free 
movement of goods across 30 states. 
In the early-1990s the EU decided to set up the TEN-T policy, an infrastructure 
policy at supranational level with the overall aim of improving the functioning of 
the internal market through continuous and efficient transnational networks in 
transport flows. TEN-T goal was to interconnect national infrastructure networks 
and ensure their interoperability by setting standards which could remove 
transnational technical barriers, such as incompatible standards for railway traffic. 
It was designed to promote and strengthen seamless transport chains for passenger 
and freight, while keeping up with the latest technological trends such as High-
Speed Railway (HSR) technology in the rail sector. 
The urgent need for a trans-European transport infrastructure policy was clear 
since the mid-1980s when the EU initiated the liberalization of transport services 
at the European level. In the following years, the European Commission 
undertook an intensive regulatory effort (Directive 91/440 and four railway 
packages in 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2016) aimed at reforming the national transport 
systems with the purpose of opening existing state-owned monopolies to 
international competition. As already mentioned, a core aspect of this reform 
process was the promotion of interoperability across national transport networks. 
Within this reform context, in 1996 the EU established the TEN-T program, an 
EU-level investment program providing financial resources and legal rules to 
realize a list of infrastructure projects representing the backbone of the future 
trans-European transport network.  
Through time, the accomplishment of TEN-T- programmed infrastructure projects 
has proved to be very difficult and, thus, has fallen behind the initial development 
plans. Major problems were about the technical difficulties related to the 
construction works of such large infrastructure projects, lack of political support 
by various national authorities and oppositions by local communities within the 
Member States. Due to these problems, the EU authorities have been delaying the 
official deadline for the completion of programmed projects several times. The 
1996 initial deadline was 2010. Then, in 2001 it was delayed to 2020. In 2014 it 
was further delayed to 2030. 
To solve these problems, the EU authorities have introduced a number of 
managerial innovations. EU-level criteria for the selection of projects to be 
funded by the TEN-T budget have become stricter. Project submitted for EU 
funding are required to be not only relevant to the achievement of TEN-T policy 
objectives but also mature. This means that candidate projects should have 
received formal approval at all levels within the Member States: i.e., enjoy 
political commitment, have completed all necessary public consultations, is ready 
to start from a technical point of view, has received all building permits, can show 
that its various procurement procedures are well advanced, has all necessary 
financial resources committed and has identified all possible risks. Additionally, 
in the mid-2000s, several EU-level managers (so called “European Coordinators”) 
were introduced to facilitate the coordination among industry and concerned 
public authorities within the Member States in order to the timely 
accomplishment of funded projects at national levels. In a similar vein, tools to 
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monitor and assess the performance of these projects have been strengthened 
through time by the European Commission to better steer the effective 
achievement of planned objectives.  
At the local level, these managerial innovations have been accompanied by the 
increasing opposition of local communities in several Members States concerned 
by the implementation of TEN-T-funded projects: Italy and France (Lyon-Turin 
project), Germany (Stuttgart project), Spain (Basque Y project), UK (HS2 
project). In 2010, these local oppositions have joined efforts by creating a trans-
national movement called “Forum Against Unnecessary and Imposed Mega 
Projects”. From their viewpoints, opposition groups consider these projects (1) 
unnecessary, because they do not respond to the real needs of populations but 
divert public money to investment initiatives that mainly benefits market and 
corporate interests while destabilizing national welfare systems and harming the 
environment and society; and, (2) imposed, because populations are excluded 
from the decision making process with governments and public administrations 
operating in obscurity and treating proposals by citizens with contempt. 
The Lyon-Turin (LT) project is certainly the most emblematic of existing 
opposition movements. For more than 20 years, the local communities of the Susa 
Valley (near Turin), backed by the local authorities, have blocked the project 
implementation with “a protest of epic tenacity and occasional violence” (Hooper, 
2012). Since 2012, protests have developed also in France (departments of Rhône, 
Isère and Savoie). The core argument of Italian and French oppositions was that 
the project is useless - because many studies other than those produced by the 
project promoters showed that traffic flows are decreasing between Italy and 
France – and undemocratic - because it has been imposed from the top by the 
European Commission and the national governments without any adequate 
involvement of local communities.  
Presentation of the Lyon-Turin project 
LT is a TEN-T-planned 270 km-long HSR line that will connect Lyon (in east-
central France) and Turin (in northern Italy). It will substitute the exiting line 
which, on the contrary, is not designed for the circulation of HSR trains. The core 
of the project is a 57 kilometres base tunnel crossing the Alps between Susa 
valley in Italy and Maurienne in France. Thanks to the base tunnel, the planned 
line will dramatically reduce the gradient line of railway connections between 
Lyon and Turin from the 1200m height of the historical to 400m. Thanks to this 
reduction of the gradient line transport operations will improve and power costs 
will decrease. Additionally, the adoption of a HSR technology will allow trains to 
move at 220 km/h. In so doing, the quality of transport services between Italy and 
France will improve as people and goods will move faster and more efficiently.  
From a project management point of view, the line has been divided into three 
sections, implemented under distinct, albeit interconnected, managements: (1) the 
French section between the Lyon outskirts and Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, 
managed by Réseau Ferré de France (RFF), the owner and manager of France's 
railway network that in 2015 was placed under the control of Société Nationale 
des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF) with the name SNCF-Réseau; (2) the 
Italian section between Bussoleno (in the Susa Valley) and the Turin, managed by 
Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI), a subsidiary of Ferrovie dello Stato (FS); (3) the 
Franco-Italian cross-border section between Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne in Savoie 
and Bussoleno, managed by  Lyon Turin Ferroviaire (LTF) - a joint venture of 
RFF and RFI -, then replaced in 2015 by Tunnel Euralpin Lyon Turin (TELT) - a 
joint venture of SNCF and RFI
30
. 
Civil engineering works started in early-2000s with the construction of access 
points and geological reconnaissance tunneling, whereas the actual construction 
                                               
30 Annex 1 provides the full list of acronyms used in this dissertation 
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of the base tunnel was initially planned to start between 2014 and 2015. 
Nevertheless, throughout the mid-2000s and early-2010s, local oppositions 
intensified in both countries and imposed delays on the project management 
agenda. These were particularly strong in Italy where local opposition groups 
occupied the construction site of the geological reconnaissance tunnel as a form 
of protest. Because of increasing delays, the European Commission put pressure 
on the Italian and French governments by informing them to reduce TEN-T’s 
financial support to LT, if the timely implementation of the project could not be 
assured. Local oppositions did not stop and delays increased. On occasion of the 
2010 performance assessment of TEN-T-funded projects, the European 
Commission decided to cut approximately €9.2 million to LT and imposed a 
number of conditions to the project promoters, among which to start the 
excavation works of the reconnaissance tunnel in Italy by 2011.  
Local oppositions did not stop in both countries. On the Italian side opponents 
occupied again the construction site of the reconnaissance tunnel. As a response, 
in 2012 the Italian government approved Law 183 which, among others, declared 
LT a project of strategic priority to be realized in the name of national interest.  
This law created the juridical conditions for the Italian government to militarily 
occupy the construction site of the reconnaissance tunnel and prevent any future 
protest which could delay further the accomplishment of the planned agenda. At 
the same time, in both countries LTF – the constructor company in charge of the 
construction of the geological reconnaissance tunnels - pressed charges against 
local activists to discourage any future opposition.   
In 2015 the national governments signed an international agreement proving their 
intention to go ahead with the project despite existing oppositions. The same year 
they submitted a new request of funds to the EU. According to most recent 
information (Agence France Presse, 2017), the construction of the base tunnel is 
planned to start in 2018.  
The following tables (P2I.2a, P2I.2b and P2I.2c) and figures (P2I.2a, P2I.2b and 
P2I.2c) summarize the story of LT across contexts and time. More specifically, 
these provide a periodization of the project implementation process taking into 
account, at the same time, the French, Italian and EU contexts.  
Table and figure P2I.2a provide a synoptic story of LT in the 1990s (Period 1), 
whereas tables and figures P2I.2b and P2I.2c provide a synoptic story of LT 
respectively in the 2000s (Period 2) and 2010s (Period 3).    
The three figures below are based on the fieldwork notes and sketches made by 
the author during his fieldwork period. With the support of a graphic facilitator
31
, 
the sketches were processed until reaching the form they have now in the text. 
                                               
31 These figures, as they now appear in the text, were realized with the support of Carlotta 
















In the late-1980s, SNCFS’s planning 
department launches some studies on 
LT. In the early-1990s SNCF includes 
LT in the national masterplan of HSR 
lines. Throughout the 1990s, regional 
and local authorities promote new 
studies and public meetings with the 
civil society concerned by the project. 
During these meetings the project 
promoters discuss the socio-economic 
interest of LT with the local 
communities.   
In the late-1980s FS does not consider LT 
a strategic priority. Nevertheless, in the 
early-1990s the lobbying of Tecnocity 
leads central and regional authorities to 
support the project. After restructuring the 
top-management of FS, the government 
commits to the construction of a national 
plan of HSR lines. LT is included in this 
plan but the local civil society concerned 
by the project protests. Local communities 
contest the socio-economic interest of LT 
and claim more participation in decision-
making.  
In the early-1990, the approval of 
the Maastricht Treaty leads the 
European Commission to introduce 
the TEN-T policy. It provides 
financial incentives to stimulate 
Member States’ investments in the 
construction of the trans-European 
transport network. This is a supra-
national plan of strategic 
infrastructure projects to be 
accomplished by 2010. LT is in the 
list of planned projects. 














































The government and SNCF timely 
accomplish planned preliminary works, 
while the local communities are 
regularly consulted in the framework of 
the public inquiry procedure. Even 
though, in 2003 an independent 
administrative (CGPC) body releases a 
report that casts doubt on the socio-
economic interest, project promoters do 
not stop implementing LT. 
The government approves Law 443/01. 
Thanks to this law, all the decision-
making power of LT is concentrated in 
the hands of a governmental body (CIPE), 
with little involvement of local 
communities. Protests explode in the Susa 
Valley and delay the accomplishment of 
preliminary works. The turmoil of these 
events leads the government to appoint an 
extra-ordinary commissioner in charge of 
organizing public consultations between 
project promoters and local communities 
to discuss the socio-economic interest of 
LT. The consultations take long and 
planned preliminary works cannot start. 
TEN-T authorities put pressure on 
national authorities to take up the 
implementation again in accordance 
with the planned agenda otherwise 
financial support to the project 
might be reduced and earmarked to 
support better-performing projects. 
Subsequently, the Italian extra-
ordinary commissioner unilaterally 
adopts the “Pracatinat Agreement”. 
This document imposes that public 
consultations shift their focus from 
debating the socio-economic 
interest of LT to its 
implementation. 
Table P2I.2b – Period 2 of LT implementation in France, Italy and EU 















































In 2012 a second independent administrative 
body (CdC) releases a report casting doubts 
on LT socio-economic interest. Following the 
emergence of a new leader, local 
communities protest against LT. They claim 
that the data used for the socio-economic 
studies were inaccurate whereas the past 
consultations were not transparent enough. 
Nevertheless, the government considers these 
requests incompatible with the 
implementation status of LT and confirms the 
construction of the base tunnel. Protests 
increase and, in 2014, LTF files a claim for 
defamation against the leader of local 
opposition groups. 
Local protests increase and 
threaten again the timely 
completion of the preliminary 
works. Subsequently, the 
government approves Law 
183/2011 creating the legal 
conditions to mobilize 
permanently the army in the Susa 
Valley. Therefore, the 
construction site of LT is 
militarily occupied and LTF can 
start the works. However protests 
do not stop and LTF files claims 
for sabotage against those who 
oppose LT. 
The European Commission conducts the 
mid-term review to assess the 
performance of TEN-T projects. 
Because of delays on the Italian side of 
the project, LT performance is 
considered under-effective. 
Subsequently, the Commission partially 
reduces its financial support to LT and 
extends the remaining part of the funds 
under specific implementing conditions. 
At the same time, it establishes the 
corridor forum, a transnational 
governance body allowing the EU to 
better coordinate with national project 
promoters and steer more effectively the 
performance of TEN-T projects. 

































Data collection and methods 
Data for this part of the research are based on an extensive qualitative database 
(Yin 2014) of semi-structured interviews and documents - press releases, 
agreements, policy papers, third-parties studies and reports - covering a period 
from 1985 to 2016. They have been collected during a fieldwork which lasted 3 
years, from 2014 to 2016.    
Since LT is a transnational investment project articulating across different 
jurisdictions (France, Italy and EU) and organizational entities (e.g. governments, 
public administrative bodies, industry, lobbies, civil society) data collection was 
designed on the basis of an embedded case study methodology allowing dealing 
with phenomena characterized by more than one sub-unit of analysis (Yin 2014). 
Following this methodological framework, 79 semi-structured interviews
32
 were 
conducted between 2014 and 2016 with actors playing a role in the governance of 
the LT project. Interviews were guided by a conceptual grid of information 
collection using a three-layer approach where individual functions, organizations’ 
roles and the overall system of project governance were separately, albeit 
interdependently, examined. Semi-structured interviews averaged 90 minutes and 
included 4 typologies of actors: 1) project promoters, 2) public institutional 
actors, 3) lobbyists, 4) local communities. For the sake of clarity, the group of 
project promoters includes actors from both the national public administrations 
and the railway companies implementing LT. The group public institutional 
actors include actors from both the political (MPs, MEPs and non-elected parties) 
and administrative (administrative staff of parliamentary assemblies and public 
officers of administrations concerned by the project but not implementing it 
directly) members of organizations playing a role in the story of LT. The group of 
lobbyists refers to those actors who attempt to influence LT- and TEN-T-related 
                                               
32 ANNEX 6 provides the interview guidelines used during the fieldwork.  
actions, policies, or decisions of officials in their daily life. The local communities 
refers to organized groups of citizens from the Susa Valley (Italy) and the French 
areas concerned by LT (suburbs of Lyon, the Lower Dauphiné region, the Avant-
Pays Savoyard and the Maurienne region).  
Typology of actors Jurisdiction N° Interviews  
Project Promoters 
EU 5 















   
79 
Table P2I.3 – Interviewees by group of actors and jurisdiction 33  
These typologies were not decided ex-ante, rather they matured on the field 
during the interview process. Indeed, the set of interviewees was progressively 
constituted through snowball sampling. Following this sample strategy, we asked 
participants who had already been selected for the study to recruit other 
participants. We thus started interviewing EU’s public officials in charge of the 
LT project and, then, trickled down across French and Italian jurisdictions up to 
local communities opposing it. At the end of this process, our sample included: 18 
                                               
33 Further details concerning our sample are provided in ANNEX 1. 
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project promoters, 19 public institutional actors, 7 lobbyists, 35 members from the 
Italian and French local communities opposing LT. Because of the transnational 
nature of the observed phenomenon, interviewees issued from different 
jurisdictional contexts: France, Italy and EU (Table P2I.3).   
During the fieldwork, the author and his PhD committee have met several times. 
On occasion of these meetings they have debated the content of the interviews 
and fieldwork notes until sharing a common understanding of most important 
aspects. Based on these debates, the author prepared a data analysis table based on 
Pettigrew’s (1985, 1990) contextualism suggesting that, when studying 
organizational change, context process and content should be separately, albeit 
interdependently, considered in the analysis. Based on this table, a chronicle of 
the key events was developed by:  (1) using the interviews; (2) chronologically 
ordering the descriptions of the process LT implementation in the Italian and 
French context; and (3) juxtaposing accounts from different sources to ascertain 
convergence. Based on the chronicle, we could capture “who did what, and when” 
(Maguire and Hardy 2009: 153) and we could therefore prepare a narrative 
making sense of the history of LT. 
As far as documentary data are concerned, a systematic analysis of their content 
was conducted by using the NVivo software. The coding process was based on a 
set of theoretical categories issued from the theoretical lenses presented above 
(further methodological details are provided in the dedicated methodology 
sections of essays 5 and 6 in Part 2 of this PhD dissertation). 
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5. Managing Performance in Trans-European Railway 
Projects (Essay 4) 
 
Abstract 
Riding the wave of NPM reforms, since the 1970s Performance Management 
Systems (PMSs) have spread in many countries, across various policy areas and at 
every level of government. The rationale behind these tools lies in the belief that 
the public sector works better if public administrative bodies are oriented toward 
results, rather than being focused on processes. Some studies have showed that 
PMSs’ functioning conflict with important-but-unmeasured democratic values. In 
a similar vein, academic scholars have noticed that their implementation may 
result into disciplinary regimes producing organizational forces that structure and 
guide managers’ decisions to allocate penalties across the organization field. This 
article addresses the functioning of PMSs in the complex settings of trans-
European megaprojects funded under the EU’s TEN-T investment program. It 
draws on the Foucauldian theory of power to explain how PMSs enable EU-level 
officers to govern complex trans-national organizational processes – involving 
many different stakeholders such as governments, local communities, 
independent administrative bodies, lobbies and industry - by representing them in 
a form amenable to managerial and political decision.  
Keywords:  megaproject, Performance Management Systems (PMSs), TEN-T 
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Transport services in Europe provides for the movement of over 700 million 
people and associated freight (United Nations 2009). Politically, Europe is 
divided into about fifty sovereign states. This politico-geographical fragmentation 
- along with the increasing movement of people and freight due to the deepening 
process of economic integration - has led to a strong cooperation between 
European countries in developing and maintaining transport networks. Since the 
1950s, the European Union (EU) has put much effort to develop international 
standards and agreements that allow people and freight to cross the borders of 
Europe. The creation of the Schengen Area has enabled border control-free travel 
between 26 European countries. Freight transportation has favored a high level of 
intermodal compatibility, whereas the European Economic Area has allowed for 
the free movement of goods across 30 states. 
Within this context, in the early-1990s the EU decided to set up the Trans-
European Transport Network (TEN-T) policy, an infrastructure policy at 
supranational level with the overall aim of improving the functioning of the 
internal market through continuous and efficient transnational networks in 
transport flows. TEN-T goal was to interconnect national infrastructure networks 
and ensure their interoperability by setting standards which could remove 
transnational technical barriers, such as incompatible standards for railway traffic. 
It was designed to promote and strengthen seamless transport chains for passenger 
and freight, while keeping up with the latest technological trends such as High-
Speed Railway (HSR) technology in the rail sector. 
The urgent need for a trans-European transport infrastructure policy was clear 
since the mid-1980s when the EU initiated the liberalization of transport services 
at the European level. In the following years, the European Commission 
undertook an intensive regulatory effort (Directive 91/440 and four railway 
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packages in 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2016) aimed at reforming the national transport 
systems with the purpose of opening existing state-owned monopolies to 
international competition. A core aspect of this reform process has been the 
promotion of interoperability across national transport networks. 
Interoperability is crucial because Europe has many national transport systems 
that have evolved each in their own way over the past years. Their technical 
standards are different, and this is clearly an obstacle to cross-border traffic. 
Therefore, this is also an obstacle to cross-border competition. For example, with 
international trains it is usually the case that the engine has to be changed at the 
frontier station. In especially difficult cases passengers must change trains or 
goods must be reloaded. There is also a need to harmonize infrastructure because 
of, for example, differences in platform heights or command and signaling 
systems. In the railway sector different gauge widths, electrification standards and 
safety and signaling systems made it more difficult and more costly to run a train 
from one country to another. In this situation, the European transport market was 
fragmented - and no liberalization initiative could be really effective - because 
each national transport network could be used only by those operators having a 
rolling stock apparatus complying with the national market standards. 
For all the reasons mentioned above, in 1996 the EU established the TEN-T 
program, an EU-level investment program providing financial resources and legal 
rules to realize a list of infrastructure projects representing the backbone of the 
future trans-European transport network. In terms of performance, a number of 
major problems (e.g. planning, construction and financing of listed projects) 
emerged since the first phase of implementing TEN-T starting in 1996. “The 
completion of the originally defined TEN-T fell behind the optimistic 
development plans” (Schade et. al., 2013: 19) and, as a consequence, the deadline 
for the accomplishment of planned projects was delayed several times. In 1996 
the deadline was 2010. Then, in 2001 it was delayed to 2020. In 2014 it was 
further delayed to 2030. 
At the European level, a number of managerial innovations have come in 
succession through time to improve the program performance. For example, EU-
level criteria for the selection of projects to be funded by the TEN-T budget have 
become stricter. An EU-level manager (so called European Coordinator) was 
introduced to supervise and facilitate the accomplishment of funded projects at 
the national level. Tools to monitor and assess the performance of funded projects 
were adopted by the European Commission to assure the timely achievement of 
planned objectives.  
Across time, these managerial innovations have been accompanied by the 
increasing opposition of local stakeholders in several Members States concerned 
by the implementation of projects funded by TEN-T: Italy and France (Lyon-
Turin project), Germany (Stuttgart project), Spain (Basque Y project), UK (HS2 
project). Recent studies on TEN-T (Schade et. al., 2013, 2014) notice that, not 
only the accomplishment of planned objectives, but also the participation of local 
stakeholders to project decision-making should be duly considered in the 
management of the program.  
TEN-T projects are a great example of megaprojects – e.g. see DTOIG’s (2001) 
definition of megaprojects. This is a particularly complex typology of 
construction projects, usually characterized by conflict, uncertainty and poor 
cooperation between stakeholders involved (Marrewijk et al. 2008). For them to 
succeed they need appropriate management structures through which the 
objectives of the project are set, the means of attaining those objectives are 
determined, and the means of monitoring performance are determined (Turner 
2006). However, monitoring of an agent’s adherence to top-management’s 
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objectives is critical as it requires high bandwidth and engagement from all 
stakeholders involved (Ruuska et al. 2009). 
This article addresses the issue of performance management in the complex, 
pluralist and multi-level settings of trans-European megaprojects funded under the 
TEN-T investment program. It focuses on the effects of supra-national systems of 
performance management on stakeholder participation. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we critically review the relevant 
literature of performance management systems. Then, after a brief methodological 
section, we present the Lyon-Turin case and discuss the relation between the 
supra-national instruments to manage performance and the participation of 
stakeholders as observed in this case.  
5.2 Theoretical framework 
Riding the wave of New Public Management (NPM) reforms, since the 1970s 
performance management systems (PMSs) have spread in many countries, across 
various policy areas and at every level of government (Olvera and Avellaneda 
2017). The rationale behind these tools lies in the belief that the public sector 
works better if public administrative bodies are oriented toward results, rather 
than being focused on processes. It thus recommends the public sector to take on 
private sector management as an organizing principle. 
Kettl (2015) defines public administration as the administration of governmental 
affairs. In this sense, PMSs are expected to improve the performance of 
government actions. Olvera and Avellaneda (2017) suggest that this expectation is 
based on a rational perspective of organizational performance, according to which 
organizational effectiveness has to do with the achievement of organizational 
goals through design, management, and other organizational features (Rainey, 
2014). They say that the way PMSs can help improve performance is by 
providing public managers with proper information about the level of goal 
achievement, so they can use this information to determine a strategy that would 
help accomplish their goals. Provided with this information, managers may opt 
for continuing, modifying, or terminating any organizational process or feature in 
order to improve performance. Strategy, goals, structure, resource allocation, and 
human resource reallocation are some of the organizational features that managers 
may target.  
PMSs have been widely debated in the academic literature. Moynihan (2008: 5) 
defines them as “a system that generates performance information through 
strategic planning and performance measurement routines and that connects this 
information to decision venues, where, ideally, the information influences a range 
of possible decisions”. Smith and Goddard (2002: 247) present them as “an 
integrated set of planning and review procedures that cascade down through the 
organization a link between each individual and the overall strategy of the 
organization”. For Agere and Jorm (2000: 1), PMSs refer to the “use of 
performance measurement in shaping the performance of organizations and 
people”. According to Olvera and Avellaneda (2017), existing academic 
definitions of PMS include three essential components: 1) strategic planning; 2) 
performance measurement (data collection and analysis); and 3) performance 
management (data utilization for decision-making). 
From a critical perspective, Radin (2006) suggests that PMSs embed performance 
values which may conflict with democratic values. This is because their 
evaluation criteria rely too often on simplistic, one-size-fits-all solutions that do 
not correspond to the dynamic reality of organizations. According to other authors 
(Kroll 2015, Kalgin 2016), even if PMSs can be used in a “purposeful” way – e.g. 
metrics are really utilized to improve organizational performance (Moynihan 
2009) -, there are cases where managers and politicians make a “perverse” use of 
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performance information like gaming, cheating, and advocating. In sum, public 
managers can use performance metrics for different purposes and in different 
forms (Hood, 2008).  
Another line of research (Hvidman and Andersen 2014, Faull 2016) has focused 
on the unintended consequences of PMSs by showing their negative effects on 
trust and equity. PMSs have been blamed for producing unplanned effects like 
tunnel vision and myopia (Mannion and Braithwaite 2012; Smith 1995). In their 
study on the Florida Welfare Transition program, Soss et al. (2011) provide a 
detailed analysis of the unintended consequences of the control mechanisms used 
by the management to measure and improve performance. They show how the 
“tunnel vision” created by performance numbers can lead local actors to innovate 
in perverse ways that subvert important programmatic goals and divert attention 
from important-but-unmeasured values and activities. Their focus is on the 
disciplinary regimes resulting from the implementation of PMSs which produce 
organizational forces that structure and guide managers’ decisions to allocate 
penalties across the organizational field. A central theme of their analysis is the 
Foucault’s (1975) idea that PMSs exert a disciplinary power that shapes 
organizational behavior in deep ways.  
How do PMSs exert disciplinary power? 
For Michel Foucault power is never conceived as monolithic or autonomous, but 
rather is a matter of superficially stable structures emerging on the basis of 
constantly shifting relations underneath, caused by an unending struggle between 
actors. He thus adopts an infinitely complex and open-ended notion of power and 
asks how power is exercised and what its effects are, not why.  As explained by 
McKinlay and Pezet (2017), Foucault’s intention is to redefine the object of study 
from the motives and politics of governing elites to their techniques of governing. 
His intellectual project reflects his personal experience of grassroots politics 
challenging not just, say, the condition of prisoners but also the practices that 
define them as deviant. To go further in his theorization of power, Foucault 
(2004a, 2004b) coins the term ‘governmentality’ (in French gouvernmentalité), 
establishing a semantic link between the act of governing (in French gouverner: 
tr. ‘to govern’) and the modes of thinking (in French mentalité: tr. ‘mentality’) 
(Lemke 2001). In doing so, he indicates the existence of a link between the 
technologies of government – intended as collections of techniques, skills, 
methods, and processes used by those who govern – and their rationales - 
intended as the fundamental reason or reasons serving to account for the act of 
governing.  
Foucault’s governmentalist research pays attention to the practices that constitute 
power and, more specifically, to the way in which the state exercise control over - 
or governs - the body – and so the behavior - of its populace. It aims to 
understand how power shapes behavior in society, including the role of 
institutions to control groups of people. A stream of this research tradition (Miller 
and Rose 1990, Lemke 2001) suggests looking at ‘intellectual technologies’ as 
key mechanisms mobilized by governors to shape the behavior of a population. 
Miller and Rose (1990: 6-7) argue that “all government depends on a particular 
mode of ‘representation’: the elaboration of a language for depicting the domain 
in question that claims both to grasp the nature of that reality represented, and 
literally to represent it in a form amenable to political deliberation, argument and 
scheming. […] Before one can seek to manage a domain such as an economy it is 
first necessary to conceptualize a set of processes and relations as an economy 
which is amenable to management. […] It is through language that governmental 
fields are composed, rendered thinkable and manageable”. According to these 
authors, language itself is a technology. It is indeed an ‘intellectual technology’ 
providing a mechanism for rendering reality amenable to certain kind of actions. 
Specifically, it allows governors to translate events and phenomena to which 
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government is to be applied into information such as written reports, drawings, 
pictures, charts, graphs, and statistics. Plans and programs of government also 
depend on these devices used for the inscription of reality in a form that 
governors can debate and diagnose. 
PMSs are a great example of intellectual technology, which resorts to the 
language of performance (e.g. ‘effective/ineffective project’, ‘efficient use of 
resources’, ‘mid-term reviews’) to shape the collective behavior of organizations.  
How do PMSs’ intellectual technologies shape the collective behavior of 
organizations? 
Berdayes (2002: 43) provides insights in how the pliant human body can be 
constrained by systems managing the performance of work in organizations: 
“designed for each task under study, these grid-shaped ‘shop observation sheets’ 
specified each element of a work process and allowed laborers’ performance to be 
measured and compared to ideal standards. Shop observation sheets and 
stopwatches were used conjointly to specify the time and sequence of operations 
and to record actual worker performance”. Drawing on the Foucault’s (1975) idea 
of Panopticon, he depicts scientific management systems as forms of disciplinary 
power employing three tacit principles - representing the most fundamental 
aspects of the Foucauldian panoptic schema - : hierarchical observation, 
examination, and normalizing judgment.  As explained by Berdayes (2002), 
hierarchical observation allows placing actors under the supervision of nested 
tiers of managerial personnel and establishing clear lines of command across the 
organizational hierarchy. On the other hand, examination is the basis for 
constructing organizational charts revealing flaws in the organic structure of an 
organization: “these charts allow management to inspect and overhaul the firm’s 
administrative machinery and maintain ‘unity of command’ over the entire firm” 
(Berdayes, 2002: 42). Finally, the normalizing judgment aims at sanctioning 
departures from correct behavior by differentiating actors by means of a rule that 
is the minimum of behavior: normalization makes actors homogeneous, after 
differences between them have been measured. 
5.3 Case study 
In 1992, the then 12 member states signed the Treaty of Maastricht and decided to 
set up the TEN-T policy. In 1994, the European Council met in Essen and 
identified 14 projects (“Essen projects”) representing the backbone of the trans-
European transport network. In 1996, because of the endorsement received by the 
Council, these 14 projects were included in the first edition of the EU’s 
investment guidelines developed by the European Commission to allocate the 
budget of the TEN-T program. According to this text, the 14 planned projects 
should have been completed by 2010. In the early-2000s, the EU’s geopolitical 
context changed as several Eastern European countries joined the EU. As a 
consequence, 16 new infrastructures were listed in the guidelines as projects to be 
funded as part of the TEN-T program. 
During the 2000s, it became clear that the number of planned projects realized 
throughout the Member States fell behind the 1996 optimistic development plans. 
Delays in the completion of projects were mainly due to the fact that Member 
States’ governments used the TEN-T budget to refund national expenditure 
already settled, instead of generating additional investments in trans-national 
infrastructures. As a consequence, in 2004 the EU amended the 1996 investment 
guidelines and introduced the role of the European Coordinator, an EU-level 
manager acting in the name of the European Commission to assure the timely 
completion of planned projects. His/her role was to supervise the Member States 
in the development of projects to be funded by TEN-T.   
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In 2010, Decision 661/2010/EU came into force and amended the 2004 
guidelines. As delays in the completion of planned projects were evident, the new 
text extended the deadline for the accomplishment of the network from 2010 to 
2020. It also created an executive agency to support the European Commission in 
the administration of the program and to monitor the performance of funded 
projects. Additionally, article 19 of Decision 661/2010/EU reinforced the position 
of the European Coordinator by requiring the Member States to transmit him/her 
all the information needed to appreciate the design and implementation of funded 
projects.  
In 2014, the investment guidelines were amended for the last time by Regulation 
1315/2013. As delays in the completion of planned projects did not stop, the list 
of projects to be funded was reviewed. This revision was done by the European 
Commission on the basis of a scientific methodology using the evolving traffic 
demand as a basis to distinguish between most strategic and least strategic 
projects. The objective was to concentrate TEN-T funding in the main European 
urban nodes and economic centers. Based on this methodology, the Commission 
concluded that the TEN-T could be best developed through a dual-layer approach, 
consisting of a comprehensive network and a core network. The former was the 
basic layer of the TEN-T network consisting of all existing and planned 
infrastructure projects meeting the requirements of the guidelines. The deadline 
for its completion was extended to 2050. The latter overlaid the comprehensive 
network and consisted of its strategically most important projects. Because of 
their strategic importance, the deadline for the completion of core-network 
projects was extended to 2030.  
 Figure 5.1 – Source: European Commission 
Additionally, the 2014 reform of the guidelines introduced the notion of 
“corridor”. All the infrastructure projects composing the core network were 
organized into 9 trans-European transport axes called “corridors” (see Figure 5.1). 
Each of these 9 corridors was provided with a dedicated governance body, called 
“corridor forum” and operating under the supervision of a European Coordinator. 
This forum is a consultative body, chaired by the European Coordinator, where 
the public authorities (national governments, ministry-level administrations and 
regions) and industry (infrastructure managers of ports, airports, rail and roads, as 
well as freight transport operators) gather to prepare and follow up the work plan 
detailing the activities to be done to assure the harmonized and timely 
implementation of all the projects composing the corridor.  
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Since the 1990s, the managerial innovations mentioned before have been 
accompanied by the increasing opposition of local communities in several 
Members States concerned by the implementation of TEN-T-funded projects: 
Italy and France (Lyon-Turin project), Germany (Stuttgart project), Spain 
(Basque Y project), UK (HS2 project). The Lyon-Turin (LT) project is certainly 
the most emblematic of existing opposition movements. For more than 20 years, 
the local communities of the Susa Valley (near Turin), backed by the local 
authorities, have blocked the project implementation with “a protest of epic 
tenacity and occasional violence” (Hooper, 2012). Since 2012, protests have 
developed also in France (departments of Rhône, Isère and Savoie). The core 
argument of Italian and French oppositions was that the project is useless - 
because many studies other than those produced by the project promoters showed 
that traffic flows are decreasing between Italy and France – and undemocratic - 
because it has been imposed from the top by the European Commission and the 
national governments without any adequate involvement of local communities.  
LT is a TEN-T-planned 270 km-long HSR line that will connect Lyon (in east-
central France) and Turin (in northern Italy). The core of the project is a 57 
kilometres base tunnel crossing the Alps between Susa valley in Italy and 
Maurienne in France. Civil engineering works started in early-2000s with the 
construction of access points and geological reconnaissance tunneling, with actual 
construction of the line initially planned to start between 2014 and 2015. 
Nevertheless, throughout the mid-2000s and early-2010s local oppositions 
intensified in both countries and the construction of the base tunnel was 
postponed. Because of this delay, the European Commission put pressure on the 
Italian and French governments by informing them to reduce TEN-T’s financial 
support to LT if the timely implementation of the project could not be assured. 
However, local oppositions did not stop and delays increased. Therefore, on 
occasion of the 2010 performance assessment of TEN-T-funded projects, the 
European Commission cut approximately €9.2 million to LT. 
In 2012, as oppositions showed no sign of decreasing the Italian government 
approved Law 183 which, among others, declared LT a project of strategic 
priority to be realized in the name of national interest. In so doing, it created the 
juridical conditions to militarily occupy the construction site of the base tunnel 
and prevent any future protest which could delay further the accomplishment of 
the project. At the same time, in both countries Lyon-Turin Ferroviaire (LTF) – 
the constructor company in charge of the geognostic wotks for the base tunnel - 
pressed charges against local activists to discourage any future opposition to LT.   
In 2015 the national governments signed an international agreement proving their 
intention to go ahead with the project despite existing oppositions. The same year 
they submitted a new request of funds to the EU. According to most recent 
information (Agence France Presse, 2017), the construction of the base tunnel is 
planned to start in 2018.    
5.4 Data collection and analysis 
Data come from an extensive qualitative database (Yin 2014) of interviews and 
documents - press releases, agreements, policy papers, third-parties studies and 
reports - covering a period from 1985 to 2016. They have been collected during a 
fieldwork which lasted 3years, from 2014 to 2016.    
Since LT is a transnational investment project articulating across different 
jurisdictions (France, Italy and EU) and organizational entities, data collection 
was designed on the basis of an embedded case study methodology allowing 
dealing with phenomena characterized by more than one sub-unit of analysis (Yin 
2014). Following this methodological framework, 79 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted between 2014 and 2016 with actors – from the three jurisdictions 
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involved - playing a role in the governance of the LT project. Interviews were 
guided by a conceptual grid of information collection using a three-layer approach 
where individual functions, organizations’ roles and the overall system of project 
governance were separately, albeit interdependently, examined. Semi-structured 
interviews averaged 90 minutes and included 4 typologies of actors: 1) project 
promoters, 2) public institutional actors, 3) lobbyists, 4) local communities. For 
the sake of clarity, the group of project promoters includes actors from the 
European Union (DG MOVE and INEA executive agency), the national public 
administrations and the railway companies implementing LT. The group of public 
institutional actors include actors from both the political (MPs, MEPs and non-
elected parties) and administrative (administrative staff of parliamentary 
assemblies and public officers of administrations concerned by the project but not 
implementing it directly) members of organizations playing a role in the story of 
LT. The group of lobbyists refers to those actors who attempt to influence LT- 
and TEN-T-related actions, policies, or decisions of officials in their daily life. 
The local communities refers to organized groups of citizens from the Susa 
Valley (Italy) and the French areas concerned by LT (suburbs of Lyon, the Lower 
Dauphiné region, the Avant-Pays Savoyard and the Maurienne region).  
These typologies were not decided ex-ante, rather they matured on the field 
during the interview process. Indeed, the set of interviewees was progressively 
constituted through snowball sampling (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007). 
Following this sample strategy, we asked participants who had already been 
selected for the study to recruit other participants. We thus started interviewing 
EU’s public officials in charge of the LT project and, then, trickled down across 
French and Italian jurisdictions up to local communities opposing it. At the end of 
this process, our sample included: 18 project promoters, 19 public institutional 
actors, 7 lobbyists, 35 members from the Italian and French local communities 
opposing LT. Because of the transnational nature of the observed phenomenon, 
interviewees issued from different jurisdictional contexts: France, Italy and EU 
(Table 5.1).   
Typology of actors Jurisdiction N° Interviews  
Project Promoters 
EU 5 















   
79 
Table 5.1 – Interviewees by group of actors and jurisdiction  
During the fieldwork, the authors have met several times. On occasion of these 
meetings they have debated the content of the interviews and fieldwork notes 
until sharing a common understanding of most important aspects. Based on these 
debates, the author prepared a data analysis table based on Pettigrew’s (1985, 
1990) contextualism suggesting that, when studying organizational change, 
context process and content should be separately, albeit interdependently, 
considered in the analysis. Based on this table, a chronicle of the key events was 
developed by:  (1) using the interviews; (2) chronologically ordering the 
descriptions of the process LT implementation in the Italian and French context; 
and (3) juxtaposing accounts from different sources to ascertain convergence. 
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Based on the chronicle, we could capture “who did what, and when” (Maguire 
and Hardy 2009: 153) and we could therefore prepare a narrative making sense of 
the history of LT. This narrative was used to summarize our case study in section 
3.  
5.5 TEN-T’s panoptical system of performance management  
5.5.1 Hierarchical observation 
When thinking at the functioning of the TEN-T program, a distinction must be 
done between the formulation of the investment guidelines and their 
implementation. These are two different phases which occur in a sequential 
manner over a period of several years (formulation in time t and implementation 
in time t+1).   
On the one hand, there is the making phase of the EU legislation about TEN-T 
during which the guidelines and the financial rules of the program are formulated 
on the basis of the co-decision procedure: for the last financial framework, this 
phase came to an end in 2013 under the Irish presidency of the Council. On the 
other hand there is the implementation phase of the EU legislation enacting the 
TEN-T program: this phase has started in 2014.  
(Public officer, Italian State-level administration, Fieldwork interview) 
The formulation of the guidelines follows the EU’s ordinary procedure and is 
based on the trialogue between the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council of the EU.  For the last edition of the guidelines, this 
process started in February 2009 and came to an end in December 2013 with the 
adoption of Regulation 1315/2013. This legal text provides the main geographical 
and technical characteristics of the trans-European transport network. Based on 
this text, the European Commission prepares the work programs, detailing the 
funding priorities and the total amount of financial support to be committed to 
each of the priorities in a given year. Based on the priorities of the work program, 
the Commission launches the calls for project proposals to allocate the TEN-T 
budget across the project promoters of the Members States. On the one hand, the 
work program describes the objectives, funding priorities and available budget for 
the calls. On the other, the call for proposals invites the Member States to propose 
projects to be funded as part of the TEN-T budget. Most of the EU funding 
implemented through the calls is concentrated along the nine Core Network 
Corridors. Most recently, a multi-annual work program was adopted in 2014, with 
a financial envelope of €11 billion. The same year, the Commission published the 
calls for project proposals and, in so doing, initiated the implementation phase. 
The opening of the calls activates a competitive selection process during which 
the Commission with the support of the executive agency called INEA - evaluates 
and selects the proposals coming from the Member States. Based on this process, 
the Commission prepares a list of projects to be funded by TEN-T. The list is 
submitted to a committee of consisting of representatives of Member States for 
the final approval. Following this last approval, INEA adopts individual grant 
agreements for each of the selected projects, detailing the conditions under which 
the EU funds will be distributed, including a set of milestones and deadlines to be 
reached during the project implementation. 
The timely implementation of all funded projects is assured by the nine European 
Coordinators. Their role is to put a constant pressure for the realization of projects 
on the governments concerned and all relevant actors involved. They make 
relentless efforts to push the performance of funded projects and identify suitable 
solutions to any obstacles or attempts to block their implementation.  
The European Coordinator works to promote the development of corridors and 
plays a political role to tell governments: “Look, it’s really time now!” 
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[…]Because of its reputation, personality and experience, he has the capability to 
speak with high-level politicians from the member states.  
(Public officer, DG MOVE – European Union, Fieldwork interview) 
Each of the nine European Coordinators chairs a Corridor Forum, a consultative 
body composed of representatives of the industry and public authorities 
concerned by a corridor’s projects. As shown in the following piece of interviews, 
this forum works as an implementation tool whose objective is to assure that all 
the projects composing a corridor progress well.   
We shifted from the project approach to the corridor approach and now we need 
a management tool to consider the entire corridor. This tool is the Corridor 
Forum. It is conceived to put all the actors involved in the same corridor around 
a table. It is important to understand that this forum is not a place where any type 
of actor meets and discusses about the project but rather it hosts professional 
meetings to decide how to implement the construction of a corridor. […] 
Participation in these fora refers to infrastructure managers, governments, 
regions and also other actors such as infrastructure operators, ports managers, 
and freight transportation actors. 
(Manager of RFI, Fieldwork interview) 
Civil society stakeholders have no formal right to participate in the Corridor 
Forum but if the European Coordinator thinks that it is useful he can establish a 
dialogue with them. A constructive dialogue I must say. We do not include 
opponents because if they do not want to work with us constructively it does not 
really make sense to involve them. 
(Public officer, DG MOVE – European Union, Fieldwork interview) 
National procedures regarding regional and local authorities as well as civil 
society affected by a project of common interest shall be complied with, where 
appropriate, in the planning and construction phase of a project. 
(TEN-T Investment guidelines, Regulation 1315/2013, article 50, paragraph b) 
Thanks to the Corridor Forum, the European Coordinators have the possibility to 
closely monitor project performance, as well as to closely supervise concerned 
public authorities and industry over the implementation process. The European 
Coordinator has a high degree of control over the Corridor Forum as he/she 
supervises the redaction and approval of the work plan, detailing the actions that 
the forum’s participants have to realize before the end of the funding schedule.  
Civil society and local authorities concerned by the implementation of funded 
projects have no formal right to participate in the Corridor Forum and the duty of 
involving them is transferred to the national public authorities. In fact, TEN-T 
guidelines’ article 50 asks the national governments to duly apply their national 
procedures concerning the participation of civil society and local authorities in the 
implementation of funded projects. However, these procedures may vary across 
the Members States of the EU – because different institutional systems are in 
place within the national boundaries – and may differently assure the execution of 
TEN-T’s article 50. For example, the LT case shows that France and Italy have 
very different legal rules that regulate the decision-making of large infrastructure 
projects. French rules have their source in a set of codified administrative 
procedures – so called ‘Enquête Publiqe’ and ‘Démarche Grand Chantiers’– that 
obligate the project promoters to involve local authorities and civil society in 
decision-making through public consultation and meetings. Conversely, Italian 
rules have their source in a governmental regulation – so called ‘Legge Obiettivo’ 
- making project promoters use a rigidly centralized top-down decision-making 
procedure allowing them to bypass both local authorities and civil society.  
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To summarize, the TEN-T design is based on a sequential and hierarchical 
division of work. The sequential division assures that decisions taken in time t by 
the EU’s bodies are immortalized in the investment guidelines and unalterably 
transmitted to national public authorities and industry for implementation in t+1. 
This sharp and institutionalized distinction between the formulation of decisions 
and their implementation (“I decide, then I implement”) allows safeguarding the 
agreements achieved in time t during the formulation of the guidelines and makes 
the management guard against any change that may occur in time t+1 during the 
implementation of specific projects. At the same time, the hierarchical division of 
work guarantees that the decisions taken at the top by the EU’s bodies during the 
formulation phase are properly transmitted to the bottom for the implementation 
of corridors’ specific projects. The European Coordinator facilitates this 
transmission by aligning the accomplishment of projects being part of the same 
corridor. This approach places local authorities and civil society under 
supervision of nested tiers of public managerial personnel and establishes clear 
lines of command across the organizational hierarchy of the program. This form 
of organizational rationalization constitutes a pyramidal field of visibility wherein 
each tier in the organizational hierarchy is subjected to the direct observation of 
immediate superiors (Figure 5.2). Such hierarchical observation is enabled by 
several intellectual technologies – work programs, corridor fora and work plans - 
maintaining persistent contact between the supra-national bodies (EU-level 
organization) and local stakeholders (civil society and local authorities) during the 
implementation of funded projects. 
 Figure 5.2 - Form of the hierarchical observation in the implementation of TEN-T 
5.5.2 Examination  
The European Commission - with the support of the INEA agency - periodically 
monitors and evaluates the program performance. This is done thanks to several 
reporting devices allowing EU bodies to examine the implementation status of 
funded projects.  
After a project passes the selection procedure, a grant agreement is realized 
between the Commission and the beneficiary. This agreement is essentially a 
funding decision of the Commission detailing the financial resources made 
available to the selected project as well as the description of the funded activities 
and milestones to be achieved by the beneficiary. Based on this agreement, the 
beneficiary redacts the Strategic Action Plan […]. This plan is a list of objectives 
and consists of milestones defined in the grant agreement. The beneficiary will 
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then provide every year an Action Status Report. This document allows the INEA 
to assess the progress made by the project promoters against the objectives listed 
in the Strategic Action Plan. 
(Program manager, INEA executive agency – European Commission, Fieldwork 
interview) 
The [mid-term] review aims at optimising the use of TEN-T funds […]. The main 
aim is to assess the progress made in the current and future implementation of the 
projects. On this basis, the Commission was able to analyse to what extent and 
under what conditions the Multi-Annual Programme is expected to achieve its 
stated objectives and to propose possible improvements. 
(Summary results of the mid-term review, European Commission, 
MEMO/10/526, 10 October 2010) 
The Strategic Action Plan (SAP) is a project management document, which 
identifies the activities to be carried out and the associated resources, timeline and 
dependencies. On the other hand, the Action Status Report (ASR) is an annual 
report submitted by the implementing body on the technical progress of a project 
against the SAP’s initial plan, and the associated budget consumption. It is the 
main document used by the INEA to assess progress. For multi-annual projects, 
the ASR is crucial it is the basis for deciding whether funding for the next phase 
of work should be allocated.  
SAP and ASR provide the European Commission – and INEA agency - with 
detailed data on the annual progress of funded projects which can be used to: (1) 
monitor project outputs against the plan; and, (2) identify deviation from plan. 
Both tools are thus key examination tools constituting the basis for constructing 
organizational charts that reveal flaws in the performance of TEN-T projects. An 
example of these charts is provided in Figure 5.3. 
 Figure 5.3 – TEN-T’s performance chart of the LT project. Source: DG MOVE 
(2010)  
This chart comes from the ‘Mid-Term Review of the 2007-2013 TEN-T MAP 
Project Portfolio’, a report providing a record of the results following the mid-
term assessment of the implementation of the TEN-T’s Multi-Annual work 
Program (MAP). Calculations and performance flaws are elaborated by experts on 
the basis of the SAP and ASR data. The assessment process looks at the actual 
variations of budgeted costs - as reported by the beneficiary in the ASR report - 
against the costs planned in the funding decision (and described in the SAP). 
Based on this information, the European Commission – with the support of 
external experts – revises the costs of the projects by providing a more realistic 
calculation of their future evolution. This revised cost act as a benchmark 
describing the normal course of action a beneficiary will have to follow to assure 
the timely completion of the project. Revised cost predictions are used to review 
the list of objectives to be accomplished by the beneficiary during the remaining 
funding period.  
Above-mentioned reports and charts are key instruments of organizational 
rationalization because they open the entire space of the TEN-T program, no 
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matter how vast, to managerial observation and control. They thus allow the EU-
management bodies to inspect and overhaul the program administrative 
machinery and maintain unity of command over the implementation process of 
individual projects. In fact, the European Commission uses them to classify the 
performance effectiveness of funded projects and, if needed be, to reorganize their 
implementation plan. ‘Effective’ projects – for which the examined data suggest 
that they will be completed in compliance with the planned objectives - are 
allowed to run their normal course until completion. By contrast, ‘ineffective’ and 
‘under-effective’ projects undergo corrective measures. Projects classified as 
ineffective – for which the examined data suggest that they will no longer meet 
the planned objectives - undergo the cancellation of funds whereas those 
classified as under-effective – for which examined data suggest that they will be 
completed behind the planned schedule - undergo the conditional extension of 
funds. Extension is usually accompanied by detailed implementing conditions - 
which can be of administrative, technical, financial or political nature depending 
on the specific issues to be addressed within each individual project - that will be 
closely observed by the Commission in order to ensure better use of resources 
while fulfilling the objectives of the program.  
5.5.3 Normalization 
The final moment of disciplinary performance management is normalization, a 
pervasive form of social control that brings project promoters’ behavior in line 
with organizationally prescribed norms. It is not articulated through brute force 
but instead results from strategies that depoliticize the inculcation of norms. It 
thus forms an apolitical basis for organizing human beings. 
With this [mid-term] review, we want the scarce resources available to be 
managed strictly. But where projects are no longer meeting their objectives then 
EU funding must be cut and reallocated so we make best use of the limited 
resources. 
(Siim Kallas, Commission Vice-President responsible for transport, press release 
IP/10/1391, 2010) 
Our unit informs the European Coordinator when a project is not performing 
well.  We can suggest him reducing the amount of money available for that 
project if it clearly appears that the project is late compared to the planned 
timeline. In this case money are cut and shifted to other projects. […] This is the 
“use it or lose it” principle. It aims to create pressure on the Member States and 
lead them to comply with the planned duration and budget of the project. 
(Program manager, INEA executive agency – European Commission, Fieldwork 
interview) 
Based on the outcomes of the examination phase, the funds of projects that are no 
longer meeting the planned objectives are either cut or reallocated to most 
performing projects, so that a better use of the limited resources is assured. As 
explained by the program manager of the INEA, this is done on the basis of the so 
called ‘use it or lose it principle’ which is a financial rule allowing the TEN-T 
management to reallocate resources from ineffective and under-effective projects 
to effective ones. Such reallocation of funds is not presented as a political choice 
but rather as a managerial consequence of the rational economic assessment of 
project performance. While the examination tools (SAP, ASR and mid-term 
review) are used to differentiate between effective, under-effective and ineffective 
projects (‘normalizing judgment’), the ‘use it or lose it principle’ is applied to 
compel ineffective and under-effective project promoters to comply with the 
delays and conditions of the TEN-T program. It is thus a managerial rule whose 
aim is to normalize project promoters’ use of the TENT funds in a way that is 
consistent with the planned objectives. If compliance with initial plans is not 
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assured, the European Commission may impose corrective measures – such as 
cancellation or conditional extension of funds. During the 2010 mid-term review 
(Table 5.2), about 36% of the projects assessed was considered to be ineffective 
or under-effective and, thus, underwent either total or partial cancellation of funds 
on the basis of the use-it-or-lose it principle.  
Table 5.2 - Classification of projects under the mid-term review of the 2007-2013 
TEN-T programming period 
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4,3 31,81 0,6 
Projects expected to 
be completed by 
2015 that will be 
either partially 
reduced or prolonged 










31,5 2984,46 56,3 
72,2 
Projects expected to 
be completed by 
2014 and 2015 that 
will be prolonged 




12 842,86 15,9 
Projects expected to 
be completed by the 
end of the 
programming period 






52,2 1441,87 27,2 
On occasion of the 2010 mid-term review, the European Commission partially cut 
the TEN-T contribution (approximately €9.2 million) to the LT project because, 
in the past years, the project had shown under-effective performance on the Italian 
side. The remaining funds were extended subject to specific conditions.  
On the joint Franco-Italian section (St Jean de Maurienne to the 
Bussoleno/Bruzolo area) the construction of the St Martin, La Praz and Modane 
inclines, all on French territory, has continued on schedule. […] On the Italian 
part of this section, the situation in the Val Susa and the moratorium on the work 
imposed by the government pending the observatory’s conclusions has resulted in 
no activity apart from continuing design work and the contribution of LTF and 
RFI to the observatory’s activities. 
(Progress Report of the European Coordinator, July 2007) 
The Mid-Term evaluation concluded that despite the progress achieved so far, the 
future implementation of the project will be significantly delayed, because of 
cross-border coordination and technical issues. […] The completion of the 
project by the end of 2015 is more realistic, provided that the following 
conditions are met: (1) the two Member States conclude, within 2010, the terms of 
the revised Treaty establishing the new public promoter, and the financial model 
for the implementation and operation of the project including the respective 
financial contribution; (2) the preliminary design study is approved by both 
Member States by the end of 2010; (3) excavation of the Maddalena Gallery 
starts, at the latest, by the first quarter of 2011, (4) the final design studies are 
completed by the end of 2011.   
(Mid-Term Review of the 2007-2013 TEN-T Multi-Annual Work Programme 
Project Portfolio, October 2010) 
Throughout the 2000s, the Italian process of project implementation experienced 
major delays because of the increasing opposition of local stakeholders from the 
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Susa Valley. The 2010 mid-term review made emerge these delays and, 
consequently, led the European Commission to apply the use it or lose it 
principle. TEN-T financial support to TEN-T to LT was thus reduced by €9.2 
million. 
In the early-2010s, local oppositions showed no sign of decreasing. To prevent 
further delays – and thus an additional reduction of EU’s funds - the Italian 
government approved Law 183/2011. This law declared LT a project of strategic 
priority to be realized in the name of national interest. In so doing, it created the 
juridical conditions for the government to militarily occupy the construction site 
of the base tunnel and prevent any future protest which could delay further the 
accomplishment of the project.   
At the same time, as protests begin also in the French areas concerned by the 
project, LTF – the constructor company in charge of the geognostic works for the 
base tunnel - pressed charges against local activists in both countries to 
discourage any future opposition to LT.  
5.6 Discussion 
PMSs are key management devices that allow public managers and officials to 
evaluate policies and programs, uncover the factors that led to their success in 
achieving their objectives or deciphering the miscalculations and strategic errors 
that led to their failure. The rationale behind these tools lies in the belief that the 
public sector works better when public administrative bodies are oriented toward 
results, rather than being focused on processes. Riding the wave of NPM reforms, 
PMSs have spread in many countries, across various policy areas and at every 
level of government (Olvera and Avellaneda 2017). A growing body of empirical 
literature has showed that the initial aims of NPM reforms have been rarely met 
(i.e. Hood, 2001; Pichault, 2007; Lodge and Gill, 2011; Siltala, 2013). Such 
mitigated results may be linked to the disciplinary characteristics of NPM models 
whose style of management is essentially designed, monitored and imposed from 
the top (Hood, 2000; Ryan et al., 2008). 
How do PMSs exert disciplinary power? 
We know from the literature (Berdayes 2002, Soss et al. 2011) that PMSs may act 
as disciplinary regimes where performance indicators unleash organizational 
forces that guide managers’ decisions to allocate penalties to deviant (non-
performing) behaviors across the field.  
Our findings suggest that PMSs’ disciplinary regimes operate through 
‘intellectual technologies’ allowing managerial élites to make judgements as to 
whether and why this or that policy succeeded or failed, or to devise remedies for 
alleged deficiencies across all actors in the field.  
Our study shows that in the case of the LT project, PMSs are key intellectual 
technologies that enable managers to govern complex trans-national 
organizational processes. Particularly, they enable managers to represent reality 
in a form amenable to managerial and/or political deliberation, argument and 
scheming.    
These findings are consistent with Miller and Rose (1990) suggesting that before 
one can seek to manage a government domain (e.g. economy, transport, and 
foreign affairs) it is first necessary to conceptualize the set of processes and 
relations to be managed. Intellectual technologies render governmental fields 
thinkable, manageable and, eventually, amenable to certain kind of actions. Their 
function is to translate events and phenomena to which government is to be 
applied into information - such as written reports, drawings, pictures, charts, 
graphs, and statistics – that governing élites can debate and diagnose. The 
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combination of these technologies determines specific governmentalist 
assemblages that practice an infinitely complex art of governing. 
Our study on the LT case provides an example of multi-level, transnational 
governmentalist assemblage. This is a complex assemblage of centralized 
monitoring and devolved administration tasks which together structure the 
organizational field of the TEN-T program. It operates through a vertical 
distribution of actors in the transnational space of the projects funded through the 
TEN-T budget where EU bodies are at the top of the decision-making scheme and 
the civil society and local authorities at the bottom. This top-down relation 
between actors articulates through multilevel hierarchized management structures 
and is controlled at distance through intellectual technologies that resort to the 
language of performance (e.g. ‘effective/ineffective project’, ‘efficient use of 
resources’, ‘mid-term reviews’) to steer TEN-T’s overall organizational behavior 
towards the fundamental policy objectives.  
How do PMSs’ intellectual technologies shape the collective behavior of 
organizations? 
Our study on LT suggests that PMSs’ intellectual technologies may articulate on 
the basis of three primary principles of panoptical control: (1) hierarchical 
observation, (2) examination and (3) normalization. The hierarchical observation 
is used to place stakeholder groups under the supervision of nested managerial 
tiers and establish vertical lines of command across the organizational hierarchy 
of TEN-T. Examination is used to construct charts revealing performance flaws in 
the TEN-T’s organizational structure. Thanks to these charts, the EU bodies at the 
top of the hierarchy inspect and overhaul the administrative machinery managing 
the funded projects. Examination allows measuring performance differences 
between projects and planning the re-allocation of financial resources from low-
performing to high-performing projects. As a final step, low-performing projects 
are sanctioned and conditional measures are applied to correct performance. This 
is the final phase of normalization during which (1) departures from correct 
behavior are sanctioned, (2) and rules (e.g. the use it or lose it principle) are 
applied to homogenize behavior across the TEN-T’s structure. Our findings show 
that thanks to these three principles of panoptical control the top management of 
TEN-T maintains unity of command over the entire process of program 
implementation and assures the achievement of planned programmatic goals. 
Our study shows that in the case of the LT project, PMSs’ intellectual 
technologies narrow the focus of managerial action on the control of 
organizational outputs - as measured by performance numbers - and overlook the 
behavior of people unfolding over time within and between organizations. This 
narrow focus may have inescapably-disciplinarian effects on the evolution of the 
field. 
We know from the literature (Radin 2006) that PMSs embed performance values 
which may conflict with the democratic values of an organizational field. This is 
because their evaluation criteria rely on simplistic, one-size-fits-all solutions that 
do not correspond to the dynamic reality of organizations and may result into 
behavior described as tunnel vision - undue focus on performance measures to the 
detriment of other areas - and myopia - short-sightedness leading to the neglect of 
longer-term objectives - (Mannion and Braithwaite 2012; Smith 1995). In these 
cases, managers and politicians make a “perverse” use of performance 
information (Kroll 2015, Kalgin 2016, Moynihan 2009) with negative unintended 
effects on trust and equity (Hvidman and Andersen 2014, Faull 2016). 
Performance numbers may lead the line management to innovate in perverse ways 
that narrow the focus on output control and divert attention from important-but-
unmeasured values.  
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Consistently with this literature, our analysis shows that TEN-T’s PMSs lead 
EU’s supranational authorities to narrow their focus on the progress made against 
initial plans and to pay little attention to the process taking place within the 
national contexts. For example, when the local oppositions intensified in Italy 
throughout the 2000s and 2010s, the European Commission’s concerns were 
about the delays these oppositions provoked vis-à-vis the existing schedule of 
project implementation. It therefore decided to apply the use it or lose it principle 
to normalize the project implementation process to align it with TEN-T’s 
programmatic goals. To prevent further delays – and thus an additional reduction 
of TEN-T funds due to the application of the use it or lose it principle - the Italian 
government militarily occupied the construction site of the project. The aim was 
to discourage any future protest which could delay further the accomplishment of 
TEN-T’s planned objectives. These findings suggest that, when the panoptical 
techniques of performance management fail to normalize deviant behaviors, top-
management levels (e.g. TEN-T supranational bodies) may unintendedly push the 
lowest levels of the management (e.g. the national and sub-national public 
authorities in contact with the civil society) to innovate in perverse ways (e.g. 
overtly displaying coercive power such as the threat of violence) which conflict 
with important-but-unmeasured values (e.g. democracy, right to participation, 
equity). In these cases, hierarchical power may turn back to old-fashion devices of 
control relying on violent forms of punishment.  
5.7 Conclusion 
This article has addressed the functioning of PMSs in the complex settings of 
trans-European megaprojects funded under the TEN-T investment program. 
Through a case study research of the LT megaproject, it has focused on the 
disciplinarian effects of PMSs on local stakeholder participation. 
PMSs are certainly very important instruments thanks to which megaprojects’ 
objectives are set, the means of attaining those objectives are selected, and the 
means of monitoring performance are determined. In a nutshell, PMSs are key 
instruments to assure goal alignment across all the stakeholder groups involved. 
As explained by Ruuska et al. (2009), in the context of megaprojects, members 
from diverse organizations have underlying differences in their behaviors, values, 
and attitudes while they not only notice different information, but perceive the 
same information differently. As a result, diverse organizations tend to lack a 
shared social reality with members and their organizations failing to have a 
common ‘‘here-and-now” and perspective. Additionally, individuals and their 
organizations may even have differing motives and these motives may change 
over time. This all leads to the lack of goal alignment. 
In a similar vein, this article has presented PMSs as the combination of several 
intellectual technologies, which resort to the language of performance to steer 
TEN-T’s overall organizational behavior towards the fundamental policy 
objectives. We have explained how these technologies enable managers to govern 
complex trans-national organizational processes by representing them in a form 
amenable to managerial and/or political decision. The systematic combination of 
these technologies produces sophisticated governmentalist assemblages that 
practice an infinitely complex art of governing.  
In this study we have focused on the panoptical assemblage. We have showed 
that, within this particular assemblage, PMS technologies are held together 
through three principles: (1) hierarchical observation, (2) examination, and (3) 
normalizing judgment. In the case of TEN-T, such panoptical settings empower 
the top management to (1) legitimately acquire deep information on individual 
behaviors in the field and (2) correct unfolding intra- and inter-organizational 
processes when these deviate from the planned direction. According to our 
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findings, this panoptical assemblage may have inescapably-disciplinarian effects 
on organizational behavior. This occurs because PMSs’ technologies narrow the 
focus of managerial action on (1) controlling the achievement of pre-determined 
organizational outputs and (2) normalizing deviant behaviors. 
These findings are coherent with the existing academic literature (Radin 2006, 
Hvidman and Andersen 2014, Faull 2016) according to which PMSs embed 
performance values which may conflict with the fundamental democratic values 
of an organizational field and have perverse effects on important-but-unmeasured 
values like trust and equity. From a wider perspective, we suggest that such 
dysfunctions may be linked to the NPM logic underneath PMSs. This logic is 
based on the belief that the public sector works better when public administrative 
bodies are oriented toward outputs, rather than being focused on processes. 
Although in the past decades NPM beliefs have increasingly spread throughout 
the European public sectors (Esposito et al. 2017), their attractiveness is now 
declining because of (1) their inappropriate likening of the public sector to the 
private one (DeLeon and Denhardt, 2000; Hefetz and Warner, 2004; McCabe and 
Vinzant, 1999; Rocha and De Araujo, 2007) and (2) the fact that NPM models 
have led to not only positive outcomes such as gains in effectiveness and 
efficiency but also to negative outcomes such as losses of equity, citizenship, and 
accountability (Boyne, 1998; Kettl, 1993; Morgan and England, 1988; Romzek, 
2000).  
In parallel with this decline, there has been the rise of new logics in public-sector 
reasoning which take complexity as their theoretical background (e.g. Cilliers, 
1998). A post-NPM logic that that is alleged to reconcile democracy and 
efficiency in public decision-making processes is provided by the Public Value 
(PV) theory (Moore 1995, O’Flynn 2007, Stoker 2006). The PV perspective 
abandons NPM’s mono-centric and mono-rational vision all to the good of a poly-
centric and poly-rational vision where the core of public decision-making is 
stakeholder participation. PV shifts the focus of public action from results to 
citizenship, network governance and the role of public agencies in working with 
citizens to create public value, generate democratic authorization, legitimacy and 
trust. This approach considers public sector organizations as complex adaptive 
systems with characteristics which are qualitatively different from simple market 
forms, or private sector business principles.  
According to Stoker (2006), the PV paradigm promotes alternative management 
systems functioning through dialogue and exchange practices associated with 
network governance (Powell 1990) - rather than practices of top-down 
hierarchical control and disciplinarianism. He believes that it is through the 
construction, modification, and adaptability of these alternative systems that 
democracy and management can be reconciled and delivered. Bozeman (2002) 
introduces the notion of public-value failures, occurring when core public values 
are not reflected in social relations, either in the market or in public policy. From 
his perspective, “a public-failure approach changes the discussion of public policy 
by making government (and public values) something other than residual 
category or an issue of technical efficiency in pricing structures. […] The public-
failure model is not a decision-making tool (à la cost-benefit analysis), but a 
framework to promote deliberation about public value” (Bozeman 2002: 150). 
According to this perspective public value does not exist per se, but it is 
negotiated and constructed among wide-ranging stakeholders who may disagree 
on what course of actions will produce the maximum public value (Yang & 
Holzer 2006, Sanger 2008). “Under [the public value] model, the role of 
government is not simply to regulate, distribute, or redistribute public benefits but 
to serve as a catalytic agent to invest private and nonprofit stakeholders in shared 
ownership of the public good. This can take the simple form of community 
policing programs or a much more complicated form of networked governance 
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such as watershed management over a very large geographic area involving 
multiple stakeholders, jurisdictions, and structures of authority” (Bao et al. 2012: 
447). 
Future research directions should focus on the design of PMSs adaptable to the 
PV logic. A stream of the management literature (Hazen, 1993; Clegg et al., 2006; 
Pichault, 2013) has explored a polyphonic design. Polyphony refers to the diverse 
voices of various organization members, and how these voices are present, 
disclosed and utilized in management (Hujala and Rissanen 2012). It means that 
managers’ role is to guard that all voices in the everyday life of an organization 
are considered equivalent and that the struggle between different ideas and 
interpretations is considered normal. According to Pichault (2013), the 
polyphonic approach to monitoring and evaluation sharply contrast with the 
panoptical model. The latter searches for control and correspondence 
(accomplishing objectives established in advance) whereas the former proposes 
evaluations “in several voices” where stakeholders’ multiple representations of 
and expectations on the organizational performance are taken into account to 
design PMS indicators. The identification of stakeholder groups, the 
environments in which they interact, and the recognition of the active role of 
various stakeholders in producing PMS are all key aspects of this polyphonic 
approach.  
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6. National Institutional Frameworks of Trans-European 
Megaproject Governance (Essay 5) 
Abstract 
Megaprojects play a key role in the global economy as they make up 8% of the 
world GDP. These are described in the literature as temporary endeavours 
characterized by large investment commitment, vast organizational complexity 
and long-lasting impact on the economy, environment and society. These are 
often characterized by conflicts and poor cooperation between concerned 
stakeholders, which may create a pool of future unresolved issues, frustration and 
resentment having a negative impact on performance. The focus of this article is 
on the conflicts between the project and the stakeholder groups outside the project 
team. We adopt a dialectical perspective and use neo-institutionalism to explain 
the dynamics of these conflicts in the case of the Lyon-Turin megaproject, a high-
speed railway infrastructure planned at the EU level in the framework of the 
trans-European network policy. Particularly, we adopt an institutional work 
perspective and describe the practices that proponents and opponents mobilize 
over time to create, maintain and disrupt the Lyon-Turin megaproject.  
Keywords:  megaproject, national frameworks of governance, TEN-T 
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6.1 Introduction 
Megaprojects play a key role in the world economy as, globally, they make up 8% 
of total GDP (Flyvbjerg 2014). Most definitions of megaprojects are provided by 
governments and industry directives (Hu et al. 2015). The US department of 
Transportation (DTOIG 2001) has provided one of the most widely accepted 
definitions describing a megaproject as a project with at least a 1 billion US dollar 
budget. Moreover, Capka (2006) suggests that they attract a high level of public 
attention or political interest because of substantial direct and indirect impacts on 
the community, environment, and state budgets. In the context of the European 
Union (EU), the International Project Management Association (IPMA 2011) 
identified a threshold of 100 million euros as the basis for defining megaprojects 
across all industries. 
Megaprojects contain a large element of innovation associated with high risk and 
characterized by conflict, uncertainty and poor cooperation between actors 
involved (Marrewijk et al. 2008). Awakul and Ogunlana (2002) argue that 
conflicts encountered on large scale construction projects occur in two broad 
categories: internal conflicts and interface conflicts. 
This article focuses on project interface dynamics and mobilizes institutional 
theory to explain the conflict between the project and groups outside the project 
team. By doing so, it contributes to the debate on the role of institutional 
frameworks in the management of large complex projects. A number of scholars 
(Miller and Lessard, 2000; Miller & Hobbs, 2002, 2005) involved in the 
International Research Program on the Management of Large Engineering and 
Construction Projects (IMEC) highlighted that the anchoring of projects to 
institutional frameworks is one of the most critical aspects of megaprojects. In 
63% of cases examined by the IMEC program, important regulatory and 
institutional factors were critical part of the project development process as they 
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contributed to make the projects able to withstand and survive the impacts of 
emergent uncertainty. This confirms what is by now a substantial amount of 
professional and academic literature (Association for Project Management 2002, 
Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, Morris and Hough 1987) showing that institutional 
arrangements – decision-making structures, firm culture, government roles, 
policies, regulations, and so on - have crucial importance to the planning and 
management of large investment projects. 
The analysis adopts a dialectical perspective (Seo and Creed 2002, Poole and Van 
de Ven 2004, Hargrave and Van de Ven 2009) and focuses on the interaction 
between the proponents and opponents of a given megaproject. We use 
institutional work theory (Lawrence and Subbady 2006, Lawrence et al. 2009) to 
describe the coalescence of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization practices 
in a planned megaproject.  
6.2 Theoretical Background 
6.2.1 Megaprojects as complex institutional systems  
Brookes and Locatelli (2015) define megaprojects as temporary endeavors 
characterized by large investment commitment, vast complexity (especially in 
organizational terms), and long-lasting impact on the economy, the environment, 
and society. Megaprojects contain a large element of innovation associated with 
high risk and characterized by conflict, uncertainty and poor cooperation between 
partners (Marrewijk et al. 2008).   
Poorly managed conflicts can create a pool of future unresolved issues, frustration 
and resentment which can result into performance shortcomings (Zikmann 1992). 
According to Whitfield (1994), successful conflict management largely depends 
on the recognition of the real causes of opposition - including how and why it 
arises. Awakul and Ogunlana (2002) argue that conflicts encountered on large 
scale construction projects occur in two broad categories: internal conflicts and 
interface conflicts. The former refer to conflicts between people in the project 
team, whereas the latter refer to conflicts between the project and groups outside 
the project team. Many scholars (Susskinds, 1985; Priscoli, 1987; Harashina, 
1995) have studied interface conflicts on projects involving various stakeholders 
and have shown that successful conflict management can be achieved through 
mutual education, as well as openness and fairness in decision making: “It is 
possible to convince an opposing party through sharing of information, quality 
argument and sound reasoning. When parties to a project are unwilling to use 
these approaches, conflict can get out of hand as opposing groups develop hard 
attitudes towards each other” (Awakul and Ogunlana 2002: 366). External 
oppositions to a megaproject are often associated with divergent views about its 
effects on community life or ways of life, on people’s relation with one another 
and how residents perceive and feel about communities and project-related 
changes (Leistriz and Murdock 1981). Indeed, people have different way of 
thinking depending on their personal cultural and social backgrounds which affect 
the way they perceive themselves, their behavior, and the stimuli in their 
environment (Al-Arjani 1995, Awakul and Ogunlana 2002).    
Levitt and Scott (2016) suggest looking at megaprojects as complex institutional 
systems representing a distinctive type of organization fields characterized by 
interactions among an extraordinarily diverse and shifting set of actors or 
stakeholders. Following Scott et al. (2000), one can describe megaprojects as 
complex organization fields containing actors—both individual and collective—
who carry differing institutional logics, and are overseen by varying types of 
governance structures. The complexity of these fields arises from the participation 
of key project delivery partners coming from different national institutional 
frameworks who must find a way to resolve their differences so they can work 
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effectively together to resolve multiple challenging technical, contractual and 
political issues (Levitt and Scott 2016).  
6.2.2 Institutional pillars, institutional work and dialectics 
“By organization field, we mean those organizations that, in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce 
similar services or products” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 148). Drawing on 
Scott (2001) and Maguire and Hardy (2009), one can see fields as held in place by 
three “pillars”—regulative, normative, and cognitive - through which legitimacy 
is established and conformity secured. The regulative pillar refers to the ability of 
certain actors to establish rules, police conformity and, if necessary, coerce 
compliance (Scott, 2001). Conformity to legal rules, for example, occurs in 
response to these coercive pressures (Maguire and Hardy 2009). The normative 
pillar refers to the values and norms that produce conformity (Caronna, 2004) 
because of social expectations and moral obligations (Hoffman et al., 2002; Scott, 
2001). The cognitive pillar is based on “shared conceptions that constitute the 
nature of social reality” and define the prevailing orthodoxy (Scott, 2001: 57). 
Conformity in this case may be automatic and unconscious because of a 
conceptually correct basis of legitimacy which becomes unquestioned (Hoffman, 
1999).  
According to Maguire and Hardy (2009), institutional pillars are key factors 
which determine field stability and change. On the one hand, they contribute to 
stability because they help to reproduce behavior (Scott 2001): institutionalized 
practices may be held in place by one dominant pillar (Hoffman, 1999) or by an 
alignment of all three (Wicks, 2001). On the other, this tendency toward stability 
and reproduction does not preclude change as it is possible for the pillars to 
become misaligned (Caronna, 2004) or for one or more to collapse (Ahmadjian 
and Robbins, 2005), making deinstitutionalization more likely (Maguire and 
Hardy 2009).    
How do institutional pillars shape stability and change in the complex field of 
megaprojects? 
To answer this question we propose to draw on Lawrence and Subbady (2006) 
urge researchers to focus on the interstitial elements of institutions in order to 
unpack the relational and interactive moments of institutional production. This 
means that, when doing research, analysis should focus on the work of actors as 
they attempt to create, maintain and disrupt institutional pillars. Based on a 
review of institutional studies published in mainstream journals, Lawrence et al. 
(2009) distinguish three broad categories of institutional work: creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions.  
As to creation, Lawrence and Subbady (2006) identify three groups of practices 
through which actors engage in actions that result in the creation of new 
institutions. The first group consists of those forms of institutional work that focus 
on rules and refers to three typologies of actions: advocacy, defining and vesting. 
The second group accounts for those forms of work aiming at changing norms 
and beliefs systems and refers to: constructing identities, changing norms and 
constructing normative networks. The third set of practices aims at giving actors 
cognitive frames - or sets of meanings - to interpret the behavior of others and 
refers to three forms of work: mimicry, theorizing and educating.        
As to maintenance, Lawrence and Subbady’s (2006) review detects six forms of 
work devoted to maintaining institutions. The first three account for the 
maintenance of institutions through ensuring adherence to rule systems and refer 
to three types of actions: enabling, policing and deterring. The second three – 
valorizing/demonizing, mythologizing, and embedding and routinizing - describe 
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processes where actors maintain institutions by reproducing existing norms and 
belief systems.        
As to disruption, Lawrence et al. (2009: 9) say that they found relatively little in 
terms of concrete descriptions of actions aimed at disrupting institutions since 
“the practices associated with actors attempting to undermine institutional 
arrangements are not well documented”. However, three forms of disrupting work 
can be found in the literature: disconnecting sanctions/reward, disassociating 
moral foundations, and undermining assumptions and beliefs. 
Hargrave and Van De Ven (2009: 122) further develop the understanding of 
institutional work by taking a dialectical perspective: “In dialectical processes, 
change emerges from interactions between proponents of current institutional 
arrangements and parties espousing contradictory arrangements. The new 
arrangements that emerge are then challenged by proponents of alternative 
arrangements as the dialectical process recycles”. The authors thus hold that 
contradictions are central to dialectical processes of change and it is not possible 
to understand the perspective of proponents for an institutional change without 
examining the views of opponents. By drawing on Werner and Baxter (1994) they 
define a contradiction as the dynamic tension between unified opposites in a 
system. Thus, contradictions are more than dualities and exist only when there is 
dynamic tension between oppositions that are interdependent, which together 
compose a unity, and which logically presuppose each other (Hargrave and Van 
De Ven 2009).  
How does change occur in the complex field of megaprojects? 
Dialectics is long since considered the motor of change (Hegel 1807, Marx 1859). 
More than two centuries ago, Hegel suggested that a dialectical process comprises 
three dialectical stages of development: a thesis (giving rise to its reaction), an 
antithesis (contradicting or negating the thesis), and the tension between these two 
beings resolved by means of a synthesis. In more simplistic words, one can 
consider a dialectical sequence in the following terms: action-reaction-solution. 
From this perspective, one can imagine that the dialectical tension in the field of a 
megaproject results from the relationship between the managerial initiatives of the 
project team (action) and the resistance to them of stakeholders outside the project 
team (reaction).  
6.3 Case study  
Pettigrew (1990) suggests that, when choosing the research site, social dramas or 
critical incidents may offer social scientists the opportunity to look inside 
previously shielded or ignored social systems. Following this suggestion, we have 
chosen to study the LT (LT) megaproject which is of “extravagant dimensions 
and has been blocked for almost 20 years by a protest of epic tenacity and 
occasional violence” (The Guardian, 9th April 2012).  
LT is a planned 270 km-long high-speed railway (HSR) line that will connect 
Lyon (in east-central France) and Turin (in northern Italy). The core of the project 
is a 57 kilometres base tunnel crossing the Alps between Susa valley in Italy and 
Maurienne in France. The tunnel will be one of the longest rail tunnels in the 
world. Civil engineering works started in early-2000s with the construction of 
access points and geological reconnaissance tunneling, with actual construction of 
the line initially planned to start between 2014 and 2015: as of today, the 
construction of the base tunnel has not started yet. However, in 2015 the national 
governments signed an international agreement proving their will to go ahead 
with the project (European Commission 2015). According to most recent 
declarations, construction works should start in 2018 (Le Monde, 2017). 
Two railway companies – one in Italy and the other in France – along with the 
two national governments and the European Commission are the project 
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promoters. According to the French Court of Audit (2012), the overall cost of the 
project has increased by 117,5% between 2002 and 2012 (12€ billion in 2002 and 
26,1€ in 2012). LT is financed through public funds by the EU (40%), Italy (35%) 
and France (25%) in the framework of the EU’s Trans-European Transport 
Network (TEN-T) investment policy: an infrastructure policy at the supranational 
level whose overall objective is to improve the functioning of the European 
internal market through continuous and efficient transnational networks in 
transport flows.  
Because of LT’s transnational nature, this case study is comparative in essence 
and provides the opportunity to examine two “polar types” (Pettigrew 1990: 275) 
as the Italian site of the project illustrates low performance and the French one 
high performance. In fact, while in France planned objectives - construction of 
access points and geological reconnaissance tunneling - have been timely met by 
the promoters, in Italy the project has experienced implementation delays because 
of the opposition of several civil society organizations. In the Italian context, the 
project has repeatedly been the objective of demonstrations by environmental 
organizations and local populations – backed by local authorities and intellectuals 
- who oppose the construction of the line for its cost, because traffic is currently 
decreasing, and for potential environmental and public health risks. The protests 
have often ended in violent clashes with the police force, permanently mobilized 
together with the army to defend the site which at the beginning of 2012 was 
declared of strategic national interest by the Italian government. 
6.4 Data  
Data for this research are based on an extensive qualitative database (Yin 2014) of 
interviews and documents - press releases, agreements, policy papers, third-
parties studies and reports - covering a period from 1985 to 2016. They have been 
collected during a fieldwork which lasted 3years, from 2014 to 2016.    
6.4.1 Data collection 
Since LT is a transnational investment project articulating across different 
jurisdictions (France, Italy and EU) and organizational entities, data collection 
was designed on the basis of an embedded case study methodology allowing 
dealing with phenomena characterized by more than one sub-unit of analysis (Yin 
2014). Following this methodological framework, 79 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted between 2014 and 2016 with actors playing a role in the 
governance of the LT project. Interviews were guided by a conceptual grid of 
information collection using a three-layer approach where individual functions, 
organizations’ roles and the overall system of project governance were separately, 
albeit interdependently, examined. Semi-structured interviews averaged 90 
minutes and included 4 typologies of actors: 1) project promoters, 2) public 
institutional actors, 3) lobbyists, 4) local communities. For the sake of clarity, the 
group of project promoters includes actors from both the national public 
administrations and the railway companies implementing LT. The group public 
institutional actors include actors from both the political (MPs, MEPs and non-
elected parties) and administrative (administrative staff of parliamentary 
assemblies and public officers of administrations concerned by the project but not 
implementing it directly) members of organizations playing a role in the story of 
LT. The group of lobbyists refers to those actors who attempt to influence LT- 
and TEN-T-related actions, policies, or decisions of officials in their daily life. 
The local communities refers to organized groups of citizens from the Susa 
Valley (Italy) and the French areas concerned by LT (suburbs of Lyon, the Lower 
Dauphiné region, the Avant-Pays Savoyard and the Maurienne region).  
These typologies were not decided ex-ante, rather they matured on the field 
during the interview process. Indeed, the set of interviewees was progressively 
constituted through snowball sampling. Following this sample strategy, we asked 
participants who had already been selected for the study to recruit other 
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participants. We thus started interviewing EU’s public officials in charge of the 
LT project and, then, trickled down across French and Italian jurisdictions up to 
local communities opposing it. At the end of this process, our sample included: 18 
project promoters, 19 public institutional actors, 7 lobbyists, 35 members from the 
Italian and French local communities opposing LT. Because of the transnational 
nature of the observed phenomenon, interviewees issued from different 
jurisdictional contexts: France, Italy and EU (Table 6.1). 
Typology of actors Jurisdiction N° Interviews  
Project Promoters 
EU 5 















   
79 
Table 6.1 – Interviewees by group of actors and jurisdiction  
6.4.2 Data analysis  
6.4.2.1 Interview data 
We used several techniques to make sense of the institutionalized practices 
mobilized in the implementation of LT.   
During the fieldwork, the author has met several times with his PhD supervisor 
and PhD committee. On occasion of these meetings they have debated the content 
of the interviews and fieldwork notes until sharing a common understanding of 
most important aspects. Based on these debates, the author prepared a data 
analysis table based on Pettigrew’s (1985, 1990) contextualism suggesting that, 
when studying organizational change, context process and content should be 
separately, albeit interdependently, considered in the analysis. Based on this table, 
a chronicle of the key events was developed by:  (1) using the interviews; (2) 
chronologically ordering the descriptions of the process LT implementation in the 
Italian and French context; and (3) juxtaposing accounts from different sources to 
ascertain convergence. Based on the chronicle, we could capture “who did what, 
and when” (Maguire and Hardy 2009: 153) and we could therefore prepare a 
narrative making sense of the institutionalized practices mobilized in the 
implementation of LT. 
6.4.2.2 Documentary data 
We conducted systematic coding of the fieldwork documents (n = 80) with the N-
Vivo software. The researcher read and re-read each document, selecting 
sentences, words and phrases that addressed the research questions. 
As shown in Figure 6.1, the coding process led to identify 6 typologies of codes: 
public decision-making at the national level, EU-level project management, 
environment, economy, local and technical aspects of the investment. These six 
typologies were regrouped into the 3 categories of institutional pillars developed 








Figure 6.1 – Coding structure
 The regulative pillar refers to the public decision-making and project-
management rules and practices as determined respectively by national and EU-
level regulations. The normative pillar refers to the environmental, economic and 
local justifications of the project as mobilized by the four groups of actors. The 
cognitive pillar refers to the technical aspects of the infrastructure investment (i.e. 
cost-benefit analyses, traffic flows, infrastructure technology, forecasting models 
and techniques) providing 
the scientific and 
technological arguments in 
support of the project.  
At the end of the coding 
process we coded 4199 
passages, distributed across 
the three categories of 
institutional pillars as 
follows (Fig. 2): regulative 
(42%), normative (19%) and 
cognitive (39%).  
Table 2 shows that 38% of 
the 4199 coded passages refer to project promoters, 35% local communities, 21% 
public institutional actors and 7% lobbies. These percentages reflect the relative 
weight of each group in the LT case. Even if public institutional actors and 
lobbies have an essential role in the story, project promoters and local 
communities are the most important groups whose competing views of the 
infrastructure are decisive in the evolution of LT. They over time introduce 
contradictory logics in the field of LT that contribute to shape change and 
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stability. We dogive particular attention to these two stakeholder groups and 
explore their institutional workin the implementation of LT, but we also consider 
the different roles played by lobbies and public institutional actors in Italy and 












Local communities 531 255 684 1470 35% 
Lobbies 117 64 116 297 7% 
Project promoters 615 309 618 1542 37% 
Public institutional 
actors 
354 176 360 890 21% 
Total columns 1617 804 1778 4199  
% columns 39% 19% 42%   
Table 6.2 – Coded passages across groups of actors and institutional pillars34 
 
6.5 Institutionalization 
In this section we present the creative and maintaining practices that in each 
national context are associated with the existing institutional pillars (see Table 
6.3). We first describe the practices associated with the cognitive pillar, then those 
with the normative and regulative pillars. 
 
 
                                               
34 Values in Table 2 were calculated as follows. Firstly, we assigned each of the 80 
documents of our sample to one of the 4 groups emerged during the fieldwork process. 
Secondly, we coded the total passages of a document according to the corresponding 
group of actors. Thirdly, we systematically counted the number of passages coded for a 




Cognitive Theorizing Defining 
Normative 
Constructing normative networks 
Advocacy 
Mythologizing  
Regulative Embedding and routinizing Enabling 
Table 6.3 – Description of institutional pillars, cross-country comparison 
6.5.1 The cognitive pillar 
A cognitive pillar is usually constructed by experts whose role is to produce a 
scientific orthodoxy through “fact-making” (Maguire 2004). Our analysis shows 
that the cognitive pillar was inconsistently fabricated across the French and the 
Italian contexts. In France, national railways’ experts actively contributed to lay 
down the cognitive foundations of LT by engaging in an intense work of 
infrastructure theorizing. In Italy, national railways’ top management did not 
consider LT a strategic priority. This resulted into a deficiency of the 
infrastructure theorization which was solved, at a later stage, through defining 
work.    
6.5.1.1 France 
Theorizing the technical need for a new railway connection between Lyon (capital 
of Rhône-Alps region) and Turin (capital of Piedmont Region) was far and away 
the very first important form of institutional work in France. As referred by 
Greenwood et al. (2002; 60), theorizing is “the development and specification of 
abstract categories, and the elaboration of chains of cause and effect”. 
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Preliminary theorizing efforts came from SNCF’s planning department which in 
1986 launched the idea of modernizing the railway connection between Lyon and 
Turin as the transport service provided by the historical railway line was affected 
by technical shortcomings. This new line was needed as the gradient of the old 
one was about 30% (three times higher than recommended values) and imposed 
strong limitations on operation, as well as higher additional power costs. The 
construction of a base tunnel crossing the Alps at the height of 400m – instead of 
the 1200m of the historical line – would have enabled a dramatic reduction of the 
gradient line (Figure 6.4).    
SNCF’s managers anchored LT in a number of rational categories which 
established a cause-effect link between the technical shortcomings of the 
historical line and its poor performance. By theorizing this link, they provided 
technical arguments to justify the construction of a new high-performing railway 
connection served by a base tunnel.   
Thanks to a new base tunnel of about 54 km under Mont Cenis, this link will not 
only ensure the connection of high-speed French and Italian networks, but also 
creates a new high-performance route for freight traffic.  
(SNCF, National Master Plan for the Development of TGV Lines, 1992, p. 10) 
SNCF’s idea immediately met the support of Rhône-Alps’ political authorities 
which, at that time, had the ambition of internationalizing the region by 
improving its transport connections with other European cities. For this reason 
Rhône-Alps’ important politicians, such as Charles Millon (President of the 
regional assembly) and Louis Besson (major of Chambéry, an important city of 
Rhône-Alps Region) considered LT a golden opportunity. They not only 
supported the project but also introduced an innovation as they proposed that the 
new connection should have adopted a TGV technology (French HSR 
technology). SNCF welcomed this innovation and included LT in its master plan 
for the development of TGV lines in France and Europe.  
 
SNCF included LT in its master plan on the basis of two big options proposing 
alternative routes to connect Lyon and the French border. A first option referred 
to Nord-Isère route whose main characteristic was the fact that it favored the 
integration of Chambéry in the LT project. The second option referred to three 
different routes aimed at integrating the city of Grenoble in the project. These 
different options triggered an intense debate between the cities of Chambéry and 
Grenoble which both wanted to be served by an international TGV line. Technical 
theorizing played again a crucial role since Rhône-Alps Region decided to solve 
this dispute on the basis of rational arguments establishing a cause-effect link 
between the preferred option and regional transport needs. It commissioned a 
study to an independent consultant which concluded that Nord-Isère route was the 
preferred option since it was the best suited solution to serve both Lyon’s 
international airport and existing Ginevra-Chambèry railway connection in the 
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framework of the Diamant Alpin program, an international railway infrastructure 
program aiming at connecting major Alpine cities.  
Additional theoretical elements legitimating the project idea arrived in early 
1990s from French transport ministry which established a working group to study 
the traffic evolutions between Italy and France. In 1991, the working group 
released the so-called Rapport Legrand, a report justifying the new railway 
connection because existing road tunnels between Italy and France would have 
reached their saturation point by 2010. 
Since early-1990s, the outcomes of this intense process of theorization were 
shared with the local communities affected by the project. These communities 
were provided with informative brochures about the project and were also 
involved in a public debate organized by the prefecture of the Rhône-Alps region.  
In the early-1990s, the prefect of the region organized a public debate on the 
Lyon-Turin project. He invited all the associations and actors concerned to 
discuss the economic interest of the project. […] The aim of this debate is to make 
citizens participate in public meetings where everyone is free to come. Citizens’ 
associations have enough speaking time. Most often these associations are 
opponents, associations in defense of their territories. Since the beginning we 
invite them and they can give their opinion on the interest of the project.    
(Public officer in charge of large infrastructure projects, French regional 
administration, fieldwork interview) 
In 1992, local communities were thus involved in a public debate on the 
economic and social interest of the project. The debate was opened to associations 
and individual citizens who both were provided with the possibility to question 
the project as theorized by the industrial and regional experts.    
6.5.1.2 Italy 
In the early-1990s, during the initial phase of LT development, the technical need 
for a new infrastructure between Lyon and Turin was undertheorized in Italy. At 
that time, then FS’ chairperson – Mario Schimberni – believed that the 
infrastructure priority was not the development of new international HSR lines 
but rather the upgrading of the existing national infrastructure network.  
Mario Schimberni had the same opinion of the “old guard” of Italian railway 
engineers who considered the HSR philosophy unsuitable for the Italian 
orography. He believed that HSR systems were inappropriate because in Italy 
there are many cities with short distances between them. The only way to move 
traffic from the road, airways and seaways to railways was to improve the 
existing infrastructure network instead of building new lines for long distance 
trips.  
(Member of a local community’s committee previously working in the railway 
industry, fieldwork interview) 
In 1990 the incumbent government removed Mr Schimberni from his position and 
replaced him with Lorenzo Necci. Mr Necci was an experienced executive with a 
managerial mindset and well-known admirer of the French TGV technology. He 
firmly believed that new investments in modern HSR systems, such as TGV 
systems, could have relaunched the Italian rail market and improved the quality of 
the transport service.  
To initiate his TGV program and overcome the resistance of the “old guard” of 
engineers, Mr Necci engaged in a form of institutional work involving activities 
directed toward defining. According to Lawrence and Subbady (2006) defining 
refers to the construction of rule systems that confer status or identity, define 
boundaries of membership, or create status hierarchies within a field.  
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Under Mr Necci’s direction, in 1991 FS adopted the resolution AS/971. This 
resolution established Treno Alta Velocità S.p.A. (also known as TAV S.p.A.), a 
joint stock company in charge of the planning and development of the future 
Italian HSR network. The same year, he went to Turin and signed a memorandum 
of understanding with the Piedmont region making official the intention of 
realizing LT. Three years later, he led FS to join SNCF in the process of 
infrastructure theorization. In fact, in 1994, drawing on the European Community 
Council Regulation 2137/85, FS and SNCF created a European Economic Interest 
Grouping – called Alpetunnel - entitled to conduct the feasibility studies of the 
base tunnel for both the Italian and French governments. In 2001, Alpetunnel 
delivered the results of its studies to the two governments and recommended the 
construction of the base tunnel.  
6.5.2 The normative pillar 
Maguire and Hardy (2009) suggest that normative pillars might be constructed to 
spread discourses reproducing a particular way of seeing as “truth” (Knights & 
Morgan, 1991: 262). To this end, discourses ‘hook’ into common-sense notions of 
good and bad to produce ideas which convey messages about morality and 
immorality, as well as acceptable and inappropriate behaviors (Carabine, 2001). 
Our analysis shows that the normative pillar was consistently fabricated across the 
French and the Italian contexts thanks the construction of normative networks 
engaged in the advocacy and mythologizing of the LT project.   
6.5.2.1 France 
According to Lawrence and Subbady (2006), constructing normative networks 
describes a form of institutional work that alters the relationship between actors in 
a field by changing the normative assumptions that connect them. Advocacy may 
be an important component of the institutional work conducted by these forms of 
networks, which are formally established to make claims for - to represent - 
important constituencies in an organizational field (Galvin 2002: 673). Advocacy 
campaigns often consist in mobilizing political or regulatory support through 
direct and deliberate techniques of social suasion (Lawrence and Subbady 2006).  
Between 1987 and 1988 the Rhône-Alps Region organized a cycle of 
international conferences gathering representatives from Piedmont and Catalonia 
regions. These conferences were the occasion to provide political support to the 
initial SNCF’s project idea. LT was presented as a key infrastructure section of 
the Mediterranean transport axis, an ambitious infrastructure program aimed at 
connecting Spain (Barcelona), France (Lyon) and Italy (Turin). In 1991 the region 
created the Comité de promotion pour la Transalpine (often simply called 
Transalpine), a normative network in charge of the advocacy work in support of 
LT. Three typologies of actors compose this network: (1) regional (i.e. Rhône-
Alps Region and Savoy Department) and municipal (i.e. Lyon and Chambery) 
administrations, (2) economic stakeholders (i.e. SNCF, the federation of transport 
and logistics companies, the federation of public construction companies, banks) 
and (3) individual actors – senior civil servants and, especially, entrepreneurs. 
 
The Board of Directors is composed in such a way as to assure the right balance 
between our typologies of members: local administrations, economic stakeholders 
and enterprises. […] Transalpine is chaired by the head of a great company. Our 
current Chairman is Franck Riboud, CEO of Danone, a great company. Our 
Deputy Chairman is François Lépine, our big boss in the everyday life of 
Transalpine. In the past, Mr Lépine was prefect, a Senior Civil Servant of the 
French State. […] The Chairman, the Deputy Chairman and the CEO of 
Transalpine are three complementary profiles. The Chairman takes cares of the 
good performance of the project. The Senior Civil Servant - who is the Deputy 
Chairman - can open any door at any level of the central State. The CEO - who is 
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a civil servant of the local administrations - works in direct contact with the local 
communities.   
(Executive officer of Transalpine, fieldwork interview)    
 
Transalpine “goads” the project implementation into the right direction. It oils the 
decision-making machine of LT and undertakes several advocacy activities - 
including media campaigns, public speaking, as well as commissioning and 
publishing research - to strengthen the political, economic, and social support of 
key stakeholders to LT: 
Transalpine’s activities may be studies, individual meetings with the actors of the 
project, events to promote the project, newsletters, as well as other initiatives to 
spread the relevant information.  […] We have a very particular role. We are like 
a “goad”. It means that we are not directly involved in the governance of the 
project but we assure that decisions are made in the right way and as fast as 
possible. […] We goad and enlighten in such a way that the project can properly 
advance across the gears of the European and national machine.  
(Executive officer of Transalpine, fieldwork interview) 
Transalpine has supported the French regional authorities in raising awareness 
spreading about the importance of the LT project as well as spreading 
information throughout the local communities. They take care of the press 
coverage at the regional level.  There are systematically news stories on Lyon-
Turin. In the regional press, every month there are two or three articles. I think 
that this helps the local citizens to imagine their future lives with the Lyon-Turin. 
Transalpine has been crucial for that: they organize information campaigns.    
(Public officer of the Rhône Alps Region, fieldwork interview) 
Mythologizing was also a crucial component of Transalpine’s advocacy 
campaign. Consistently with Lawrence and Subbady’s (2006) framework, 
mythologizing focused on the past - rather than the present – and was meant to 
preserve the normative underpinnings of LT by exalting the history of the project, 
as well as revoking and sharing a distant past.  
Over the centuries, crossing the Alps has been a test of strength, an individual 
and physical commitment. Great political and financial exploits have succeeded 
one after the other to create, reinforce and protect areas of passage. 
(“Crossing the Alps: a long history”, Transalpine’s brouchure, September 2005) 
For example, to this end in 2007 Transalpine organized an exhibition called 
Exposition Alpes 2020 in the Lyon’s chamber of commerce. During this event, 
many of its members gathered to explain to the large public that trans-alpine 
infrastructures, such as LT, have a longstanding tradition in the history of Franco-
Italian relations as they date back to the 19th century. In a similar vein, they took 
part in an event celebrating the centenary of Fréjus rail tunnel between Italy and 
France. On this occasion, LT was narrated as the historical outcome of past 
railway relations between French and Italian peoples. 
6.5.2.2 Italy 
Similarly to France, in Italy the normative pillar was erected through the 
construction of normative networks, advocacy and mythologizing. 
If we go back to the origins of the Italian lobbying activities in support of LT we 
find the association Tecnocity, the ancestor of Transpadana. Transpadana 
actually was born from Tecnocity. More precisely, Tecnocity was among the 
founders of Tranpadana. Its initial members were all from the Piedmont region 
because, unlike today, LT was not considered a European project yet. From the 
late-1980s to the late-1990s its role was to promote studies and symposiums in 
support of LT. […] In the late-1990s the name changed from Tecnocity to 
Comitato Transpadana because new members arrived from all the Padana Plain. 
(Executive officer of Transalpine, fieldwork interview) 
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In the late-1980s, Tecnocity – a foundation controlled by FIAT (the largest Italian 
automobile manufacturer founded by the Agnelli family) and IFI (an Italian 
investment company controlled by the Agnelli family) – was the first to support 
the construction of a new HSR infrastructure between Lyon and Turin. It was a 
local organization promoting the development of new technologies, culture, 
tourism and trade in the city of Turin, and in general, in Piedmont. At that time, 
Tecnocity was following the initiatives of the European Round Table of 
Industrialists, an EU-level influential group supporting the construction of a base 
tunnel across the Alps to enhance the European transport system. Within this 
context, in September 1989 it organized a symposium where LT was presented to 
an audience of business organizations and politicians coming from all the Padana 
Plain. This initiative succeeded to favor the formation of a network of 
administrative authorities, economic stakeholders and enterprises which called 
itself Comitato Transpadana (known as Transpadana).  
Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, Transpadana has conducted numerous actions 
which can be classified as advocacy and mythologizing work, many of them in 
collaboration with Transalpine.  
This symposium is an initiative of Transalpine and Transpadana. It will be filmed, 
recorded and broadcasted on Twitter. In so doing, everybody will benefit from it. 
In addition, the proceedings will be distributed to all participants and put online 
on the site of Transalpine. […] We have organized two round tables.  One will 
deal with the question of how the economic actors and enterprises see, from a 
long term perspective, the modal shift in the geographical area at issue. The other 
will deal with the question of the future conditions of this shift on the 
Mediterranean corridor. We would like to look at this situation from the 
perspective of the economic performance of the rail freight and the conditions of 
its modal shift.  
(Proceedings of the symposium entitled “The future of rail freight and modal shift 
in the Southern Europe after the Franco-Italian summit”, 8 March 2016) 
In January 2001 it organized a convention called "Un treno da non perdere. 
Ragioni e risorse di un nuovo collegamento veloce, merci e passeggeri, tra 
Torino e Lione" (tr. “Don’t miss the train: reasons and resources for the new high-
speed passenger and freight connection between Lyon and Turin”). During this 
event, the organizers projected a video presenting LT as a major progress not only 
for Italy but also for the local populations of the Susa Valley: the title of the video 
was “Valsusa un viaggio nei futuri” (tr. “Susa Valley, a trip towards the future”). 
In 2005 it participated in the French initiative “Exposition Alpes 2020”.  
6.5.3 The regulative pillar 
In their study on the deinstitutionalization of DDT practices, Maguire and Hardy 
(2009) suggest that the regulative pillars coerce compliance through legal rules. 
They examined the texts of all federal regulations and administrative rulings 
affecting practices of DDT. Their focus was on texts that were backed by the 
coercive power of government, such as administrative rulings, court orders, and 
acts of legislation, in connection with the regulative pillar. Following Maguire 
and Hardy (2009), we thus focused our analysis on the national laws and 
administrative regulations affecting the decision-making of LT in France and 
Italy. We show that that decision-making rules for large infrastructure projects 
vary across the two countries. French rules have their source in a set of codified 
administrative procedures – so called ‘Enquête Publiqe’ and ‘Démarche Grand 
Chantiers’– that coerce LT promoters into involving local authorities and citizens 
in the project decision-making. Conversely, Italian rules have their source in a 
governmental regulation – Law 443/01, so called ‘Legge Obiettivo’ - coercing 
promoters into a rigidly centralized top-down decision-making procedure 
allowing them to bypass both local authorities and citizens. At the national levels, 
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these regulative differences produced different forms of institutional work - 
embedding and routinizing work in France and enabling work in Italy. 
6.5.3.1 France   
In France, existing administrative regulations - ‘Enquête Publiqe’ (EP) and 
‘Démarche Grand Chantiers’ (DCG) – compelled project promoters to use 
primarily embedding and routinizing work. As explained by Lawrence and 
Subbady (2006), this category of institutional work involves actively infusing the 
normative foundations of an institution into the actors’ day to day routines and 
organizational practices. In the French context, LT was maintained and 
reproduced through the stabilizing influence of administrative routines of public 
consultations aimed at embedding the project into the local communities.     
The EP starts with the administrative tribunal – a neutral actor - appointing the 
committee in charge of the public inquiry. It lasts for almost 2 months during 
which everybody can give his opinion. These opinions can be sent to the 
Municipality - where there are dedicated registers -, or be expressed during 
public meetings. Based on these opinions, the inquiring committee releases a 
legal opinion. This opinion either says ‘yes, the project can be declared of public 
utility’ or ‘no, the project cannot be declared of public utility’. For example, we 
had a public inquiry in 2012 and, in August 2013, the declaration of public utility. 
[…] The declaration is a decree of the government.  
 (Public officer of the Rhone Alps DREAL administration, fieldwork interview)  
The consultation files were sent to 500 local actors: 251 municipalities, 64 inter-
municipal structures, 5 local authorities, 40 Members of the Parliament, 77 
consular and socio-professional bodies, 45 services of the State. The consultation 
resulted into about 30 meetings. Of these 30 meetings, 7 were information 
sessions with 40 to 150 participants each. [… ]During these administrative 
consultations, local authorities organized many public meetings. These meetings 
provided RFF with several occasions to present the implementation status of the 
project as well as to answer participants’ questions. 
(‘Rapport de la Commission d’enquête publique’, 2012, p. 25-26) 
EP routinized practices coerced an independent administrative tribunal into 
creating a public inquiry committee. This committee disseminated information on 
LT to local authorities and communities and organized public meetings to explain 
them their stakes in the project. RFF was often involved and, as also referred in 
the 2012 Report of the public inquiry committee (p.26), established two offices – 
one in La Tour-Du-Pin and one in Chambéry – to best address local concerns.  
Since 2001, several public inquiries have taken place by favoring dialogue 
between project promoters and local stakeholders. EP routinized practices to 
embed the project into local stakeholder groups have been supported by the DCG.   
The DGC is a mechanism to establish a good relation between the project and the 
territory. It aims at realizing the project as fast as possible with the support and 
collaboration of local communities.  For example, in the Maurienne region the 
DGC allowed us to organize a round table with the concerned social and 
economic stakeholders and tell them: ‘a large infrastructure project will take 
place on your territory. It will have a disrupting impact on your territory. What 
do you think? Which are your fears? What do you want to gain from it? Based on 
this dialogue, we developed a set indicators reflecting the need of the territories 
and allowing us, when the works of the tunnel start, to monitor everything 
happens in the construction site.    
(Public officer of the Savoy Department administration, fieldwork interview)    
As explained by this public officer, the DGC allows the project promoters to sit at 
the table with local stakeholders and identify with them the best way to 
implement the project at the local level. A dialogue is thus established with local 
stakeholders to negotiate the local implementation of the project (i.e. employment 
 301 
 
of local workers and enterprise) and define common indicators to monitor in the 
future the progress made.   
6.5.3.2 Italy 
In Italy, the existing regulation led project promoters to use enabling work. This 
form of work refers to the creation of rules that facilitate, supplement and support 
institutions. According to Lawrence and Subbady (2006), this may include the 
creation of authorizing agents needed to carry on institutional routines or 
diverting resources required to ensure institutional survival. It maintains 
institutions by introducing certainty into institutional arrangements which allows 
actors to avoid intra-institutional conflict.  
As explained by the interviewees, LT decision-making was not regulated by 
ordinary administrative sources but rather from a 2001 parliamentary law - Law 
443/01, so called ‘Legge Obiettivo’ (LO). LO introduced extra-ordinary 
institutional arrangements allowing the government to bypass local authorities in 
the LT decision-making and have preferential access to financial resources since 
the early phases of project development. Thanks to these new institutional 
routines, project promoters could swiftly divert resources towards LT without any 
intra-institutional resistance at the local level.     
The ‘Legge Obiettivo’ came into force in 2001 because the government 
considered that this infrastructure project – along with many others listed in the 
legal text – was a national priority. The project could therefore be approved 
through an exceptional fast-lane procedure because it was very important for the 
Italian economic development.    
(Member of the technical staff of the Osservatorio, fieldwork interview) 
The ‘Legge Obiettivo’ has essentially deprived our majors of any decision-making 
power on their own territory. The government decided the project and imposed it. 
Listing the Lyon-Turin project in the ‘Legge Obiettivo’ allowed promoters to 
abstain from the traditional decision-making procedure and from the dialogue 
with the territory. That’s what the ‘Legge Obietivo’ really is.    
(Member of the Piedmont Regional Assembly, fieldwork interview) 
Thanks to the ‘Legge Obiettivo’, some infrastructure projects can be approved by 
the government without being obliged to comply with the traditional system of 
checks and balances. Since the preliminary phase of project design, this law 
facilitates the access to financial resources. 
(Member of the Italian Senate, fieldwork interview)      
Through this law, the Italian Parliament mandated the government to realize 
several infrastructure projects listed in the legal text itself. It instituted new 
decision-making rules introducing a fast-lane procedure to facilitate the 
accomplishment of LO-listed projects. These new rules concentrated all decision-
making power in the hands of an inter-ministerial body, called Comitato 
Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica (CIPE). Indeed, if a project 
was listed in LO, then the CIPE was empowered to approve it by majority. There 
was no legal requirement of involving local citizens and authorities. The only 
constrain was to acquire the non-binding opinion of local authorities concerned by 
planned projects. Thanks to LO, the CIPE became the main authorizing agent 
entitled to divert resources towards projects deemed by the government of priority 
importance for the Italian economy.   
6.6 De-institutionalization  
In France and Italy, the local communities concerned by the future infrastructure 
felt threatened by the initiatives of the project promoters. They expressed 
concerns about the technical arguments in support of the project and the fairness 
of the public authorities in the decision-making process. To counter promoters’ 
forms of institutional work, they produced counter forms of institutional work 
and, in so doing, mounted an attack of the institutional pillars of LT. In both 
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countries their aim was to disassociate LT’s institutional pillars from their moral 
foundations. According to Lawrence and Subbady (2006), disassociating moral 
foundations is a particular form of work mobilized to disrupt current institutional 
arrangements. This form of work has the potential to disrupt institutions by 
disassociating the practice, rule or technology from its normative foundation as 
appropriate within the relevant organizational context.  
Oppositions developed differently in the two national contexts. In the early-
1990s, the Italian local populations of the Susa Valley gave birth to a grassroots 
movement against LT, so called NOTAV (‘NO Treno ad Alta Velocità’, tr. No 
High-Speed Train) movement. In France the opposition of local communities 
slowly emerged in the early-2010s following the official audit of two French 
public administrative bodies - the ‘Court des Comptes’ and the ‘Conseil General 
des Pont et Chaussées’ – which questioned the realism of the technical studies at 
the basis of the project.  
6.6.1 Italy 
In Italy local oppositions to LT emerged in the early-1990s from the activities of a 
local group of citizens composed of: (1) environmental activists (most of them 
members of ProNatura association), (2) retired railway engineers and (3) 
university professors. They all lived in the Susa Valley (near Piedmont’s Alps) or 
in Turin’s surroundings. Such an experienced coalition of actors joined efforts 
with the local authorities and residents of the Susa valley. In so doing, the 
NOTAV activists rapidly evolved from a NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) 
opposition to a citizen movement fighting useless expensive megaprojects 
imposed by the government without bottom-up participation.  
The NOTAV movement has three legs: the technical experts, the people and the 
institutional representatives. The technical experts provide knowledge support. 
They study the texts prepared by the project promoters and then, through public 
information sessions and events, explain them to the local people. Thanks to the 
information provided by the experts, the people make an idea of the project and 
take their decisions about the project. Decisions are taken at different levels: the 
committee, where citizens take decisions concerning their town; the coordination 
group, where they define a common agenda for all the committees; and the 
assembly, taking political decisions concerning the overall opposition strategy. 
Finally, the institutional representatives contribute to the movement by defending 
its position in the institutional arena, like the government or the region.  
(Spokesperson of the NOTAV Movement, Assembly – Turin, 12 October 2015. 
Fieldwork notes) 
Thanks to this internal organization, NOTAV activists have opposed the project 
for about 30 years by disassociating LT from its normative foundations as 
appropriate to the their cognitive and regulative contexts. Their aim was to show 
that the promoters were liars and LT was not a good project (normative pillar) 
because it could not be justified on the basis of scientific evidence (cognitive 
pillar) and its decision-making rules were undemocratic (regulative pillar).  
They know very well that there is no freight traffic and that the decline has started 
about 20 years. They know that traffic won’t develop further between the Italian, 
French and Spanish economies because these are advanced economies, and so 
on. They lie knowing that they lie. […] High-speed railways have been a great 
burden for our public debt. They have favored corruption and have been the 
largest distributor of bribes between political parties and industrial groups. 
(Expert of the NOTAV movement, fieldwork interview) 
The volume of freight traffic across the Alps has decreased and is clearly below 
the capacity of the existing infrastructures. […]This project does make sense. The 
reality has confuted all technical and economic forecasts. The passenger traffic –
expected to triple between 1992 and 2002 by the project promoters – declined by 
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20%.  It really doesn’t make sense to waste our resources to invest in these 
massive projects. They have disrupting environmental costs and they respond to 
no problem in terms of traffic increase and infrastructure capacity. 
(NOTAV Brochure ‘100 ragioni contro la TAV in Val di Susa’, released in 2004) 
The Legge Obiettivo came into force in the late December 2001. It formalized 
[the exclusion of local communities] and made it a legal rule. The local 
administrations (and the communities of people they represent) have been totally 
excluded from the decision-making of projects deemed of strategic national 
interest by the government. In a nutshell, the Legge Obiettivo transfers any type of 
decision - on the urban planning, the geographical localization of the 
infrastructure, and the public utility of large infrastructure projects - to the Prime 
Minister (and to the CIPE). No authorization or approval is required to other 
local or central administrations.   
(Final statement of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal met in Turin in 2015) 
From the early-1990s, Transpadana’s advocacy work had promoted LT by 
highlighting the strategic importance of the new infrastructure for the 
development of the Italian economy and transport system. NOTAV activists 
argued that these normative foundations were lies as no scientific argument could 
support this claim. The expert group of the movement produced empirical 
evidence that, contrary to the outcomes of promoters’ theorization, the traffic 
flows between Italy and France were far from reaching the saturation point of the 
existing line. Indeed, according to their studies, the traffic between Italy and 
France had continuously decreased from the late-1990s. For this reason, they 
rather considered the project as a burden for Italian taxpayers. From their 
perspective, the decreasing traffic was symptomatic of a lack of transport demand 
between the two countries. Therefore, investing in a new infrastructure was wrong 
as no positive return on the investment could be realistically expected. Italian 
taxpayers will have paid in the future for such inconsiderate project.  
Throughout the project life-cycle, NO TAV activists - backed by the local 
authorities of the Susa Valley – often manifested their dissent to the promoters. 
Nevertheless, promoters ignored them as the decision-making framework 
provided by the regulative pillar (LO) enabled them to take any decision without 
having the support of local stakeholders. This particular situation led NOTAV 
activists to denounce the regulative foundations of LT by betraying the 
questionable democratic nature of LO.  
6.6.2 France 
In France, local oppositions developed in the suburbs of Lyon, the Lower 
Dauphiné region and the Avant-Pays Savoyard. Activists from these geographical 
areas merged together in an association known as la Coordination Ain Dauphiné 
Savoie (CADS). Project promoters did not ignore them. They kept them informed 
– e.g. by sending them informative brochures of planned infrastructure – and 
involved them in public consultations since the early stages of the theorization 
process (e.g. 1992 public debate on the economic and social interest of the 
project). Such an open approach to local oppositions allowed promoters to control 
the dissent by adapting it to their agenda.   
In Italy, the decision-making is very autocratic. There is no debate and the State 
imposes its decision to the local populations. It is really a confrontation between 
the State and the populations. In France, they have understood that oppositions 
must be institutionalized […] ‘I stretch out my hand to you so that you accept the 
project I will impose to you’. This is anyway the French conception of 
participatory democracy.  
(Spokesperson of the French opposition groups, fieldwork interview) 
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Italian difficulties were due to the lack of consultation with local populations 
against the high-speed line. In France the situation was different because there 
was is an opposition within the techno-structure of the state. 
 (Public officer of the European Parliament, fieldwork interview) 
In France, everybody knows that this project will be a failure. The main 
difference between Italy and France is that in France there are bodies of the 
public administration – like the Court des Comptes and the Conseil General des 
Pont et Chaussées – that audited Lyon-Turin and did not considered it a good 
project.  
 (Researcher of the University of Lyon, fieldwork interview) 
In 2003, the ‘Conseil général des Ponts et Chaussées’ - a public administration 
supervising civil engineering initiatives of the French State – released a report 
casting doubts on the socio-economic interest of LT. Ten years later, a 2012 
report (‘Référé n° 64174’) of the French Court of Audit confirmed these doubts 
and questioned the realism of the costs estimates and traffic forecasts of the 
project promoters. Intrigued by these reports, in 2012 Daniel Ibanez – an 
experienced business consultant from the Savoie department – decided to take 
part in the public consultations organized by LT promoters with the residents of 
the departments of Rhône, Isère and Savoie.    
Daniel Ibanez understands complex economic issues and knows how to work with 
them. This is because of his professional background. […] Since he joined us 
things have changed a lot. He has skills that others among us do not have: he is 
able to produce analyses and conduct technical studies. We needed someone with 
his profile. If he had not joined us I would have surrendered.  
(Member of a French opposition group, fieldwork interview) 
During the public consultations, residents were provided with detailed 
information about the landed properties that would have been affected by the 
future railway line. Vis-à-vis the concrete opportunity to see these properties 
either confiscated by public authorities or devalued because of their proximity to 
the infrastructure, residents organized under the leadership of Mr Ibanez. Thanks 
to its expertise,   
Mr Ibanez developed technical and legal arguments disassociating LT from its 
normative foundations. His aim was to show that the promoters were liars and LT 
was not a good project (normative pillar) because it could not be justified on the 
basis of scientific evidence (cognitive pillar) and its decision-making was not 
transparent (regulative pillar). 
During the public enquiry project promoters showed us some graphs presenting 
increasing transport flows from France, Switzerland and Austria towards Italy up 
to 2008. According to their presentation, these increasing flows justified the 
construction of a new tunnel. This was an abuse of consciousness! We understood 
this later when we decided to take the same data and separately analyze them. We 
noticed that, of course, by aggregating all the transport flows going from 
Switzerland, Austria and France to Italy we could observe that they generally 
increased. But when we disaggregated them we could see that while Swiss and 
Austrian flows increase, French flows dramatically decrease since 1988. 
Moreover, we could also notice that today these flows are less than those in 1988.  
(Spokesperson of the French opposition groups, fieldwork interview) 
[We discovered] that Mr Guy Truchet was the brother of a director of the Truchet 
TP company, interested in the infrastructure works. The very existence of this 
direct family relationship prevents an inquiring commissioner from being 
impartial. If a commissioner is concerned by family ties, he obviously runs the 
risk to be reproached for dissimulation and dependence, or bias. 
 309 
 
(“Memoire en Replique” of the French opponents, parag. 196-197, 2012) 
The inquiring commissioners, the public officers under the responsibility of the 
Prefect, the Lyon-Turin promoters, all knew that someone of the inquiring 
commissioners was not entitled to sit in the public inquiry commission. All of 
them have deceived the public; this is today a STATE SCANDAL. 
(‘Scandale d'Etat sur le Lyon-Turin’, public notice of the French opposition 
groups, 2015) 
In the same way as NOTAV experts, Mr Ibanez produced empirical evidence that, 
contrary to the outcomes of promoters’ theorization, the traffic flows between 
Italy and France were far from reaching the saturation point of the existing line. 
His studies showed that the traffic between Italy and France had continuously 
decreased from the late-1980s. From his standpoint, investing in LT was wrong 
because the project promoters based the cost-benefit analysis of the infrastructure 
investment on inaccurate data. Under his leadership, French opponents claimed 
new studies on the socio-economic as impact of LT. Moreover, they called for a 
new public debate on the public interest of the project that was truly transparent 
(e.g. independence and impartiality of one of the inquiring commissioners).   
They wanted a new public debate where all concerned stakeholders could 
participate based on most recent accurate data on transport flows, as well as on an 
adequate cost-benefit analysis of the infrastructure. However, promoters 
considered these arguments incompatible with the implementation status of the 
project which had already been gone through many EU decisions and 
international agreements, duly ratified by the French Parliament. 
6.7 Re-institutionalization 
Vis-à-vis local communities’ attack, project promoters reacted to preserve the 
planned design of LT. To this end, they introduced new institutional practices 
aimed at restoring LT promoters’ control over the process of project 
implementation. They primarily used two forms of institutional work: mimicry 
and deterrence. Actors attempting to create new institutions have the potential to 
leverage existing sets of taken-for-granted practices and rules, if they can 
associate the new with the old in some way that eases adoption: one way in which 
this is done is through mimicry (Lawrence and Subbady 2006). Deterrence is a 
different form of work which focuses on establishing coercive barriers to 
institutional change. It involves the threat of coercion to inculcate the conscious 
obedience of institutional actors (Lawrence and Subbady 2006). 
Ongoing oppositions at the local level resulted into major delays of the project 
implementation throughout the 2000s and 2010s. These delays led the European 
Commission to put pressure on the Italian and French national governments and 
threaten to reduce its financial support to LT if the timely implementation of the 
project was not assured. Within this context, the project promoters decided to 
increase their control over the project in order to secure the future funds. In Italy, 
they first used mimicry in the mid-2000s to appease local stakeholders’ requests 
of participation and, then, drew on deterrence in the early-2010s to crush their 
demonstrations against LT. In France, they resorted to deterrence in the early-
2010s to discourage Mr Ibanez from organizing further the French opposition.      
Despite local oppositions, in the 2000s Italian promoters did not stop advancing 
the project. In 2005 they sent expropriation letters to the residents of Venaus, a 
village in the Susa Valley concerned by the construction of a geognostic tunnel. 
Vis-à-vis promoters’ obstinacy, Venaus residents occupied the construction site. 
As a response, the police violently evacuated them to let the promoters start the 
geognostic works. The images of this police operation circulated all around the 
country and, two days later, 30000 people assembled in Venaus, removed the 
enclosures from the construction site and occupied it again. Their request to the 
project promoters was to involve local communities and authorities in the 
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decision-making of the project and open a debate on the technical reasons at the 
basis of LT.   
Vis-à-vis NOTAV’s mass mobilization, in 2006 the incumbent government 
announced to stop the LO procedure and created a new extraordinary body, the 
Osservatorio Torino-Lione (OTL). OTL’s objective was to establish a dialogue 
between LT proponents and opponents. The government presented it as a bi-
partisan body where the most contested technical aspects of the project could be 
debated. It was composed of experts appointed by the local authorities of the Susa 
Valley and the project promoters. However, the fieldwork revealed that these 
initiatives of the government were a mere mimicry exercise. On the one hand, the 
LO procedure never stopped and OTL decisions were approved by the Chairman, 
on behalf of the government, without the support of local representatives. On the 
other, a truly technical debate about LT inconsistencies never occurred in the 
OTL as promoters’ experts preferred to follow a political logic rather than a 
scientific one.   
They said ‘yes it’s true that the existing line is far from reaching the saturation 
point, but we need to do our traffic forecasts on the basis of future flows’. The 
experts appointed by the project promoters shifted [from the retrospective 
approach] to the prospective approach. It means that, instead using past data for 
the traffic forecast, they formulated hypotheses on the future evolution of traffics 
in the future 30 years. Then, they used these hypotheses to calibrate their models 
which of course gave as output an increase of traffics. […]However the 
hypotheses were based on inputs coming from the project promoters. […] The 
experts appointed by the project promoters didn’t want to discuss with us neither 
the validity of the inputs nor the truth of the hypotheses used in the model. This 
was clearly a political issue and they didn’t want to step on politicians’ toes. A 
veritable scientific debate never took place in OTL.   
(Expert representing local communities in OTL, fieldwork interview) 
The OTL was created by the incumbent government without suspending Law 
443/01, meaning that the juridical activities connected to the LO’s procedure to 
approve the project did not stop. During the works of the OTL, the decision-
making of the project as planned in 2001 went forward. The works were chaired 
by an extraordinary commissioner appointed by and acting on behalf of the 
government. Between 2006 and 2007 the OTL hosted more than 50 meetings 
during which the most controversial aspects of the project were debated. 
Proponents’ and opponents’ experts had diverging opinions on the forecasting 
methodology (retrospective vs prospective) to be used in the estimation of the 
traffic flows between Italy and France. Because of existing divergent views, 
OTL’s technical talks were taking long and the implementation of the project was 
delayed. Because of these delays, the European Commission warned the Italian 
government to apply the “use it or lose it” principle if the planned implementation 
of the project could not be timely assured. 
 [When we apply the use it or lose it principle] […] we use a set of documents to 
understand whether the performance of a project is good enough to be funded 
again. We look at the actual expenses of the project, like for example the interim 
payment. We verify whether the beneficiary has spent the funds as planned in the 
agreements with the European Commission. If this is not the case the funds are 
withdrawn or granted under specific conditions. 
 (EU officer, INEA - executive agency of the European Commission. Fieldwork 
interview) 
Within this context, in 2008 the Chairman of the OTL decided that it was time to 
stop debating the technical problems of the project and work constructively on the 
infrastructure design. Therefore, he unilaterally adopted a document – so called 
“Agreement of Pracatinat” – in the name of all OTL’s participants even if Susa 
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Valley representatives had not signed it.  This document imposed OTL members 
to shift the focus of their works from debating the project feasibility to project 
implementation. 
On 28th of June 2008 the Observatory found an agreement, called 'Agreement of 
Pracatinat' […] to start preliminary design procedures for the new line from the 
French border to Settimo Torinese. Even though the Agreement of Pracatinat was 
not adhered to by all local representatives in the Observatory, the Commission 
took the financial decision of December 2008, under the condition that the 
responsible authorities respect the deadlines they indicated in their grant 
application.  
(2009 annual report of the European Coordinator) 
As the deadlines to apply for a new EU financial support were approaching, the 
Italian government put pressure on the local authorities to tell their experts to stop 
debating the technical feasibility of the project and start preparing the submission 
file to obtain the EU’s funds. The local authorities refused and, in 2010, the 
government publicly threatened to expel them from the OTL if they didn’t declare 
to contribute to the implementation of the project:  
The government believes that the municipalities concerned by the new line Turin-
Lyon and represented in the OTL have to be redefined […] based on the following 
criteria: […]explicitly declare their will to be involved in the best realization of 
the infrastructure, in the framework of the best protection and development of the 
local territories and in compliance with the European agenda.   
(Italian government, press release, 8
th
 January 2010) 
For the local communities, this press release of the government was the ultimate 
proof giving evidence that the OTL was a mere mimicry exercise. New decision-
making structures were formally introduced without altering old practices. Project 
promoters followed a decoupling strategy, as emphasized in myth theory (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). They created the OTL to conform symbolically to the external 
pressures for more democracy in the decision-making of the project. However, the 
government continued to take decisions through authoritative practices. The 
project promoters used the OTL to present themselves in a better light without 
really intending to implement it if decisions were in contrast with the national and 
European agendas.   
Because the OTL was not able to assure any democratic participation, and 
because many technical issues remained unresolved, the local communities asked 
their experts to quit the OTL. The citizens of the Susa Valley, backed by their 
mayors, went back to the streets. A new season of protests and demonstrations 
started again. 
In 2011, as a form of protest the NOTAV activists occupied another construction 
site in Chiomonte where some geognostic works for the base tunnel were about to 
start. To prevent further delays, the government resorted to the police forces 
which violently evacuated them to let the promoters start the geognostic works. 
Faced with increasing protests, the same year the government approved Law 183 
which, among others, declared LT a project of strategic priority to be realized in 
the name of national interest. In so doing, it created the juridical conditions to 
mobilize permanently the army in the Susa Valley and militarily occupy the site 
in order to prevent any future protest against the construction works. The military 
power was therefore disclosed as a form of deterrence aimed at discouraging 
demonstrations against the project. In a similar vein, the project promoters used 
the judiciary power to discourage any further opposition against Lyon-Turin 
Ferroviaire (LTF), the company- equally owned by FS and SNCF – that managed 
the geognostic works in Venaus and Chiomonte. For example, they prosecuted 
one of Italy’s most acclaimed writers because in 2013 he publicly defined LT a 
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“useless and harmful project [and it was] legitimate to sabotage [it]” (The 
Guardian, 27 January 2015). As referred by The Guardian (2015), LTF pressed 
charges against him shortly after he made these remarks. The Italian anti-terror 
prosecutors followed suit, claiming that the writer had publicly instigated the 
commission of crimes and violations intended to hurt LTF. He was accused of 
incitement to damage property. Finally, he was acquitted by the court in Turin in 
2015.  
At the same time, LTF used this logic of judiciary deterrence also in France where 
local oppositions were growing under the leadership of Daniel Ibanez. In 2014, 
the company filed a claim for defamation against Daniel Ibanez. However, upon 
reaching the court the lawsuit was dismissed on insufficient legal ground.  
Within this renewed climate of deterrence, in 2015 the Italian government 
officially approved the definitive version of the project and, along with the French 
counterpart, submitted a new request of funds to the EU in the framework of the 
ongoing 2014-2020 financial program. 
6.8 Discussion 
How do institutional pillars shape stability and change in the complex field of 
megaprojects? 
Institutional pillars are key factors which determine field stability and change. 
They contribute to stability because they help to reproduce behavior (Scott 2001): 
institutionalized practices may be held in place by one dominant pillar (Hoffman, 
1999) or by an alignment of all three (Wicks, 2001). However, this does not 
prevent change from emerging as the pillars might become misaligned (Caronna, 
2004) or collapse (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005), making deinstitutionalization 
more likely (Maguire and Hardy 2009). 
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Table 6.4b 
Our study showed that a trans-national megaproject like LT may be regarded as a 
complex institutional field held in place by as many sets of interdependent 
regulative, normative, and cognitive pillars as the national jurisdictions involved. 
Following Lawrence and Subbady (2006) and Lawrence et al. (2009), the analysis 
unpacked the relational and interactive moments in the evolution of the 
institutional field. Our focus was thus on the actors’ work to create, maintain and 
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disrupt the institutional pillars of LT. As showed in Tables 6.4a and 6.4b, we 
could identify three key phases of institutional production that through time have 
paced stability and change in the transnational field of LT: (1) institutionalization, 
(2) de-institutionalization and (3) re-institutionalization. 
Our study suggests that in the case of LT, the institutional pillars have variously 
stabilized the field across time. The normative and cognitive pillars played a key 
role in the institutionalization phase. Then, the decline of the normative pillar 
during the de-institutionalization phase made way for the strengthening of the 
cognitive pillar. Throughout this process, the regulative pillar - which had 
steadily supported the other pillars to stabilize the field during both 
institutionalization and de-institutionalization – was of crucial importance at a 
later stage to shape the re-institutionalization phase.    
The creation of LT initiated in the 1990s with an intense work of infrastructure 
theorizing (cognitive pillar) and sponsoring (normative pillar). Theorizing 
provided the project promoters with the fundamental technical arguments (e.g. 
increasing transport flows, modal shift) to justify LT from a rational point of 
view. These arguments presented LT as the result of a rational cause-effect chain 
and, therefore, as a form of truth or a fact. At the same time, project promoters 
sponsored the infrastructure with the support of ad-hoc normative networks 
whose role was to spread positive discourses reproducing the theorized truth 
about LT. These networks engaged in advocacy and mythologizing activities to 
‘hook’ LT into the common-sense notion of good project.  
Throughout the 2000s, local stakeholders felt threatened by the initiatives of the 
project promoters. They expressed concerns on several aspects of the project and, 
particularly, on the technical arguments developed by the promoters in support of 
the project. They thus opposed project promoters and intensively worked to show 
that LT was not a good project (normative pillar) because the rational arguments 
developed by the project promoters were not true (cognitive pillar). Their aim was 
to disrupt LT by disassociating the normative foundations of the project especially 
from their cognitive basis. Vis-à-vis unfolding disrupting tensions, promoters 
concentrated their efforts on the strengthening of the cognitive pillar. They thus 
created new institutional fora were their experts could meet with those of local 
stakeholder groups and discuss with the most controversial technical aspects of 
the project.  
Nevertheless, promoters did not succeed to impose their truth on local 
stakeholders. As a consequence, between the late-2000s and early-2010s 
oppositions increased. To stop them, project promoters relied on the strength of 
the regulative pillar. They thus established new rules that enabled them to police 
conformity and, finally, coerce compliance in the field. 
How does change occur in the complex field of megaprojects? 
Our study suggests that in the case of trans-national fields like LT, change can be 
described as a series of overlapping national cycles of institutionalization, de-
institutionalization and re-institutionalization. 
In Italy instability is very high throughout the entire project life-cycle. This is 
because proponents’ efforts of institutional creation and maintenance 
(institutionalization) are based on authoritative practices which marginalize local 
stakeholders from the project implementation. As a response to proponents’ 
marginalization, the local stakeholders form a grassroots movement to attack the 
moral foundations of the project (de-institutionalization). Their aim is to be 
involved in the decision-making of LT and convince proponents to stop its 
implementation. As a response to opponents’ disruptive pressures, promoters 
restore their control over the process of project implementation through a mix of 
judiciary and military power (re-institutionalization).  
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In France instability is very low during the early stage of the project life-cycle 
whereas increases in the late stage. This is because proponents’ efforts of 
institutional creation and maintenance (institutionalization) are based on 
participatory practices which favor the integration of local stakeholders in the 
project implementation. However, the analysis shows these practices do not 
prevent the emergence of oppositions. As soon as new official information against 
the project is released, local oppositions develop and demand promoters to stop its 
implementation as well as to be accountable for the newly-emerged 
inconsistencies (de-institutionalization). Similar to Italian context, promoters 
reacted to opponents’ disruptive forces by restoring their control over the process 
of project implementation by means of the judiciary power (re-
institutionalization).           
In each national context, the sequence of institutionalization, de-
institutionalization and re-institutionalization may be understood as a dialectical 
sequence of action, reaction and solution. Following Hargrave and Van De Ven 
(2009), we can thus describe LT implementation as a dialectical process where 
change emerges from interactions between proponents of current institutional 
arrangements and parties espousing contradictory arrangements. The new 
arrangements that emerge are then challenged again by proponents through 
counter-alternative arrangements that recycle the dialectical process. Our study 
also indicates that, beside the two poles of the cotraddiction (proponents VS 
opponents), a key role is played by third-party actors. These actors may 
differently influence the interaction between proponents and opponents. Our 
analysis shows that, beside the proponents (national governments and rail 
industries) and opponents (local communities) of LT, other actor groups 
contribute the project implementation. In Italy, during the early stage of the 
project, the commitment of a local lobby in the area of Turin (Tecnocity) was 
crucial to secure the support of public authorities to LT. In France, two 
independent administrative bodies (Cour des Comptes and Conseil général des 
Ponts et Chaussées) contributed to the development of oppositions groups. They 
did so by releasing new technical information casting doubts on the project 
feasibility.          
Coherently with this dialectical perspective (Seo and Creed 2002, Poole and Van 
de Ven 2004, Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006, 2009), our study on LT suggests 
that change is an uncertain process whose direction depends on the interaction 
between proponents of current institutional arrangements and opponents 
espousing contradictory arrangements. The institutional order is thus a 
temporary truce reflecting the power relations of opposing parties. Third-party 
actors contribute to shape the contradictions. 
Many studies (Ford and Backoff 1988, Werner and Baxter 1994, Martin 2007) 
have already addressed dialectical contradictions from a management perspective. 
Hargrave and Van de Ven’s (2009) resumed the work of these scholars into three 
approaches to managing contradiction: “either/or” approach, moderation and 
“both/and” approach. While moderation and “both/and” approaches address both 
poles of a contradiction, “either/or” approach focuses on only one pole. 
Nevertheless, moderation and “both/and” approaches are profoundly different as 
the latter deals with contradictory poles as they were complementary elements of 
a unity whereas the former frame them as competing and irreconcilable. 
Our study shows that in the case of trans-national fields like LT, the interaction 
between proponents of current institutional arrangements and parties espousing 
contradictory arrangements may vary across the national boundaries. Differences 
between the national forms of interaction may be described as country-specific 
forms of contradiction management which variously impact change in the field.  
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In Italy, LT proponents might have adopted an either/or approach and marginalize 
the opponents since the very early-stage of the institutionalization process. 
According to Hargrave and Van de Ven’s (2009: 125), “either/both approaches 
separate different poles of contradiction, and tend to deny one pole by proceeding 
as if that pole does not exist, or seek to satisfy one pole while ignoring, or at the 
expenses of the other”. In France, LT proponents involved opponents in formal 
rituals of public consultations since the early-stage of the institutionalization 
process. However, as the disruptive potential of opponents’ participation 
increased over time, participatory practices of proponents weakened. These 
elements suggest that in the French context proponents might have adopted a 
moderation approach (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2009) enabling them to live with 
– but not embrace or resolve – the contradiction between the competing poles.  
6.9 Conclusions 
What does this study has to say more broadly about the management of 
megaprojects? 
We know from the literature (APM 2002, Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, Miller and 
Lessard 2000, Morris and Hough 1987) that government roles, policy 
frameworks, regulations and cultural beliefs have vital importance to the planning 
and management of megaprojects. These elements define the space in which the 
day-to-day megaproject activities occur.  
Our study suggests that megaprojects can be better defined as complex 
institutional systems whose evolution depends on the rules, norms and beliefs 
prevailing in the national contexts involved. According to our findings, change in 
these systems is idiosyncratic and may result into very different country-specific 
institutional cycles. These cycles differ across countries because at the national 
levels actors have divergent objectives and mobilize different forms of 
institutional work to institutionalize, de-institutionalize and re-institutionalize the 
megaproject.  
Our study on LT suggests that institutional change in transnational megaprojects 
is an uncertain process whose direction may vary across the national contexts 
involved because, at the national levels, different institutional pillars are set in 
place. Differences and similarities between the national pillars may be described 
as country-specific configurations of institutional working practices that the field 
actors unfold over time in accordance with their objectives, rules or beliefs.  
Therefore, our study indicates that the reality that megaproject management is the 
(national institutional) context, not the content, must be reinforced. As suggested 
by Pichault (2013), when managers’ over-rely on the content they tend to 
prioritize planning and control activities (e.g. plans and programs, performance 
targets and evaluation). Change is thus understood as a linear process in which the 
manager has full control of over the decision-making process “from the problem 
definition stage onwards, before proceeding with its implementation, which is 
monitored using sophisticated evaluation tools” (Pichault 2013: 53). In the case of 
transnational megaprojects, this linear perspective may be detrimental as 
managers might be required to adapt their practices to the unfolding phases 
(creation, maintenance, disruption and restoration) of the institutional cycle. In 
fact, most traditional planning and control approaches are unable to cope with the 
diversity of viewpoints that characterize the complexity of transnational mega-
projects. These approaches assume “that all the parties involved […] 
fundamentally share the same values and objectives. Once these objectives are 
incorporated into the plan, they are not discussed again and remain unchanged 
from formulation to implementation and control (principle of invariability of 
objectives). […] It is easy to understand that such a decision-making process can 
only take place in a relatively simple environment” (Pichault 2013: 53).  
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We thus suggest to the management teams of megaprojects to soften up their 
planning attitude and give more importance to the processes and contexts taking 
place around and within such complex projects. Time is also an important aspect 
as we see that viewpoints on and attitudes towards megaprojects may change over 
time as new information is disclosed. Additionally, our findings suggest that 
future research ought to pay more attention to the interplay between the national 
and supra-national levels across which the megaprojects unfold. In fact, we show 
that the impact of supra-national managerial initiatives vary from national context 
to national context in the form of country-specific institutional cycles.  We 
suggest to the management teams of multi-level megaprojects to invest more 
efforts in the design of mechanisms enabling a better alignment between national 
and supra-national organizational processes.      
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 7. The Clash of Worlds: Justifications and Controversies in 
Trans-European Megaprojects (Essay 6) 
 
Abstract 
Neo-institutional theorists look at megaprojects as complex fields characterized 
by vast organizational complexity and long-lasting impact on the economy, 
environment and society. These are often characterized by conflicts and poor 
cooperation between concerned stakeholders, which may create a pool of future 
unresolved issues, frustration and resentment having a negative impact on 
performance. In this article we explore change in the field of the Lyon-Turin 
megaproject. This is a multilevel and pluralist field where the contradictory logics 
of Lyon-Turin proponents and opponents variously co-exist and evolve as a result 
of their different collective representations of the megaproject. Drawing on 
Cloutier and Langley (2013) and Patriotta et al. (2011), we use Boltanski and 
Thévenot's (1991) theoretical framework to understand how proponents’ and 
opponents’ contradictory logics variously co-exist across the levels of the field 
and generate controversies that actors try to shape at the micro-level through 
justification work.  
Keywords:  megaproject, TEN-T infrastructures, justifications, controversies, 





Megaprojects play a key role in in world economy (Flyvbjerg 2014). Most 
definitions of megaprojects are provided by governments and industry directives 
(Hu et al. 2015). The US department of Transportation (DTOIG 2001) has 
provided one of the most widely accepted definitions describing a megaproject as 
a project with at least a 1 billion US dollar budget. Moreover, Capka (2006) also 
suggests that they attract a high level of public attention or political interest 
because of substantial direct and indirect impacts on the community, 
environment, and state budgets. In the context of the European Union (EU), the 
International Project Management Association (IPMA 2011) identified a 
threshold of 100 million euros as the basis for defining megaprojects across all 
industries. From a wider perspective, Brookes and Locatelli (2015) define 
megaprojects as temporary endeavors characterized by large investment 
commitment, vast complexity (especially in organizational terms), and long-
lasting impact on the economy, the environment, and society. With regard to 
complexity, Marrewijk et al. (2008) have noticed that megaprojects contain a 
large element of technological innovation associated with high risk and 
characterized by conflict, uncertainty and poor cooperation between partners.   
Poorly managed conflicts can create a pool of future unresolved issues, frustration 
and resentment which can result into performance shortcomings (Zikmann 1992). 
According to Whitfield (1994), successful conflict management largely depends 
on the recognition of the real causes of opposition - including how and why it 
arises. Prapatpaow and Stephen (2002) argue that conflicts encountered on large 
scale construction projects occur not only between people in the project team 
(internal conflicts) but also between the project and groups outside the project 
team (interface conflicts). Many scholars (Susskinds, 1985; Priscoli, 1987; 
Harashina, 1995) have studied interface conflicts on projects involving various 
stakeholders and have shown that successful conflict management can be 
achieved through mutual education, as well as openness and fairness in decision 
making: “It is possible to convince an opposing party through sharing of 
information, quality argument and sound reasoning. When parties to a project are 
unwilling to use these approaches, conflict can get out of hand as opposing groups 
develop hard attitudes towards each other” (Prapatpaow and Stephen 2002: 366). 
Because of these conflictual dynamics, the implementation process of 
megaprojects can be better understood from a dialectical perspective of analysis 
(Ford and Backoff 1988, Werner and Baxter 1994, Martin 2007). According to 
Hargrave and Van De Ven (2009), in dialectical processes, change emerges from 
the multiple interactions between proponents of a given arrangement and parties 
espousing contradictory arrangements. From this standpoint, conflicts between 
contrasting viewpoints are central to processes of change and it is not possible to 
understand the perspective of proponents without examining the views of 
opponents.  
In the context of megaprojects, conflicts between the project team and external 
stakeholders (e.g. local communities, environmental activists, NGOs, etc.) are 
frequent. These conflicts often depends on the divergent views about the effects 
of a planned megaproject on community life or ways of life, on people’s relation 
with one another and how residents perceive and feel about communities and 
project-related changes (Leistriz and Murdock 1981). Indeed, people have 
different way of thinking depending on their personal cultural and social 
background which affects the way they perceive themselves, their behavior, and 
the surrounding reality (Al-Arjani 1995, Prapatpaow and Stephen 2002).    
This article draws on Boltanski and Thévenot's (1991) theory of economies of 




7.2 Justifications and controversies: insights from the literature  
One can adopt Levitt and Scott’s (2016) perspective and see trans-European 
megaprojects as complex organizational fields. A trans-European megaproject 
offers a great opportunity to have insights into fields operating in multilevel 
(national and supra-national) and pluralist (competing actor groups) settings. 
From this perspective, it can be seen as a network of relationships emerging as 
structured and/or structuring the trans-national environment of competing local 
logics (Powell, et al. 2005). In this transnational environment, actors carrying out 
competing logics interact in a hierarchically ordered space of governance 
(national and supra-national) where each local order - understood as patterns of 
interaction reproduced in the action – is perennially established, maintained or 
transformed (Fligstein 1991, 2001). At the national and supra-national levels, 
preexisting local practices and rules - embedded in power relations between 
groups and cognitive structures which function as cultural frames (habitus) – 
define different local contexts with different local systems of collective action in 
place that change over time. In several cases, these contexts can be defined as 
pluralist environments where the contradictory logics of proponents and 
opponents of a trans-European megaproject variously co-exist and evolve as a 
result of the contradictions immanent in the field.  We first ask: How do actors’ 
contradictory logics co-exist and evolve in the complex field of trans-European 
megaprojects? Which differences can be observed at the national and supra-
national levels?    
Cloutier and Langley (2013) describe logics as bundled sets or ensembles of 
higher order meanings, values, norms and or rules that frame how actors make 
sense of the worlds around them and consequently know behave. They reflect 
organizing principles that help frame collective behavior within the different 
levels of the field. According to their own logic, some actors in the field might 
have good reasons to support a megaproject project, whereas others might have 
good reasons to oppose it. This generates contradicting tension between 
proponents and opponents that may affect stability and change in the field. 
Hargrave and Van De Ven (2009) suggest that contradictions play a key role in 
the evolution of institutional fields and it is not possible to understand the logic of 
proponents without examining the views of opponents. By drawing on Werner 
and Baxter (1994) they define a contradiction as the dynamic tension between 
unified opposites that co-exist in a field by logically presupposing each other 
Divergent logics may lead to competing moral evaluations of a megaproject. 
Opposing collective entities (firms, political parties, interest groups, social 
movements and local communities) may present competing claims about the 
worthiness of a project, and justify them based on different sets of moral 
principles. Boltanski and Thévenot's (1991) justification theory can provide useful 
support for interpreting controversies between collective entities with competing 
moral evaluations. From their perspective justifying a project, say, in economic 
terms amounts to taking the moral stand that money is a relevant measure of 
worth and ought to be privileged when projects are evaluated. However, while the 
project team may argue that economic considerations should come first, other 
external stakeholders (e.g. local communities or environmental activist groups) 
may take the stand that environmental concerns ought to be prioritized no matter 
what the cost in economic terms. This kind of conflict between economically 
justified arguments and those using environmental justifications is a moral 
controversy.  
According to Cloutier and Langley (2013), Boltanski and Thévenot's (1991) 
theoretical framework provides valuable analytical support to investigate the 
structure and content of the broad-based sets of values and conceptions of the 
common good that shape the logics competing in the field. Drawing on Patriotta 
et al. (2011), this framework - later extended by Lafaye and Thévenot (1993), 
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Lamont and Thévenot (2000) and Thévenot et al. (2000) - allows justifications to 
be organized into seven logics corresponding to seven different “common worlds” 
or “polities”: civic, opinion, market, industrial, domestic, inspired, green and 
connectionist worlds or polities. It thus act as a ‘political grammar’ enabling 
researchers to understand how proponents’ and opponents’ contradictory logics 
co-existing across the levels of a trans-European field generates controversies that 
actors try to shape at the micro-level through justification work.  
On the one hand, engineers and project managers operating in the pluralist 
settings of a trans-European megaproject might justify their actions using 
industrial arguments (i.e. better performance, optimizing processes and systems). 
On the other, they might also be required to justify the project in terms of civic 
and environmental arguments as they need to secure the support of public 
authorities and local environmental associations. In these situations, actors have 
the opportunity of critiquing other justifications by referring to the principles of 
their own value regime. So for instance, the policymaker might oppose engineers’ 
top-down planning by mobilizing civic arguments (i.e. bottom-up democracy and 
participation of local communities in the project). In a similar vein, environmental 
associations might criticize the project promoters on the basis of green 
justifications (i.e. preservation of the local ecosystem). These criticisms can 
ultimately lead to ‘state-of-worth’ controversies during which opponents question 
the degree to which the organizing principles appropriate to a situation are being 
correctly applied (Dansou and Langley 2012, Boltanski and Thévenot 1999). On 
the other hand, opponents and proponents may also engage in ‘order-of-worth’ 
controversies during which actors question the appropriateness of the principles 
proponents apply in a particular situation. In both cases, tests are crucial devices 
to overcome unfolding criticisms and reduce the uncertainty generated by the 
contradictory tensions between the competing views in the field. Specifically, 
while a test on the “order of worth” allows contradicting parties to verify the 
appropriateness of macro-level organizing principles in practice, a test on the 
“state of worth” enables them to verify that macro-level organizing principles are 
properly instantiated in the empirical realm (micro-level actions).  
As far as order-of-worth controversies are concerned, Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1999: 374), suggest a way to solve them is by setting up compromises between 
contradictorily coexisting worlds:  “In a compromise, people maintain an 
intentional proclivity towards the common good by cooperating to keep present 
beings relevant in different worlds, without trying to clarify the principle upon 
which their agreement is grounded”. We therefore ask: how do proponents’ 
responses to opponents’ critiques shape controversies in the complex field of 
trans-European megaprojects? Which differences can be observed at the national 
and supra-national levels?     
Tests and compromises define two different ways of reaching an agreement 
between contradictory parties. Agreements are important as they allow the parties 
to leave a critical moment and go back to the ordinary course of action. However, 
frequently people just drop the dispute without making new agreements. 
According to Boltanski and Thévenot (1999: 375), “[i]f we want to understand 
these puzzling endings we probably must leave the realm of justice, which 
depends on a principle of equivalence, in order to shift towards other logics of 
action which […] put aside the reference to equivalence”. They mention different 
logics such as forgetting and forgiveness, but also alienation and domination.  
7.3 The case 
Pettigrew (1990) suggests that, when choosing the research site, social dramas or 
critical incidents may offer social scientists the opportunity to look inside 
previously shielded or ignored social systems. Following this suggestion, we have 
chosen to study the Lyon-Turin (LT) megaproject which is of “extravagant 
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dimensions and has been blocked for almost 20 years by a protest of epic tenacity 
and occasional violence” (Hooper 2012).  
LT is a planned 270 km-long high-speed railway (HSR) line that will connect 
Lyon (in east-central France) and Turin (in northern Italy). The core of the project 
is a 57 kilometres base tunnel crossing the Alps between Susa valley in Italy and 
Maurienne in France. The tunnel will be one of the longest rail tunnels in the 
world, behind just the 57.1 km Gotthard Base Tunnel. Civil engineering works 
started in early-2000s with the construction of access points and geological 
reconnaissance tunneling, with actual construction of the line initially planned to 
start between 2014 and 2015: as of today, the construction of the base tunnel has 
not started yet. However, in 2015 the national governments signed an 
international agreement proving their will to go ahead with the project (European 
Commission 2015). According to most recent declarations, construction works 
should start in 2018 (Agence France Presse, 2017). 
Two railway companies – Ferrovie dello Stato (FS) in Italy and Société Nationale 
des Chemins de fer Français (SNCF) in France – along with the two national 
governments and the European Commission are the main promoters of the 
project. According to the French Court of Audit (2012), the overall cost of the 
project has increased by 117,5% between 2002 and 2012 (12€ billion in 2002 and 
26,1€ in 2012). LT is financed through public funds by the EU (40%), Italy (35%) 
and France (25%) in the framework of the EU’s Trans-European Transport 
Network (TEN-T) investment policy: an infrastructure policy at the supranational 
level whose overall objective is to improve the functioning of the European 
internal market through continuous and efficient transnational networks in 
transport flows.  
Because of LT’s transnational nature, this case study is comparative in essence 
and provides the opportunity to examine two “polar types” (Pettigrew 1990: 275) 
as the Italian site of the project illustrates low performance and the French one 
high performance. In fact, while in France planned objectives - construction of 
access points and geological reconnaissance tunneling - have been timely met by 
the promoters, in Italy the project has experienced implementation delays because 
of the strong local opposition. In the Italian context, the project has repeatedly 
been the objective of demonstrations by local environmental organizations and 
populations – backed by local authorities and intellectuals - who oppose the 
construction of the line for its cost, because traffic is currently decreasing, and for 
potential environmental and public health risks. The protests have often ended in 
violent clashes with the police force, permanently mobilized together with the 
army to defend the site which at the beginning of 2012 was declared of strategic 
national interest by the Italian government. 
7.4 Data collection 
Data for this research are based on an extensive qualitative database (Yin 2014) of 
interviews and documents - press releases, agreements, policy papers, third-
parties studies and reports - covering a period from 1985 to 2016. They have been 
collected during a fieldwork which lasted 3years, from 2014 to 2016.    
Since LT is a transnational investment project articulating across different 
jurisdictions (France, Italy and EU) and organizational entities, data collection 
was designed on the basis of an embedded case study methodology allowing 
dealing with phenomena characterized by more than one sub-unit of analysis (Yin 
2003). Following this methodological framework, 79 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted between 2014 and 2016 with actors playing a role in the 
governance of the LT project. Interviews were guided by a conceptual grid of 
information collection using a three-layer approach where individual functions, 
organizations’ roles and the overall system of project governance were separately, 
albeit interdependently, examined. Semi-structured interviews averaged 90 
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minutes and included 4 typologies of actors: 1) project promoters, 2) public 
institutional actors, 3) lobbyists, 4) local communities (Table 7.1). For the sake of 
clarity, the group of project promoters includes actors from both the public 
administrations and the railway companies implementing LT. The group public 
institutional actors include actors from both the political (MPs, MEPs and non-
elected members of parties) and administrative (administrative staff of 
parliamentary assemblies and public officers of administrations concerned by the 
project but not implementing it directly) organizations playing a role in the story 
of LT. The group of lobbyists refers to those actors who attempt to influence LT- 
and TEN-T-related actions, policies, or decisions of officials in their daily life. 
The local communities refers to organized groups of citizens from the Susa 
Valley (Italy) and the French areas concerned by LT (suburbs of Lyon, the Lower 
Dauphiné region, the Avant-Pays Savoyard and the Maurienne region).  
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Table 7.1 – Fieldwork interviews 
These typologies were not decided ex-ante, rather they matured on the field 
during the interview process. Indeed, the set of interviewees was progressively 
constituted through snowball sampling. Following this sample strategy, we asked 
participants who had already been selected for the study to recruit other 
participants. We thus started interviewing EU’s public officials in charge of the 
LT project and, then, trickled down across French and Italian jurisdictions up to 
local communities opposing it. At the end of this process, our sample included: 18 
project promoters, 19 public institutional actors, 7 lobbyists, 34 members from the 
Italian and French local communities opposing LT. Because of the transnational 
nature of the observed phenomenon, interviewees issued from different 
jurisdictional contexts: France, Italy and EU (see Table 7.1).   
7.5 Data analysis and coding 
Overall strategy. We used several techniques to make sense of the longitudinal 
process of justification that occurred during the LT controversy. First, based on 
the interviews and fieldwork notes we built a chronicle of the key events and we 
used it to identify the main turning points of the controversy. The chronicle was 
constructed following Pettigrew’s (1985, 1990) contextualist framework 
suggesting that, when studying organizational change, context process and 
content should be analytically considered. Second, we analyzed the fieldwork 
documents and quantified the orders of worth mobilized in the LT controversy. 
Third, we looked at how stakeholders mobilized the orders of worth. Fourth, we 
analyzed the distribution of orders of worth during the period considered.        
Content analysis. We conducted systematic coding of the 80 documents articles 
with the N-Vivo software. The coding system used to classify the documents was 
structured according to the ‘common worlds’ described by Boltanski and 
Thévenot (2006) as well as the relevant stakeholder groups, jurisdictions (Italy, 
France and EU) and periods (1990s, 2000s and 2010s). To code the ‘common 
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worlds’ we followed Patriotta et al (2011) and initially developed a rudimentary 
list of semantic descriptors based on Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) schematic 
account of common worlds. This allowed us to identify the presence of a given 
‘order of worth’ in the text. We then expanded this original list through an 
inductive reading of the sample texts (e.g. by adding synonyms as well as other 
terms that were systematically deployed in the text to refer to a particular ‘order 
of worth’). The semantic descriptors, and the additional words in the list, were 




We have followed Patriotta et al (2011) and, with the help of this list of 
descriptors, we have coded systematically all the utterances in the transcribed 
texts according to the seven orders of worth. When an utterance referred to 
multiple worlds, it was assigned to more than one code, as suggested by Boltanski 
and Thévenot (2006). This first coding of the ‘order of worth’ was then revised to 
check the consistency of the coded text with Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) 
original definition of each ‘order of worth’.  
Finally to code the stakeholders, we have assigned each of the 80 documents of 
our sample to one of the 4 stakeholder groups emerged during process of 
fieldwork interview. 
Common worlds’ quantification. We systematically counted the number of coded 
passages mentioning a given common world and, then, we divided it by the total 
number of codes citing the common worlds. This data provided us with the 
relative weight of each common world within the total amount of coexisting 
common worlds. We used this data to quantify the intensity of a common world’s 
utilization in the LT dispute (Figure 7.1). We found that the most popular forms 
                                               
35 A full list of the English, French and Italian semantic descriptors used in the NVivo 
analysis for this essay is provided in ANNEX III. 
of justification mobilized by LT stakeholders were based on the industrial world 
(cited in 35% of the coded utterances) and the civic world (34%). The 
connectionist, green and market worlds were used to a lesser extent (respectively 
9%, 8% and 7%), while the fame (3%), domestic (2%) and inspirational (2%) 
were very rarely mobilized. We thus focus on the first two groups of worlds - (1) 
civic and industrial worlds, and (2) connectionist, green and market worlds - in 
order to explore the work of justification at the micro-level of analysis. 
 
Figure 7.1 – Coded passages across worlds (% values) 
We then looked at the work of justification by the various stakeholder groups 
involved in the controversy. We counted the occurrences of each stakeholder’s 
voice in the documents in our dataset, identifying 4635 passages corresponding to 
a stakeholder expression of a justification based on a given order of worth. Our 
analysis suggested that the project promoters and the local communities played a 
dominant role in the unfolding of the controversy. As shown in the Table 7.2, the 
71% of the 4635 passages in the documents mentioning a justification refer to one 
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of these two groups: 1536 (33%) express the views of local communities and 
whereas 1737 (37%) correspond to the views of project promoters. We thus give 
particular attention to these two stakeholder groups to explore their work of 
justification at the micro-level of analysis. 
 
7.6 Findings 
7.6.1 The co-existing worlds across groups 
Table 7.3 presents the coded passages across jurisdictions and actor groups. It 
shows that all stakeholder groups mobilized the industrial and the civic worlds 
more than other worlds to frame their justification work. The connectionist world 
was mainly mobilized by the EU-level promoters, whereas the market world was 
mobilized by French and EU-level promoters. The green world appeared in all 
actor groups; however, project promoters mobilized it to a lesser extent than local 
communities. 
Table 7.2 – Coded passages across stakeholder groups and time 
      
 




Local communities 341 423 772 1536 33% 
Lobbies 21 240 115 376 8% 
Project promoters 141 1121 475 1737 37% 
Public institutional 
actors 
377 259 350 986 21% 
Total columns 
880 2043 1712 4635 
 
% columns 19% 44% 37% 
  
 
Table 7.3 – Coded passages across stakeholder groups and jurisdictions (% values) 
 
Civic Industrial Connectionist Green Market 
Coded passages for 
selected worlds / 




EU 26% 33% 20% 8% 9% 97% 
95% FR  29% 42% 6% 7% 8% 92% 
IT 36% 40% 8% 6% 1% 91% 
Local 
Communities  
FR  59% 26% 0% 9% 2% 96% 
91% 
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7.6.1.1 Project promoters 
Tab. 3 shows that, across all jurisdictions involved, the industrial world was most 
often mobilized by the project promoters in their justification work. Defined by 
science and technology, the industrial world encompasses the values of 
efficiency, productivity, reliability and performance (Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006). Judgement in the industrial world centers on the question of effective 
functioning and involve a commitment to progress and development. LT is 
described as a missing link of the future trans-European transport network. It is 
aimed to promote and strengthen seamless trans-European transport chains for 
passenger and freight. In so doing it contributes to close the gaps between 
Member States' transport networks and remove the bottlenecks that still hamper 
the smooth functioning of the internal market. Both Italian and French promoters 
considered that there was a bottleneck between Lyon and Turin because the 
existing infrastructure imposed strong limitation on transport operations and 
would have soon reached its saturation point as an effect of the increasing traffic 
demand between Italy and France.  
Market justifications were also mobilized. As explained by Cloutier and Langley 
(2013), in this world the law of the market prevails, and actors deemed worthy are 
those who know how to take advantage of it and reap its rewards. Wealth is an 
end market opportunities are objectively and unemotionally identified (Boltanski 
and Thévenot, 1991). From the standpoint of project promoters, a new HSR 
connection between Italy and France can considerably improve the quality of the 
transport service for passengers by shortening the journey times. HSR systems are 
deemed to attract new transport demand for passengers and freight and, thus, 
contribute to make railway services more competitive than those provided by 
roads and airways on medium and long distance trips between Italy and France. 
As a consequence, LT can have a positive impact on the modal shift from roads 
and airways to railways. Table 3 shows that Italian promoters mobilized this 
world less than French and EU ones. This was because until the 1990s FS (the 
Italian railway company) had a deep-rooted corporate culture considering rail 
transport as a universal public service rather than a commercially driven service 
(European Conference of Ministers of Transport [ECMT] 2005, Drew and 
Ludewig 2011). In fact, as we explain further in section 6.2.2, during the first 
years of the project life-cycle FS’ top management did not support it. 
Because of its positive impact on the modal shift, LT is also presented as a green 
project. In the green world environment is a key themes and nature-harmony, 
preservationism and sustainability are deemed supremely worthy (Thévenot et al. 
2000). Project promoters consider rail to be a ‘green’ mode of transport, at least 
‘greener’ than cars and airways in terms of its relative impact on climate change. 
According to them, LT can lead to an annual reduction of carbon gas emissions 
around 3 million tons as an outcome, which is comparable to the CO2 emissions 
produced by a city of 300.000 inhabitants. Thanks to the relocation of 1 million 
lorries from the road to the railway, LT can have a positive impact on the 
environment. 
For all the above-mentioned arguments (industrial, market and green), European 
and national promoters have deemed LT a project of collective interest and 
earmarked financial resources to realize it. The project has therefore undergone, at 
both European and national levels, official approval processes with ministries, 
parliaments, regional assemblies and municipality councils involved. Drawing on 
Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), Patriotta et al. (2011) define the civic world as 
the political environment of a given community and mobilizes the registers of 
representativeness, legality, officialdom. The state of worthiness in this world 
corresponds with being legal, governed, official, or authorized.   
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At the EU level, since 1994 LT is a key project funded by TEN-T program. This 
program consists of hundreds of projects whose ultimate purpose is to ensure the 
cohesion, interconnection and interoperability of the trans-European transport 
network, as well as access to it. TEN-T projects are in every EU Member State 
and include all modes of transport. Embedded within this supranational 
framework of project management, LT also reflects Boltanski and Chiapello’s 
(1999) characteristics of the “projective city”, where flexible actors are constantly 
working to improve their performance, as they navigate from project to project 
within a networked or “connectionist” world. As shown in Tab. 3, this world is 
mainly mobilized by EU actors in their justification work.  
7.6.1.2 Local communities 
Both in Italy and France, opponents mobilized industrial counter-justifications 
and argued that there was no empirical or scientific evidence demonstrating the 
need for a new infrastructure. Their core argument was about the traffic flows 
between the two countries involved. With the support of experts who joined the 
opposition movements against LT, local communities produced several studies 
demonstrating that the project was useless because the traffic flows were 
declining  
Concerning the green world, they did not deny the importance of the modal shift 
to decrease CO2 emissions. However, they argued that the narrow focus on CO2 
emissions as a unique impact category of the environmental effects LT was 
misleading. They claimed that the environmental impact assessment should 
consider not only the emissions related to the operational phase of the 
infrastructure (i.e. a comparison between saved emissions from less car traffic and 
released emissions from train transport), but also the global environmental impact 
of its entire life-time including both construction and maintenance phases. 
Therefore, they argued that the assessment should have accounted not only for 
direct but also indirect costs such as, for example, those related to the storage of 
the excavated material. 
Because of the above-mentioned concerns, the local communities came to the 
conclusion that the project could not be considered of public interest. Therefore, 
they increasingly attacked LT civic justifications and argued that it was a waste of 
public money. They thus called for a new public debate where the unveiled 
environmental and industrial inconsistencies could be duly addressed on the basis 
of more transparent and democratic decision-making procedures.     
7.6.2 The dynamics of worlds across jurisdictions  
7.6.2.1 France 
When LT emerged in the 1990s, promoters’ justifications mainly framed the 
project into the industrial and market worlds (Figure 7.2). LT was presented as an 
engineering project that would have made railways more competitive than other 
transport modes – namely airways and roadways - by improving the 
transportation services, for both passengers and freight, between Italy and France:  
Thanks to a new base tunnel of about 54 km under Mont Cenis, this link will not 
only ensure the connection of high-speed French and Italian networks, but also 
creates a new high-performance route for freight traffic. […] With the ability to 
offer increased transport quality, high-speed rail renews the competition between 
modes of transportation. […] The gradual realization of the projects of the master 
plan would result in a profound change in the railway supply in France, thanks to 
the considerable time savings it would provide to customers. 




Figure 7.2 - Passages coded across jurisdictions and time.  
The idea of a HSR cross-border infrastructure between Lyon and Turin dates to 
the late 1980s when SNCF’s planning department highlighted that the transport 
service provided by the historical railway line was affected by technical 
shortcomings. Primarily, there was a problem of capacity that could be solved by 
increasing the loading gauge. Secondarily, there was a problem related to the 
gradient of the old line, which was about 30% (three times higher than the 
recommended value) and imposed strong limitations on operation and higher 
additional power costs. Based on these justifications, SNCF planned the 
construction of a new HSR line to connect Lyon and Turin. The core of the initial 
project was a 54 km base tunnel crossing the Alps between Susa Valley in Italy 
and Maurienne in France. The planned line would have dramatically reduced the 
gradient line by crossing the Alps at the height of 400m – instead of the 1200m of 
the historical line. The railway connection was designed to adopt a HSR 
technology allowing trains to move at 220 km/h. On the one hand, the new line 
would have considerably improved the quality of the transport service for 














and much wider curves compared to the existing line will have allowed heavy 
freight trains to transit between the two countries at 100 km/h and with much 
reduced energy costs. For all these reasons, SNCF included LT in its Master Plan 
for the construction of HSR Lines in France.   
In the early-1990s, local oppositions to the project developed in the Lower 
Dauphiné region and the Avant-Pays Savoyard. At this initial stage, opponents 
did not criticize the technical and economic foundations of the project but simply 
expressed concerns about the impact of LT on the landed properties affected by 
the future railway line. Project promoters did not ignore them. They informed – 
e.g. by sending them informative brochures with technical details about LT – and 
involved them in public consultations since the early stages of the project - e.g. in 
1992 they organized a public debate on the economic and social interest of the 
project.  
The interviews we have conducted with the members of the local opposition 
groups reveal that, in some occasions, the project promoters secured the support 
of local communities by swindling them:  
We can take the example of the noise pollution. The French government […] 
wanted to show us that [TGV trains] do not produce any noise. We accepted. A 
group of politicians and engineers was with us. We were about 70 people. We 
arrived by car to a TGV line. The engineers had some instruments to measure the 
noise. When the train passed the noise was around the 60 decibels. Only later we 
understood that they swindled us. We were close to a train station and [when the 
trains approach a station] do not travel at high speed. 
(Member of a French local opposition group, fieldwork interview) 
As showed in Figure 2, throughout the 2000s, actors’ justifications continued to 
appeal to the industrial world but relocated the project from the market to the 
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green and civic worlds. The opposition of local communities led the project 
promoters to elaborate more on issues related to the public interest of the project 
and its environmental impact on the concerned areas. On the one hand, LT was 
thus presented as an ambitious engineering project that would have made railways 
more environmental-friendly. On the other, it made the object of formal 
procedures of public consultation allowing the local communities to participate 
and express their points of view in the decision making of the project.   
French rules for the decision-making of large infrastructure projects in France 
have their source in a codified administrative procedure – so called ‘Enquête 
Publique’ - that obligates the project promoters to undertake public consultations 
with local communities and citizens. They are required to disseminate information 
to these local stakeholders and organize public meetings to explain them their 
stakes in the project. They have to report their conclusions to a public inquiry 
committee appointed by an administrative tribunal. The latter then examines, 
validates and sends these conclusions to the ministry who decides whether the 
project can be officially declared of public interest. As showed in the following 
interview statement, promoters might be confronted with the opposition of local 
stakeholders that perceive the project as a threat to them and their territory:  
So there was the opposition of [Villarodin-Le Bourget], which forced us to redo a 
public inquiry for this municipality. We had to clarify the impacts of the project 
on this area. After that, a new prefectural order was approved to complete the 
decree of public utility we had already approved. Oppositions were due to the 
drainage of local water sources, and the risks associated with the storage of the 
excavation material. 
(Public officer, Ministry-level administration, fieldwork interview) 
As explained by this public officer, between 2002 and 2007 a long process of 
public consultation took place in Villarodin-Le Bourget (Maurienne region). 
Protests developed in this town because local people were worried about the 
environmental impacts of the infrastructure works - namely the drainage of local 
water sources, and the risks associated with the storage of the excavation material. 
As a response, the project promoters set up a local information point to answer the 
questions of local communities about the operations connected with ongoing 
works. Additionally, they had to organize new public consultations and provide 
further details about the environmental impacts of the project. In 2007 the 
consultations came to an end. A prefectural order came into force and declared of 
public interest the operation works in Villarodin-Le Bourget.  
As showed in Figure 2, in the early- 2010s, actors’ justifications referring to the 
green and industrial worlds were subsumed into the civic world. Local opponents 
reproached the public authorities promoting the project for the appropriateness of 
their conduct during (1) the environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure 
and (2) the public consultations about the traffic flows between Italy and France. 
From the standpoint of opposition groups, the project could not be considered of 
public interest because the estimation of the (1) environmental impacts and (2) 
traffic flows associated with the new infrastructure was not transparent. They thus 
considered LT declaration of public utility invalid and called for a new public 
debate on the public interest of the project that was really transparent.      
In 2012 the French Court of Audit released a report (‘Référé n° 64174’) that 
questioned the realism of the costs estimates and traffic forecasts of the project 
promoters. This document came out ten years after a 2003 report of the ‘Conseil 
général des Ponts et Chaussées’ - a public administration supervising civil 
engineering initiatives of the French State –, which casted doubts on the socio-
economic interest of LT. Intrigued by these reports, in 2012 Daniel Ibanez – an 
experienced business consultant from the Savoie department – decided to take 
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part in the public consultations organized by LT promoters in the departments of 
Rhône, Isère and Savoie.    
Daniel Ibanez understands complex economic issues and knows how to work with 
them. This is because of his professional background. […] Since he joined us 
things have changed a lot. He has skills that others among us do not have: he is 
able to produce analyses and conduct technical studies. We needed someone with 
his profile. If he had not joined us I would have surrendered. Even Italian 
opponents – who have the support of engineers and lawyers - trust him. They 
recognize his analytical abilities.  
(Member of a French opposition group, fieldwork interview) 
Mr Ibanez established contacts with the experts of the Italian opposition groups 
and collaborated with them to examine the studies (e.g. cost-benefit analysis, 
feasibility studies) prepared by the project promoters. He re-elaborated some data 
about the traffic forecasts provided by the project promoters during a 2012 public 
consultation and came to the conclusion that these data were misleading.  
During the public enquiry project promoters showed us some graphs presenting 
increasing transport flows from France, Switzerland and Austria to Italy. 
According to their presentation, these increasing flows justified the construction 
of a new tunnel. This was an abuse of consciousness! We understood this later 
when we decided to take the same data and separately analyze them. We noticed 
that, of course, by aggregating all the transport flows going from Switzerland, 
Austria and France to Italy we could observe that they had generally increased. 
But when we disaggregated them we could see that while Swiss and Austrian 
flows had increased, French flows had been dramatically decreasing since 1988.  
(Spokesperson of the French opposition groups, fieldwork interview) 
Under the leadership of Mr Ibanez, local opposition groups also questioned the 
validity of promoters’ assessment of the environmental impact of LT. As shown 
in the following statement, opponents based their arguments on procedural errors 
relating to the incorrect application of the EIA procedure not allowing splitting 
the project into smaller sub-projects, otherwise the project as a whole avoids 
becoming subject to the EIA requirements. 
Contrary to what the Minister claims, the environmental impact of the projects in 
question has not been taken into consideration globally. The same goes for the 
question of the storage of excavation materials during the realization of above-
mentioned projects. The storage areas of these materials were not determined at 
the time of the public inquiry (even in an approximate way) and consequently, of 
course, the associated environmental impacts could not duly described and taken 
into account. The [opponents] have demonstrated that by providing statements 
from the decision issued from the meeting of 2nd July 2014. 
(“Memoire en Replique” of the French opponents, parag. 237, 2012) 
Promoters’ irregularities in the conduct of the public inquiry and EIA procedures 
frustrated local stakeholders who had the impression that the project was pre-
determined before any public involvement. As a consequence, opponents claimed 
new studies on the impacts of LT. They thus asked the promoters to review their 
estimations by using more accurate data the traffic forecasts and analyzing the 
environmental impact of LT as one single project. Additionally, they called for a 
new public debate on the public interest of the project where decision-making 
procedures would be applied in a truly transparent way. 
The promoters considered these requests incompatible with the implementation 
status of the project which had already been gone through many EU decisions and 
international agreements, duly ratified by the French Parliament. Therefore, in 
2013 the concerned ministry declared LT of public utility. Local protests did not 
 355 
 
stop and, in 2014, Lyon Turin Ferroviaire (LTF) – the company in charge for the 
geognostic works of the base tunnel - filed a claim for defamation against Daniel 
Ibanez. However, upon reaching the court the lawsuit was dismissed on 
insufficient legal ground.  
7.6.2.2 Italy 
When LT emerged in the 1990s, promoters’ justifications mainly framed the 
project into the industrial world (Figure 7.3). LT was presented as an engineering 
project that would have better integrated Italy in Europe. At this initial phase, 
promoters faced the opposition of local communities that appealed not only to the 
industrial but also to the green world to frame their justification work. 
'Absolute priority: the need to renew transport infrastructures in Europe'. This 
imperative is the title of the document with which the European Industrial 
Roundtable (ERT) takes position to support a series of resolutions and initiatives 
to complete those 'missing links' which may delay the creation of the European 
HSR network, as well as a more efficient use of the European transport system. 
Particular attention has to be paid with particular to the construction of a 
transalpine tunnel and the Eurotunnel. 
(Tecnocity, ‘I progetti della Tavola Rotonda degli Industriali Europei’, Document 
n°2, 1989) 
In the late-1980s, Tecnocity – a foundation controlled by FIAT (the largest Italian 
automobile manufacturer founded by the Agnelli family) and IFI (an Italian 
investment company controlled by the Agnelli family) – was the first to support 
the construction of a new HSR infrastructure between Lyon and Turin. It was a 
local organization promoting the development of Turin, and more generally, of 
the Piedmont region. At that time, Tecnocity was following the initiatives of the 
European Round Table of Industrialists, an EU-level influential group supporting 
the construction of a base tunnel across the Alps to enhance the European 
transport system. Within this context, in the early-1990s Tecnocity engaged in an 
intense lobbying activity aimed at securing the support of business organizations 
and political authorities to LT.  
 
Figure 7.3 – Passages coded across jurisdictions and time.  
At this initial stage, Tecnocity had weak support from FS, the Italian railway 
company. At that time, then FS’ chairperson – Mario Schimberni – believed that 
the infrastructure priority was not the development of new international HSR lines 
but rather the upgrading of the existing national infrastructure network. 
Nevertheless, in 1990 the incumbent government removed Mr Schimberni from 
his position and replaced him with Lorenzo Necci. Mr Necci was an experienced 
executive with a managerial mindset and well-known admirer of the French TGV 
technology. He firmly believed that new investments in modern HSR systems, 
such as TGV systems, could have relaunched the Italian rail market and improved 
the quality of the transport service. Under Mr Necci’s direction, in 1991 FS 
adopted the resolution AS/971. This resolution established Treno Alta Velocità 
S.p.A. (also known as TAV S.p.A.), a joint stock company in charge of the 















went to Turin and signed a memorandum of understanding with the Piedmont 
region making official the intention of realizing LT. In the early-2000s, LT 
geognostic works started. 
Throughout the 1990s, local oppositions to the project emerged in the Susa Valley 
with the formation of the Committee Habitat in 1992. This was originally 
constituted by a small group of environmental activists coming from the 
association ProNatura. It rapidly grew and enlarged to 60 members including 
railway experts and professionals, medical doctors, factory workers, lecturers of 
the Turin polytechnic university, as well as mayors and civil servants from the 
local authorities of the valley. In 1994, after studies and discussions that lasted a 
few years, the Committee Habitat expressed a negative view of the project. Their 
core argument was that it was technically useless – because of decreasing traffic 
flows between Italy and France - and extremely impacting for the environment of 
the valley. As for the environment, their concerns were about the presence of 
uranium and asbestos in the mountains where the tunnel was planned to be bored. 
They were worried for the environmental risk associated with the construction of 
the tunnel and, more precisely, with the storage of excavated materials. For these 
reasons, the Committee Habitat - backed by local mayors and civil servants - 
asked the project promoters to open a public debate on the construction of the 
new infrastructure, and namely of the base tunnel.  
As showed in Figure 3, throughout the 2000s, actors’ justifications relocated the 
project from the industrial and green worlds to the civic world.  
Until the mid-2000s, the project promoters ignored these requests. This happened 
because in Italy megaprojects like LT were designed and implemented on the 
basis of Law 443/01 – so called ‘Legge Obiettivo’ (LO). This law allowed 
promoters to use a rigidly centralized top-down decision-making procedure 
enabling them to bypass both local authorities and civil society groups. Within 
this legal framework, between 2001 and 2004, the meetings amongst the 
proponents multiplied but local stakeholders were most often excluded or, if 
invited, ignored. In parallel, local committees of citizens and demonstrations 
against the project grew in number. Many local authorities of the Susa Valley 
took sides with the organized groups of local citizens. Their focus progressively 
shifted from an industrial-green criticism of the infrastructure - concerning the 
content of the project – to a civic criticism – concerning the decision-making of 
the project. Their arguments were against the limitations imposed by Law 443/01.  
They denounced the national legislation for eliminating any involvement of the 
local communities and authorities in the public contracts and for avoiding any 
democratic control on the use of public money. Therefore, they asked the 
government to open a public debate where all the arguments about the project 
could be examined on the basis of a scientific and impartial method.  
The promoters continued ignoring local protests without stopping LT planned 
activities. In 2005 they sent expropriation letters to the residents of Venaus, a 
village in the Susa Valley concerned by the construction of a geognostic tunnel. 
Vis-à-vis promoters’ obstinacy, Venaus residents occupied the construction site. 
As a response, the police violently evacuated them to let the promoters start the 
geognostic works. The images of this police operation circulated all around the 
country and shocked the public opinion. Two days later, 30000 people assembled 
in Venaus, removed the enclosures from the construction site and occupied it 
again. Their request to the project promoters was to involve local communities 
and authorities in the decision-making of the project and open a debate on the 
technical reasons at the basis of LT.   
Vis-à-vis this mass mobilization, in 2006 the incumbent government created a 
new extraordinary body, the Osservatorio Torino-Lione (OTL). OTL’s objective 
was to establish a dialogue between LT proponents and opponents. The 
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government presented it as a bi-partisan body where the most contested technical 
aspects of the project could be debated. Until the late-2000s, the OTL hosted 
many meetings during which the most controversial aspects of the project were 
debated. Proponents’ and opponents’ experts had diverging opinions on the 
forecasting methodology and the variables to be used in the estimation of the 
traffic flows between Italy and France: 
It was evident to everybody that in the past years passenger traffic had not 
increased at all. So promoters shift their arguments to freight traffic and, again, 
said us that the saturation for this type of traffic was forthcoming. We therefore 
made different studies […] and it was clear that the existing freight traffic was 
not close at all to the saturation point of the line. […] The experts appointed by 
the proponents shifted [from the retrospective approach] to the prospective 
approach. It means that, instead using past data for the traffic forecast, they 
formulated conceptual hypotheses on the future evolution of traffics in the next 30 
years. They used these hypotheses to calibrate their models which of course gave 
as output an increase of traffics. […] These were of course complex models 
developed by experts, but the hypotheses were based on inputs coming from 
outside the expert group. The experts received the input from the project 
promoters.  
(Expert representing local communities in OTL, fieldwork interview) 
As explained by this interviewee, local communities’ experts had to deal with the 
inconsistent positions of the experts appointed by the project promoters. The latter 
changed many times their mind about the variables to be studied (passenger VS 
freight traffic) and the methods to be used (retrospective VS prospective 
forecasting). Because of existing divergent views, OTL’s technical talks were 
taking long and the construction of the base tunnel was delayed. As a 
consequence, in 2008 the Chairman of the OTL decided that it was time to stop 
debating the technical problems of the project and work constructively on the 
infrastructure design. Therefore, he unilaterally adopted a document – so called 
“Agreement of Pracatinat” – in the name of all OTL’s participants although Susa 
Valley representatives had not signed it.  This document imposed OTL members 
to shift the focus of their works from debating the project feasibility to project 
implementation. 
Additionally, as the deadlines to apply for a new EU financial support were 
approaching, the Italian government put pressure on the local authorities to tell 
their OTL experts to stop debating the technical feasibility of the project and start 
preparing the submission file to obtain the EU’s funds. The local authorities 
refused and, in 2010, the government publicly threatened to expel them from the 
OTL if they had not declared to support the implementation of the project:  
The government believes that the municipalities concerned by the new line Turin-
Lyon and represented in the OTL have to be redefined […] based on the following 
criteria: […]explicitly declare their will to be involved in the best realization of 
the infrastructure, in the framework of the best protection and development of the 
local territories and in compliance with the European agenda.   
(Italian government, press release, 8
th
 January 2010) 
This press release convinced the local communities that the project promoters 
used the OTL to present themselves in a better light without really intending to 
implement its decisions if these were in contrast with the national and European 
agendas. Because the OTL was not able to assure any democratic participation, 
and because many technical issues remained unresolved, the local communities 
asked their experts to quit the OTL. The citizens of the Susa Valley, backed by 
their mayors, went back to the streets. A new season of protests and 
demonstrations started again. 
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As shown in Figure 7.3, in the early-2010s, actors’ justifications did not change 
much. According to our interpretation, this happened because they dropped the 
dispute without making new agreements. Specifically, the project promoters left 
the realm of justice and shifted towards a new logic of action, domination. 
In 2011, as a form of protest the NOTAV activists occupied another construction 
site in Chiomonte where some geognostic works for the base tunnel were about to 
start. To prevent further delays, the government resorted to the police forces 
which evacuated the activists to let the promoters start the geognostic works. 
Faced with increasing protests, the same year the government approved Law 183 
which declared LT a project of strategic priority to be realized in the name of 
national interest. In so doing, it created the juridical conditions to mobilize 
permanently the army in the Susa Valley and militarily occupy the site in order to 
discourage any future protest against the construction works. The military power 
was therefore used to impose the project to the local communities. In a similar 
vein, the project promoters used the judiciary power. For example, LTF 
prosecuted one of Italy’s most acclaimed writers because in 2013 he publicly 
defined LT a “useless and harmful project legitimate to sabotage” (Kirchgaessner 
2015). As a consequence, LTF pressed charges against him shortly after he made 
these remarks. The Italian anti-terror prosecutors followed suit, claiming that the 
writer had publicly instigated the commission of crimes and violations intended to 
hurt LTF. He was accused of incitement to damage property. Finally, he was 
acquitted by the court in Turin in 2015.  
7.6.2.3 EU 
As showed in Figure 7.4, during the 1990s, the industrial, civic, connectionist and 
market worlds all co-existed in the justifications of EU-level actors. This long 
interview statement provides an example:   
The European Council in December 1993 invited the Commission, assisted by a 
group of personal representatives of the Heads of State or Government, to lead 
and coordinate the speedy and efficient implementation of trans-European 
networks in transport and energy. […] The task that the Union and the Member 
States have undertaken consists first of all in identifying and accelerating projects 
considered to be of priority importance. […] The common EC transport policy is 
guided by two main principles which give some general indications in this 
respect. The first element is the market-economy orientation of this work […] The 
second leading principle, which is established in Community decisions and policy 
communications, is that transport infrastructure costs shall be borne by the users 
to the maximum extent feasible. This principle is looked at as one key element to 
establish a fair competition between the different transport services which might 
lead to a shift of market shares between modes. 
(European Union, report of the Christopherson High-Level Group, 1994) 
 
Figure 7.4 - Passages coded across jurisdictions and time.  
In 1994 the high-level expert group led by Henning Christophersen, a former 

















infrastructure projects addressing the missing links and bottlenecks of the future 
trans-European transport infrastructure network. In 1996, this list was approved 
by the Council of the European Union held in Essen (Germany) and, following 
the adoption of Decision No 1692/96/EC, officially became part of the TEN-T 
program. This program aimed to promote and strengthen seamless trans-European 
transport chains for passenger and freight. The purpose was to close the gaps 
between Member States' transport networks and remove the bottlenecks that still 
hamper the smooth functioning of the internal market.  
Throughout the 2000s, because of local criticisms at the national levels, EU actors 
relocated the project from the connectionist, civic and market worlds to the 
industrial and green worlds whose importance increased in their justifications.    
[The Coordinator] decided to promote a European mediation in order to try to 
restart the dialogue with the local inhabitants of the valley and reassure about 
their concerns. The Commission has therefore commissioned external experts to 
carry out an independent assessment of the quality and coherence of the studies 
carried out by LTF on the issues at the heart of the concerns of the inhabitants of 
the Susa Valley, namely public health, environment and the possibility of 
upgrading the historical line instead of building a new line. 
(European Coordinator, ‘Rapport annuel d’activité du Coordonnateur Européen’, 
July 2006) 
Following the request of the European Commission, the consultancy company 
COWI A/S conducted a study on the issue of the traffic flows. COWI A/S 
experts’ conclusion was that the historical line had many operational limits due to 
its loading gauge, gradient line, width of the curves and electrification system. 
They thus provided the Commission with a report 
(‘TREN/05/ADM/S07.54919/2005 revised version 3’) explaining that the 
historical line could have no longer been able to absorb all traffic in the medium 
term. In this report, COWI A/S explicitly agreed with LTF that the saturation was 
likely to be achieved by 2020. Therefore, they recommended the construction of 
the new rail link.  
At the same time, the European Commission strengthened its commitment to 
promote a sustainable transport system in the EU: 
Over and above everything else, the fight against climate change requires 
Europe-wide measures to underpin Europe's leading role in the world. Transport 
and transport infrastructure are areas which offer considerable potential for 
positive contributions. […] TEN-T policy has begun to provide responses to 
issues in the field of freight transport, where expected growth (an increase of 34% 
between 2005 and 2020) underlines the importance of introducing real co-modal 
solutions to overcome problems such as congestion, rising carbon dioxide 
emissions, infrastructure and organizational gaps. 
(European Commission, Green Paper ‘TEN-T a Policy Review’, COM(2009) 44 
final, 2009) 
The decarbonisation of the European transport system became one of the EU’s 
key environmental objectives. Within this policy framework, the modal shift from 
road and air to rail emerged as a crucial factor to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
in Europe. Therefore, LT assumed the form of a green project which would have 
reduced the CO2 emissions in the Alpine areas by shifting the transalpine cargo 
traffic from road to railways. In so doing, LT would have contributed to the EU 
strategy of reducing carbon gas emissions. 
Between the late-2000s and early-2010s, delays in the planned implementation of 
the project increased and EU actors relocated their justifications from the 
industrial and green worlds to the connectionist world. The connectionist world 
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was thus mobilized by the EU actors to secure the accomplishment of projects 
funded by TEN-T.    
Any project has been screened in a detailed way for each of their objectives. In 
case these objectives are no longer met, the related budget will be cut. As a result 
of the above analysis, around €311 million will be liberated to be reinjected into 
new calls for proposals under the current TEN-T programme. 
(European Commission, press release IP/10/1391, 2010) 
Money that are not properly spent can be used in the next calls to finance other 
projects, if the case in other countries. If EC does not reduce the funds, these 
funds are lost. 
(Program manager, INEA executive agency – European Commission, Fieldwork 
interview) 
In 2010, the European Commission undertook the so called ‘Mid-Term Review of 
the 2007-2013 TEN-T MAP Project Portfolio’, an assessment of the 
implementation status of projects funded by TEN-T. The assessment process 
looked at the actual variations of the costs budgeted by the project promoters 
against the costs planned in the funding decision of the European Commission. 
Based on this information, the Commission – with the support of external experts 
– revised the costs of the projects by providing a more realistic calculation of their 
future evolution. Revised cost predictions were used to review the list of 
objectives to be achieved by the promoters during the remaining funding period. 
If predictions had showed that the project could not been accomplished by the 
planned deadline, funds could have been cut and made available to other projects. 
In so doing, new projects could be constantly funded and the timely completion of 
the TEN-T program could be assured.      
Throughout the 2000s, the Italian process of project implementation experienced 
major delays because of the increasing opposition of local stakeholders from the 
Susa Valley. The 2010 mid-term review made emerge these delays and, 
consequently, led the European Commission to reduce the TEN-T contribution by 
€9.2 million.  
7.7 Discussion 
We know from the literature (Levitt and Scott 2016, Marrewijk et al. 2008) that 
megaprojects may be described as complex fields characterized by conflict, 
uncertainty and poor cooperation between actors carrying out competing 
institutional logics. Most often conflicts occur between the project team and 
groups outside the project team (Susskinds, 1985; Priscoli, 1987; Harashina, 1995 
Prapatpaow and Stephen 2002). And most often, these conflicts issue from the 
divergent views of opponents and proponents about the project effects on 
community life or ways of life, people’s relation with one another and how 
residents perceive and feel about communities and project-related changes 
(Leistriz and Murdock 1981). Divergent views may depend on actors’ personal 
cultural and social backgrounds which affect the way they perceive themselves, 
their behavior, and the surrounding reality (Al-Arjani 1995, Prapatpaow and 
Stephen 2002). Collectively, these different backgrounds may produce pluralist 
environments where the contradictory logics of proponents and opponents of 
megaprojects variously co-exist and evolve as a result of their interactions in the 
field. 
We adopted a dialectical perspective (Ford and Backoff 1988, Werner and Baxter 
1994, Martin 2007) to analyze the contradictory tensions between proponents’ 
and opponents’ logics in the LT field, a trans-European megaproject. We 
therefore used the Boltanski and Thévenot's (1991) common worlds to describe 
opponents’ and proponents’ competing logics.  
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Our findings on LT show that different common worlds may coexist in the field of 
a transnational megaproject and actors may variously appeal to them to justify 
their positions. Actors’ justification work may exhibit contradictory logics 
(proponents VS opponents) giving birth to state-of-worth and/or order-of-worth 
controversies. 
In section 6.1.1 we have showed that, at the national levels, project promoters (LT 
proponents) mobilized different common worlds (industrial, civic, market and 
green) to frame their justification work. Industrial, civic and green justifications 
were similarly mobilized in both countries. However, contrary to Italy, in France 
– in the 1990s - LT proponents also appealed to the market world. We have 
explained this difference on the basis of cultural differences between the French 
and Italian railways. Contrary to France, at that period market justifications in 
Italy were weak because railways were seen as a public service rather than a 
market service. At the supra-national level, proponents have appealed not only to 
the worlds already co-existing at the national levels (industrial, civic, market and 
green) but also to the connectionist world. We have explained this difference on 
the basis of the wider perspective that EU-level actors have on LT. For them, LT 
is one project, among hundreds of projects, funded by the TEN-T program. Their 
role is to provide management support (coordination and supervision) to all the 
projects funded by TEN-T across the Member States of the EU. In so doing, they 
assure the flexible and efficient use of resources as well as the timely completion 
of the TEN-T program. 
In section 6.1.2 we have showed that local communities (LT opponents) 
mobilized counter-justifications to oppose the implementation of LT. They 
challenged LT from within proponents’ industrial justifications (state-of-worth 
controversy) by questioning the degree to which the scientific and empiricist 
principles – typical of an industrial situation – were being correctly applied to LT. 
They argued that there was no empirical or scientific evidence demonstrating the 
need for a new infrastructure. Their core argument was that the project was 
useless as several studies demonstrated that traffic flows between Italy and France 
were declining. Moreover, based on arguments from the green and civic worlds, 
opponents also questioned the appropriateness of proponents’ industrial principles 
applied to the decision-making of LT (order-of-worth controversy). They thus 
called for a wider assessment of the project where, not only the traffic flows, but 
also the environmental impact of the project and its public interest were duly 
taken into account.  
Our findings on LT show that actors’ justifications may change over time as an 
effect of the unfolding controversies. Trajectories of change may vary across the 
levels and contexts involved.    
When LT emerged, the French proponents framed it into the industrial and market 
worlds whereas the Italian opponents mainly appealed to the industrial world. 
During this initial stage, local oppositions to LT developed in both national 
contexts and engaged proponents in two different forms of controversies: a state-
of-worth controversy within the industrial world and an order-of-worth 
controversy opposing the green and civic worlds to the industrial one. As a 
consequence, proponents, while continuing to appeal to the industrial world to 
face opponents’ state-of-worth criticisms, they increasingly had to justify LT from 
a green and civic perspective to appease unfolding order-of-worth criticisms. 
Proponents’ strategies vis-à-vis opponents’ critiques varied across Italy, France 
and EU contexts.  
In France, the proponents appeased the early criticisms of opponents by means of 
public tests (e.g. public consultations and public enquiries). However, at a later 
stage opponents reproached the public authorities involved in the decision-making 
of the project for the appropriateness of their conduct in the estimation of the (1) 
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environmental impacts and (2) traffic flows associated with the new 
infrastructure. As a consequence, proponents’ justifications referring to the green 
and industrial worlds were subsumed into the civic world which became the realm 
of confrontation with the opponents.  
In Italy, the proponents ignored the early criticisms of opponents by making them 
grow in intensity until the point of becoming unmanageable. After a vain attempt 
of appeasing local criticisms through public tests (e.g. OTL public consultations), 
the proponents decided to drop the dispute without making any new agreement 
with the opponents. They thus left the realm of justice and shifted towards the 
domination logic. 
At the supra-national level, when LT emerged, the industrial, civic, connectionist 
and market worlds all co-existed in the justifications of EU proponents. Later, 
because of tensions between opponents and proponents at the national levels, they 
relocated LT from the connectionist, civic and market worlds to the industrial and 
green worlds. However, as delays in the planned implementation of the project 
increased, they relocated their justifications from the industrial and green worlds 
to the connectionist world. The connectionist world was thus mobilized at the EU 
level to secure the accomplishment of the TEN-T program by a flexible and 
efficient management of funded projects.    
Our findings on LT show that proponents’ responses to opponents’ critiques may 
shape the controversies in ways that differ across the levels and contexts 
structuring the field.   
The evolution of the controversy at the national levels suggests that addressing 
soon external critiques may have a positive impact on the resolution of a 
controversy. In the Italian context, the prolonged unaccountability of proponents 
to opponents’ critiques erodes their credibility and undermines the civic 
foundations of the project. The project appears opaque and the external 
stakeholders intensify their opposition. Nevertheless, addressing soon external 
critiques does not prevent the development of new controversies in the future. In 
the French context, proponents’ conduct during the decision-making of the project 
was questioned on a civic basis by the local actors whose opposition revitalized at 
a later stage of LT life-cycle.    
The evolution of the controversy at the supra-national level suggests that EU 
actors exhibit a myopic connectionist behavior. Myopia refers to the short-
sightedness of managers who narrow their focus on the control of short-term 
objectives by neglecting longer-term ones (Mizick 2010). Our analysis shows that 
EU proponents narrow their focus on the progress made by national proponents 
against initial plans and pay little attention to the contradictory processes taking 
place within the national contexts. As a consequence, this narrow focus may have 
unintended consequences at the national levels. For example, when the local 
oppositions intensified in Italy throughout the 2000s, the European Commission’s 
concerns were about the delays these oppositions provoked vis-à-vis the existing 
schedule of project implementation. It therefore decided to cut part of the funds 
made available to it and reallocate them to other projects. However, unintended 
consequences developed at the national level where, to prevent further delays – 
and thus an additional reduction of TEN-T funds -, the Italian government 
militarily occupied the construction site of the project. The aim was to discourage 
any future protest which could delay further the accomplishment of TEN-T’s 
planned objectives. EU actors’ myopic focus on the efficient and flexible 
management of funded projects led them to narrow their focus on performance 
information and divert attention from important-but-unmeasured values likely to 
have long term effects on trust and democracy. Moreover, we suggest that 
unintended consequences are likely to emerge at the national levels as an effect of 
supra-national myopic behavior.      
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Finally, our findings on LT suggest that at the national levels, proponents of 
transnational megaprojects may address differently opposing parties. Differences 
may be described as country-specific forms of contradiction management which 
variously impact the evolution of the controversy.  
Many studies (Ford and Backoff 1988, Werner and Baxter 1994, Martin 2007) 
have addressed dialectical contradictions from a management perspective. 
Hargrave and Van de Ven’s (2009) resumed the work of these scholars into three 
approaches to managing contradiction: “either/or” approach, moderation and 
“both/and” approach. While moderation and “both/and” approaches address both 
poles of a contradiction, “either/or” approach focuses on only one pole. 
Nevertheless, moderation and “both/and” approaches are profoundly different as 
the latter deals with contradictory poles as they were complementary elements of 
a unity whereas the former frame them as competing and irreconcilable.  
In Italy, LT proponents adopted an either/or approach by ignoring the claims of 
the opponents during the initial stage of the project. According to Hargrave and 
Van de Ven’s (2009: 125), “either/both approaches separate different poles of 
contradiction, and tend to deny one pole by proceeding as if that pole does not 
exist, or seek to satisfy one pole while ignoring, or at the expenses of the other”. 
Our analysis suggests that this approach may exacerbate the tensions between 
proponents and opponents and, eventually, lead the former to leave the realm of 
justice to embrace domination logic. 
In France, LT proponents adopted instead a moderation approach. According to 
Hargrave and Van de Ven’s (2009: 125), Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) decoupling 
is an example of moderation strategy that enables  organizations to live with – but 
not embrace or resolve – the contradiction between the competing poles. 
Decoupling is the creation and maintenance of gaps between formal policies and 
actual organizational practices. In the French context, we see that proponents 
involved opponents in formal public consultations since the early stage of LT. 
However, as criticisms intensified and asked for a fundamental revision of the 
planned project, proponents used civic justifications to reduce opponents’ margin 
to maneuver.  
7.8 Conclusion 
This article suggests considering trans-European megaprojects as complex 
organizational fields operating in pluralistic, trans-national and multilevel 
settings: (1) pluralistic because of the co-existence in the field of divergent actor 
groups, each with its own legitimate set of beliefs and objectives; (2) trans-
national because they may concern more than one nation-state; and, (3) multi-
level because their decision making may be dispersed from the national to the 
supra-national level.  
In our study on the case of LT, we could identify two predominant actor groups 
operating in the field and espousing contradictory logics - the project team 
proposing LT (proponents) and the local communities opposing it (opponents). 
Drawing on Cloutier and Langley (2013), we have used Boltanski and Thévenot's 
(1991) framework to describe the multiplicity of ‘common worlds’ to which 
proponents and opponents have appealed to justify their positions in the field. In 
so doing we have explained how multiple broad-based sets of values and 
conceptions of the common good co-exist in the complex field of trans-European 
megaprojects. 
Our study suggests that, in the case of trans-European megaprojects, there can be 
as many sets of co-existing worlds as the levels and contexts structuring the field. 




First, differences can be observed between the two national contexts involved. For 
example, the analysis has showed that in France proponents’ justifications 
mobilized market justifications to a larger extent than Italian ones. According to 
our interpretation, this was because of differences between French and Italian 
actors in terms of railway culture. Specifically we have argued that, contrary to 
France, market justifications in Italy were weak because railways were seen as a 
public service rather than a market service.   
Second, differences can be observed between the national and supra-national 
levels. For example, actors at the EU level, unlike those at the national levels, 
have increasingly appealed to the connectionist world. According to our 
interpretation, this was because of the wider perspective that EU-level actors have 
on LT from their supra-national position in the field. For them, LT is one project, 
in a list of hundreds of projects, funded by the TEN-T program. Their role is to 
provide coordination and supervision to all the projects funded by TEN-T across 
the Member States of the EU. In so doing, they assure the flexible and efficient 
use of resources as well as the timely completion of the TEN-T program. 
Our study also suggests that actors’ contradictory logics give birth to state-of-
worth and order-of-worth controversies. On the one hand, we have showed that 
opponents challenged LT from within proponents’ industrial justifications (state-
of-worth controversy) by questioning the degree to which the scientific and 
empiricist principles – typical of an industrial situation – were being correctly 
applied to LT. They argued that there was no empirical or scientific evidence 
demonstrating the need for a new infrastructure because the traffic flows between 
Italy and France were declining. Additionally, based on arguments from the green 
and civic worlds, they also questioned the appropriateness of proponents’ 
industrial principles applied to the decision-making of LT (order-of-worth 
controversy). They thus called for a wider assessment of the project where, not 
only the traffic flows, but also the environmental impact of the project and its 
public interest were duly taken into account. 
Moreover, our findings on LT show that proponents may end controversies in the 
field in different ways. They can either make agreements with opponents (like in 
France) or just drop the dispute without making any agreement (like in Italy). 
As explained by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), tests and compromises are two 
different strategies to reach an agreement between contradictory parties. In the 
case we examined, LT proponents preferred tests to compromises as a strategy to 
reach an agreement with local opposition groups. In France, for example, in the 
early-1990s proponents organized a public debate on the economic and social 
interest of the project. This provided the occasion for a public test allowing 
proponents to explain publicly the appropriateness of LT to meet the declared 
civic, industrial and market benefits. Thanks to this test, proponents and 
opponents could clarify the principles (civic, industrial and market) upon which 
their agreement was to be grounded. In a similar vein, when in the 2000s 
opponents’ green and civic criticisms against LT intensified in the Maurienne 
region, French proponents accepted to delay the official approval of the project 
and organize new public consultations with the local populations. The objective 
was to produce new evidence about the environmental impacts of some 
infrastructure works - namely the drainage of local water sources, and the risks 
associated with the storage of the excavation material. In so doing, proponents 
attempted to reinforce the environmental principles underneath LT.   
Contrary to France, proponents in Italy have proved to be less open to establish an 
agreement with opponents. This might have happened because in Italy, unlike in 
France, project promoters have no legal obligation to involve local communities 
in the decision-making process and are thus allowed to ignore their criticisms. 
However, our analysis suggests that ignoring unfolding criticisms may exacerbate 
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the tensions between proponents and opponents and, eventually, lead the former 
to leave the realm of justice and embrace the domination logic with the use of 
military power.  
To conclude, our study on LT suggests that an important aspect for the successful 
design and implementation of megaprojects is proponents’ ability to cope with the 
multiplicity of worlds that contradictorily co-exist in the field. Particularly, the 
analysis shows that in France – where proponents have most often worked to 
make agreements with the opponents – resistance to change is weaker than in 
Italy – where proponents have most often ignored opponents’ critiques. Making 
agreements – in this case by means of tests– with stakeholders outside the project 
team is thus a key factor for the smooth conduct of complex megaprojects. 
However, our analysis shows that agreements are instable as they may rise and 
fall over time. In the France, local communities’ viewpoints on and attitudes 
towards LT change over time as new information is disclosed (e.g. 2003 report of 
the ‘Conseil général des Ponts et Chaussées’ and 2012 report of the French Court 
of Audit) and when new actors (e.g. Daniel Ibanez) enroll in the official decision-
making procedure of the project. This suggests that the disclosure of new 
information in the field and/or the enrollment of new actors in the decision-
making process may change the collective perception of the project and 
deteriorate existing agreements. Our findings also suggest that this deterioration 
may exacerbate opponents’ resistance and lead proponents to increase 
coerciveness to police conformity in the field (e.g. prosecution of opponents’ 
spokesperson).    
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8. The Strategic Organization of LT and Patterns of 
Governance in Trans-European Megaprojects (Essay 7) 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we provide a transversal analysis of essays 4, 5 and 6. By drawing 
on Pettigrew’s contextualism, we reflect more generally on the governance of 
TEN-T projects. As our study on LT shows, variations in performance (content) 
are determined by and determine variations in (1) national institutions’ openness 
to civil society stakeholders (inner context), (2) supra-national intensity of 
supervision and control (outer context), and (3) actors’ capacity of making 
agreements (process). We thus suggest that, from a strategic point of view, there 
is not a linear relationship between the content, contexts and process of change. 
This is rather a recursive relationship which varies over time with little 
predictability. As we explain, time is a key factor to understand these interactions 
between the content, contexts and process of change. We finally claim that in the 
case of complex public projects – like LT – the NPM rationalist posture may fail 
in understanding and organizing change. We therefore invite to think more about 
alternative systems based on: (1) decision-making systems widely opened to the 
stakeholder participation; (2) performance management systems where the plans 
and objectives against which performance is assessed are collectively debated and 
approved (bottom-up) rather than decided by the top management (top-down); (3) 
open dialogue between opponents and proponents.  





In the 1960s strategy was traditionally viewed as a high-level plan to achieve one 
or more goals under conditions of uncertainty (Ansoff
 
1965, Ansoff and 
Mcdonnel 1990). During the 1970s, behavioural scholars (e.g. Mintzberg 1979) 
criticised this traditional conception because strategy is rarely the result of one-off 
planned decisions. It is rather the outcome of a process shaped by conflicting 
interests, politics and organisational culture. They thus defined strategy as a 
‘pattern in a stream of decisions’ in contrast with the earlier view of ‘strategy as 
planning’ (Miller and Friesen 1982, Mintzberg and Waters 1985). Their seminal 
works shifted the research focus from the strategy content (formulation of planned 
goals) to the strategy process. A process is a sequence of events that lead to an 
outcome (Peterson 1998, Sminia 2009) and has to be studied in its organizational, 
societal and political context (Pettigrew 1985, 1987, Van de Ven et al. 1999).  
In a similar vein, the Strategy as Practice (SaP) school has recently suggested that 
strategic decisions are not simply taken at the top of organizations and 
implemented down through hierarchies; rather, they are influenced by many intra- 
and extra-organisational members whose behaviours shape the process that gives 
rise to the strategy. Johnson et al. (2007) consider that strategy is rarely the result 
of one-off decisions, but rather is the outcome of complex processes characterized 
by a plurality of levels of analysis, actors and dependent variables. They therefore 
ask “if it is possible to understand the complexity with which we are concerned 
through singular theoretical lenses. We may need to employ multiple theoretical 
lenses” (Johnson et al. 2007: 15).  
There already exist examples of research initiatives (Allison 1971; Addicott and 
Ferlie 2007) utilising multiple theories to study decision-making and strategic 
change. In this regard, Pichault (2013) stresses the need for integrated 
multidimensional models allowing researchers to mobilise multiple theories and 
grasp the multifaceted nature of strategic change. He considers that the 
contextualist research tradition developed by Pettigrew (1987) is well-suited to 
this end: “Contextualism is not an explanatory approach strictly speaking: rather, 
it proposes a general analytical framework which different approaches may fit 
into. It places the emphasis on three key concepts and their interrelations: content, 
context and process” (Pichault 2013: 68). 
Andrew Pettigrew is recognised as a leading process researcher (Langley 2009; 
Sminia and de Rond 2012, Sminia 2016). His contextualist methodology was 
designed to conduct process research and, thus, to study phenomena that are very 
complex and difficult to capture through quantitative methods and statistical 
techniques. “His process scholarship helped lay the foundations for more 
sociological and qualitatively oriented management and organisation research, 
including, for instance, the current [SaP] movement” (Sminia 2016: 111). 
Pettigrew’s (1985) content-context-process model was aimed at capturing both 
the managerial reality of decision-making and organisational change and, then, 
linking them to outcomes. It allowed him to show that, from a process 
perspective, management reality sharply contrasts with the reality presumed by 
mainstream conceptions. Indeed, the process angle revealed that managerial 
decision-making is not an ordered and linear process of information processing 
and rational choice, but rather the result of conflicting interests, politics and 
organisational culture which, all at the same time, make management a social 
process, meandering and developing over time (Sminia 2016).                       
Based on Pettigrew’s (1985, 1987) contextualism, in the previous sections of this 
PhD thesis we have mobilized three different theoretical lenses to analyze the 
interactions between content, context and process of the LT megaproject. The 
analysis showed that the implementation of LT (content) has been influenced by 
three key variables: (1) the configuration of national institutional systems (inner 
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context), (2) the supra-national techniques of program management (outer 
context) and (3) the capability of national project promoters to make agreements 
with local stakeholders (process). First, we have mobilized the Neo-
Institutionalist Theory to investigate the link between inner context and content - 
namely how national institutions influence the performance of trans-European 
megaprojects. Second, we have mobilized the Foucauldian Theory of Power to 
investigate the link between outer context and process - namely how supra-
national institutions influence at distance the stakeholder interactions taking place 
at the national levels. Finally, we have mobilized Boltanski and Thévenot’s 
(1991) Justification Theory to investigate the link between process and content - 
namely how stakeholder interactions influence the performance of trans-European 
megaprojects.     
In this section of the thesis, we provide an integrated interpretation of these 
variables. First, we remind the theoretical background mobilized in this research 
by showing its novelty vis-à-vis the state of the art in contextualist research. 
Second, we recall the main contextualist features of our case by presenting the 
overall strategic organization of LT. Third, we describe the three variables 
mentioned above by highlighting how these have influenced the implementation 
of LT. Finally, we discuss these variables within the broad context of 
megaprojects and provide some concluding remarks concerning the governance of 
TEN-T projects. 
8.2 Theoretical background: an integrated perspective 
Pettigrew’s (1985, 1990) method of research on change is based on 
contextualism, an epistemological posturing considering knowledge as context-
sensitive. Contextualism is concerned with the understanding of events in their 
settings. It is based on Pepper’s (1942) philosophy and its root metaphor is the 
common-sense notion of the ongoing act in context. According to Morris (1997: 
533), Pepper’s use of the term “context” drew on Dewey’s notion of context as 
“the historical situatedness of the meaning and function of behavior”. Indeed, 
contextualism is interested in what Pepper (1942: 232) calls the “the historic 
event” and, therefore, is inherently a form of longitudinal research acknowledging 
“the importance of temporal interconnectedness, locating change in past, present, 
and future time” (Pettigrew 1990: 269).   
As pointed out by Pettigrew and Whipp (1991), the contextualist framework of 
analysis distinguishes between three dimensions of change: content, process and 
context. The content refers to what is changed as expressed in terms of objectives, 
purpose and goals of change. The process refers to how change is implemented, 
whereas the context refers to the internal and external environment where change 
is implemented. Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) emphasise the continuous interplay 
between these dimensions and hold that change is an iterative and cumulative 
process.  
SaP scholars have levelled several criticisms against Pettigrew’s contextualism 
and his tradition of process studies. Johnson et al. (2007) say that these studies 
tended to be at the fore in the 1980s and early 1990s. Then, they have come to be 
concerned with the systems and processes of organizations as wholes as the units 
of analysis (Chakravarthy and Doz 1992, Chakravarthy and White 2002), 
neglecting the practice that is inside such processes (Brown and Duguid 2000). 
During the 1970s, process strategy researchers came up with detailed analyses of 
activities involved in strategic decision making processes. Johnson et al. (2007) 
refer very good examples: the longitudinal case studies on resource allocation 
process by Bower (1972); Pettigrew’s (1973) politics of investment decisions; and 
Mintzberg et al. (1976) clinical dissection of comparative decision processes. 
However, in the following years, process research on strategic decision-making 
progressively migrated to cross-sectional studies (Johnson et al. 2007) providing 
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categories of decision-making modes (i.e. Papadakis et al. 1998, Wally and Baum 
1994) and shifting the attention from what people actually do in the real world to 
what they do in controlled environments such in laboratories using MBA students 
in experiments (i.e. Bettenhausen and Muringhan 1985). In a similar vein, other 
scholars (Chia and MacKay 2007, Hernes 2014, Tsoukas and Chia 2002) believe 
that his conception of process does not incorporate an epistemology and an 
ontology that are truly processual. 
Several criticisms have focused on Pettigrew’s conceptualization of the context. 
According to Sminia (2016), those who have engaged with and criticised 
contextualism accept Pettigrew’s requirement of embeddedness but argue that his 
elaboration of context is uncritical because it does not question top management’s 
legitimacy (Morgan and Sturdy 2000, Wilmott 1997). Caldwell (2005) speaks 
about inconsistency as Pettigrew argues that context should not be treated as 
either a descriptive background or a list of antecedents, which is – according to 
Caldwell – what Pettigrew does. In fact, even if Pettigrew (1997: 338) has pointed 
out that managerial action is “embedded in contexts which limit their information, 
insight and influence”, some scholars (Buchanan 1991, Buchanan and Boddy 
1992) have noticed that his classification of context (inner and outer) do not offer 
adequate analytical support to understand contextual roles in the shaping of 
management responses. According to Caldwell (2006), the contextual dichotomy 
does not provide any insight into the interaction and interrelationships between 
the inner and outer context. 
Above-mentioned criticisms seem to overlook the fact that, strictu sensu, 
contextualism is not a theory of organisational change but rather a method of 
inquiry allowing researchers to unpack change processes and describe them as a 
result of the multiple content-process-context interactions. This is the position of 
Pichault (2013: 68) according to whom “contextualism is not an explanatory 
approach strictly speaking: rather, it proposes a general analytical framework 
which different approaches may fit into. It places the emphasis on three key 
concepts and their interrelations: content, context and process”. In a similar vein, 
Sminia (2016: 126) refers that “Pettigrew’s approach can still serve as the starting 
point for a research agenda in many areas, with Pettigrew’s contextualism 
offering a well-developed process methodology that can serve as a template”. 
Contextualuism can be thus regarded as a procedural method to design and 
implement research projects on change processes and acquiring knowledge about 
these phenomena. As suggested by Pichault (2013), contextualism can be used as 
framework within which different theoretical lenses may be mobilized to analyse 
and interpret the different interactions occurring between the content, the process 
and the context.  
First, our suggestion is that the lens of neo-institutionalism (i.e. Di Maggio and 
Powell 1983, Powell and Di Maggio 1991) allows understanding the relationship 
between context and organizational behaviour. This theoretical framework 
focuses on why and how organisations behave in a certain way within a given 
context. Neo-institutionalism views organisations as institutions which operate in 
an open environment consisting of other institutions: this open environment is 
called the institutional environment. Because of institutional peer pressure, every 
institution is influenced by the broader environment. The main goal of 
organizations is to survive in this environment and, to do so, not only they need to 
succeed economically, they also have to establish legitimacy within the world of 
institutions. Nevertheless, while the initial focus of neo-institutionalism was on 
how institutions guide action, over time researchers have more and more showed 
that action is able to manipulate institutional parameters (Holm 1995). Therefore, 
the stream of institutional work theorists (e.g. Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) has 
suggested shifting the focus of analysis on the work of actors as they attempt to 
create, maintain and disrupt the institutional environment. We thus suggest that 
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mobilising neo-institutionalist theories within the contextualist framework may 
help understanding how contextual roles shape change. In so doing, it allows 
answering those criticisms (e.g. Caldwell 2005) according to which contextualism 
see the context either as a list of antecedents or a descriptive background.   
Second, our suggestion is that the lens of Foucault’s theory of power provides 
useful support to develop a critical analysis of the context and question the 
legitimacy of managerial choices (Morgan and Sturdy 2000, Wilmott 1997). As 
suggested by Berdayes (2002), the Foucauldian theory provides useful insights 
into the nature of managerial power by shedding light on those inter- and intra-
organisational ties which constrain affect individual and collective behaviour in 
organisations. A key point about Foucault’s approach to power is that it 
transcends politics and sees power as an everyday, socialised and embodied 
phenomenon. From his perspective, power is constituted through accepted forms 
of knowledge, scientific understanding and ‘truth’: “Each society has its regime 
of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it 
accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable 
one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned, the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of 
truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” 
(Foucault, 1980: 131). We thus suggest that mobilising Foucauldian theories 
within the contextualist framework may help improving our understanding of the 
techniques and procedures turning the socio-political context into organisational 
constraints shaping the individual and collective behaviours involved in the 
change process. 
Third, our suggestion is that the lens of Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1991) 
justification theory may provide a deep understanding of actors’ practices within 
organizational processes. In fact, this theoretical approach offers insights into 
situated disputes and the different forms of conflict which are likely to emerge 
among actors: it provides a very fine theorisation of the agreements, critiques and 
crises in which these actors may be involved. This lens is particularly important to 
understand the dynamics of disputes and agreements between collective entities 
with competing moral evaluations of the ongoing change project. On the one 
hand, this theory focuses on actors’ discursive justifications about their practices 
and, therefore, allows understanding the multiple moral stances which compete in 
a controversy. On the other, it provides a taxonomy of practices that actors may 
deploy to solve a controversy. Actors may either make agreements with actors 
espousing competing moral stances or just drop the dispute without making any 
agreement (domination, forgiveness and forgetting). We thus suggest that 
mobilising Boltanski and Thévenot’s theory within the framework of 
contextualism allows answering those criticisms according to which contextualist 
studies tend to adopt the systems and processes of organizations as wholes as the 
units of analysis (Chakravarthy and Doz 1992, Chakravarthy and White 2002), 
without considering the practice that is inside such processes (Brown and Duguid 
2000). 
8.3 The strategic organization of LT 
In the framework of this research, the strategic organization of LT refers to the 
process of organizing change in a structured and thoughtful way in order to meet 
planned goals, objectives, and missions. This change can be described as 
multilevel, transnational and pluralistic: (1) multi-level because its decision 
making is dispersed from the national to the supra-national level; (2) trans-
national because, at the national level, it is implemented within two nation-states 
having different domestic institutions; and, (3) pluralistic because of the co-
existence of divergent actor groups, each with its own legitimate set of beliefs and 
objectives. While the multilevel and transnational settings (Figure 8.1) describe 
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where change is implemented (context), pluralism refers to how it is implemented 
(process).  
 
Figure 8.1 – Multi-level and transnational settings of LT (Context)36 
At the national level, LT articulates across two different domestic contexts (inner 
contexts) characterized by two different institutional systems for the design and 
implementation of megaprojects like LT. In France, the decision-making of LT is 
regulated by a set of administrative procedures - ‘Enquête Publiqe’ – that impose 
the railways and the government to set up - with support of independent 
administrative authorities - public consultations with the civil society affected by 
the project. In Italy, it is regulated by a 2001 ad-hoc law of the Parliament - Law 
                                               
36 Figure 8.1 was realized with the support of Adriano Frantantonio, business architect at 
Bizliner (Belgium). 
443/01, so called ‘Legge Obiettivo’ (LO). This law introduced a fast-lane 
procedure allowing the railways and the government to bypass both local 
authorities and civil society stakeholders in the decision-making of LT and have 
preferential access to financial resources. It follows that in the Italy the decision-
making power is mainly concentrated in the hands of the political apex of the 
state machinery, whereas in France it is more shared with the administrative 
authorities and the civil society.    
At the supra-national level, we have considered the EU as the outer context of LT. 
Since 1994, LT is a project co-funded by TEN-T program (40% of the total cost). 
This program consists of hundreds of projects whose ultimate purpose is to ensure 
the cohesion, interconnection and interoperability of the trans-European transport 
network, as well as access to it. TEN-T projects are in every EU’s Member State 
and include all modes of transport. The European Commission is the key actor at 
this level. Its decision-making power derives from the TEN-T investment 
guidelines. These guidelines take the form of an ordinary law of the EU 
(Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 December 2013). They regulate the allocation of the TEN-T budget from the 
supra-national to the national level. The national governments, along with the 
railway companies, send the project proposals to the European Commission 
which – with the support of an executive agency and 9 European Coordinators - 
decides whether it may be awarded the TEN-T financial contribution. On the one 
hand, the executive agency provides administrative support in the evaluation and 
selection of the project proposals. On the other, the 9 European Coordinators - 
appointed by and acting on behalf of the European Commission - supervise the 
Member States’ authorities in the implementation of funded projects. 
Additionally, the 9 European Coordinators chair 9 corridor fora. This forum is a 
consultative body where the national public authorities (national governments, 
ministry-level administrations and regions) and industry (infrastructure managers 
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of ports, airports, rail and roads, as well as freight transport operators) gather to 
prepare and follow up a work plan. This work plan schedules the activities to be 
accomplished to assure the harmonized and timely implementation of all the 
projects composing the corridor. As shown in Figure 1, the corridor forum is a 
meso-level body connecting the national levels with the supra-national one. 
Thanks to this body, the European Coordinator has the possibility to closely 
monitor the performance of funded projects, as well as to closely supervise 
concerned public authorities and industry over the implementation process. 
Moreover, he/she has a high degree of control over the corridor forum as he/she 
supervises the redaction and approval of the work plan, detailing the actions that 
the forum’s participants have to realize before the end of the funding schedule. 
In terms of process, we refer to the stakeholder interactions. On the one hand, we 
have explored the way these interactions have been influenced by the outer 
context. On the other, we have also considered how these interactions have 
influenced the project performance within the national contexts. We have 
therefore focused on: (1) how EU’s supra-national techniques of program 
management have affected the national implementation process; and, (2) how 
French and Italian project promoters’ managerial attitudes have influenced the 
implementation of LT.  
At the supra-national level, we see that EU’s actors use a complex system of 
performance management to steer the TEN-T program towards the fundamental 
policy objectives. By resorting to the language of performance, this system 
enables managers to govern complex multilevel and transnational processes by 
representing them in the form of performance indicators. Thanks to these 
indicators, EU-level actors have a direct vision of and control on the 
implementation of individual projects taking place within the Member States. 
‘Effective’ projects – for which the performance data suggest that they will be 
completed in compliance with the planned objectives - are allowed to run their 
normal course until completion. By contrast, projects classified as ‘ineffective’ – 
for which the examined data suggest that they will no longer meet the planned 
objectives - undergo the cancellation of funds whereas those classified as ‘under-
effective’ – for which examined data suggest that they will be completed behind 
the planned schedule - undergo the conditional extension of funds. In the case of 
LT, during the 2010 performance assessment of TEN-T-funded projects, the 
European Commission cut approximately €9.2 million to Italy and France because 
the project implementation was deemed as under-effective. 
At the national level, French and Italian promoters of the project have been 
directly confronted with the opposition of local communities, whose protests – 
especially in the Italian context – have been the major cause of LT’s under-
effective performance. In France, they have acknowledged the existence of 
opponents and accepted to live with their criticisms of the project. However, their 
attitude was to moderate them by accepting only those questioning the way of 
implementing the project but not the overall feasibility of the planned 
infrastructure. In fact, when at a later stage the criticisms intensified and asked for 
a fundamental revision of the planned project, promoters decided to avoid the 
debate with opponents and appealed to the judiciary power to weaken their 
opposition. By contrast, in Italy promoters have rather ignored opponents’ 
critiques since the initial stage of the project. This prolonged indifference vis-à-
vis local criticisms has eventually exacerbated the tensions between promoters 
and opponents by leading the former to leave the realm of justice and use the 
military power to weaken their opposition. 
When looking at the actual implementation of LT, one can notice that the above-
mentioned contextual and processual elements have been associated with poor 
performance (content), especially on the Italian side of the project. Initial plans 
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fixed the beginning of the construction of the base tunnel between 2014 and 2015. 
In 2003, both Italian and French promoters had already designed and approved 
the preliminary project of the base tunnel. However, in the mid-2000s major 
delays emerged during the design and approval of the definitive project in Italy. 
While in France the definitive version was already approved in 2007, in Italy - 
because of local oppositions in the Susa Valley – it could not be approved before 
2015. The initial objective of initiating the construction works between 2014 and 
2015 was thus postponed. Nowadays, the construction of the base tunnel is 
expected to start in 2018 and to take approximately 10 years.   
8.4 The determinants of change in the case of LT: an integrated contextualist 
model 
From a contextualist perspective change is determined by both contextual and 
processual variables. Schein (1980) suggests that although organizational change 
is often about change in structures, hierarchy, reward systems, and technology, it 
is often mediated through human change. In many cases, change efforts fail 
because implementing actors underestimate the importance of this human, 
cognitive-affective nature of organizational change. In the previous sections of 
this PhD thesis, we have adopted a multidisciplinary perspective on contextualism 
and have thus explored the contextual and processual variables by mobilizing 
three different theoretical lenses (Figure 8.2). First, with the support of neo-
institutionalism, we have studied the relationship between national institutions 
(inner context) and change. Second, with the support of Foucault’s theory of 
power, we have investigated the relationship between supra-national techniques 
of performance management (outer context) and change. Third, with the support 
of Boltanski and Thévenot’s justification theory, we have explored the 
relationship between actors’ competing logics (process) and change.  
 
            Figure 8.2 – Contextualist integrated model applied to LT case 
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VARIABLES JURISDICTIONS TIME 
1990s 2000s 2010s 
Performance 
(content) 
IT + - + - 





EU + - + + + + 
Openness to civil 
society 
stakeholder 
(inner context)  
IT - + - - 





IT - - + - - 
FR + + - 






The analysis in the previous essays suggests that the performance of LT (content) 
is variously correlated with three key variables: (1) the openness of national 
institutional systems to stakeholder participation (inner context), (2) the intensity 
of control and supervision functions at the supra-national level (outer context) and 
(3) the capacity of national project promoters to make agreements with civil 
society stakeholders (process). Table 1 summarizes how these variables have 
evolved through time across the levels and contexts involved. 
Legend 
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Broadly speaking, performance – in the sense of achieving planned objectives – in 
France is relatively better than in Italy (Table 8.1). Additionally, we see that its 
trajectory in the French context is different from the Italian one (Figure 8.3). In 
France, performance steadily goes well until the early-2010s and then it slightly 
decreases. In Italy, it decreases between the 1990s and 2000s and increases during 
the 2010s. In both contexts, delays in the realization of plans emerge as local 
opposition to the project increases.  
 
Figure 8.3 – Performance across time and national contexts (graphical display) 
In France, planned geognostic works concerning the base tunnel are accomplished 
by the late-2000s. However, in the 2010s the opposition of local stakeholders 
leads the project promoters to review the plans for the development of the 
national route giving access to the base tunnel. As of today, while the 
implementation of the base tunnel timely goes on, no plan is envisaged yet for the 
construction of the access routes. 
In Italy, planned geognostic works concerning the base tunnel stop in the mid-

















following the militarily occupation of the construction site, the geognostic works 
re-start. As of today, the geognostic works are ongoing but they are late compared 
to the initial plans. Similarly to France, no plan is envisaged yet for the 
construction of the access routes to the base tunnel. Table 1 suggests that LT 
planned objectives are differently achieved within the national contexts. In 
France, LT proponents implement LT (1) in a context of national institutions 
relatively opened to civil society stakeholders and (2) by making relatively stable 
agreements with opponents. Conversely, Italian proponents implement LT (1) in a 
context of national institutions relatively closed to civil society stakeholders and 
(2) by finding it relatively hard to make agreements with opponents. These results 
seem two suggest two polar scenarios of performance implementation as in 
France performance is achieved through relatively participative practices whereas 
in Italy it is achieved on the basis of relatively coercive practices.   
In the following paragraphs, we separately present the contextualist variables and 
then discuss their relationship with LT performance.  
8.4.1 Openness to civil society stakeholders (inner context) 
As mentioned, Italy and France have different institutional systems regulating the 
decision-making process of large infrastructure project like LT. According to our 
analysis, a key difference between the two national systems concerns their 
openness to stakeholders with divergent views of the project. The French system 
is more opened than the Italian one. By drawing on Hargrave and Van de Ven 
(2009), we have presented the French system as a moderation system whereas the 
Italian one as an either/or system.  
Hargrave and Van de Ven’s (2009) suggest that there might be three different 
typologies of institutionalized practices to deal with stakeholders espousing 
divergent views of change: “either/or”, moderation and “both/and” approach. 
While moderation and “both/and” approaches are opened to the requests of 
divergent stakeholders, the “either/or” approach is closed. Nevertheless, 
moderation and “both/and” approaches are profoundly different as the latter deals 
with stakeholders’ divergent views as they were complementary elements of a 
unity whereas the former frame them as competing and irreconcilable. 
Our analysis shows that the degree of openness of national institutions has 
differently varied over time in France and Italy (Figure 8.4).  
 
Figure 8.4 – Openness of national institutional systems to civil society 
stakeholders 
In France openness was high throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and then it slightly 
decreased in the 2010s. In the 1990s, the project promoters set up a public debate 
with the local stakeholders on the social and economic interest of LT. In the 
2000s, the ‘Enquete Publique’ procedure imposed the creation of a public enquiry 
committee in charge of consulting the local stakeholders before the project is 

























the light of new information available about LT – ask to stop the project 
implementation to do a new public debate on the social and economic interest of 
the project. Promoters refuse and prosecute their spokesperson while continuing 
the consultation with those local actors who do not oppose the implementation of 
LT.  
In Italy openness was low during the 1990s, then – after a slight increase in the 
2000s – it dramatically worsened during the 2010s. In the 1990s, local 
stakeholders have no place in the decision-making of LT. In the 2000s, Law 
443/01 intensifies the marginalization of local stakeholders who thus strengthen 
their protest campaign against LT. Vis-à-vis local stakeholders’ mass 
mobilization, the project promoters create an extra-ordinary body - so called 
‘Osservatorio Torino-Lione’ (OTL) - to have public consultations with the 
representatives of the opposition groups. Nevertheless, the consultations fail 
because of extremely divergent views between the local stakeholders and the 
project promoters. In 2010s as local protests do not stop, the national government 
approves Law 180/2011 and permanently mobilizes the army in the Susa Valley 
to discourage further protests against the implementation of LT.  
French national institutions are more opened to civil society stakeholders than 
Italian ones and, at the same time, experience a better performance in terms of 
achievement of planned objectives (Figure 8.5). 
 Figure 8.5 – Cross-country comparison of performance and openness to 
stakeholders 
In Italy, performance is low because of the strong opposition of local 
communities. These oppositions intensify in the mid-2000s and lead to stop the 
project implementation. They claim more participation in the decision-making of 
LT. As a response, proponents reform their institutional system by making it more 
opened to opposing local stakeholder. The government sets up the OTL and the 
dialogue between proponents and opponents of LT can start. Until the late-2000s, 
the OTL hosts many meetings during which the most controversial aspects of the 
project are debated. Proponents’ and opponents’ experts have diverging opinions 
on the forecasting methodology and the variables to be used in the estimation of 
the traffic flows between Italy and France. Because of existing divergent views, 
OTL’s talks take long and the accomplishment of the geognistic works for the 
base tunnel is delayed. Performance worsens and EU’s authorities in charge of 
supervising and monitoring the project at the supra-national level put pressure on 


















take up the implementation again in accordance with the planned agenda. At the 
same time, the 2010 mid-review cut 9.2€ millions to LT because, especially on 
the Italian side, performance is under-effective. As a response, in the 2010s 
proponents reform again their institutional system, but this time by making it 
more closed to opposing local stakeholders. Thanks to the approval of Law 
183/2011, the government can militarily occupy the construction site of LT and 
the geognostic works can restart. Performance finally improves but at the 
expenses of local stakeholder participation. 
In France, the project performs better than in Italy and is accompanied by a more 
open institutional system. This system is designed to allow proponents to 
integrate opponents in the decision-making of LT and adapt the project to their 
requests. Nevertheless, we notice that as soon as local requests jeopardize the 
planned implementation of the project, proponents introduce new institutionalized 
practices to reduce opponents’ margin to maneuver (e.g. prosecution of their 
spokesperson).        
8.4.2 Intensity of supervision and control functions (outer context) 
As explained, EU’s actors use a complex Performance System Management 
(PMS) to steer the TEN-T program towards planned objectives. This is done 
through indicators representing the project performance in terms of objectives 
achieved by state-level project promoters against the initial plans agreed with the 
European Commission.   
PMSs are very important instruments that allow EU managers and officials to 
evaluate the implementation of the TEN-T program, to uncover the factors that 
led to success in achieving planned objectives and to decipher the strategic errors 
that led to failure. Particularly, our findings suggest that these instruments may be 
described as ‘intellectual technologies’ (e.g. written reports, drawings, pictures, 
charts, graphs, and statistics) allowing the managerial staff to make judgements as 
to whether and why this or that project succeeded or failed, or to devise remedies 
for alleged deficiencies across all actors in the field. These technologies enable 
the managers to represent the TEN-T reality in a form amenable to managerial 
and political deliberation, argument and scheming.    
By drawing on Foucault (1980) and Berdayes (2002), our analysis shows that 
TEN-T intellectual technologies articulate on the basis of three primary principles 
of panoptical control: (1) hierarchical observation, (2) examination and (3) 
normalization. The hierarchical observation is used to place stakeholder groups 
from the Member States under the supervision of nested managerial tiers and 
establish vertical lines of command across the organizational hierarchy of TEN-T. 
Examination is used to construct charts revealing performance flaws in the TEN-
T’s organizational structure. Thanks to these charts, the EU bodies at the top of 
the hierarchy inspect and overhaul the national administrative machineries 
managing the funded projects. Examination allows measuring performance 
differences between projects and planning the re-allocation of financial resources 
from low-performing to high-performing projects. As a final step, low-performing 
projects are sanctioned and conditional measures are applied to correct 
performance. This is the final phase of normalization during which (1) departures 
from correct behavior are sanctioned, (2) and rules (e.g. the use it or lose it 
principle) are applied to homogenize behavior across the TEN-T’s structure. Our 
findings show that thanks to these three principles of panoptical control the top 
management of TEN-T maintains unity of command over the entire process of 
program implementation and assures the achievement of planned programmatic 
goals. 
Our findings clearly show that, at the supra-national level, the intensity of TEN-T 




Figure 8.6 – Intensity of supra-national functions of supervision and control 
In the 1990s, there is no system to manage the implementation of projects funded 
within the Member States. During the 2000s, the number of planned projects 
realized throughout the Member States fall behind the optimistic plans of the 
1990s. The European Coordinator and an executive agency are thus introduced to 
assure the timely completion of funded projects. In the 2010s, the plans are 
reviewed and the EU financial contribution is concentrated on the 9 core network 
corridors. Each of these corridors is placed under the governance of the so called 
the ‘corridor forum’. This is a dedicated body where all the national industries 
and public authorities concerned by the construction of a corridor collaborate to 
the timely implementation of funded projects under the supervision of the 
European Coordinator.  
EU’s supervision and control functions do not have a direct impact on 
performance – as the project is materially implemented at the national levels by 
Italian and French actors. However, our findings suggest that they may interfere 




























EU’s supervision and control intensify since the mid-2000s, when local 
oppositions at the national level (especially in Italy) delay the planned course of 
LT implementation. Vis-à-vis emerging delays, in 2010 the European 
Commission cuts 9.2€ millions and asks the national governments to (1) 
conclude, within 2010, the financial model for the implementation and operation 
of the project including the respective financial contribution; (2) approve the 
preliminary design study by the end of 2010; (3) start the geognostic works in 
Italy, at the latest, by the first quarter of 2011, (4) complete the final design 
studies of the infrastructure by the end of 2011 (see 2010 mid-term review). 
These conditions particularly burden the agenda of Italian proponents who, at that 
time, are engaged in a difficult and time-consuming effort of public consultations 
with the local stakeholders who oppose the project. However, the discussions take 
long and no common ground to restart the project implementation as required by 
EU conditions can be found. In parallel, the deadlines to apply for a new EU 
financial support are approaching. Within this context, to prevent any further 
delays, the Italian authorities in charge of the project mobilize the army to 
discourage any further opposition and, as required by the EU, attempt to restore 
the project performance. These findings suggest that the increasing intensity of 
supervision and control functions at the supra-national level may influence the 
implementation process at the national levels and – as shown in the Italian context 
- lead the project promoters to restore the planned implementation of LT at the 
expenses of  stakeholder participation. This means that the supra-national 
pressures may have unintended consequences on the national institutional systems 
which may ‘perversely’ transform to marginalize opposing stakeholders and 
better comply with planned performance standards.    
8.4.3 Capacity of making agreements (process) 
Our study suggests that LT can be also described as an organizational field where 
the competing institutional logics of contradicting groups (proponents VS 
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opponents of LT) generate controversies whose evolution variously impact on 
change. Differences in the evolution of these controversies may be explained as a 
consequence of differences in national proponents’ capacities of making 
agreements with opponents. 
By drawing on Cloutier and Langley (2013), our study has used Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s (1991) conceptual framework of ‘common worlds’ to describe the 
competing logics of LT proponents and opponents. On the one hand, the national 
governments and railways propose LT because consider it of public interest (civic 
world). From their perspective, LT is of public interest because it will (1) 
modernize the transport connections between Italy and France by making them 
more efficient (industrial world), (2) increase the competitiveness of railways vis-
à-vis other roads and airways by improve the quality of their transport services for 
both passengers and freight operators (market world), and (3) reduce CO2 
emission by shifting traffic from roads and airways to railways (green world). On 
the other hand, French and Italian local communities oppose LT because they do 
not consider it of public interest. From their perspective, the industrial, green and 
civic justifications the proponents mobilize in support of LT are erroneous. They 
thus engage in an intense work of de-institutionalization of the project by 
undermining its moral foundations. They mobilize counter-justifications by giving 
birth to state-of-worth and order-of-worth controversies. In both contexts, 
opponents challenged LT from within proponents’ industrial world (state-of-
worth controversy) by questioning the degree to which the scientific and 
empiricist principles – typical of an industrial situation – were being correctly 
applied to LT. They argued that there was no empirical or scientific evidence 
demonstrating the need for a new infrastructure because the traffic flows between 
Italy and France were declining. Additionally, based on arguments from the green 
and civic worlds, they also questioned the appropriateness of proponents’ 
industrial principles applied to the decision-making of LT (order-of-worth 
controversy). They thus called for a wider assessment of the project where, not 
only the traffic flows, but also the environmental impact of the project and the 
overall public interest were duly taken into account. 
Our study suggests that an important aspect for the successful design and 
implementation of megaprojects like LT is proponents’ ability to cope with the 
multiplicity of worlds that contradictorily co-exist in the field. Particularly, the 
analysis shows that in France – where proponents have most often worked to 
make agreements with the opponents – resistance to change is weaker than in 
Italy – where proponents have most often ignored opponents’ critiques. Making 
agreements with stakeholders outside the project team is thus a key factor for the 
smooth conduct of complex megaprojects. 
Our analysis shows that, despite different capacities of making agreements, Italian 
and French proponents’ posturing towards opponents’ requests have similarly 
evolved over time (Figure 8.7).  
In France, proponents’ capacity is relatively high throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
when opponents’ criticisms do not question the overall feasibility of the project. 
In the early-2010s, while the French Court of Audit releases a report that casts 
doubt on the economic feasibility of LT, local opposition groups appoint a new 
spokesperson, Daniel Ibanez. Under the leadership of Mr. Ibanez, the opponents 
ask to stop the implementation of LT and set up a new public debate on the social 
and economic interest of the project. Proponents refuse and file a claim for 
defamation against Mr.Ibanez. However, upon reaching the court the lawsuit is 




Figure 8.7 – Capacity of proponents to make agreements with opponents 
In Italy, proponents’ capacity is low during the 1990s, then – after a slight 
increase in the 2000s – it dramatically worsened during the 2010s. In the 1990s, 
proponents avoid local opponents’ criticisms of the project by ignoring their 
requests of taking part in the decision-making of LT. In the 2000s, after a mass 
mobilization of Susa Valley’s populations, proponents accept to establish a 
dialogue with the opponents on condition that they accept to limit the discussion 
to how implementing the project rather than whether implementing it or not. 
Opponents interpret this condition as a way of the proponents to avoid again their 
criticisms and impose de facto the planned project. As a consequence, they decide 
to stop the ongoing dialogue and occupy the construction site of the base tunnel as 
a form of protest. As a response, in the 2010s the proponents mobilize the army to 
evacuate the opponents. They thus militarily occupy the construction site and 




























Our findings show that French proponents have a better capacity of making 
agreements than Italian ones and, at the same time, experience a better 
performance in terms of achievement of planned objectives (Figure 8.8).   
Performance in Italy is lower than in France because the opposition of local 
stakeholders is much stronger. In the Italian context, throughout the 2000s and 
2010s local communities’ protests physically stop the geognostic works several 
times by producing implementation delays. Local opposition against the Italian 
proponents is stronger than French ones because the latter succeed to make 
relatively stable agreements with the opponents whereas the former tend to ignore 
them.  
 
Figure 8.8 – Cross-country comparison of performance and capacity of making 
agreements. 
A change in the posture of Italian proponents towards opponents takes place in 
the mid-2000s when the turmoil of local communities protest leads the 

















representatives of the opposition groups. As mentioned, the discussions taking 
place at the OTL between proponents and opponents take long and delay the 
accomplishment of the geognistic works for the base tunnel. Performance worsens 
and EU’s authorities in charge of supervising and monitoring the project at the 
supra-national level put pressure on the national authorities to take up the 
implementation again in accordance with the planned agenda. To comply with the 
EU requests, the Chairman of the OTL decides that it is time to stop debating 
about the different views of the project and work constructively on the 
infrastructure implementation as required by the European agenda. Therefore, he 
unilaterally adopts a document – so called “Agreement of Pracatinat” – in the 
name of all OTL participants although none among the local stakeholder had 
signed it. This document imposes OTL members to shift the focus of their 
meetings from debating the project feasibility to project implementation. As a 
response, in the early-2010s the local stakeholders quit the OTL and occupy again 
the construction site where the geognostic works are about to start. In their turn, 
the project proponents respond by occupying militarily the construction site to let 
the works start and by pressing charges against all those who publicly support LT. 
The Italian capacity of making agreements clearly runs out.  
8.4.4 Content, context and process on the move 
Our analysis suggests that, in the case of LT, variations in performance (content) 
are determined by and determine variations in (1) national institutions’ openness 
to civil society stakeholders (inner context), (2) supra-national intensity of 
supervision and control (outer context), and (3) actors’ capacity of making 
agreements (process). 
  
Figure 8.9 – Contextualist interactions through time. 
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Time is a key factor to understand the continuous interactions between the 
content, contexts and process of change. In the case of LT, we identified three 
periods (t, t+1 and t+2) through which we could observe important variations in 
the contextualist interactions (Figure 8.9).  
The analysis suggests 12 key interactions which unfold over time. 
In the early-1990, the Treaty of Maastricht introduces the TEN-T policy to 
stimulate Member States’ investments in seamless trans-European transport 
chains for passenger and freight, while keeping up with the latest technological 
trends such as high-speed railway technology in the rail sector. In Italy and 
France, this policy framework provides economic incentives that lead both 
national governments and railways to invest public funds in the construction of 
LT (interaction n°1). Within each national context, different institutional systems 
are in place to govern the project implementation. The French system is opened to 
stakeholder participation whereas the Italian one is not. These different systems 
produce two different implementation strategies. In France the project proponents 
establish a dialogue with the local communities, whereas in Italy they ignore 
them. Despite these different strategies, LT experiences a relatively positive 
performance in both contexts (interaction n°2). By the end of the 1990s, the first 
preliminary studies are accomplished and both national governments and railways 
declare their official commitment to the construction of the new infrastructure. 
However, the implementation of the project at the national levels produces 
different processes where local communities differently oppose the project 
(interaction n°3). In France – where proponents implement LT while making 
agreements with the opponents (moderation strategy) – resistance to change is 
weaker than in Italy – where proponents implement LT while ignoring opponents’ 
critiques and avoiding agreements (either/or strategy). 
In Italy, the systematic exclusion of local stakeholders from the decision-making 
process leads to popular protests and to the occupation of the base-tunnel 
construction site. The turmoil of these events – and the pressures of the public 
opinion - leads the government to reform the national institutions in charge of LT 
and make them more opened to local participation (interaction n°4). An 
extraordinary body (OTL) is thus created to integrate the local communities in the 
decision-making system and dialogue with them. Because of proponents’ and 
opponents’ divergent views, the OTL consultations take long and the 
implementation of LT is further delayed (interaction n°5). Performance worsens 
and the mid-term review of the TEN-T’s executive agency provides a negative 
assessment of LT (interaction n°6).  Alarmed by the negative assessment, the 
European Coordinator puts pressure on the national authorities to take up the 
implementation again in accordance with the planned agenda otherwise financial 
support to LT might be reduced (interaction n°7). To comply with the EU 
requests, the Chairman of the OTL – an extraordinary commissioner appointed by 
and acting on behalf of the central government - unilaterally adopts the 
“Agreement of Pracatinat”. He does it in the name of all OTL participants 
although none among the local stakeholders has signed it. This document imposes 
OTL members to shift the focus of their meetings from debating the project 
feasibility to project implementation. As a consequence, the representatives of the 
local communities quit the OTL.   
In the 2010s, local protests intensify in Italy and revitalize in France. As a 
consequence performance worsens (interaction n°8). In Italy, the local 
communities occupy the construction site and impede the start of the geognostic 
works. In France the works do not stop, but the opposition of local stakeholders 
leads the project promoters to review the plans and objectives for the 
development of the national route giving access to the base tunnel. At the supra-
national level, the poor performance of several projects funded by TEN-T leads 
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the EU to strengthen its supervision and control functions on the Member States 
(interaction n°9). The new investment guidelines introduce the corridor forum that 
imposes to all the Member States involved in TEN-T to provide a work plan of 
funded projects (interaction n°10). Moreover, any further delay at the national 
levels in the implementation of funded projects will imply new reductions of 
EU’s financial support (so called ‘use it or lose it’ principle). As a consequence, 
Italian and French proponents introduce new institutional practices (e.g. Law 
183/2011 and prosecution of opponents) which reduce the margin to maneuver of 
local opponents (interaction n°11). In both contexts, proponents overtly manifest 
their will to make agreements only with those actors who support the 
implementation of LT. In Italy, they get to the point of militarily occupying the 
construction site to discourage any further opposition and secure the timely 
implementation of planned objectives. The project performance improves but at 
the expenses of important-but-unmeasured democratic values (interaction n°12). 
8.5 The governance of TEN-T projects 
Our analysis of LT invites to reflect on the governance of trans-European 
megaprojects. 
We have analyzed the governance scheme of these projects in the complex 
settings of TEN-T, an infrastructure policy at supranational level with the overall 
aim of improving the functioning of the internal market through continuous and 
efficient transnational networks in transport flows. In 1992, the Treaty of 
Maastricht introduced this policy to stimulate Member States’ investments in 
seamless trans-European transport chains for passenger and freight, while keeping 
up with the latest technological trends such as high-speed railway technology in 
the rail sector. 
Since the 1980s, trans-European infrastructures have emerged as a priority aspect 
of EU’s transport liberalization policies enabling to solve interoperability 
problems between national infrastructure networks. Interoperability is a crucial 
issue because Europe has many national transport systems with their own 
governance structure - that have evolved each in their own way over the past 
years. Their technical standards are different, and this is clearly an obstacle to 
cross-border traffic and, therefore, to cross-border competition. For example, with 
international trains it is usually the case that the engine has to be changed at the 
frontier station. In especially difficult cases, passengers must change trains or 
goods must be reloaded. In the railway sector different gauge widths, 
electrification standards and safety and signaling systems made it more difficult 
and more costly to run a train from one country to another. In this situation, the 
European transport market was fragmented - and no liberalization initiative could 
be really effective - because each national transport network could be used only 
by those operators having a rolling stock apparatus complying with the national 
market standards. 
For all the reasons mentioned above, in 1996 the EU established the TEN-T 
program, an EU-level investment program providing financial resources and 
supra-national legal rules to realize – by 2010 - a list of priority infrastructure 
projects representing the backbone of the future trans-European transport 
network. In terms of performance, a number of major problems emerged 
throughout the mid-1990s and the completion of the originally defined TEN-T 
infrastructure network fell behind the optimistic development plans (Schade et. al. 
2013). As a consequence, in 2001 the deadline was delayed to 2020. In 2014, 
trans-European infrastructures still resembled to a patchwork rather than a 
network. Therefore, the deadline was further extended to 2030 for most strategic 
project and 2050 for the least strategic. 
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Through time, a number of organizational innovations (e.g. European 
Coordinator, executive agency and Corridor Forum) have come in succession 
through time to improve the governance of funded projects and boost 
implementation at the national levels. Nevertheless, these innovations have been 
accompanied by the increasing opposition of local stakeholders in several 
Members States: Italy and France (Lyon-Turin project), Germany (Stuttgart 
project), Spain (Basque Y project), UK (HS2 project). Recent studies on TEN-T 
(Schade et al. 2013, 2014) notice that, not only the accomplishment of planned 
objectives, but also the participation of local stakeholders to project decision-
making should be duly considered in the governance of the program.  
As we have showed, the governance of TEN-T is centered on the notion of 
performance, in the sense of achievement of planned objectives. This is done 
through indicators representing the project performance in terms of objectives 
achieved by state-level project promoters against the initial plans agreed with the 
European Commission. The rationale behind these tools lies in the NPM belief 
that the public organizations work better when they are oriented toward results, 
rather than being focused on processes. However, this research has showed that, 
when translated into practice, this belief may lead the management to strengthen 
the supervision and control of planned outputs while reducing its openness to 
stakeholders and ability to make agreements with opponents. From our 
perspective, this occurs because NPM has a rather linear conception of change. It 
sees collective decision-making as a rational choice process where all 
stakeholders share the same set of values and hold homogenous preferences. 
Nevertheless, our study suggests that this is a simplistic view of collective 
decision-making as stakeholder groups may behave on the basis of contradicting 
logics (proponents VS opponents of change) and by responding to different 
institutional pressures (French VS Italian institutions). As a consequence, change 
is rather the result of conflicting interests, politics and institutional cultures which, 
all at the same time, make management a social process, meandering and 
developing over time. 
According to our findings, performance management instruments narrow the 
focus of supra-national managerial action on the supervision and control of 
project outputs - as measured by performance numbers - but overlook the process 
unfolding over time within the national contexts involved. This narrow focus may 
have inescapably-disciplinarian effects which improve performance at the 
expenses of important-but-unmeasured democratic values. For example, when the 
local oppositions intensified in Italy throughout the 2000s and 2010s, the 
European Commission’s concerns were about the delays these oppositions 
provoked vis-à-vis the existing schedule of project implementation. It therefore 
decided to apply the use it or lose it principle to normalize the project 
implementation process to align it with TEN-T’s programmatic goals. To prevent 
further delays – and thus an additional reduction of TEN-T funds due to the 
application of the use it or lose it principle - the Italian government militarily 
occupied the construction site of the project. The aim was to discourage any 
future protest which could delay further the accomplishment of TEN-T’s planned 
objectives. 
Additionally, our study suggests that, at the state level, change in trans-European 
megaprojects is an uncertain process whose direction may vary across the national 
contexts involved. In fact, the institutional systems of the Members States may be 
characterized by different degrees of openness to stakeholders and capacity of 
making agreements, which in their turn may affect performance by producing 
resistance to change. It therefore indicates that the reality that the governance of 
trans-European projects is the national contexts and processs, and not merely the 
content, must be reinforced. As suggested by Pichault (2013), when managers’ 
over-rely on the content they tend to prioritize planning and control activities (e.g. 
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plans and programs, performance targets and evaluation). Change is thus 
understood as a linear process in which the manager has full control of over the 
decision-making process “from the problem definition stage onwards, before 
proceeding with its implementation, which is monitored using sophisticated 
evaluation tools” (Pichault 2013: 53). In the case of trans-European megaprojects, 
this linear perspective may be detrimental as EU managers and officers might be 
required to adapt their practices to the evolution of national contexts and 
processes – and not merely implement planned objectives. Most traditional 
planning and control approaches are unable to cope with the diversity of 
viewpoints that characterize the complexity of trans-European megaprojects. 
These approaches assume “that all the parties involved […] fundamentally share 
the same values and objectives. Once these objectives are incorporated into the 
plan, they are not discussed again and remain unchanged from formulation to 
implementation and control (principle of invariability of objectives). […] It is 
easy to understand that such a decision-making process can only take place in a 
relatively simple environment” (Pichault 2013: 53).  
At the supranational level, this research suggests that the planning approach 
should be softened to give more importance to the different processes and 
contexts structuring the national level. Due attention is to be paid at the complex 
interplay between supra-national and national levels as we show that supra-
national initiatives of performance management may interfere with the institutions 
and social relationships at the national levels. Particularly we have showed 
negative effects in terms of institutional openness to civil society stakeholders and 
actors’ capacity of making agreements with opposing groups in society. We 
suggest to EU actors to invest more efforts in the design of mechanisms enabling 
a better alignment between national and supra-national organizational processes. 
Time is also an important aspect as we see that viewpoints on and attitudes 
towards public initiatives may change over time as new information is disclosed.  
The findings of this study invite us to think the governance of TEN-T projects 
beyond the traditional planning logic of NPM and reflect more on alternative 
managerial paradigms. A post-NPM logic that is alleged to reconcile stakeholder 
participation and performance in public decision-making processes is the Public 
Value (PV) logic (Moore 1995, O’Flynn 2007, Stoker 2006). The PV perspective 
abandons NPM’s mono-centric and mono-rational vision all to the good of a poly-
centric and poly-rational vision where the core of public decision-making is 
stakeholder participation. PV shifts the focus of public action from results to 
citizenship, network governance and the role of public agencies in working with 
citizens to create public value, generate democratic authorization, legitimacy and 
trust. This approach considers public sector organizations as complex adaptive 
systems with characteristics which are qualitatively different from simple market 
forms, or private sector business principles.  
According to Stoker (2006), the PV paradigm promotes alternative management 
systems functioning through dialogue and exchange practices associated with 
network governance (Powell 1990) - rather than practices of top-down 
hierarchical control and disciplinarianism. He believes that it is through the 
construction, modification, and adaptability of these alternative systems that 
democracy and management can be reconciled and delivered. Bozeman (2002) 
introduces the notion of public-value failures, occurring when core public values 
are not reflected in social relations, either in the market or in public policy. From 
his perspective, “a public-failure approach changes the discussion of public policy 
by making government (and public values) something other than residual 
category or an issue of technical efficiency in pricing structures. […] The public-
failure model is not a decision-making tool (à la cost-benefit analysis), but a 
framework to promote deliberation about public value” (Bozeman 2002: 150). 
According to this perspective public value does not exist per se, but it is 
negotiated and constructed among wide-ranging stakeholders who may disagree 
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on what course of actions will produce the maximum public value (Yang & 
Holzer 2006, Sanger 2008). “Under [the public value] model, the role of 
government is not simply to regulate, distribute, or redistribute public benefits but 
to serve as a catalytic agent to invest private and nonprofit stakeholders in shared 
ownership of the public good. This can take the simple form of community 
policing programs or a much more complicated form of networked governance 
such as watershed management over a very large geographic area involving 
multiple stakeholders, jurisdictions, and structures of authority” (Bao et al. 2012: 
447). 
Following the findings of this study, a PV approach to the governance of 
megaprojects ought to be based on decision-making systems widely opened to the 
participation of all stakeholder groups, also those having a negative view of the 
initiative. Alternative systems of performance management ought to be envisaged 
to monitor the progress made over the implementation process. Our study 
suggests that the plans and objectives against which performance is assessed 
ought to be collectively debated and approved (bottom-up) rather than decided 
from the top management (top-down). Finally, mangers’ capability of dialoguing 
with opposing parties ought to be better improved. Our findings show that 
megaprojects take place in transnational multilevel pluralist environments 
characterized by competing logics carried out by extremely divergent actors (e.g. 
governments, industry, public administrations, international organizations, 
consultancies and local communities) who have to make agreements - all over the 
implementation process - to solve complex political, contractual, regulatory, 
ethical and technical issues. 
Future research directions should focus on the design of governance mechanisms 
adaptable to the PV logic. A stream of the management literature (Hazen, 1993; 
Clegg et al., 2006; Pichault, 2013) has explored a polyphonic design. Polyphony 
refers to the diverse voices of various organization members, and how these 
voices are present, disclosed and utilized in management (Hujala and Rissanen 
2012). It means that managers’ role is to guard that all voices in the everyday life 
of an organization are considered equivalent and that the struggle between 
different ideas and interpretations is considered normal. According to Pichault 
(2013), the polyphonic approach to monitoring and evaluation sharply contrast 
with the panoptical model – espoused at the EU level. The latter searches for 
control and correspondence (accomplishing objectives established in advance) 
whereas the former proposes evaluations “in several voices” where stakeholders’ 
multiple representations of and expectations on the organizational performance 
are taken into account to design indicators. The identification of stakeholder 
groups, the environments in which they interact, and the recognition of the active 
role of various stakeholders in producing these indicators are all key aspects of 
this polyphonic approach.  
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9. Synthesis: performance management, institutions and 




Through an in-depth case study of the LT project, in Part 2 of this dissertation, we 
examined the decision-making techniques and rules underneath the governance of 
TEN-T projects, as well as the conflicts with local communities that arise from 
the implementation of these projects. In line with the critical stance of this 
dissertation, we have drawn attention on performativity, that is the taken for 
grantedness of ‘performance’ (Austin 1962, Lyotard 1984, Spicer et al. 2009), 
here in the sense of effectiveness and efficiency.  
TEN-T projects are a great example of performativity. As explained in the 
introductory chapter at the beginning of Part 2, the implementation of these 
projects relies on some key NPM principles: (1) explicit standards and measures 
of performance and ‘hard look' at objectives; (2) output controls and orientation 
towards results; (3) discretionary control of organizations from professional top 
management; and, (4) stress on discipline in resource use. By analyzing the case 
of the LT project, we look at the way how these principles translate into action, 
with particular attention on the control mechanisms and conflicts resulting from 
the application of these principles. 
By mobilizing contextualism in conjunction with theoretical pluralism, we 
attempted to disentangle politics from management. In essay 4, we used 
Foucault’s theory of power to show that performance management systems are 
not neutral devices but can be used by the top-level management as intellectual 
technologies to control collective action at distance. Therefore, in this forth essay, 
we narrowed the focus on how EU-level performance management systems 
influence stakeholders interactions at the national levels, in France and Italy. In 
essay 5, we used neo-institutionalism to show that collective action is not only 
shaped by top-managerial decisions but also by the institutional pressures specific 
to the context where action takes place. Therefore, in this fifth essay, we 
narrowed the focus on how national institutions differently influence the 
implementation of LT, in the Italian and French contexts. In essay 6, we used 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification theory to show that managerial élites and 
civil society groups may have divergent interests. This divergence of interest 
makes the implementation of TEN-T projects a contradicting process, marked by 
collective controversies which unfold over time in different ways according to 
contexts that embed them. Therefore, in this sixth essay, we narrowed the focus 
on how actor groups with divergent views of LT generate conflicts over the 
implementation of LT which contribute to shape collective action at the national 
levels.  
Essays Research Questions Answers 
4 
How do supra-national 
Performance Management 
Systems influence the 
interactions between LT 
stakeholders at the national 
levels? 
Traditional performance management 
systems narrow public managerial action 
on performance targets and make it less 
responsive to stakeholders' concerns, 
with detrimental disciplinary 
consequences on stakeholders 
interactions.  
5 
How do national institutions 
influence LT 
implementation in Italy and 
France? 
National institutional frameworks are 
more or less opened to civil society 
stakeholders participation. They 
variously impact LT implementation Italy 
and France depending on their openness 
degree 
6 
How do stakeholders with 
divergent views about LT 
interact and influence LT 
implementation at the 
national levels? 
Stakeholders competing views generate 
controversies which have detrimental 
effects on LT implementation 
Table 9.1 – Part 2 - Findings summary and recommendations 
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Table 1 summarizes the research questions at the basis of these three essays, our 
answers to them and the recommendations we provide on the basis of our findings 
to improve the governance of TEN-T projects.       
9.1 Controlling performance across the Member States from the top of the 
EU  
9.1.1 Performance management at the supra-national level and stakeholders 
interactions at the national levels 
The functioning of the TEN-T program is regulated by the so called ‘investment 
guidelines’, providing (1) the geographical and technical characteristics of the 
trans-European network, (2) the list of infrastructure projects to be funded by the 
TEN-T budget and (3) the minimum governance scheme of funded projects. 
These guidelines take the form of a regulation (a legal text approved at the EU 
level through the ordinary legislative procedure) undergoing major amendments 
at the end of every budget period, that usually lasts five years. By learning from 
past errors, these amendments aim to improve continuously the program 
performance by updating (1) the characteristics of the network, (2) the project list 
to be funded; and, (3) the governance scheme.   
Based on the content of these guidelines, the European Commission adopts a 
work program. This program details the activities which are funded for each 
project in the guidelines list, as well as the budget made available for these 
activities. During the financial cycle, the budget is periodically allocated through 
several calls for proposal, which the European Commission manages with the 
support of an executive agency called INEA. Through these calls, the 
governments of the Member States - together with the enterprises that will realize 
the funded activities - are invited to send proposals which address the 
infrastructure priorities outlined in the work program. 
The opening of the calls activates a competitive selection process during which 
the European Commission and the INEA evaluate and select the proposals that 
best comply with the specifications of the call. The promoters (representatives of 
national governments and enterprises) of successful proposals are invited by the 
INEA to sign a grant agreement, detailing the conditions under which funds will 
be allocated to them, including the milestones, objectives and deadlines to be 
reached during the implementation of proposed activities.  
During the implementation of proposed activities, the promoters are supervised by 
a European Coordinator. This is an EU-level manager, appointed by the European 
Commission because of its professional expertise. His/her role is to support 
national promoters in the timely achievement of the milestones and objectives 
identified by the funding agreement. He/she is entitled by the guidelines to take 
any implementing decision that can help national promoters to remove the 
obstacles which hamper at the national levels the timely achievement of 
objectives and milestones planned in the funding agreement.   
The implementation by national promoters of funded activities is closely 
monitored by the European Commission and INEA through two documents: the 
Strategic Action Plan (SAP) and the Annual Status Report (ASR). The SAP is a 
project management document. It is based on the content of the funding 
agreement and identifies the activities to be carried out by the national promoters, 
as well as the associated resources and timeline. On the other hand, the ASR is an 
annual report submitted by the promoters to INEA. Based on the content of SAP, 
it provides information on the technical progress of funded activities and the 
associated budget consumption. With the support of external experts, INEA 
officers periodically aggregate and analyze individual SAP and ASR data to 
assess the overall performance of TEN-T-funded projects. This exercise is called 
‘Mid-Term Review’ and is done halfway in each TEN-T budget period. It aims to 
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evaluate to which extent the overall implementation of the TEN-T program is in 
line with the objectives planned for the ongoing budget period.       
SAPs, ASRs and Mid-term Reviews are key tools of organizational rationalization 
that open the entire space of the TEN-T program, no matter how vast from a 
geographical point of view, to managerial observation and control. They thus 
allow the EU-level bodies to inspect and overhaul the program administrative 
machinery and maintain unity of command over the implementation process of 
individual projects. With the support of the INEA, the European Commission uses 
these tools to classify individual projects and, if needed be, to reorganize their 
implementation plan. The concept of effectiveness plays a crucial role in this 
classification exercise.  
Effective projects – for which the examined data suggest that they will be 
completed in compliance with the planned objectives - are allowed to run their 
normal course until completion. By contrast, ineffective and under-effective 
projects undergo corrective measures. Projects classified as ineffective – for 
which the examined data suggest that they will no longer meet the planned 
objectives - undergo the cancellation of funds whereas those classified as under-
effective – for which examined data suggest that they will be completed behind 
the planned schedule - undergo the conditional extension of funds. Extension is 
usually accompanied by detailed implementing conditions - which can be of 
administrative, technical, financial or political nature depending on the specific 
issues to be addressed within each individual project - that will be closely 
observed by the Commission in order to ensure better use of resources while 
fulfilling the objectives of the program. 
Efficiency is another key concept of the performance management system 
underneath TEN-T. Following the classification outputs of the Mid-term Review, 
the funds of projects that are no longer meeting the planned objectives 
(ineffective and under-effective projects) are cut and reallocated to most 
performing projects (effective projects), so that an efficient use of the financial 
resources made available by the TEN-T is assured through the entire budget 
period. This is done on the basis of the so called ‘use it or lose it principle’, a 
managerial rule allowing TEN-T officers to reallocate resources from ineffective 
and under-effective projects to effective ones. Such reallocation of funds is not 
presented as a political choice but rather as a managerial consequence of the 
rational economic assessment of project performance.  
While monitoring tools (SAP, ASR and Mid-term Review) provide the basis to 
classify projects, the use-it-or-lose-it managerial rule is applied to compel 
‘ineffective’ and ‘under-effective’ project promoters to comply with the delays 
and conditions of the TEN-T guidelines. Indeed, if compliance with initial TEN-T 
plans is not assured, the European Commission has the right to impose corrective 
measures – such as cancellation or conditional extension of funds. Figure 9.1 
graphically summarizes this process.  
As showed in essay 4, during the 2010 Mid-term Review, the European 
Commission considered about 36% of the evaluated projects as ineffective or 
under-effective, and imposed corrective measures to the concerned national 
promoters in the form of total or partial cancellation of funds.  
In the case of the LT project, the TEN-T financial contribution was cut 
approximately by €9.2 million because the project management indicators 
registered an under-effective performance on the Italian side of the project. The 
remaining part of TEN-T financial contribution (approximately €662.6 millions) 
was extended but under specific conditions
37
. As we explain here below, the 
                                               
37 Four conditions were identified by the European Commission. These are that : (1) the 
Italian and French governments revise the Treaty at the base of LT, within 2010, by 
establishing the new public promoter, and the financial model for the implementation and 
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imposition of these corrective measures at the supra-national level had 
disciplinary consequences on the relationship between the national promoters – 
the governments and enterprises managing LT-related funds - and the civil society 
stakeholders concerned by the project – the Italian and French local communities.  
Throughout the 2000s, the Italian process of project implementation had in fact 
experienced major delays due to the increasing opposition of local communities 
from the Susa Valley. The 2010 mid-term review made emerge these delays by 
representing LT as under-effective. As a consequence, the European Commission 
decided to apply the above-mentioned corrective measures and, among others, 
required the Italian government to start the excavation of the geognostic gallery in 
Maddalena, at the latest, by the first quarter of 2011. Nevertheless, in the early-
2010s, these oppositions had not stopped yet. To prevent further delays, the 
Italian government approved Law 183/2011, which declared LT a project of 
strategic priority to be realized in the name of national interest. Therefore, this 
law provided the government with a legal basis to militarily occupy the 
construction site of the geognostic gallery and prevent any future protest which 
could delay further the accomplishment of the project.   
At the same time, as protests were emerging also in the French areas concerned 
by the project, LTF – the constructor company in charge of the geognostic works 
in both countries - pressed charges against local activists in both countries to 
discourage any future opposition to funded activities. 
                                                                                                                      
operation of the project, including the respective financial contribution; (2) the 
preliminary design study is approved by both governments by the end of 2010; (3) 
excavation of the new geognostic gallery in Maddalena starts, at the latest, by the first 
quarter of 2011, (4) the final design studies are completed by the end of 2011. 
Figure 9.1 – TEN-T performance management process38
                                               
38 Figure 9.1 was realized with the support of Adriano Frantantonio, business architect at Bizliner (Belgium). 
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Our findings in essay 4 indicate that the TEN-T system of performance 
management used at the supra-national level by the European Commission may 
entail disciplinary effects on state-level stakeholder interactions which vary 
accordingly to the national contexts. In Italy, these effects take the form of 
military and judiciary initiatives that both the government and the constructor 
company use to weaken local oppositions and secure the implementation of 
planned objectives. In France, these only take the form of judiciary initiatives of 
the constructor company against local activists. As we explain further, these 
cross-country differences may be better understood if we narrow the focus of 
analysis on the different country-specific institutional frameworks that structure 
the decision-making of LT at the national levels. 
9.1.2 Steering performance through intellectual technologies: insights from 
Foucault’s theory of Panopticon 
Drawing on Foucault (1980), essay 4 suggests that the TEN-T performance 
management system acts as an ‘intellectual technology’ that allows EU-level 
officers to influence stakeholders interactions at the national levels in a way 
which is consistent with the achievement of TEN-T-planned objectives.  
Intellectual technologies refer to “techniques of notation, computation and 
calculation; procedures of examination and assessment” (Miller and Rose 1990: 
8). These are often inscribed within the logic of means-ends calculation and have 
thus a strong performative potential. As explained by Edenius and Hasselbladh 
(2002), artifacts such as written reports, pictures, numbers, charts and statistics 
are performative and important instances of organizing, as they create new 
domains of power/knowledge at the same time as they provide the means for 
acting upon what is constructed. 
Miller and Rose (1990) consider that the language itself is a ‘intellectual 
technology’ that provides a mechanism for rendering reality amenable to certain 
kind of actions. Specifically, it allows governors (e.g. politicians, public officers 
and top-managers) to translate events and phenomena to which government is to 
be applied into information such as written reports, drawings, pictures, charts, 
graphs, and statistics. Plans and programs of government also depend on these 
devices used for the inscription of reality in a form that governors can debate and 
diagnose. 
Our analysis in essay 4 indicates that TEN-T performance-based techniques of 
governance are a great example of intellectual technology. These resort to the 
language of performance (e.g. ‘effective/ineffective project’, ‘efficient use of 
resources’, ‘mid-term reviews’) to shape the collective behavior of project 
promoters within the Member States. Particularly, these techniques allow TEN-T 
program officers to make judgements as to whether and why this or that funded 
project succeeded or failed, or to devise remedies for alleged deficiencies across 
all the Member States making use of TEN-T funds. 
Our study on LT suggests that TEN-T performance-based techniques may 
articulate on the basis of three primary principles of panoptical control: (1) 
hierarchical observation, (2) examination and (3) normalization. The hierarchical 
observation is used to place stakeholder groups under the supervision of nested 
managerial tiers and establish vertical lines of command across the organizational 
hierarchy of TEN-T. Examination is used to construct charts revealing 
performance flaws in the TEN-T’s organizational hierarchy. These charts allow 
TEN-T officers to measure performance differences between projects and plan the 
re-allocation of financial resources from low-performing to high-performing 
projects. As a final step, TEN-T officers normalize low-performing projects by 
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applying sanctions and conditional measures having the objective to correct 
performance.  
Nevertheless, our findings point out the unintended consequences that these 
supra-national performance-based, panoptical techniques of program management 
produce at the national levels. As we show, these consequences are due to the fact 
that EU-level officers running the TEN-T program narrow the focus of their 
managerial action on the achievement of predetermined ends - as measured by 
performance numbers - and overlook the behavior of people at the lowest levels 
of the governance scheme (stakeholders interactions at the national levels). This 
narrow focus may divert program officers’ attention from important-but-
unmeasured values and have disciplinary effects on the process of project 
implementation. 
Drawing on existing literature (Radin 2006), we explained these disciplinary 
consequences by the fact that TEN-T-style performance-based systems of 
governance are herald of performative values which overlook the traditional 
democratic values of national institutions. This occurs because their evaluation 
criteria rely on one-size-fits-all solutions that do not correspond to the dynamic 
reality of funded projects within the national contexts of the Member States. Such 
simplistic criteria may lead EU-level officers to behaviors described as tunnel 
vision - undue focus on performance measures to the detriment of other areas - 
and myopia - short-sightedness leading to the neglect of longer-term objectives - 
(Mannion and Braithwaite 2012; Smith 1995).  
9.2 The implementation of LT within the national contexts 
9.2.1 Cross-country regulatory differences and openness of national decision-
making systems to stakeholders participation 
We show in essay 5 that, at the national levels, LT implementation takes place 
within two different countries with two different regulatory frameworks for the 
decision-making of large infrastructure projects. In France, decision-making of is 
regulated by a set of administrative rules – ‘Enquête Publique’ procedure – 
leading the railways, the central government and the local authorities to set up - 
with the support of various administrative bodies (e.g. ‘Tribunal administratif’, 
‘Commissaire enquêteur’) - public consultations with the local communities 
affected by the project. In Italy, it is regulated by a 2001 ad-hoc law of the 
Parliament - Law 443/01, so called ‘Legge Obiettivo’ (LO). This law introduced a 
fast-lane procedure allowing the railways and the central government to bypass 
the local communities and authorities in the decision-making of LT and have 
preferential access to financial resources. Therefore, in Italy decision-making is 
mainly concentrated in the political apex of the state machinery, whereas in 
France it is more shared with the administrative authorities and the civil society.    
According to our analysis, a key difference between the two national systems is 
their openness to stakeholders participation. The French system is more opened 
than the Italian one. Nevertheless, through time, both systems manifest a tendency 
towards closure. In France, decision-making was opened to local stakeholders 
participation throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and then it increasingly closed 
throughout the 2010s due to emerging local oppositions. In Italy, decision-making 
was closed to local stakeholders participation during the 1990s, then – after a 
slight opening in the 2000s – it dramatically closed during the 2010s due to the 
strengthening of local oppositions.  
 443 
 
In France, throughout the 1990s, regional and local authorities promoted studies 
and public meetings on the economic interest of LT with the civil society 
concerned by the project. Throughout the 2000s, the ‘Enquete Publique’ 
procedure imposed the creation of a public enquiry committee in charge of 
consulting concerned local communities before the governments officially 
declares LT of public interest. Additionally, in 2003 the project promoters 
introduced an exceptional administrative procedure – so called ‘Démarhe Grands 
Chantiers’ – to involve local socio-economic stakeholders in the implementation 
of planned activities. Nevertheless, in parallel to this process, two independent 
administrative authorities (‘Conseil général des Ponts et Chaussées’ and ‘Cour 
des Comptes’) released two reports casting doubt on the socio-economic interest 
of LT. Based on these reports, in 2010s, during the ongoing public consultation of 
the ‘Enquete Publique’ procedure, a group of local citizens asked to stop the 
project implementation and to launch a new public debate on the socio-economic 
interest of the project. The government and the railways ignored these requests 
and prosecuted their spokesperson while continuing the consultation with those 
local stakeholders more in line with the implementation of LT (e.g. ‘Démarche 
Grand Chantiers’ procedure).  
In Italy, throughout the 1990s, concerned local communities had no formal right 
to participate in the decision-making of LT. In the 2000s, their exclusion from 
decision-making worsened with the approval of Law 443/01. They thus mounted 
a strong protest campaign against LT (so called NOTAV: ‘NO Treno ad Alta 
Velocità’, tr. No High-Speed Train) which led them to occupy the construction 
site of a geognostic tunnel funded by the EU. Vis-à-vis such strong local 
mobilization against LT, the government created a new extra-ordinary body - so 
called ‘Osservatorio Torino-Lione’ (OTL) - to conduct public consultations with 
the representatives of NOTAV opposition groups. Until the late-2000s, the OTL 
hosted many meetings during which the most controversial aspects of the project 
were debated. NOTAV representatives and LT promoters had diverging opinions 
on the forecasting methodology and the variables to be used in the estimation of 
the traffic flows between Italy and France. Because of these diverging views, 
OTL talks took long and the accomplishment of the geognistic works was 
delayed. In the meantime, at the supra-national level, TEN-T authorities in charge 
of supervising and monitoring the project implementation put pressure on the 
national authorities to solve the problems with the local communities and to take 
up the implementation again in accordance with the planned agenda. In parallel, 
the 2010 mid-review came to an end and the European Commission cut 9.2€ 
millions to LT because, especially on the Italian side, the project performance was 
under-effective. As a response, throughout, the 2010s the Italian government 
modified again the regulatory framework for decision-making. This time by 
making it more closed to opposing local stakeholders. This was done through the 
approval of Law 183/2011, which allowed the government to militarily occupy 
the construction site of LT and discourage further protest against the project. The 
geognostic works could thus restart. 
9.2.2 Adapting national institutions to supra-national performance targets 
and local stakeholders opposition: insights from neo-institutionalist theory 
Levitt and Scott (2016) suggest looking at megaprojects as complex institutional 
fields characterized by the interactions among an extraordinarily diverse and 
shifting set of stakeholders. These stakeholders may carry different institutional 
logics which create tensions in the field (Scott et al. 2000) between the project 
team and stakeholders outside the team (Awakul and Ogunlana 2002). In such 
contested situations the team promoting the project might be required to 
manipulate the institutional framework and integrate the external stakeholders 
into the project decision-making so that they can resolve their differences and 
work effectively together to implement the project.  
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Drawing on this neo-institutionalist perspective, essay 5 examined the different 
regulatory frameworks that, in Italy and France, shape the LT trans-national field. 
It suggests that national regulatory frameworks for the decision-making of large 
infrastructure projects may be more or less opened to civil society stakeholders 
participation and may variously influence the implementation process of these 
projects within the national contexts. Particularly, our findings on the LT case 
indicate that frameworks more opened to participation (France) have a more 
positive influence than the closed ones (Italy).  
From a more longitudinal perspective, our study points out that these national 
frameworks are not static. These rather evolve and adapt to unfolding problems in 
order to (1) cope with the increasing opposition of civil society stakeholders at the 
local levels and (2) ensure that the project implementation at the national levels is 
consistent with the performance targets of the supra-national level.  
Our study shows that, despite different initial degrees of openness to civil society 
stakeholders participation, local-level oppositions to LT develop in both 
institutional systems. As a response, in both systems national promoters make use 
of extra-ordinary procedures to open further the project decision-making to local 
stakeholders participation. In so doing, they reform LT-related regulatory 
frameworks and make them more inclusive of local stakeholders. Nevertheless, 
their participation to decision-making is limited to the project implementation 
process as planned in the supra-national agenda.  
Our findings also indicate that any local initiative by civil society stakeholders 
that alters the execution of the supra-national agenda is sanctioned by the national 
promoters. This is particularly clear in the Italian context, where local oppositions 
are stronger and their resistance to the project implementation cause delays in the 
execution of the EU-level agenda. To eradicate these oppositions, Italian 
promoters reform again their institutional environment by introducing new extra-
ordinary procedures. Particularly, the incumbent government, with the support of 
the Parliament, approves a legislative act that officially declares LT a national 
priority. Within this reformed institutional framework, any attempt to oppose LT 
is considered a threat to the national interest and, thus, legitimates the national 
government to use the army to stop it.   
Following Hargrave and Van De Ven (2009), our study indicates that LT 
implementation can be described as a dialectical process where change emerges 
from the continuous interactions between proponents of institutional 
arrangements and parties espousing contradictory arrangements. The new 
arrangements that emerge can be challenged again by proponents through 
counter-alternative arrangements that recycle the dialectical process.  
Consistently with the literature on the dialectical change of institutional fields 
(Seo and Creed 2002, Poole and Van de Ven 2004, Hargrave and Van de Ven 
2009), our study suggests that institutional change can be described as an 
uncertain process whose direction depends on the interaction between proponents 
of current institutional arrangements and opponents espousing contradictory 
arrangements. The institutional order is thus a temporary truce reflecting the 
power relations of opposing parties.   
9.3 The effects of stakeholders competing views on LT implementation 
9.3.1 Competing views of LT and proponents attitudes towards opponents 
In essay 6 we used Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1991) conceptual framework of 
‘common worlds’ to describe the competing views of the proponents and the 
opponents LT.  
On the one hand, the national governments and railways propose LT for TEN-T 
funding at the supra-national level because consider it of public interest (civic 
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world). From their perspective, LT is of public interest because it will (1) 
modernize the transport connections between Italy and France by making them 
more efficient (industrial world), (2) increase the competitiveness of railways vis-
à-vis other roads and airways by improving the quality of transport services for 
both passengers and freight operators (market world), and (3) reduce CO2 
emission by shifting traffic from roads and airways to railways (green world).  
On the other hand, French and Italian local communities oppose LT because they 
do not consider it of public interest. From their perspective, the industrial, green 
and civic justifications the proponents mobilize in support of LT are erroneous. 
They thus engage in an intense work of de-institutionalization aimed at showing 
that LT is not a good project because the theoretical arguments developed by the 
proponents are not true. At a later stage, they also criticize the decision-making 
rules which, especially in the Italian context, are seen as highly undemocratic. To 
this end, they mobilize counter-justifications by giving birth to state-of-worth and 
order-of-worth controversies.  
In both national contexts, opponents challenged LT from within proponents’ 
industrial and green worlds (state-of-worth controversy). Concerning the 
industrial world, they questioned the degree to which the scientific and empiricist 
principles – typical of an industrial situation – were being correctly applied to LT. 
They argued that there was no empirical or scientific evidence demonstrating the 
need for a new infrastructure because the traffic flows between Italy and France 
were declining. Concerning the green world, they did not deny the importance of 
the modal shift to decrease CO2 emissions. However, they argued that the narrow 
focus on CO2 emissions as a unique impact category of the environmental effects 
of LT was misleading. They claimed that the environmental impact assessment 
should consider not only the emissions related to the operational phase of the 
infrastructure (i.e. a comparison between saved emissions from less car traffic and 
released emissions from train transport), but also the global environmental impact 
of its entire life-time including both construction and maintenance phases. 
Therefore, they argued that the assessment should have accounted not only for 
direct but also indirect costs such as, for example, those related to the storage of 
the excavation materials. 
Based on arguments from the civic and green worlds, opponents also questioned 
the appropriateness of proponents’ industrial and market principles applied to 
projects like LT, having a wide impact on society, environment and economy 
(order-of-worth controversy). From their viewpoint, opponents consider LT as an 
unnecessary and imposed megaproject: (1) unnecessary, because it does not 
respond to the real needs of populations but divert public money to investment 
initiatives that mainly benefits market and corporate interests while destabilizing 
national welfare systems and harming the environment and society; and, (2) 
imposed, because populations are excluded from the decision making process 
with governments, industry and public administrations operating in obscurity and 
treating proposals by citizens with contempt. Based on these arguments, 
opponents in both national contexts, called for a truly-transparent public debate 
on LT where, not only the traffic flows, but also the wider environmental impact 
and the overall public interest of the project could be duly considered prior to any 
implementing decision of the infrastructure. 
According to our analysis, a key difference between Italian and French 
proponents is their attitude towards opponents. In France proponents have been 
more available to dialogue with opponents than in Italy. This can be partially 
connected with the configuration of the national regulatory frameworks of 
decision-making. In France, the regulatory framework opened to stakeholder 
participation, created various opportunities of dialogue between proponents and 
opponents. Conversely, in Italy the regulatory framework closed to stakeholder 
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participation provided little opportunity for dialogue. Our findings suggest that, 
despite different attitudes towards dialogue, Italian and French proponents 
posturing towards opponents’ critiques have similarly evolved over time. In 
France, proponents’ availability to dialogue with opponents is relatively high 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s when opponents’ criticisms do not question the 
overall feasibility of the project but only minor aspects. It eventually worsens in 
the 2010s when criticisms cast doubt on the socio-economic interest of the entire 
project. In Italy, proponents’ availability to dialogue is low during the 1990s, then 
– after a slight improvement in the 2000s – it dramatically worsens during the 
2010s with the military occupation of LT construction site. 
In France, throughout the 1990s and 2000s opponents did not criticize the 
technical and economic foundations of the project but expressed concerns about 
the economic impact of the project on the landed properties affected by the future 
line, the noise pollution of TGV trains and the storage of excavation materials. 
Proponents did not ignore them. They informed them – e.g. by sending them 
informative brochures with technical details about LT – and involved them 
through public consultations since the early stages of the project implementation. 
Throughout the 2010s, proponents’ availability to dialogue with opponents 
worsened. In 2012 the French Court of Audit released a report that questioned the 
realism of the costs estimates and traffic forecasts of the proponents. This 
document came out ten years after a 2003 report of the ‘Conseil général des Ponts 
et Chaussées’, which casted doubts on the socio-economic interest of LT. 
Intrigued by the content of these reports, Daniel Ibanez – an experienced business 
consultant from a town concerned by the project – decided to re-examine the 
documents the proponents presented to the opponents during the public 
consultations. He found some irregularities in the traffic data and came to the 
conclusion that these were deliberately presented in a misleading way. His review 
of the project found other major irregularities in the LT dossier. Firstly, he found 
procedural errors concerning the application of the environmental impact 
assessment procedure. Secondly, he found that the some members of the inquiring 
committee running the public consultations with the opponents were in a position 
of conflict of interest. Under the leadership of Daniel Ibanez – who in the 
meantime had developed ties with the Italian NOTAV movement -, the opponents 
called for a new public debate on the public interest of the project where public 
consultations procedures would be applied in a truly transparent way. Proponents 
considered these requests incompatible with the implementation status of the 
project which had already been gone through many EU decisions and 
international agreements, duly ratified by the French Parliament. Therefore, in 
2013 the concerned ministry declared LT of public utility. At the same time, LTF 
filed a claim for defamation against Daniel Ibanez. Upon reaching the court the 
lawsuit was dismissed on insufficient legal ground.  
In Italy, since the early stages of the project implementation opponents criticized 
the technical, environmental and economic feasibility of LT. Proponents ignored 
these criticisms as no legal obligation imposed them to involve opponents in the 
decision-making. They changed their attitude in the mid-2000s when the turmoil 
of opponents’ protests led the government to set up the OTL and establish a 
dialogue with them. As the OTL discussions between proponents and opponents 
were taking long, TEN-T authorities put pressure on the proponents to solve their 
divergences with opponents and take up the project implementation again in 
accordance with the planned agenda. To comply with the EU requests, the 
Chairman of the OTL decided that it was time to stop debating about the 
feasibility of the project and work constructively on its implementation as 
required by the European agenda. Therefore, he unilaterally adopted a document – 
so called “Agreement of Pracatinat” – in the name of all OTL participants 
although none among the opponents had signed it. This document imposed OTL 
members to shift the focus of their meetings from debating the project feasibility 
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to focus on project implementation. As a response, in the early-2010s opponents 
quitted the OTL and occupied the construction site where the geognostic works 
were about to start. In their turn, proponents responded by occupying militarily 
the construction site to let the works start and discourage any further opposition to 
LT. Additionally, LTF pressed charges against opponents who publicly 
demonstrated their dissidence against LT.  
9.3.2 Managing controversies and promoting agreements: insights from 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s justification theory  
Using Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1991) justification theory, essay 6 describes 
proponents’ and opponents’ contradicting views of LT. It brings the focus on the 
controversies which oppose these parties as well as on the different approaches 
that these parties used to resolve their contradictions. 
Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) suggest that competing actors may resolve a 
controversy either by making agreements or without making agreements. In 
agreements, the contradicting parties reach a common understanding of the 
situation they are involved and manifest their assent about the course of action 
they will follow. As explained by the authors, agreements may either take the 
form of tests or the form of compromises. During a test people might not change 
their opinion and want to find an agreement through argument and reasoning. 
Usually, at the end of a test a party is deemed good and the other party is deemed 
wrong. On the other hand, competing parties using a compromise to solve a 
dispute more likely accept to reduce their demands or change their opinion in 
order to reach an agreement. Agreements are very important to solve 
controversies. Nevertheless, often people drop a dispute without making 
agreements and by applying different logics such as forgetting and forgiveness, or 
alienation and domination. 
Our findings in essay 6 suggest that proponents’ and opponents’ competing views 
of LT generate controversies which have detrimental effects on the project 
implementation. These effects are less detrimental where proponents work to 
promote agreements with the opponents.    
Our analysis indicates that a key difference between Italian and French 
proponents is their attitude towards opponents. In Italy, these were less available 
to dialogue and make agreements with opponents than in France. This can be 
certainly connected with the different configuration of the national regulatory 
frameworks of decision-making, less opened in Italy to civil society participation 
than in France. These different institutional configurations of the national contexts 
create different opportunities of dialogue between the contradicting parties.  
By drawing on Hargrave and Van de Ven’s (2009) typologies of contradiction 
management, we identified three different approaches to manage the interactions 
between contradicting parties in a field: “either/or” approach, moderation and 
“both/and” approach. Moderation and “both/and” approaches address both poles 
of a contradiction, whereas “either/or” approach focuses on only one pole. 
Nevertheless, moderation and “both/and” approaches are profoundly different as 
the latter deals with contradictory poles as they were complementary elements of 
a unity whereas the former frame them as competing and irreconcilable. 
Our findings suggest that Italian proponents mainly followed an ‘either/or 
approach’ to opponents and marginalized them since the early-stage of the project 
implementation. As explained by Hargrave and Van de Ven (2009: 125), 
“either/both approaches separate different poles of contradiction, and tend to deny 
one pole by proceeding as if that pole does not exist, or seek to satisfy one pole 
while ignoring, or at the expenses of the other”. Conversely, French proponents 
involved opponents in formal rituals of public consultations since the early-stage 
of the project implementation. However, as the disruptive potential of opponents’ 
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participation increased over time, participatory practices of proponents weakened. 
These elements suggest that in the French context proponents mainly followed a 
moderation approach (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2009) enabling them to live with 
– but not embrace or resolve – the contradiction between the competing poles.  
Our analysis suggests that in the either/or approach to contradiction proponents 
are reluctant to make agreements with opponents, whereas in the moderation 
approach these are opened to agreements as long as opponents’ requests comply 
with the planned agenda of proponents. In both cases we see that proponents 
prefer to use tests rather than compromises. One explanation is that at the end of a 
test a party is deemed good and the other party is deemed wrong. Therefore tests 
can be used by proponents to affirm the righteousness of their proposals against 
the fallacy of opponents’ requests. In so doing, tests can be better used by 
proponents to confirm their agenda and, further, marginalize opponents. 
Conversely, the achievement of compromises may require proponents to make 
concessions to opponents and, eventually, review their initial agenda. This 
indicates that compromises can suit better both/and approaches to contradictions 
than either/or and moderation approaches.   
Our case shows that tests failed in both countries, by leading proponents to use 
judiciary deterrence (e.g. lawsuit against opponents) to discourage further 
oppositions to LT and, in so doing, put an end to the controversy. In Italy, where 
local oppositions to the project were particularly intense, deterrence was also 
based on military deployment. As explained by Boltanski and Thévenot (1999: 
375), “[i]f we want to understand these puzzling endings we probably must leave 
the realm of justice, which depends on a principle of equivalence, in order to shift 
towards other logics of action which […] put aside the reference to equivalence”. 
Deterrence can be considered a form of domination logic allowing proponents to 
prevent or control opponents’ behavior through fear of punishment. According to 
our analysis this fear can be created by using judiciary and, if needed be, military 
threats.   
9.4 Governing change in the complex organizational settings of TEN-T 
Governing change in projects funded under the TEN-T program is highly 
complex as these take place in multilevel, transnational and pluralist settings. 
Based on a NPM philosophy, the governance of these projects follows a 
performative design and takes on effectiveness and efficiency as key organizing 
principles. It is thus based on a top-down performance management system used 
by supra-national institutions (European Commission and INEA) to monitor and 
steer the effective and efficient implementation of projects funded across several 
Member States. Drawing on Foucault’s notion of governmentality, we described 
this system as a sophisticated assemblage of intellectual technologies (e.g. 
indicators, reporting systems, assessment techniques, etc.) which ensure that EU-
level planned objectives are timely met across all the levels of government 
concerned by the implementation of projects. The rationale behind this system 
lies in the NPM belief that public organizations work better when they are 
oriented toward outputs, rather than being focused on processes. It assumes that 
all the stakeholders of a project share the same values and objectives. These 
objectives are known by the management team of a project (officers from 
concerned departments of the European Commission and national governments, 
as well as mangers from concerned railway enterprises) and can be first 
formulated and incorporated in a plan and, then, implemented and monitored. 
Change is thus understood as a linear process in which the project team has full 
control of over the decision-making - “from the problem definition stage onwards, 
before proceeding with its implementation, which is monitored using 
sophisticated evaluation tools” (Pichault 2013: 53) -, and there is no constrain 
from the organizational environment (e.g. culture, rules, social norms) on the 
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decision outcome. Our analysis of LT showed that this conception of change is 
unrealistic.  
Drawing on neo-institutionalism, we showed that national institutional 
arrangements differently influence decision-making at the national levels. This 
indicates that change, in the transnational settings of TEN-T, is a social process 
embedded in specific national institutions providing rules for decision-making 
which interact with the performative decisions taken at the supra-national level. 
These interactions may have different influences on the governance of funded 
projects depending on the openness of national regulatory frameworks to the 
participation of civil society stakeholders in decision-making. According to our 
findings, national regulatory frameworks opened to stakeholder participation have 
a positive effect on TEN-T project implementation and this is why we 
recommend that these types of frameworks ought to be generalized across the 
Member States. Nevertheless, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition as 
our analysis indicates that another key aspect of successful implementation for 
TEN-T protects is the ability of project promoters to establish dialogue and 
cooperation with civil society stakeholders who oppose the project at the local 
levels of the Member States.   
In the context of TEN-T, civil society opposition to funded projects is not rare. 
According to our analysis, this is because supra-national and national managerial 
élites and citizens from the local communities do not share the same interests in 
society and have diverging views of funded projects. Drawing on Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s Justification Theory, we have showed that a trans-European 
infrastructure project might be construed differently by managerial élites at the 
national and supra-national levels and the civil society groups at the local levels.  
On the one hand, the European Commission, national governments and rail 
industries construe these projects as: (1) a step forward towards the creation of 
one single European rail market, (2) a great opportunity to provide the rail sector 
with new infrastructures which will make the railways more competitive than 
airways and roadways; and (3) a transport mode greener than cars and planes in 
terms CO2 emissions. 
On the other, the civil societies at the local levels of the Member States construe 
these projects as: (1) unnecessary, because they do not respond to the real needs 
of citizens (e.g. increasing traffic) but divert public money to investment 
initiatives that mainly benefits market and corporate interests while destabilizing 
national welfare systems; (2) harmful for the environment because their 
environmental impact is often estimated by omitting important variables from the 
calculations; and (3) imposed, because citizens are often excluded from the 
decision making process with governments and public administrations operating 
in obscurity and treating proposals by citizens with contempt. 
These competing views between actors make the governance of TEN-T projects a 
contradicting process marked by politics and conflicts. Our findings suggest that 
in such contradictory settings, the most traditional NPM linear conception of 
change – prioritizing governance by plans, and ‘hard look on objectives’ and 
performance indicators - underneath the current performative design of TEN-T 
may prove to have disciplinary consequences on those stakeholders groups which 
do not share the same set of values of the managerial élites. Particularly, we see 
that this traditional conception narrows public managerial action on performance 
targets and makes it less responsive to civil society stakeholders' concerns. This is 
why we recommend thinking more about innovative supra-national performance 
management systems able to reflect all stakeholders’ concerns and favor 
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In this PhD dissertation we addressed NPM as a policy paradigm to reform and 
organize public sectors in the European context. We have defined the policy 
paradigm as an interpretive framework that guides actors in policy-making; at the 
same time, a sort of Weltanschauung and Gestalt. The former refers to the way of 
seeing and conceiving the world by a civilization living within a specific age, 
whereas the latter refers to the patterns behind the (individual and collective) 
ability to acquire and maintain meaningful perceptions of reality in an apparently 
chaotic world. Albeit different, these two definitions of policy paradigm are 
complementary. Indeed, the first is more about ideology, that is to say a system of 
ideas which prevail during a particular historical period and form the basis for 
economic and political theory and policy. The second is more about the 
techniques and rules inspired to the prevailing system of ideas and which actors 
use to cope with the reality they are confronted.    
Based on this twofold definition of paradigm, and by adopting a critical stance of 
analysis, we looked at NPM through the lenses of power. Drawing on Weber 
(1971), we mean by power the relationship between social actors (individuals, 
social groups or social classes) and refer to the ability of some actors to achieve 
their own goals or aims when others are trying to prevent them from realizing 
them. As we have explained in the introductory chapter of this PhD dissertation, 
on the one hand, power can be defined at the macro level in terms of social 
structures where dominant actors seek to substantiate and legitimize their 
dominant position through ideology. On the other, it can also be seen from a meso 
level perspective in terms of technologies (set of techniques) and institutions (set 
of norms, rules and beliefs) that shape actors behavior.  
From a macro-level perspective, Part 1 of this PhD dissertation explored (1) the 
diffusion of NPM ideas in the manifestos of national parties in Europe and (2) the 
reform process experienced by national rail industries under the influence of these 
ideas. Our analysis suggests that, during the 1950s and the 1960s, new 
institutional economics and public choice theory provided the theoretical for the 
emergence of a homogeneous system of ideas centered on two key concepts: 
market and management. These ideas have been spreading in Europe from the 
late-1970s onwards, mainly due to the political commitment of New Right 
neoliberal parties operating in national contexts of fiscal stress and poor 
governmental action. These parties were responding to the demands of a new 
majority of tax-conscious voters with increasingly high revenues, who urged their 
national governments to decrease public spending and downsize centralized 
administrations. We argued that the EU institutions played a key role in this 
process by using both regulatory and economic instruments. In the rail sector, 
starting from the 1980s EU institutions engaged in an intense regulatory effort to 
dismantle vertically integrated state-owned monopolies and create one single 
European market of rail services. This EU-driven process of reform was based on 
different regulatory texts (e.g. regulations, decisions, court rulings, directives, 
etc.) adopting a narrative of freedom. These reforms were construed through the 
rhetoric of the “four fundamental freedoms”, referring to the free movement of 
people (passengers), goods (freight), services (transport services) and capital 
(private investments).  
Nevertheless, since the early1990s, this neoliberal rhetoric of market freedom 
went hand in hand with a massive program of public investments in trans-
European infrastructures (TEN-T), involving an active participation by the 
European Commission and the governments of the Member States to construct a 
trans-national interoperable transport system. The governance of TEN-T 
investments itself was designed on the basis of NPM ideas, prioritizing: (1) 
explicit standards and measures of performance and ‘hard look' at objectives; (2) 
output controls and orientation towards results; (3) discretionary control of 
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organizations from professional top management; and, (4) stress on discipline in 
resource use. 
From a meso-level perspective, Part 2 of this PhD dissertation addressed the 
governance system of the TEN-T program - with an in-depth case study of the LT 
high-speed rail project – and, in so doing, allowed us to explore how NPM ideas 
translate into action. This part second focused on the way how the NPM logic 
underneath TEN-T technologies of governance intertwines with national 
institutions and allows some actors (e.g. European Commission, national 
governments, lobbies and industry) to achieve their own objectives when others 
(e.g. individual citizens, civil society organizations and local communities) are 
trying to prevent them from realizing them.  
Juxtaposing the macro and meso levels of analysis: the neoliberal paradox 
When juxtaposing our macro- and meso-level analyses of the NPM paradigm, a 
paradox sharply appears. At the macro level, the neoliberal rhetoric of market 
freedom has been a cornerstone of EU-driven NPM reforms to railways. In the 
EU’s texts, these reforms were construed through the narrative of the four 
fundamental freedoms. However, at the meso level these reforms have entailed a 
massive use of public budgets to build infrastructures, urban planning regulations, 
administrative and legislative acts, political decisions by executive powers at 
different levels of government, bureaucratic procedures, rulings by judiciary 
powers and, if needed be, military deployment.  
In his lectures at the Collège de France of the late-1970s, Foucault observed that 
while the neoliberal rhetoric advocates freedom and autonomy, its actual practices 
entail economic regulation, political decision and rules enforcement. From his 
standpoint, this happens because neoliberalism is different from the classical 
liberalism of Adam Smith and of the 19
th
 century. The latter is concerned with 
cutting out or contriving a free space of the market within an already given 
political society, whereas the former is rather concerned with modeling the 
overall exercise of political power on the principles of a market economy. 
Neoliberalism takes on the formal principles of a market economy to build a 
general art of government that he calls ‘neoliberal governmentality’. According to 
Foucault, a key role is played by the development of a theory of pure (or perfect) 
competition
39
, providing a theoretical market structure whose formal properties, 
in abstract terms, could assure economic regulation through the price 
mechanisms. From this perspective, the core problem of neoliberal policies was 
precisely to develop the concrete and real space in which the formal structure of 
competition could function. An example of this formal structure can be quasi-
markets, a public sector institutional structure designed to gather the efficiency 
gains of free markets without losing the equity benefits of traditional 
administrative systems. Following this line of reasoning, Foucault came to the 
conclusion that neoliberalism cannot not be identified with the traditional laissez-
faire liberal idea, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention.  
Framed with the NPM wave of reform, quasi-markets in Europe have been 
increasingly apparent as a major development in public services organization 
from the late 1980s onwards.  They have been introduced to force public service 
providers to compete to provide the best-quality service at the lowest cost (Le 
Grand 2006). As explained in Part 1 of this dissertation, the creation of quasi-
markets in the rail sectors of many European States was driven by EU-level 
                                               
39 Pure or perfect competition is a theoretical market structure built upon the following 
assumptions: (1) all firms sell an identical product; (2) all firms are price takers (they 
cannot influence the market price of their product); (3) market share has no influence on 
price; (4) buyers have complete or "perfect" information – in the past, present and future – 
about the product being sold and the prices charged by each firm; (5) resources such as 




liberalization policies. These policies were implemented by national and supra-
national authorities through the use of regulatory and economic instruments 
aimed at removing existing technical and physical barriers between the European 
States in order to allow (freight and passenger) trains to travel frictionless across 
national borders and, in so doing, creating one single, liberalized European 
market of rail services. On the one hand, regulation (Directive 91/440 and four 
railway packages in 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2016) was aimed at: (1) unbundling 
infrastructure management and service operations in the national rail industries; 
(2) opening the European market to competition by liberalizing the provision of 
rail services; and (3) promoting interoperability and technical harmonization to 
encourage the development of an integrated rail system acting as physical basis 
for a single European rail market. On the other, the TEN-T investment program 
was aimed at making financial resources available to national governments to 
construct new rail infrastructures, contributing to the creation of one single 
interoperable and technically-harmonized trans-European rail network.   
The works of du Gay (e.g. 1994, 2012) provide some useful insights to better 
understand the paradox of such tightly-regulated free markets. He notices that, 
despite the spreading anti-statist rhetoric of the last century, the State as a bundle 
of institutions, purposes and conducts still exists and plays an active role in 
contemporary societies. From his standpoint, one can argue that market freedom 
cannot function as a transcendental limit on State action because it is itself the 
product of longstanding sovereign States (whose existence in Europe dates back 
to the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 centuries). From this perspective, the economic 
rights of private undertakings to freely provide transport services in a context of 
international competition can be better understood as historical entitlements to 
legal action, contingent upon States’ capacities to create and maintain (inter- or 
supra-) national market-friendly regulatory environments for the free trading of 
this type of services. 
Techniques to intertwine national and supra-national powers 
In Part 2 of this PhD dissertation, we did show that without the firm commitment 
of national governments to the implementation of TEN-T projects, the EU has 
found it difficult to accomplish the construction of trans-European infrastructures. 
For example, during the 2000s, it became clear to the European Commission that 
the number of TEN-T planned projects realized throughout the Member States fell 
behind the 1996 optimistic development plans. Delays in the completion of these 
projects were mainly due to the fact that Member States’ governments used the 
TEN-T budget to refund national expenditure already settled, instead of 
generating additional investments in trans-national infrastructures. As a 
consequence, in the following years a number of measures were adopted by the 
EU to compel the national governments to effectively construct trans-European 
infrastructures. Our analysis led to identify three key techniques to steer the state-
level implementation of TEN-T funded projects from the top of EU institutions: 
(1) a call for projects system based on strict selection criteria; (2) supervision of 
national authorities by a professional expert appointed by the European 
Commission; and (3) tight monitoring of performance objectives through a 
sophisticated assemblage of intellectual technologies.     
Firstly, the European Commission applies strict criteria for the selection of 
projects to be funded by the TEN-T budget. Projects submitted by the Member 
States to the European Commission for funding must be ‘mature’. This means 
that, priori to submission, candidate projects are required to receive formal 
approval at all government levels within the Member States. That is to say that 
these projects: enjoy political commitment, have completed all necessary public 
consultations, are ready to start from a technical point of view, have received all 
building permits, public procurement procedures are well advanced, have all 
necessary financial resources committed and have identified all possible risks. 
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Secondly, during the implementation of funded projects, the Member States are 
supervised by a European Coordinator. This is an EU-level officer, appointed by 
the European Commission because of its professional expertise. His/her role is to 
support national authorities and rail enterprises in the timely achievement of the 
milestones and objectives identified by the funding agreement with the European 
Commission. 
Thirdly, the implementation by national authorities and rail enterprises of funded 
activities is closely monitored by the European Commission and INEA through 
three key intellectual technologies: SAP, ASR and Mid-Term Reviews. The SAP 
is a project management document, which identifies the activities national 
authorities and rail enterprises must carry out, as well as the associated resources 
and timeline. On the other hand, the ASR is an annual report submitted by the 
national authorities on the technical progress of a project against the SAP’s initial 
plan, and the associated budget consumption. The Mid-Term review is an 
assessment exercise steered by the European Commission which aggregates ASR 
data and classifies projects on the basis of their performance results, measured in 
terms of accomplishment of planned objectives. National authorities promoting 
projects classified as ineffective or under-effective undergo several corrective 
measures (total or partial cancellation of funds, and conditional extension).  
Our analysis indicates that, in the context of the LT project, these supra-national 
techniques exert great influence on the national executive powers, certainly 
greater than the influence exerted by local citizens and civil society organizations. 
We see that despite the mass popular protests against the project, national 
governments prefer to conform to the supra-national agenda of the TEN-T 
program. They thus go ahead with the implementation of LT to the point of 
appealing to military and judiciary powers to restrain local dissent and to comply 
with the funding agreement of the European Commission. Our study seems to 
suggest that, in the case of TEN-T, the source of sovereignty has shifted from the 
popular will of citizens to the technical will of TEN-T officers and managers. Far 
away from disappearing, State powers exist but reconfigured under a new form of 
technocratic control.  
From bureaucracy to technocracy  
Our study indicates that the exercise of technocratic control by (national and 
supra-national) public authorities is different from the most traditional forms of 
bureaucratic control as the former has greater adaptation ability than the latter.  
Most traditional critiques of bureaucracies suggest that these are locked-in 
systems unable to adapt to the changing nature of their environment as their 
functioning is based on rigid rational impersonal rules and procedures. As 
explained by Max Weber (1971), a bureaucracy is an organizational form 
characterized by the preponderance of rules and procedures that are applied 
impersonally by specialized agents. These agents apply these rules without 
discussing the objectives or the reasons behind them. Therefore such systems may 
end up trapping individuals in an impersonal "iron cage" of rule-based control. As 
suggested by Merton (1968), within bureaucratic organizations, agents may 
respect formal rules and procedures even when these are clearly 
counterproductive for the organizational missions and goals. For Selznick (1943), 
when bureaucratic organizations are characterized by a high degree of 
specialization and hierarchical structuration, bureaucrats easily lose sight of the 
original goals of the organization by generating subgroups and personal interests. 
Their day-to-day behavior becomes centered on specific problems and proximate 
goals, having a primarily internal relevance. By pursuing these goals, bureaucrats 
engage in new activities that come to consume an increasing proportion of their 
time and thoughts and substitute the activities needed to achieve the official 
organizational goals. From this perspective, bureaucrats’ hidden agenda may lead 
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to a deflection of the organization from its original path without modifying the 
formally professed organizational aim. Another important contribution to our 
understating of bureaucracies is provided by Crozier (1963) who focuses on 
conflicts and politics as a major source for bureaucratic failures. He explains that, 
in bureaucratic situations, almost every outcome of individual action is decided in 
advance on the basis of a set of impersonal and predefined rules. In such 
bureaucracies, the only way people have to gain some control over their action is 
to exploit unregulated zones of uncertainty where the outcomes are not already 
defined by formal rules. He thus sees bureaucratic relations as a set of power 
relations where agents attempt either to exploit existing areas of discretion to 
pursue their own personal goals, or to prevent other competing agents from 
gaining an advantage. As a result, the formal bureaucratic goals are subverted and 
the organization ends up perpetually locked into a series of inward-looking power 
struggles. Crozier points out a dramatic paradox where any attempt to use rational 
rules to make bureaucratic systems more efficient and effective leads to 
dysfunctional situations where the opposite is true.   
Our study on the LT system of governance shows that, at all levels of 
government, this system has proved to be outward-looking and able to adapt in 
response to unfolding problems. At the national levels, solutions have been found 
by going beyond ordinary bureaucratic regulations and by making use of 
exceptional procedures allowing for greater responsiveness to problems.   
At the national levels, the LT governance has mainly transformed as a response to 
the opposition of local communities to the project. For example, in 2006 the 
Italian government created an exceptional body chaired by an extraordinary 
commissioner appointed by the government – so called ‘Osservatorio Torino-
Lione’ – to run public consultations with representatives from the opposing 
groups. This body was used by the project promoters to adapt the project to minor 
local requests without altering the fundamental characteristics of the initial 
project, namely the construction of the base tunnel. On the other hand, in France, 
in 2003 the project promoters introduced an exceptional administrative procedure 
– so called ‘Démarhe Grands Chantiers’ – to involve local socio-economic 
stakeholders in the implementation of planned activities. The logic underneath 
this exceptional device was to use large infrastructure projects as means to boost 
the local economy by creating employment for the local labor force and market 
demand for local enterprises. Throughout the 2010s, the exacerbation of local 
oppositions in both countries led the Italian and French promoters to new daring 
forms of innovation making use of the military (Italy) and judiciary (Italy and 
France) powers to control local opposing groups and secure the achievement of 
objectives planned in the funding agreement with the European Commission.      
 At the supra-national level, in 2004 the poor cooperation between EU-level 
bodies and national governments led to the creation of a new coordination and 
supervision function: the European Coordinator. Most recently, the increasing 
delays in the accomplishment of TEN-T-funded projects within the Member 
States have led the European Commission to create the ‘Corridor Forum’, a 
consultative body chaired by the European Coordinator and opened to various 
stakeholders coming from the Member States, namely representatives of public 
authorities - at various levels of government - and railway undertakings. Thanks 
to this body, the European Commission gets in-depth knowledge of what happens 
on the construction sites of funded projects and, while keeping a hard look on 
performance objectives, adapts the management of individual projects to their 
local realities.  
Nevertheless, as we showed in this PhD dissertation, this adaptation followed a 
disciplinary logic which we have described through the three Foucauldian 
principles of panoptical control ( hierarchical observation, examination and 
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normalization), increasingly applied to preserve the achievement of planned 
objectives . The hierarchical observation is used to place stakeholder groups from 
the Member States under the supervision of nested managerial tiers and establish 
vertical lines of observation across the multilevel space of the TEN-T program. 
Examination is used to construct charts revealing performance flaws in the TEN-
T’s hierarchical structure. Thanks to these charts, the EU bodies at the top of the 
hierarchy inspect and overhaul the national administrative machineries managing 
the funded projects. Such examination techniques act as transnational intellectual 
technologies that allow TEN-T program officers to measure performance 
differences between national projects and plan the re-allocation of financial 
resources from low-performing to high-performing projects. As a final step, low-
performing projects are sanctioned and conditional measures are applied to 
correct performance. This is the final phase of normalization during which (1) 
departures from correct behavior are sanctioned, (2) and rules (e.g. the use it or 
lose it principle) are applied to homogenize behavior across the TEN-T’s 
structure. Thanks to these three principles of panoptical control, the top-
management of TEN-T maintains unity of command over the entire process of 
program implementation and assures the achievement of planned programmatic 
goals across the Member States.  
Our findings point out the unintended consequences that these supra-national 
performance-based, panoptical techniques of program management produce at the 
national levels. As we show, these consequences are due to the fact that EU-level 
officers running the TEN-T program narrow the focus of their managerial action 
on output control. They thus divert attention from important-but-unmeasured 
values while monitoring the performance of funded-projects within the Member 
States.     
Particularly, these techniques narrow the focus of supra-national program officers 
on the progress made against initial plans and lead them to pay little attention to 
the interactions between stakeholders taking place within the national contexts. In 
so doing, performance-based techniques indirectly push national governmental 
bureaucracies to innovate in perverse ways their broad institutional environment. 
For example, when the local oppositions intensified in Italy throughout the 2000s 
and 2010s, the European Commission’s concerns were about the delays these 
oppositions provoked vis-à-vis the existing schedule of project implementation. It 
therefore decided to apply the use it or lose it principle to normalize the project 
implementation process to align it with TEN-T’s programmatic goals. To prevent 
further delays – and thus an additional reduction of TEN-T funds due to the 
application of the use it or lose it principle - the Italian government militarily 
occupied the construction site of the project. The aim was to discourage any 
future protest which could delay further the accomplishment of TEN-T’s planned 
objectives. These findings suggest that, when the panoptical techniques of 
performance management fail to normalize deviant behaviors, top-management 
levels (e.g. TEN-T supranational bodies) may unintendedly push the lowest levels 
of the management (e.g. the national and sub-national public authorities in contact 
with the civil society) to innovate in perverse ways (e.g. overtly displaying 
coercive power such as the threat of violence) which conflict with important-but-
unmeasured values (e.g. democracy, right to participation, equity). In these cases, 
the panoptical power turns back to old-fashion devices of control relying on 
violent forms of punishment. 
We know from the literature (Radin 2006) that NPM-style performance-based 
system of governance are herald of performative values which may conflict with 
the democratic values of an organizational field. This is because their evaluation 
criteria rely on simplistic, one-size-fits-all solutions that do not correspond to the 
dynamic reality of organizations and may result into behavior described as tunnel 
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vision - undue focus on performance measures to the detriment of other areas - 
and myopia - short-sightedness leading to the neglect of longer-term objectives - 
(Mannion and Braithwaite 2012; Smith 1995). In these cases, managers and 
politicians make a “perverse” use of performance information (Kroll 2015, Kalgin 
2016, Moynihan 2009) with negative unintended effects on trust and equity 
(Hvidman and Andersen 2014, Faull 2016). Performance numbers may lead the 
line management to innovate in perverse ways that narrow the focus on output 
control and divert attention from important-but-unmeasured values.               
TEN-T: the case for hybrid technocratic models  
Our findings lead us to depict the performance-based governance of TEN-T as a 
multilevel and transnational technocratic system. This is a complex (super-) 
system that is engineered to stand above and, at the same time, envelop several 
national institutional (sub-) systems. Within this multilevel system, EU-level 
officers use trans-national intellectual technologies to exert, at a distance, 
performative pressures on State-level officers. Drawing on Foucault, we have 
called this complex system Panopticon. Performance-based intellectual 
technologies make the Panopticon highly flexible and adaptable to national 
institutional machineries of government, but also hierarchical and rigid enough to 
assure the coherent fulfillment of supra-national predetermined ends within the 
national contexts. We propose to call this characteristic of the Panoticon 
flexigidity. Thanks to its flexigidity, the Panopticon can smoothly hybridize the 
national institutional machineries with performative values that are exogenous to 
national ordinary legislation but coherent with the supra-national policy 
objectives. It does so without manipulating directly the national institutional 
frameworks but rather through the creation of performance-based systems of 
financial incentives which lead national institutional partners (governments, 
administrative bureaucracies and industries) to do their best to comply with the 
supra-national policy agenda. As we have explained before, this panoptical 
flexigidity may produce unintended consequences at the national levels, such as 
leading the State-level institutional partners to make use of judiciary and military 
powers to face the opposition of other institutional stakeholders (e.g. citizens, 
civil society organizations and local communities).  
Our findings suggest that the outcomes of this techno-driven hybridization 
process much depend on some characteristics of the national institutional systems, 
namely: (1) decision-making center of the national institutional systems; (2) 
openness of national regulatory frameworks to civil-society stakeholders 
participation in decision-making; (3) project officers ability to dialogue and make 
agreements with contradicting parties; and, (4) mechanisms of dispute resolution. 
We could identify two hybrid technocratic models: the techno-political model in 
Italy and the techno-administrative model in France (Table C.1).  
  Italy France 
Decision-making center Political apex Administrative structure 
Openness of regulatory 
frameworks to civil 
society participation 
Relatively closed Relatively opened 
Managerial approach to 
contradicting parties 
Either/Or Moderation 
Mechanisms of dispute 
resolution 








Table C.1 – National technocratic models  
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At the national levels, LT implementation takes place within two different 
institutional systems with two different regulatory frameworks for the decision-
making of large infrastructure projects. In Italy decision-making is mainly 
concentrated in the political apex of the State machinery with little involvement 
of civil society, whereas in France it is more shared with the administrative 
structure and the civil society. Despite different degrees of institutional openness 
to civil society participation, in both national contexts the project promoters 
experienced oppositions from local groups of citizens; even though these 
oppositions were much stronger in Italy than in France. We explain this difference 
in opposition intensity on the basis of the different approaches of Italian and 
French project promoters towards opponents.      
According to our analysis, a key difference between Italian and French project 
promoters is their attitude towards civil society oppositions. In Italy promoters 
were less available to dialogue with opponents than in France. This can be 
certainly connected with the different configuration of the national regulatory 
framework of decision-making, less opened in Italy to civil society participation 
than in France. In Italy, LT promoters followed an ‘either/or approach’ to 
contradicting parties and marginalized the opponents since the very early-stage of 
the project implementation. According to Hargrave and Van de Ven (2009: 125), 
“either/both approaches separate different poles of contradiction, and tend to deny 
one pole by proceeding as if that pole does not exist, or seek to satisfy one pole 
while ignoring, or at the expenses of the other”. In France, LT promoters involved 
opponents in bureaucratic procedures of public consultations since the early-stage 
of the project implementation. However, as the disruptive potential of opponents’ 
critiques to the project increased, proponents’ openness to dialogue reduced. 
These elements suggest that in the French context proponents adopted a 
‘moderation approach’ enabling them to live with – but not embrace or resolve – 
the contradiction between them and local opposition groups (Hargrave and Van 
de Ven 2009).  In such moderation approach, there is openness to the requests of 
contradictory parties as long as these requests comply with the planned agenda of 
proponents. 
Additionally, in both national contexts the project promoters decided to solve the 
controversy with the opponents by using tests rather than compromises. When a 
party uses a test to solve a dispute with another it more likely aims to prevail over 
the other through argument and reasoning. Therefore, during a test people might 
not change their opinion and want to find an agreement through argument and 
reasoning. Usually, at the end of a test a party is deemed good and the other party 
is deemed wrong. On the other hand, competing parties using a compromise to 
solve a dispute more likely accept to reduce their demands or change their opinion 
in order to reach an agreement. Our case shows that tests failed in both countries, 
by leading promoters to use judiciary deterrence (e.g. launching lawsuit against 
activists of the opposition groups) to put an end to their controversy with 
opponents. In Italy, where local oppositions to the project were particularly 
intense, deterrence was also based on military deployment. 
To summarize, in Italy LT implementation follows a techno-political mode of 
governance where: (1) the decision-making center is in the political apex; (2) the 
regulatory frameworks are relatively closed to civil society participation; (3) there 
is an either/or approach to contradictory parties; and, (4) deterrence by means of 
judiciary and military powers is used to solve disputes when tests fail. On the 
other hand, in France LT implementation follows a techno-administrative mode of 
governance where: (1) the administrative structures play a key role in the 
decision-making process; (2) the regulatory frameworks are relatively opened to 
civil society participation; (3) there is a moderation approach to contradictory 
parties; and, (4) deterrence by means of judiciary powers is used to solve disputes 
when tests fail.  
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Managerial contributions: exploring Public Value as an alternative to NPM 
instrumental rationality 
Our study indicates that the NPM model has a performative intent, in the sense 
that the type of managerial action it produces is inscribed within the logic of 
means-ends calculation.  
The governance of TEN-T is centered on the notion of performance, in the sense 
of achievement of planned objectives. This is done through indicators 
representing the project performance in terms of objectives achieved by state-
level project promoters against the initial plans agreed with the European 
Commission. The rationale behind these tools lies in the NPM belief that the 
public organizations work better when they are oriented toward results, rather 
than being focused on processes. However, this research has showed that, when 
translated into practice, this belief may lead the management to strengthen the 
supervision and control of planned outputs while reducing its openness to 
stakeholders and its ability to dialogue and find agreements with opponents. From 
our perspective, this occurs because NPM has a rather linear conception of 
change. It sees collective decision-making as a rational choice process where all 
stakeholders share the same set of values and hold homogenous preferences. 
Nevertheless, our study suggests that this is a simplistic view of collective 
decision-making as stakeholder groups may behave on the basis of contradicting 
logics (proponents VS opponents of change) and by responding to different 
institutional pressures (French VS Italian institutions). From this perspective, 
change is rather the result of conflicting interests, politics and institutional 
pressures which, all at the same time, make management a social process, 
meandering and developing over time. 
Our research indicates that performance management instruments narrow the 
focus of supra-national managerial action on the supervision and control of 
project outputs - as measured by performance numbers - and overlook the process 
unfolding over time within the national contexts involved. This narrow focus may 
have unintended disciplinarian effects which improve performance at the 
expenses of important-but-unmeasured democratic values. For example, when the 
local oppositions intensified in Italy throughout the 2000s and 2010s, the 
European Commission’s concerns were about the delays these oppositions 
provoked vis-à-vis the existing schedule of project implementation. It therefore 
decided to apply the use it or lose it principle to normalize the project 
implementation process to align it with TEN-T’s programmatic goals. To prevent 
further delays – and thus an additional reduction of TEN-T funds due to the 
application of the use it or lose it principle - the Italian government militarily 
occupied the construction site of the project, whereas the French one prosecuted 
the spokesperson of the opposition groups against LT. The aim was to discourage 
any future protest which could delay further the accomplishment of TEN-T’s 
planned objectives. 
Such unintended disciplinarian effects of performance-driven governance pave 
the way to a wider reflection on the consequences of organizational models that, 
like NPM, are premised on the logic of instrumental rationality. In this respect, 
Shenhav (2013) suggests that useful insights are provided by Hannah Arendt’s 
(1963) work on the banality of evil. In this work, she portrays a pathological and 
malfunctioning rational bureaucracy, motivated by a strong culture of 
instrumental rationality. Shenhav (2013: 381) draws attention to the manner in 
which Nazi rational bureaucracies faced unintended consequences and turned into 
a non-rational death machine: “[the instrumental rationality of these 
bureaucracies] underscored the deceptive nature of the organizational machinery, 
the detrimental effects of ideology-based efficiency and the malicious use of 
bureaucracy’s advantages towards genocide”. 
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Because of such extreme consequences associated with instrumentally-rational 
organizations, more effort ought to be devoted to a better understanding of 
alternative models of governance taking on value rationality as organizing 
principle. Drawing on Max Weber, Rothschild-Whitt (1979) suggests that value 
rational organizations are evidenced by actions that put into practice people’s 
convictions. In ideal-typical terms, he depicts these organizations as fully 
collectivized democracies which explicitly reject instrumentally-rational 
managerial action in favor of value-rational behavior.  
In Part 2 of this PhD dissertation, we suggested that the Public Value (PV) 
framework (Moore 1995, O’Flynn 2007, Stoker 2006) can be a suitable 
democracy-based model of governance alternative to NPM. As we explained, the 
PV perspective abandons NPM’s mono-centric and mono-rational vision all to the 
good of a poly-centric and poly-rational vision where the core of public decision-
making is stakeholder participation. PV shifts the focus of public action from 
results to citizenship, network governance and the role of public agencies in 
working with citizens to create public value, generate democratic authorization, 
legitimacy and trust. According to Stoker (2006), the PV paradigm promotes 
alternative management systems functioning through dialogue and exchange 
practices associated with network governance (Powell 1990). He believes that it is 
through the construction, modification, and adaptability of these alternative 
systems that democracy and management can be reconciled and delivered. 
Bozeman (2002) introduces the notion of public-value failures, occurring when 
core public values are not reflected in social relations, either in the market or in 
public policy. From his perspective, “a public-failure approach changes the 
discussion of public policy by making government (and public values) something 
other than residual category or an issue of technical efficiency in pricing 
structures. […] The public-failure model is not a decision-making tool (à la cost-
benefit analysis), but a framework to promote deliberation about public value” 
(Bozeman 2002: 150). According to this perspective public value does not exist 
per se, but it is negotiated and constructed among wide-ranging stakeholders who 
may disagree on what course of actions will produce the maximum public value 
(Yang and Holzer 2006, Sanger 2008). 
Based on the findings of Part 2, we can develop a PV-style ideal-type of EU 
megaprojects governance (Table C.2). The characteristics of this model are the 
polar opposite of the existing TEN-T panoptical model and can be described on 
the basis three key variables: (1) supra-national systems of performance 
management; (2) national regulatory frameworks for the decision-making of large 
infrastructure projects; and, (3) managerial approach to stakeholders with 
divergent views of projects. 
Key variables PV-style model 
Supra-national systems of 
performance management 
Performance indicators (1) 
constructed on the basis  multi-
criteria assessment techniques and 
(2) subject to stakeholder bargaining 
National regulatory 
frameworks for the 
decision-making of large 
infrastructure projects 
Regulatory frameworks opened to the 
participation of all concerned 
stakeholders 
Managerial approach to 
stakeholders with divergent 
views of projects 
High managerial capacity of 
integrating stakeholders with 
divergent views of projects and 
making agreements with them 
Table C.2 – PV-style ideal-type of EU megaprojects governance 
Essay 4 indicates that the NPM-style performance management systems used in 
TEN-T narrow public managerial action on performance targets and make it less 
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responsive to stakeholders' concerns, with detrimental disciplinary consequences 
on stakeholders interactions. Therefore, this essay recommends adopting 
innovative supra-national performance management systems reflecting all 
stakeholders concerns. Drawing on the academic literature on polyphonic 
management (Hazen 1993; Clegg et al. 2006; Pichault 2013), this could be done 
by designing systems of performance management where all stakeholders’ 
multiple representations of and expectations on the organizational performance 
are taken into account to construct indicators. As explained by Pichault (2013), 
the polyphonic approach to monitoring and evaluation sharply contrast with the 
most traditional NPM (panoptical) approach. The latter searches for control and 
correspondence (accomplishing objectives established in advance) whereas the 
former proposes evaluations “in several voices” with all concerned stakeholders 
involved in the process. We think that adopting such polyphonic approach to 
performance management at the supra-national level may have positive effects on 
stakeholders engagement at the national levels. Moreover, it represents a step 
forward toward the PV belief believing that public initiatives ought to be 
evaluated on the basis of multi-dimensional assessment criteria subject to 
stakeholders bargaining (e.g. Andersen et al. 2012) 
Essay 5 shows that, at the national levels, TEN-T projects take place within 
different Member States with different regulatory frameworks for the decision-
making of large infrastructure projects. Our findings indicate that these 
frameworks may be more or less opened to civil society stakeholders participation 
in decision-making and may variously impact the project implementation process. 
Particularly, our work points out that the openness of regulatory frameworks to 
stakeholders participation is an important condition for the successful 
implementation of TEN-T projects at the national levels. Therefore, we 
recommend generalizing this type of frameworks across the Member States. This 
is consistent with the PV belief that public decision-making frameworks ought to 
involve all stakeholders in decision-making and promote deliberation about public 
value (e.g. Bozeman 2002).  
Our analysis also indicates that opening State-level decision-making structures to 
civil society stakeholders participation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for successful projects. In fact, essay 6 shows that oppositions to these projects 
also develop in institutional contexts (e.g. France) where regulatory frameworks 
are relatively opened to stakeholders participation. According to our analysis, this 
happens because TEN-T projects might be construed differently by managerial 
élites at the national and supra-national levels and the civil society groups at the 
local levels. According to our findings, these different stakeholders views on a 
project may generate controversies which have detrimental effects on its 
implementation. Therefore, the ability of public managers to dialogue and make 
agreements with all civil society stakeholders is a key factor for the successful 
implementation of TEN-T projects. Such capacity of promoting agreements 
among all concerned stakeholders is a key aspect of the PV paradigm believing 
that public value does not exist per se, but it is negotiated and constructed among 
wide-ranging stakeholders who agree on what ought to be considered of public 
value (Bao et. al 2012) 
From a change management perspective, the PV model invites to think the 
governance of TEN-T projects as an iterative and negotiated process where the 
management involves all concerned stakeholders both in the formulation and 
implementation of objectives. Stakeholders participate in this process since the 
early-stages of decision-making by providing inputs during the all life-cycle of 
projects, including both formulation and implementation phases. In so doing, 
projects are collectively constructed and can best respond to the needs of all 
concerned stakeholders. This style of change management can be defined 
polyphonic. As explained by Pichault (2013), polyphony is the polar opposite of 
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panoptism. The latter proposes a governance style based on control and 
homogenization, top-down management and rationalization strategies. Whereas 
the former invites to promote autonomy and diversity of interests, bottom-up 
management and negotiation strategies. Polyphony can be thus considered an 
essential component of future PV models.    
The PV model proposes a fully collectivized democratic decision-making process 
where all concerned stakeholders participate to the government of society. 
Nevertheless, as explained by Rothschild-Whitt (1979), one ought to be aware of 
the various constraints that limit the actual attainment of pure collectivist 
democracies. Firstly, democracy takes time. Two-way communication structures 
between public managers and citizens, such those proposed by PV theorists, are 
undeniably slow and the time absorbed by meetings can be extreme. Secondly, 
cultural homogeneity may be another problem. In the absence of any hierarchical 
(bureaucratic or technocratic) structure that unites the energies of diverse people 
toward organizational goals, unified action in collectivist organizations is possible 
only if individuals hold homogeneous preferences about the goals and processes 
of the organization. Nevertheless, such homogeneity may end up constraining the 
social base of democratic organizations. Thirdly, emotional intensity may burden 
decision-making. Rothschild-Whitt (1979: 521) suggests that “familial, face-to-
face relationships in collectivist organizations may be more satisfying than the 
impersonal relations of bureaucracy, but they are also more emotionally 
threatening”. Therefore, these relationships may result into structural, 
interpersonal tensions that render conflict difficult to absorb. Fourthly, 
environmental constraints threat the survival of alternative collectivist 
organizations. These organizations are subject to external institutional pressures. 
As explained by Rothschild-Whitt (1979: 522), “because [alternative 
organizations] often occupy an adversary position vis-à-vis mainstream 
institutions, such pressures may be more intense”. Particularly, extra-
organizational pressures – coming from legal, economic, political and cultural 
realms – may insulate the collectivists organizations from the resources they need 
to survive.  
Vis-à-vis these limits to the attainment of pure collectivist organizations, 
hybridization with efficiency-driven models could be a solution. As explained by 
Battilana and Dorado (2010), hybrid organizations are characterized internally by 
the co-existence of multiple logics which all together contribute to shape the 
legitimate organizational goals and the means to pursue them. Nevertheless, they 
explain that dealing with multiple logics “is challenging for organizations because 
it is likely to trigger internal tensions that may generate conflicts among 
organization members” (Battilana and Dorado 2010: 1420). Therefore, they 
suggest that it is crucial for these organizations to develop strategies enabling 
them to cope with intra-organizational tensions. One strategy they suggest is to 
develop a common organizational identity that strikes a balance between the 
logics that the organization combines, so to prevent the emergence of subgroups 
whose different identities exacerbate the tensions between the co-existing logics. 
Drawing on Van Maaned and Schein (1979), the authors say that this can be done, 
for example, through hiring policies, defining who can become an organization 
member, and socialization policies, teaching and reinforcing desired behaviors 
and values of the organizational members. 
Theoretical contributions and future research lines on complex 
organizational change  
First of all, this PhD dissertation contributes to develop further Pettigrew’s 
original contextualist framework by integrating it through theoretical pluralism.  
Van de Ven and Scott Poole (1995) explain that to understand how organizations 
change, management scholars often need to borrow concepts, metaphors, and 
theories from many different disciplines. It is the interplay between these different 
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perspectives that helps one gain a more comprehensive understanding of 
organizational life, because any one theoretical perspective invariably offers only 
a partial account of a complex phenomenon. One of his seminal articles suggests 
that: “the juxtaposition of different theoretical perspectives brings into focus 
contrasting worldviews of social change and development. Working out the 
relationships between such seemingly divergent views provides opportunities to 
develop new theory that has stronger and broader explanatory power than the 
initial perspectives.” (Van de Ven and Scott Poole 1995: 511).  Following 
Pichault (2013), we suggest that Pettigrew’s contextualist methodology may play 
an important role to articulate multiple theoretical lenses within a coherent 
framework of analysis: “Contextualism is not an explanatory approach strictly 
speaking: rather, it proposes a general analytical framework which different 
approaches may fit into. It places the emphasis on three key concepts and their 
interrelations: content, context and process” (Pichault 2013: 68). 
Secondly, this PhD dissertation suggests that using Pettigrew’s contextualism in 
conjunction with theoretical pluralism enables to disentangle politics from 
management. Therefore, it may contribute to a critical study of change 
management, which goes beyond the most traditional planning tradition. More in 
detail, the neo-institutionalist lens of analysis reveals the strong influence of 
national regulatory frameworks on the success of megaprojects. It thus suggests 
that change management is a social process embedded in specific institutional 
arrangements, rather than the mere execution of top-down plans. The lens of 
justification theory shows that managerial groups and civil society groups may 
have divergent interests which make change management a contradicting process 
(rather than linear). The lens of Foucault’s theory of power shows that 
performance management systems are not neutral devices to assess and monitor 
performance. These can be rather used as ‘intellectual technologies’ enabling the 
top management to control stakeholders interactions at the lowest levels. Broadly 
speaking, this dissertation suggests that change is a non-linear process whose 
direction is influenced by structural and agency variables.  On the one hand, we 
pointed to two types of structural variables: the institutions (established systems 
of rules, norms and beliefs) that frame the decision-making about the content of 
change; and, the techniques managerial élites (often in the form of experts) use to 
represent, evaluate and debate change (‘intellectual technologies’). On the other, 
we pointed to the purposive actions of divergent stakeholder groups resisting 
against the current techno-institutional arrangements by espousing contradicting 
views on change. These views lead to conflicts (controversies) between the 
managerial élites and the stakeholders groups contradicting them, which shape the 
process of change itself. All at the same time, institutions, technique and social 
contradictions seem to be key drivers of change. This finding invites to think 
more at the dualism of structure and agency vis-à-vis problems of change. It 
suggests that the issue of socialization against autonomy in determining change is 
a false dilemma since agency and structure permanently coexist and both 
contribute to shape change.  
Additionally, drawing on Horkeimer’s (1937) critical theory tradition, this PhD 
dissertation invites to think the critical study of management and organizations as 
an attempt to analyze the deep significance of the ‘ruling understandings’ of 
society in order to unravel the underlying asymmetrical power relations between 
individuals and/or between groups of individuals. The idea here is to unpack the 
partiality of shared interests and point at the latent social conflicts. In so doing, 
such critical approach aims to show how these ruling understandings are 
ultimately ideology-based understandings, which misrepresent actual human 
interactions in the real world, and act to justify or legitimize the domination of 
people by ruling élites. This PhD dissertation challenged the ruling understanding 
of NPM theories of public sector management as a technical, rational analytic and 
evidence-based domain by shedding light on its ideological base. Additionally, by 
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analyzing the case of the LT project of the TEN-T program, we looked at the way 
how NPM principles translate into action, with particular attention on the control 
mechanisms and conflicts resulting from the application of these principles. 
Thirdly, from a change management perspective, this PhD dissertation indicates 
that the traditional NPM model may lead to unintended disciplinarian 
consequences on stakeholders participation. When turned into practice this model 
may convey a panoptical style of governance based on control and 
homogenization, top-down management and rationalization strategies. According 
to our analysis, this is due the fact that this model of public sector organization is 
premised on the logic of instrumental rationality. Its functioning prioritizes the 
efficient and effective achievement of hierarchically predetermined ends, with 
hard look of managers on top-down rationalist performance targets and little room 
for stakeholders’ bottom-up contributions to these ends. We therefore suggest it is 
important to explore alternative models which explicitly reject instrumentally-
rational managerial action in favor of value-rational managerial practices. We 
explored the PV model as a suitable democracy-based model of governance 
alternative to the NPM performance-based panoptical model. Thanks to its stress 
on stakeholders participation, diversity of interests and bottom-up management 
(Pichault 2013), polyphony as a style of governance can be considered an 
alternative to the traditional paoptical style and an important component of future 
PV models. 
Fourthly, this PhD dissertation suggests that using Pettigrew’s contextualism in 
conjunction with theoretical pluralism provides useful support to design research 
programs on change in highly complex organizational settings. Indeed they were 
so the multilevel, transnationl and plural settings of our case study. Pettigrew et 
al. (2017) say that, to understand the complex issues of change in our 
contemporary societies, new perspectives are required go beyond organizations or 
institutions, as well as the fields of management and organization studies. They 
thus propose the perspective of system-wide change referring to a process of 
change where multiple, interrelated changes take place across the system as a 
whole.  Ferlie et al. (1996) use the notion of system-wide change to describe the 
structural and processual kinds of change that UK’s National Healthcare System 
(NHS) experienced in the 1990s with the implementation of the NHS and 
Community Care Act. In so doing, they show how NPM reforms to NHS at the 
macro-level entail fundamental changes at the meso-level of NHS organizations, 
such as the expanding role of general management, the increasing importance of 
financial and costing data, and the move from management by hierarchy to 
management by contract. They thus conclude that: “the introduction of New Right 
ideologies relating to markets and competition and the increasing level of 
managerialism have structural manifestations but how far this process has 
affected organizational behavior and values needs to be more closely examined 
for a clearer understanding of the new public management to emerge” (Ferlie et 
al. 1996: 55).  
In this PhD dissertation we followed this research line by adopting the paradigm 
as main subject of analysis in the design of our enquiring process on NPM. As a 
first step, we observed it at the macro-level to understand the politico-economic 
context which has birthed this paradigm, but also to understand the structural 
changes it has introduced in the European rail industry. As a second step, we 
directed our attention to the meso-level processes associated with the structural 
changes experienced at the macro-level of the European rail industry. In so doing, 
we provided an explanation of how NPM-related structural processes have an 
effect on organizational behavior. To conclude, we think that, from a system 




As referred by Pettigrew et al. (2017), system wide-change studies include 
multiple and geographically dispersed stakeholders, divergent interests and 
values, dispersed and diffused power systems and the perpetual challenge of 
delivering collective action around change issues which themselves are variously 
perceived and acted upon. All these features of system wide change apply to our 
PhD research which examined the implementation of NPM models in the multi-
level, trans-national and pluralistic settings of EU-driven railway megaprojects. 
As Pettigrew et al. (2017) suggest, adopting a system-wide change perspective in 
such complex settings, perennially involve Sterman’s (2001) combinatorial and 
dynamic complexity. They explain that Sterman characterizes combinatorial 
complexity as involving multiple, diverse, and inter-connected elements which, 
all at the same time, need to be understood as a dynamic system in action. From a 
system wide-change perspective, collective action becomes thus a key research 
topic. Particularly, as the authors suggest, understanding where public action 
occurs, when it occurs, how it occurs and why it occurs represent central research 
questions for any program of research on system wide change. 
As for where, our dissertation suggests that a system-wide change might be multi-
level and poly-jurisdictional. It is multi-level because decision-making may 
articulate across different governance levels and, as we show in the LT case, may 
be dispersed from the national to the supra-national levels. It is poly-jurisdictional 
because, as we show, decision-making may articulate across different national 
jurisdictions with equal sovereign powers but different institutional systems in 
place. 
As for when, this dissertation suggests that a system-wide change might be multi-
temporal. In our case study, depending on the time boundaries we decide to 
apply, LT may be considered as the result of: (1) long-term structural changes in 
the re-organization of rail service provision in Europe from multiple state-owned 
monopolies to a single European liberalized market (macro); (2) middle-term 
changes in the EU’s mechanisms that govern the implementation of the TEN-T 
program (meso); (3) short-term changes related to particular events affecting 
stakeholders interactions in their day-to-day activities, such as the approval of an 
agreement, the emergence of a controversy, the release of a report or, still, the 
adoption of this or that methodology in the conduct of a study (micro). 
As for how, our dissertation suggests that a system-wide change might be 
pluralistic, non-linear and dialectical. It is pluralistic because, as we show in the 
LT case, wide-changing systems may be characterized by the co-existence in the 
field of divergent actor groups, each with its own legitimate set of beliefs and 
objectives. Specifically, these groups may be characterized by divergent interests 
and asymmetric distributions of power which both may lead them to espouse 
competing institutional logics. For example, this is the case of the competing 
logics espoused by LT proponents and opponents in our study. The pluralistic 
settings of wide-changing systems may give birth to non-linear processes where 
changes of the output (e.g. LT performance) are not directly proportional to 
changes of the input (top-management or political plans about LT). In fact, as we 
show, such non-linearity depends on the fact that strategic decisions are not 
simply taken at the top of organizations and implemented down through 
hierarchies; rather, they are influenced by many intra- and extra-organizational 
members whose different logics shape the process in many different, un-
predictable ways. Moreover, our findings suggest that dialectics might be a useful 
perspective to interpret non-linear change at the processual level. As suggested by 
Hargrave and Van De Ven (2009: 122), “in dialectical processes, change emerges 
from interactions between proponents of current institutional arrangements and 
parties espousing contradictory arrangements. The new arrangements that emerge 
are then challenged by proponents of alternative arrangements as the dialectical 
process recycles”. These authors thus hold that contradictions are central to 
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dialectical processes of change and it is not possible to understand the perspective 
of proponents for an institutional change without examining the views of 
opponents. By drawing on Werner and Baxter (1994) they define a contradiction 
as the dynamic tension between unified opposites in a system. Thus, 
contradictions are more than dualities and exist only when there is dynamic 
tension between oppositions that are interdependent, which together compose a 
unity, and which logically presuppose each other (Hargrave and Van De Ven 
2009).  
As for why, our dissertation indicates that understanding the cause-effect chains 
underpinning system-wide change is a complex task. As we have showed, in the 
case of LT change is at the same time the result of structural (openness of national 
institutional systems to civil society stakeholders and supra-national systems of 
performance management) and agency variables (promoters’ capabilities to make 
agreements opponents). This suggests that researchers willing to study system-
wide change ought to move beyond the dualism of structure and agency. Our 
findings lead us to think that the issue of socialization against autonomy in 
determining whether an individual acts as a free agent or in a manner dictated by 
social structure is a false dilemma since agency and structure permanently coexist 
and both contribute to shape change. In this regard, Granovetter (1985: 487) has 
argued that “actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor 
do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection 
of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action 
are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations.” 
Therefore, agency and embeddedness are in constant tension and equally affect 
change. Seo and Creed (2002) refer to this tension as the “paradox of embedded 
agency”, corresponding to the paradox existing between institutional determinism 
and agency. From our standpoint, adopting a contextualist perspective may help 
reconciling this paradox as it views actors as being embedded in a context and as 
reacting to the situations they face in this context.  
As Pettigrew et al. (2017: 3) refer, doing research on system wide change 
demands “data sensitive and date intensive studies likely to involve, amongst 
others, societal and policy elites. Whereas some of these studies can and will be 
attempted by aspirational individuals, others may necessitate the recruitment and 
perpetuation of teams of scholars sometimes located across disciplines and fields 
in particular societies and sometimes on a cross national scale and scope. The 
study of big themes may necessitate the recruitment and development of big 
teams.” As we have experienced throughout the research process of this PhD 
dissertation, access to fieldwork may be very complex, whereas societal and 
policy elites may not always been available to be involved as their political 
agenda might be misaligned with that of academic élites. As a consequence, 
alternative strategies of data collection need to be developed. In this dissertation, 
we have showed that second-hand surveys - from reliable institutional sources 
(e.g. EU, OECD, World Bank, etc.) - may provide very useful insights in the 
study of macro-level processes. Additionally, the use of statistical software to 
analyze large databases may be very important, provided that these tools are 
employed to describe and not to predict reality. Mixed research methods are thus 
very important and, as we have done throughout the past four years of research in 
Lentic, require the creation of transnational and inter-disciplinary networks of 
researchers. Finally, mobilizing multiple theories – rather than relying on one 
single theoretical framework – appears to us as an important asset for research on 
wide-system change as the complexity of the phenomenon under observation 
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ANNEX I – Full list of interviewees 
Fidelwork period: from June 2014 to May 2016 
N° Role Organization Day 












4 Public officer 
European Commission, 
DG ENTR  
10/09/2014 
5 Project Manager 
European Commission, 
INEA (Executive agency) 
26/06/2015 
6 Program Manager 
European Commission, 
INEA (Executive agency) 
03/10/2014 & 
17/10/2014 
7 Public officer 
European Parliament, DG 
IPOL - Directorate for 
Structural and Cohesion 
Policies - Committee on 
Regional Development  
26/11/2014 
8 Public officer 
European Parliament, DG 
IPOL - Directorate for 
Structural and Cohesion 
Policies - Policy 
Department B   
28/11/2014 
9 Public officer 
European Parliament, DG 
IPOL - Directorate for 
Structural and Cohesion 
Policies - Policy 
Department B   
19/11/2014 & 
21/11/2014 
10 Public officer 
European Parliament, DG 
IPOL - Directorate for 
Structural and Cohesion 
Policies - Policy 
Department B   
18/11/2014 
11 Parliamentary Assistant European Parliament,  26/06/2015 
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12 Parliamentary Assistant 
PETI (EFDD-M5S) (collective 
interview) 
13 Parliamentary Assistant 
European Parliament,  
TRAN (PPE-NCD) 
8/07/2015 
14 Parliamentary Assistant 
European Parliament,  
TRAN (PPE-FI) 
10/07/2015 




16 Parliamentary Assistant 
European Parliament,  
TRAN (Verts) 
17/07/2015 
17 Lobbyist CER 5/09/2014 
18 Lobbyist CER 21/10/2014 
19 Lobbyist EIM 24/07/2014 
20 Lobbyist UNIFE 18/06/2014 
21 Lobbyist PPTA 30/10/2014 
22 




Rhône Alpes Region 4/07/2014 
23 
Executive officer in 
charge of LT 
Rhône Alpes Region 24/02/2015 





RFF/SNCF RESEAU 17/04/2015 
26 




of France in Brussels 
24/06/2014 
27 
Executive officer in 
charge of LT 
Préfecture de la Savoie 23/03/2015 
28 
Secrétaire général de la 
délégation française à 
la CIG Lyon - Turin 
Transport Ministry 13/05/2015 
29 Secrétaire général Transalpine Lobby 17/02/2015 
30 
Executive officer in 
charge of LT 
Département de la Savoie 18/03/2015 
31 
Executive officer in 
charge of large 
infrastructures 




Executive officer in 
charge of transport 
policy 
Permanent Representation 
of Italy in Brussels 
21/08/2014 
33 Chairman advisor Osservatorio Torino-Lione 3/12/2014 
34 
Advisor of local 
authorities 
Osservatorio Torino-Lione 5/11/2014 
35 
Public officer at the 
Directorate General in 




Ministry of Infrastructure 
and Transport 
6/05/2015 
36 Executive manager Transpadana Lobby 
27/10/2014              
& 10/11/2014 
37 
Council member in 
charge of 
environmental policy 
Comunità Montana 19/11/2014 
38 
Advisor of the Director 
in charge of territory 
and transport policy 
Provincia di Torino 28/10/2014 
39 
Director of the 
Department in charge 
of sustainable 
development policy 
Provincia di Torino 10/11/2014 
40 
Executive officer in 
charge of EU affairs  




Director of the 
Directorate in charge of 
environmental and 
territorial policy 
Piedmont Region 17/11/2014 
42 
Member of the advisory 
team supporting the 
Directorate in charge of 
transport, 
infrastructures, mobility 
and logistic policies 




Head of office in 
charge of international 





Assistant of the Head of 
office 
45 
Project manager in 
charge of legal and 
financial issues 
Lyon-Turin Ferroviaire 13/01/2015 
46 University professor University of Lyon 24/09/2015 




 Coordination des 
opposants au Lyon Turin 
5/05/2016 
49 Activist 
 Coordination des 
opposants au Lyon Turin 
30/03/2016 
50 Activist 
 Coordination des 
opposants au Lyon Turin 
31/03/2016 




52 Mayor Commune de Chimilin 22/03/2016 
53 Activist 
 Coordination des 
opposants au Lyon Turin 
15/04/2016 
54 Activist 
 Coordination des 
opposants au Lyon Turin 
7/04/2016 
55 Transport expert Consultancy firm 7/04/2016 
56 
Candidate for local 
elections 
Debout la France 15/07/2016 
57 Activist 






















































70 University Professor University of Turin 14/10/2015 
71 University Professor University of Turin 4/02/2015 






Senate of the Italian 
Republic (M5S) 
16/10/2015 
75 Council member 



















The  "Cour des Comptes" (CdC) - in English Court of 
Auditors - is a French administrative court charged with 
conducting financial and legislative audits of most public 
institutions and some private institutions, including the 
central Government, national public corporations, social 
security agencies (since 1950), and public services (since 
1976). The Court is essentially a cross between a court of 
exchequer, comptroller general's office, and auditor 
general's office in common-law countries. It is as well a 
Grand Corps of the French State mainly recruiting among 
the best students graduating from the Ecole nationale 
d'administration. The Court's three duties are to conduct 
financial audits of accounts, conduct good governance 
audits, and provide information and advice to the French 
Parliament and Administration. The Court verifies the good 
form of accounting and the proper handling of public 
money. 
CEF 
The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) is a key EU funding 
instrument to promote growth, jobs and competitiveness 
through targeted infrastructure investment at European 
level. It supports the development of high performing, 
sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European 
networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital 
services. CEF investments fill the missing links in Europe's 
energy, transport and digital backbone. The CEF is divided 
into three sectors:  (1) CEF Energy; (2) CEF Telecom; and 
(3) CEF Transport.  CEF transport has replaced TEN-T and 
has two key policy objectives: (1) completion by 2030 of 
the Core Network, structured around nine multimodal Core 
Network Corridors; and, (2) completion by 2050 of the 
Comprehensive Network in order to facilitate accessibility 




The "Conseil général des Ponts et Chaussées" (CGPC) - in 
Egnlish Civil Engineering General Council - is one of the 
oldest institutions in France and the direct heir of the 
assembly of inspectors general of bridges and roads, which 
met regularly from 1747 under Daniel-Charles Trudaine. 
The CGPC was set up on 25 August 1804 by decree. It has 
been reorganized into the Conseil général de 
l'environnement et du développement durable 
CIG 
A Conférence Inter-Gouvernementale (CIG) is a roundatble 
of diplomats, usually plenipotentiaries, delegated by their 
governments to prepare an international treaty or modify an 
existing one. It hosts negotiation between governments that 
plays a major role in international relations. Today, in 
France four CIG regards Franco-Italian relations in the field 
of transport: the Lyon-Turin CIG, the Frejus CIG, the Mont-
Blanc CIG and the Southern Alps CIG (see Sutto 2010) 
CIPE 
The "Comitato interministeriale per la programmazione 
economica" (CIPE) is an Italian state body established by 
law February 27, 1967, n. 48, art.16. The Committee is 
chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers. Other 
members are the Minister of Economy and Finance, who is 
its Vice-President, and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, 
Economic Development, Agricultural, Food and Forestry 
Policies, infrastructure and transport, labor and social 
policies. 
EEIG 
A European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) is a type 
of legal entity created on 1985-07-25 under European 
Community (EC) Council Regulation 2137/85. It is 
designed to make it easier for companies in different 
countries to do business together, or to form consortia to 
take part in EU programmes.  
FS 
Ferrovie dello Stato (FS, tr. "Italian State Railways") is a 
government-owned holding company that manages 
infrastructure and services on the Italian rail network. 
INEA 
The Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) is 
the successor of the Trans-European Transport Network 
Executive Agency (TEN-T EA), which was created by the 
European Commission in 2006 to manage the technical and 
financial implementation of its TEN-T programme. INEA 
officially started its activities on 1 January 2014 in order to 
implement the following EU programmes: (1) Connecting 
Europe Facility (CEF); (2) Parts of Horizon 2020 – Smart, 
green and integrated transport + Secure, clean and efficient 
energy; (3) Legacy programmes: TEN-T and Marco Polo 
2007-2013 
LTF 
Lyon Turin Ferroviaire (LTF) was subsidiary of RFF and 
RFI. LTF was the early developer of the joint French-Italian 
part of the future rail link between Lyon and Turin. In 2015, 
it has been replaced in that role by TELT, with the same 
staff and leadership. 
OTL 
The "Osservatorio Torino-Lione" an extra-ordinary body 
created in 2006 by the incumbent government to establish a 
dialogue between LT proponents and local opponents from 
the Susa Valley. Until the late-2000s, the OTL hosted many 
meetings during which the most controversial aspects of the 
project were debated. It was chaired by an extra-ordinary 
commissioner appointed by the government. 
RFI 
Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI) is an Italian company, 
subsidiary of FS. RFI is the owner of Italy's railway 
network, it provides signalling, maintenance and other 
services for the railway network. RFI was founded on 1 July 
2001 following the European directive on rail transport, 
imposing a separation between the owner and the user of the 
network. The Italian rail network used to be managed by FS 
until 2001. 
TAV SpA 
Treno Alta Velocità SpA (TAV SpA) was a mixed company 
owned by FS and other financial institutions. It was created 
in 1991 for the planning and construction of a high-speed 





Associazione Tecnocity was a foundation controlled by 
FIAT (the largest Italian automobile manufacturer founded 
by the Agnelli family) and IFI (an Italian investment 
company controlled by the Agnelli family) 
TELT 
Tunnel Euralpin Lyon Turin sas (TELT) is a French 
company created in 2015 by SNCF and F and based in Le 
Bourget-du-Lac, in the department of Savoie (France). The 
functions and structure of TELT were defined by articles 6-
7 of the agreement between the Italian and French 
governments of 30 January 2012.  Its mission is the 
construction and management of the transalpine rail link 
Lyon - Turin. 
TEN-T/TENs 
The Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) are a 
planned set of road, rail, air and water transport networks in 
the European Union. The TEN-T networks are part of a 
wider system of Trans-European Networks (TENs), 
including a telecommunications network (eTEN) and a 
proposed energy network (TEN-E or Ten-Energy). The 
European Commission adopted the first action plans on 
trans-European networks in 1990 
NOTAV 
"No Treno ad Alta Velocità" (NO TAV) - in English No to 
the High Speed Train - is a grassroots movement, which is 
based in the Susa Valley in Piedmont and which opposes 
the creation of the new high speed railway line between 
Turin and Lyon in France. This line is part of a EU 
infrastructure policy which plans to connect Lyon to 
Budapest and then onto Ukraine. The simple principle 
behind the movement is that a new high speed railway line 
in the Valley is completely useless and not needed, its only 
purpose being the profit of the many private companies that 
have shares in it. The NO TAV movement thinks that the 
current railway line between Piedmont and France is more 
than sufficient, considering that traffic in the area has never 
been incredibly high. More importantly, the construction of 
the line would utterly and irreversibly destroy a huge part of 
the Susa Valley, causing not only an environmental but also 
an economic and social disaster, with businesses closing 





ANNEX III – List of semantic descriptors for NVivo analysis in Essay 6 
Inspirational world 
Religion OR religione OR réligion OR inconsciente OR unconscious OR 
inconscienti OR inconscient OR émotif OR émotive OR émotionnel  OR 
émotionnelle OR emotional OR feeling OR sentiment OR feelings OR sentimento 
OR sentimenti OR sentiments OR irrational OR irrationnel OR irrazionale OR 
irrazionali OR irrationnels OR reflex OR riflesso OR réflexe OR réflexes OR 
riflessi OR invisible OR invisibile OR invisibili OR unmeasurable OR 
incommensurabile OR incommensurabili OR incommensurable OR 
incommensurables OR magic OR magico OR magici OR magique OR magiques 
OR myth OR mito OR mythe OR mythes OR ghost OR fantasma OR fantasmi 
OR ghosts OR fantôme OR fantômes OR anthroposophy OR antroposofia OR 
anthroposofie OR super-human OR sovrumano OR sovraumana OR surhumaine 
OR surhumain OR affective OR affettivo OR affettivi OR affectif OR affective 
OR affettiva OR affettive OR affectifs OR affectives OR  warmth OR calore OR 
chaleur OR creativity OR creatività OR créativité OR escapism OR evasion OR 
evasion OR intuizione OR intuition OR fantastic OR fantastico OR fantastique 
OR ricordo OR ricordi OR memories OR souvenir OR souvenirs OR genius OR 




Vita OR life OR lives OR vie OR vies OR Environment OR ambiente OR 
Environnment  OR ecological OR ecologico OR écologique OR écologiques OR 
ecologici OR natura OR nature OR plants OR pianta OR piante OR plante OR 
plantes OR climate OR clima OR climat OR waste OR rifiuto OR déchets OR 
protezione OR protection OR climatico OR climatique OR radioactive OR 
radioactif OR radioattivo OR inquinamento OR pollution OR CO2 OR emissions 
OR émissions OR émission OR emission OR riscaldamento OR warming OR 
réchauffement OR catastrophe OR catastrofe OR terre OR terra OR earth OR 
landscape OR paesaggio OR paysage OR durabilité OR sustainability OR 
sostenibilità OR biomassa OR biomass OR biomasse OR santé OR salute health 
OR fauna OR faune OR acqua OR acque OR eau OR eaux OR water OR pianeta 
OR planet OR planète OR pericolo OR danger OR pericoli OR dangers 




Competition OR concorrenza OR concurrence OR competizione OR compétition 
OR concurrent OR concurrente rivalry OR concorrente OR value OR valore OR 
valeur OR vendibile OR saleable OR vente OR vendita OR sell OR lusso OR 
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luxury OR luxueuse OR luxueux OR opportunism OR opportunismo OR 
opportuniste OR possess OR possesso OR possession OR contract OR contratto 
OR contratti OR contrat OR contrats OR deal OR affare OR affaire OR prix OR 
prezzo OR price OR soldi OR money OR argent OR benefit OR beneficio OR 
benefici OR bénéfice OR bénéfices OR payment OR pay OR pagamento OR 
paiement OR payer OR monopolio OR monopoly OR monopole OR wages OR 
salario OR salaire OR salaires OR salari OR commerce OR commercio OR client 
OR cliente OR client OR clients OR offer OR supply OR offre OR offerta OR 
domanda finance OR finanza OR finanziario OR financier OR business  OR 
economia OR économie OR economy OR croissance OR growth OR crescita OR 




Tradition OR tradizione OR génération OR generation OR generazione OR 
hiérarche OR gerarchia OR hierarchy OR leader OR benevolent OR benevolent 
OR padrone OR patron OR boss OR fiducia OR trustworthy OR confience OR 
fiable OR affidabile OR onestà OR onesto OR onesta OR honnêteté OR honnête 
OR honest OR fiducioso OR fiduciosa OR confidant OR faithful OR capo OR 
chef OR “buon senso” OR “good sense” OR “bon sens” OR “sens commun” OR 
fedeltà OR fidélité OR superior OR superior OR supérieur OR famiglia OR 
famiglie OR family OR families OR famille OR familles OR respect OR rispetto 
OR identity OR identità OR identité OR collective OR collettivo OR vergogna 
OR shame OR honte OR honteuxe OR honteuse OR vergognoso OR vergognosa 
OR honor OR honour OR onori OR obbligo OR obligation OR seriousness OR 
serio OR serietà OR sérieux OR serious OR arrogant OR arrogante OR arroganza 
OR arrogance OR arrogant OR arrogante OR celebrazione OR celebration OR 
celebration OR cerimonia OR ceremony OR cérémonie OR responsabilità OR 
responsibility OR responsabilité OR figlio OR figlia OR madre OR mother OR 
mère OR padre OR father OR son OR sons OR figli OR enfants OR enfant  
 
Civic world 
Collective OR collectives OR collettivo OR collettiva OR collettivi OR collectif 
OR collective OR collectifs OR collectives OR “collective will” OR “volontà 
collettiva” OR “volontà generale” OR “volonté collective” OR “volonté générale” 
OR legal OR legale OR legali OR legal OR légale OR légaux OR giuridico OR 
juridique OR giuridici OR juridiques OR right OR rights OR diritto OR diritti OR 
droit OR droits OR rule OR règle OR règles OR regola OR regole OR 
réglementaire OR regulatory OR réglement OR réglem* OR régolamentare OR 
regolamento OR government OR gouvernement OR governo OR gouverné OR 
governare OR governed OR governato OR “interesse pubblico” OR “intérêt 
public” OR “intérêts publics” OR “interessi pubblici” OR “public interest” OR 
representative OR rappresentante OR élu OR élus OR representatives OR 
ufficiale OR official OR official OR officielle OR officier OR “public good” OR 
“bien public” OR “bene pubblico” OR “beni pubblici” OR solidarity OR 
solidarietà OR solidarité OR partecipazione OR participation OR participer OR 
“partecipazione popolare” OR “dibattito public” OR “débat public” OR public 
debate OR “common objective” OR “obiettivo comune” OR “objectif commun” 
OR obbligo OR obblighi OR obligation OR obligations OR solidarity OR 
solidarietà OR solidarité OR solidaire OR solidale OR “rights and obligations” 
OR “diritti e doveri” OR “droits et devoirs” OR democracy OR democrazia OR 
démocratie OR democratico OR democratica OR democratic OR démocratique 
OR democratiques OR democratici OR democratiche  OR democratically OR 
democraticamente OR démocratiquement OR legislation OR legislazione OR 
legislations OR legislation OR legislations OR legalmente OR legally OR 
légalement OR code OR codice OR codici OR codes OR statement OR 
dichiarazione OR declaration OR declarations OR dichiarazioni OR membership 
OR member OR membro OR membri OR member OR membres OR popolo OR 
peuple OR people OR “accordo internazionale” OR “international agreement” OR 
“accord international” OR “accords internationaux” OR “accordi internazionali” 
OR “international agreements” OR Cittadino OR cittadini OR citizen OR citizens 
OR citoyen OR citoyenne OR citoyens OR citoyennes OR cittadina OR cittadine 
OR assembly OR assemblée OR assemblies OR assemblées OR assemblea OR 
assemblee OR repubblica OR république OR republic OR ratifica OR ratificare 
OR ratific* OR ratifier OR ratification* OR ratify OR demonstration OR 
demonstrations OR manifestazione OR manifestazione OR manifestation* OR 
corteo OR cortège OR cortèges OR cortei OR “comissione parlamentare” OR 
commissione OR comitat* OR comité OR comités OR “commission 
parlementaire” OR “commissions parlementaires” OR referendum OR éléctions 
OR éléction OR referendum OR eletto OR eletti OR elezioni OR candidato OR 
candidature OR candidature OR institution OR institutions OR istituzionz OR 
istituzioni OR giudice OR juge OR juges OR judiciaires OR procura OR procure 
OR procuratore OR principio democratico OR “principi democratici” OR 
“democratic principles” OR “democratic principle” OR “principe démocratique” 
OR “principes démocratiques” OR “public consultation” OR “consultations 
publiques” OR consultations OR consultation OR consultazione OR 
“consultazione pubblica” OR “consultazioni pubbliche” OR “commissario 
straordinario” OR “extraordinary commissioner” OR commissario OR 
commissari OR commissaire OR commissaires OR commissioner OR 
commisisoners OR ignorare OR ignorato OR ignorati OR escluso OR ignorata 
OR esclusa OR esclusi OR exclu* OR exclue* OR excluded OR ignoré* OR 
ignor* OR mobilizzazione OR mobilization OR presidio OR presidi OR petizione 
OR petition PR pétitions OR pétition* OR petizioni OR esposto OR esposti OR 
movimento OR moviment* OR movement* OR movement* OR trasparenza OR 
trasparente OR transparent* OR corruzione OR corrott* OR corruption OR mafia 






“Public opinion” OR “opinione pubblica” OR “opinion publique” OR media OR 
mediatizzato OR mediatico OR média* OR médiatique* OR mediaticamente OR 
médiatiquement OR news OR notizi* OR nouvelle* OR newspaper OR giornal* 
OR journa* OR stampa OR presse OR press OR propaganda OR testate OR “titre 
journ*” OR giornalis* OR journalis* OR voci OR rumour* OR rumor* OR 
campagna OR campaign OR campagne OR “expert* communication” OR 
“espert* comunicazione” OR “strategi* comunicazione” OR sminui* OR “down 
playing” OR dévaloris* OR recognition OR riconsc* OR recon OR propaganda 
OR propagand*  OR apparenza OR apparence OR “conference presse” OR 
“conferenz* stampa” OR messagg* OR television OR television OR TV OR 
show OR farsa OR lye OR bugi* OR audience OR mensonge* OR buogiard* OR 
menteur* OR mentir OR mentire OR boycott OR boicottare OR imagine OR 
image* OR pubblicità OR advertis* OR marketing OR publicité OR pubblicit* 
OR publicit* OR reclam* OR populis* OR “brutta figura” OR “mauvaise* 
figure*” OR fint* OR fiction OR finzione OR “breach of promise” OR “fals* 




Efficiency OR performance OR future OR function* OR functional OR 
predictability OR reliability OR work OR energy OR professional* OR expert* 
OR specialist* OR operator* OR means OR method* OR methodology OR 
scientific OR objective OR methodolog* OR task* OR space OR axis OR 
direction OR definition OR plan* OR goal OR calendar OR standard* OR series 
OR average OR probability OR variable OR graph OR model* OR target OR 
calculation OR hypothesis OR hypotheses OR solution* OR progress OR 
dynamic OR control OR security OR risk* OR machinery OR machineries OR 
rail OR cogwheels OR interact* OR condition OR necessary OR integrate OR 
organize OR stabilize OR order OR anticipate OR implant OR adapt OR detect 
OR analys* OR measure* OR standardize OR standardizzare OR standardis* OR 
optimize OR optimization OR system* OR trial OR effectiveness OR instrument* 
OR operational OR operationaliz* OR measurement  OR technique OR 
technology OR technological OR degree OR gradient OR kilometer* OR  
chilometr* OR impatto OR uncontrollability OR construction* OR knowledge 
OR scale OR test OR aggregate* OR perturbation OR components OR construct* 
OR check OR proof OR installation OR gestione OR Efficienza OR prestazion* 
OR futuro OR funzional* OR prevedibilità OR affidabilità OR lavoro OR Energia 
OR professionist* OR espert* OR specialist* OR operator* OR responsabil* OR 
metod* OR metodologia OR compito OR spazio OR asse OR direzione OR 
definizione OR pian* OR obiettiv* OR calendario OR standard OR serie OR 
media OR probabilità OR variabil* OR grafic* OR modell* OR calcolo OR 
ipotesi OR soluzione OR progresso OR controllo OR dinamico OR sicurezza OR 
macchin* OR rotai* OR ruot* OR interazione OR interag* OR organizz* OR 
stabilizz* OR impianto OR rilev* OR analizz OR analisi OR rilievo OR misur* 
OR standardizzare  OR ottimizza* OR sistem* OR test OR prova OR prove OR 
efficacia OR misura OR strument* OR grad* OR pendenz* OR energetic* Or 
tecnologia OR tecnologic* OR gomma OR CO2 OR carbone OR nucleare OR 
difett* OR conseguenz* OR alimentazione OR aggregat* OR component* OR 
installazion* OR costruzion* OR system* OR normalizz* OR causa OR 
programma OR costruir* OR cantier* OR fas* OR pericolo OR anticipare OR 
prevision* OR traffic* OR transport* OR operativ* OR tecnica OR Efficacité OR 
performance OR avenir OR fonctionnalité OR prévisibilité OR fiabilité OR 
travail OR énergie OR professionnel* OR expert*OR spécialiste* OR opérateur* 
OR méthode  OR tâche OR espace OR axes OR direction OR définition OR plan 
OR programm* OR but OR calendrier OR standard OR cause* OR Série* OR 
moyenne OR probabilité* OR variable* OR graphique* OR modèle* OR 
objectif* OR calcul* OR hypothèse* OR Solution* OR progrès OR contrôl* OR 
dynamique* OR sécurité OR risque OR machine OR roues OR ferré* rail OR 
interag* OR interaction* OR besoin OR condition, OR necessaire OR intégrer 
OR organis* OR stabilis* OR anticiper OR implant* OR detect* OR analys OR 
détermin OR mesur* OR normalis* OR Optimis OR résou* OR système OR essai 
OR efficience OR mesure OR instrument* OR opérationnel* OR instruments OR  
technique, technologique OR effet* OR technologique* OR puissance OR degré  
OR charbon OR risqu* OR gestion OR danger OR production OR produzione OR 
incontrôlab* OR consequence* OR construction OR chantier* OR 
approvisionnement OR agrég* OR perturbation OR composant* OR verification 
OR prevue OR  installation OR transport OR réseau* OR rete OR reti OR 
valutazion* OR évaluation* 
 
 
   
Connectionist world 
Projet* OR lien* OR flexible* OR flexibilité OR disponible* OR contact* OR 
autonom* OR médiateur OR mediation OR partenaire* OR partenariat*OR 
coordinateur OR coordination OR coach* OR manager* OR “relation informelle” 
OR qualification* OR competence* OR information* OR bureaucrati* OR 
Progett* OR collegament* OR flessibil* OR flessibilità OR disponibili* OR 
contatt* OR autonom* OR mediator* OR mediazion* OR partner OR socio OR 
collaborazion* OR coordinator* OR coordinament* OR "rapporto informale" OR 
qualifica OR informazion* OR burocrazi* OR burocratic* OR Project OR 
flexible OR flexibility OR available OR contact OR autonomy OR mediator OR 
mediation OR mediate OR partner OR partners OR partnership* OR coordinator* 
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OR coordination* OR coach* OR manager* OR "informal relationship" OR 
qualification OR competence OR information OR bureaucra* 
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ANNEX IV – Allocation of TEN-T budget through time (1995-2013) 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, twelve Member States decided to set up an 
infrastructure policy at the Community level in order to support the functioning of 
the internal market through Trans-European Networks (TENs) in the fields of: 
transport (TEN-T), energy (TEN-E) and telecommunications (e-TEN).  
TEN-T first program guidelines were adopted in 1996 following the Council of 
Ministers held in Essen in 1994: these guidelines constituted a reference 
framework for Member States infrastructure planning and determined projects 
eligibility for EC/EU funding. Regulations governing EC/EU funding from the 
TEN-T budget were adopted for the periods 1995–1999, 2000–2006 and 2007–
2013. Other EU funds – notably the Cohesion Fund and the ERDF – contributed 
also to fund TEN-T projects.  
Fig. 1 shows how the TEN-T budget
40
 evolved during the financial periods 
mentioned above. During these periods, the budget always increased: by 134% 
from 1995-1999 to 2000-2006, and by 64% from 2000-2006 to 2007-2013.  
TEN-T budget is allocated in: 
1. Infrastructures – as inter-modality is the cornerstone of TEN-T, 
infrastructure investments includes: road, rail, inland waterway (IWW), 
ports, airports, motorways of the sea (MOS) and other interconnection 
points between modal networks.  
                                               
40 Figures provided in this section are a personal elaboration of data available from: 
Bothnian Green Logistic Corridor (2014) Allocation of TEN-T Financing in the Trans-
European Transport Network. Retrieved from: http://www.bothniangreen.se/wp-




2. Traffic Management Systems/Positioning and Navigation Systems - 
integration and smooth operation of the TEN-T infrastructures is ensured 
through efficient traffic management systems consisting of systems for 
road (Intelligent Transport Services - ITS), rail (European Rail Traffic 
Management System - ERTMS), air (Air Traffic Management – ATM) 
and waterborne transport on inland waterways (River Information 
Systems - RIS) as well as the European positioning and navigation 
systems (Galileo). 
 
Figure 1 – TEN-T budget allocation (1995-2013) 
As Figure 2 shows, the share of TEN-T budget allocated to infrastructure projects 
was higher than that allocated to traffic management system projects: on average 
infrastructure investment projects absorbed 75%, while traffic management 























 Figure 2 – TEN-T budget allocation: traffic management system and 
infrastructures  
As shown in Figure 3, in 2000-2006 the TEN-T budget allocated in traffic 
management system increased by 8% to the detriment of infrastructures, while in 
2007-2013 it decreased by -6%. Nevertheless, if we compare the share of TEN-T 
budget absorbed by traffic management system at the beginning of the TEN-T 
program with that absorbed at the end, it emerges that it increased by 2%. 
In terms of projects, TEN-T has financed three types of activities: 
1. Works 
2. Studies  

















Figure 3 - TEN-T budget allocation: traffic management system and 
infrastructures (% value) 
 
Figure 4 - TEN-T budget allocation: traffic management system and 
infrastructures (% value) 
Fig. 4 shows that the allocation of funds between works and studies was quite 















periods, funds are directed also to mixed activities, consisting of both studies and 
works.  
As far as infrastructure investments are concerned, rail is clearily the transport 
mode where the highest amount of TEN-T funds was allocated during the time 
span under observation. Tab. 1 and Tab. 2 provides figures on the TEN-T budget 
absorbotion rate for the different sectors of infrastructure investment. These 
figures show that over the years rail absorbed on average 57% of the total TEN-T 
budget, whereas the other sectors an average ranging between 0.2% and 8%. The 
absorbtion rate for rail steadily varied over time as showed by the coefficient of 
variation (CV) in Tab. 1 (which is close to zero). Neverthless, if we compare the 
2007-2013 absorbtion rate of rail with the 1995-1999 we can notice a slight drop 
of -2%. Road is the sector that experienced the highest drop (-8%) from 1995-
1999 to 2007-2013: its absorption rate progressively decreased by -38% from 
1995-1999 to 2000-2006 and by -47% from 2000-2006 to 2007-2013. This 
evolution in the EU budget is consistent with the EU policy orientations that, 
since the mid-1990s have been promoting a modal shift from road to greener 
transport modes (i.e. trains). This also explains the decrease in the TEN-T budget 
absorption rate of airport infrastructures (-4% from 1995-1999 to 2007-2013) and 
the increase in MOS (+4%) and IWW (+8%). Additionally, this explains also why 
rail has a steady absorbtion rate ranging from 56% to 58%. Indeed, framed within 
the 2020 strategy, the EU adopetd the target of reducing GHG emission in the EU 
by 20 % with respect to 1990 and MOS, IWW and, especially, rail are expected to 
give a great contribution to the achievement of this objective. 
Tab. 2 shows that the coefficient of variation (CV) of the absorption rate vary 
from 0.02 (rail) to 1.31 (MOS) meaning that the way the TEN-T budget was 
allocated differed across the infrastructure sectors. When the CV is close to 0, it 
means that over the years the absoprtion rate experienced poor fluctuations, 
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whereas when it is close to 1 it means that the absorption rate experienced 
important fluctuations. The TEN-T budget was constantly allocated towards rail 
(0.02) and port (0.19), whereas IWW (1.04) and MOS (1.31) experienced the 
highest fluctuations. On the one hand, the sharp fluctuations of IWW and MOS 
depend on the sharp increase - occurred mainly during the last financial period - 
of the TEN-T budget allocated to these infrastructure sectors in order to meet the 
environmental policy objectives. On the other hand, the sharp increase in the 
share of the EU budget allocated to IWW (8%) and MOS (4%) paralleled the 
decrease experienced by road (-8%) and airport (-4%).  
 
Budget Amount (€) and Budget Absorption Rate (%) per 
Infrastructure Sector 
 1995-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 
Rail 1068,8 58% 2499,7 58% 3970 56% 
IWW 32,2 2% 74,2 2% 684 10% 
MOS 12,5 1% 8,9 0% 318 4% 
Road 219 12% 318,3 7% 277 4% 
Port 18,2 1% 53,5 1% 103 1% 







 Table 1 
 Statistics_TEN-T Budget Absorption Rate 
 LF_Dis Mean SD CV 
Rail -2% 57% 0,01 0,02 
IWW 8% 4% 0,05 1,04 
MOS 4% 2% 0,02 1,31 
Road -8% 8% 0,04 0,52 
Port 0.2% 1% 0,00 0,19 
Airport -4% 2% 0,02 0,92 
Table 2 
Fig. 6 shows how the different absorption rates have been fluctuating across the 
different fincial periods under observation. While rail and port evolved in a steady 
way, road and airport decreased against the increase of IWW and MOS. 
 
Figure 6 – TEN-T budget absobtion rate (graphical display) 
To conclude, since the beginning of the TEN-T program, the budget has been 
progressively increasing with infrastructure investments receiving always the 
highest share of funds (on average about 76%). The rail sector is the one that 
absorbed the highest part of funds (on average about the 57%). Moreover, during 
the entire period under examination the share of TEN-T funding allocated to rail 
is the one that waved the least, with a CV equal to 0.02. Rail-related absorption 
rate is about ten times higher than those of other sectors meaning that it is 
considered a priority of the TEN-T policy. As a matter of fact the large majority 
of projects included in the most recent Core Network list is in the rail sector.  
The modal shift is an important aspect that clearly emerges from our analysis of 


















has been decreasing respectively by -8% and -4% while the one allocated to IWW 
and MOS has been increasing respectively by 8% and 4%. This is a consequence 
of the environmental-friendly policy model adopted by the EU regarding transport 
infrastructure investments, giving priority to the lowering of GHG emissions. 
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ANNEX V – Contextualist chronicle of LT project 
Content 
In the late-1980s, French SNCF’s planning department launched the idea of 
creating a new High-Speed Railway (HSR) connection between Lyon and Turin 
as the transport service provided by the existing railway line was affected by 
technical shortcomings. The core of the initial project was a 54 km base tunnel 
crossing the Alps between Susa Valley in Italy and Maurienne in France. The 
planned line would have dramatically reduced the gradient line by crossing the 
Alps at the height of 400m – instead of the 1200m of the historical line (see Fig. 
1). The railway connection was designed to adopt a HSR technology allowing 
trains to move at 220 km/h. On the one hand, the new line would have 
considerably improved the quality of the transport service for passengers by 
shortening the journey times. On the other, its reduced gradients and much wider 
curves compared to the existing line will have allowed heavy freight trains to 
transit between the two countries at 100 km/h and with much reduced energy 
costs. For all these reasons, SNCF included LT in its Master Plan for the 
construction of HSR Lines in France. In 1991, FS made official Italian intentions 
of joining SNCF’s idea and realizing the project. The same year, Italian transport 
Minister Bernini and his French counterpart met in Viterbo (Italy) and signed a 
declaration of intents supporting the construction of LT.  
Throughout the 1990s, the Italian and French railways – with the support of the 
national governments - realized the feasibility studies of the future infrastructure. 
In 1994, Lyon-Turin (LT) officially became a key project of the TEN-T program 
and EU funds were made available to it. Initial plans fixed the beginning of the 





In 2003, both Italian and French promoters had already designed and approved 
the preliminary project of the base tunnel. However, in the mid-2000s major 
delays emerged during the design and approval of the definitive project in Italy. 
While in France the definitive version was already approved in 2007, in Italy - 
because of local oppositions in the Susa Valley – it could not be approved before 
2015.      
The initial objective of initiating the construction works between 2014 and 2015 
was thus postponed. Nowadays, the construction of the base tunnel is expected to 
start in 2018 and to take approximately 10 years. 
Context 
Outer context 
In 1992, the then 12 member states signed the Treaty of Maastricht and decided to 
set up the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) policy, an infrastructure 
policy at supranational level with the overall aim of improving the functioning of 
the internal market through continuous and efficient transnational networks in 
transport flows. TEN-T goal was to interconnect national infrastructure networks 
and ensure their interoperability by setting standards which could remove 
transnational technical barriers, such as incompatible standards for railway traffic. 
It was designed to promote and strengthen seamless transport chains for passenger 
and freight, while keeping up with the latest technological trends such as HSR 
technology in the rail sector. 
In 1994, the European Council met in Essen and identified 14 projects (“Essen 
projects”) representing the backbone of the trans-European transport network. In 
1996, because of the endorsement received by the Council of the EU, these 14 
projects were included in the TEN-T program. The deadline for their completion 
was 2010.  
During the 2000s, it became clear that the number of planned projects realized 
throughout the Member States fell behind the 1996 optimistic development plans. 
Delays in the completion of projects were mainly due to the fact that Member 
States’ governments used the TEN-T budget to refund national expenditure 
already settled, instead of generating additional investments in trans-national 
infrastructures. As a consequence, in 2004 the EU amended the 1996 investment 
guidelines and introduced the role of the European Coordinator, an EU-level 
manager acting in the name of the European Commission to assure the timely 
completion of planned projects. His/her role was to supervise the Member States 
in the development of projects to be funded by TEN-T.   
In 2010, Decision 661/2010/EU came into force and amended the 2004 
guidelines. As delays in the completion of planned projects were evident, the new 
text extended the deadline for the accomplishment of the network from 2010 to 
2020. It also created an executive agency to support the European Commission in 
the administration of the program and to monitor the performance of funded 
projects. Additionally, article 19 of Decision 661/2010/EU reinforced the position 
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of the European Coordinator by requiring the Member States to transmit him/her 
all the information needed to appreciate the design and implementation of funded 
projects.  
In 2014, the investment guidelines were amended for the last time by Regulation 
1315/2013. As delays in the completion of planned projects did not stop, the list 
of projects to be funded was reviewed. This revision was done by the European 
Commission on the basis of a scientific methodology using the evolving traffic 
demand as a basis to distinguish between most strategic and least strategic 
projects. The objective was to concentrate TEN-T funding in the main European 
urban nodes and economic centers. Based on this methodology, the Commission 
concluded that the TEN-T could be best developed through a dual-layer approach, 
consisting of a comprehensive network and a core network. The former was the 
basic layer of the TEN-T network consisting of all existing and planned 
infrastructure projects meeting the requirements of the guidelines. The deadline 
for its completion was extended to 2050. The latter overlaid the comprehensive 
network and consisted of its strategically most important projects. Because of 
their strategic importance, the deadline for the completion of core-network 
projects was extended to 2030.  
Additionally, the 2014 reform of the guidelines introduced the notion of 
“corridor”. All the infrastructure projects composing the core network were 
organized into 9 trans-European transport axes called “corridors” (Figure 2). Each 
of these 9 corridors was provided with a dedicated governance body, called 
“corridor forum” and operating under the supervision of a European Coordinator. 
This forum is a consultative body, chaired by the European Coordinator, where 
the public authorities (national governments, ministry-level administrations and 
regions) and industry (infrastructure managers of ports, airports, rail and roads, as 
well as freight transport operators) gather to prepare and follow up the work plan 
detailing the activities to be done to assure the harmonized and timely 
implementation of all the projects composing the corridor.  
The TEN-T program has made available financial resources to LT since 1994. 
Because of major delays in the accomplishment of planned objectives – especially 
on the Italian side of the project -, in 2010 the European Commission cut 
approximately €9.2 million to LT.  
 
Figure 2 – Source: European Commission 
Inner context 
At the national levels, the decision-making bodies and rules involved in the 
design and implementation of LT are different in Italy and France. Moreover they 
change over time as an effect of local oppositions and supra-national pressures 
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linked to the use of TEN-T financial resources. We thus describe them through 
time. The fieldwork led us to identify three periods: 1990s, 2000s, 2010s. 
1990s: the project formulation (Period 1) 
Theorizing the technical need for a new railway connection between Lyon and 
Turin is the first important activity related to LT in France. A key role is played 
by SNCF’s planning department which in the late-1980s launched the idea of 
modernizing the railway connection between Lyon and Turin as the transport 
service provided by the historical railway line was affected by technical 
shortcomings. SNCF’s idea met the support of Rhône-Alps’ regional authorities 
which, at that time, had the ambition of internationalizing the region by 
improving its transport connections with other European cities.   
By contrast, in Italy LT emerged from the lobbying activity of Tecnocity – a 
foundation controlled by FIAT (the largest Italian automobile manufacturer 
founded by the Agnelli family) and IFI (an Italian investment company controlled 
by the Agnelli family). At that time, Tecnocity was interested in the activities of 
the European Round Table of Industrialists, an EU-level influential group that, at 
that time, supported the construction of a base tunnel across the Alps to enhance 
the European transport system. Contrary to SNCF, FS initially did not support LT 
as the priority was the upgrading of existing national infrastructures rather than 
the construction of new international ones. However, in 1990 the central 
government replaced FS’ incumbent chairperson with a new one supporting LT. 
In 1991, FS made official Italian intentions of joining SNCF’s idea and realizing 
the project. The same year, the Italian transport Minister Bernini and his French 
counterpart met in Viterbo (Italy) and signed a declaration of intents supporting 
the construction of LT.  
2000s: the official approval of the project and start of the geognostic works 
(Period 2)  
In the early-2000s, in both countries the official procedures for the approval of LT 
by public authorities take place and the gegonostic works can start. 
French rules for the decision-making of LT have their source in a codified 
administrative procedure – so called ‘Enquête Publiqe’ - that obligates the project 
promoters to undertake public consultations with local communities and citizens. 
They are required to disseminate information to these local stakeholders and 
organize public meetings to explain them their stakes in the project. They have to 
report their conclusions to a public inquiry committee appointed by an 
administrative tribunal. The latter then examines, validates and sends these 
conclusions to the ministry who decides whether the project can be officially 
declared of public interest.  
In the framework of the approval of the preliminary project,  the French 
government starts the works for three geognostic tunnels in Saint Martin-la-Porte 
(accomplished in 2003), Villarodin-Bourget / Modane (accomplished in 2002), 
and La Praz (accomplished in 2005). 
Italian rules for the decision-making of LT have their source in Law 443/01 – so 
called ‘Legge Obiettivo’ (LO). Through this law, the Italian Parliament mandated 
the government to realize several infrastructure projects listed in the legal text 
itself. It instituted new decision-making rules introducing a fast-lane procedure to 
facilitate the accomplishment of LO-listed projects. These new rules concentrated 
all decision-making power in the hands of an inter-ministerial body, called 
Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica (CIPE). Indeed, if 
a project was listed in LO, then the CIPE was empowered to approve it by 
majority. There was no legal requirement of involving local citizens and 
authorities. The only constrain was to acquire the non-binding opinion of local 
authorities concerned by planned projects. Within this legal framework, between 
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2001 and 2004, the meetings amongst the proponents multiplied but local 
stakeholders were most often excluded. 
Italian geognostic works were planned to start in 2005 in Venaus but had to stop 
because of the opposition of concerned local populations. Because of these 
oppositions, in 2006 the incumbent government created a new extraordinary 
body, the Osservatorio Torino-Lione (OTL). OTL’s objective was to establish a 
dialogue between LT proponents and opponents. Until the late-2000s, the OTL 
hosted many meetings during which the most controversial aspects of the project 
were debated. However, no common ground could be found between the 
opposing parties.  
2010s: finalizing the project approval and the geognostic works (Period 3)  
In Italy, the increasing protests of local communities led the government to 
approve Law 183/2011 which declared LT a project of strategic priority to be 
realized in the name of national interest. In so doing, it created the juridical 
conditions to mobilize permanently the army in the Susa Valley and militarily 
occupy the site in order to discourage any future protest against the construction 
works. Thanks to the support of the army the geognostic works could start in 
Chiomonte (Susa Valley). Additionally, the project promoters also relied on the 
judiciary power to weaken the protests. For example, Lyon Turin Ferroviaire 
(LTF) – the company in charge for the geognostic works of the base tunnel - 
prosecuted one of Italy’s most acclaimed writers because in 2013 he publicly 
defined LT a useless and harmful project that was legitimate to sabotage. LTF 
pressed charges against him shortly after he made these remarks. The Italian anti-
terror prosecutors followed suit, claiming that the writer had publicly instigated 
the commission of crimes and violations intended to hurt LTF. He was accused of 
incitement to damage property. Finally, he was acquitted by the court in Turin in 
2015. 
In France, local protests developed in 2012 during the public consultations with 
local communities. Opponents claimed new studies on the transport demand and 
environmental impacts of LT. Additionally, they called for a new public debate 
on the public interest of the project where decision-making procedures would be 
applied in a truly transparent way. The promoters considered these requests 
incompatible with the implementation status of the project which had already 
been gone through many EU decisions and international agreements, duly ratified 
by the French Parliament. Therefore, in 2013 the concerned ministry declared LT 
of public utility. Local protests did not stop and, in 2014, LTF filed a claim for 
defamation against the spokesperson of local opponents. However, upon reaching 
the court the lawsuit was dismissed on insufficient legal ground. 
Process 
French and Italian promoters have differently interacted with the local 
stakeholders (civil society and local authorities) concerned by LT. 
France 
Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, the French project promoters involved 
several times local stakeholders in the decision-making of the project. In the 
early-1990s, local oppositions to the project developed in the Lower Dauphiné 
region and the Avant-Pays Savoyard. At this initial stage, opponents did not 
criticize the technical and economic foundations of the project but simply 
expressed concerns about the impact of the future railway line on the landed 
properties affected by the future line. Project promoters did not ignore them. They 
informed – e.g. by sending them informative brochures with technical details 
about LT – and involved them in public consultations since the early stages of the 
project - e.g. in 1992 they organized a public debate on the economic and social 
interest of the project. However, the interviews we have conducted with the 
members of the local opposition groups reveal that, in some occasions, the project 
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promoters secured the support of local communities by swindling them (e.g. they 
provided false information on the noise pollution of the future infrastructure). 
In the framework of the ‘Enquête Publiqe’, between 2002 and 2007 a long 
process of public consultation took place in Villarodin-Le Bourget (Maurienne 
region). Protests developed in this village because local people were worried 
about the environmental impacts of the infrastructure works - namely the drainage 
of local water sources, and the risks associated with the storage of the excavation 
material. As a response, the project promoters set up a local information point to 
answer the questions of local communities about the operations connected with 
ongoing works. Additionally, they organized new public consultations and 
provided further details about the environmental impacts of the project. In 2007 
the consultations came to an end. A prefectural order came into force and 
declared of public interest the operation works in Villarodin-Le Bourget.   
In the early-2010s, local protests against LT intensified and promoters responded 
by resorting to the tribunal. 
In 2012 the French Court of Audit released a report (‘Référé n° 64174’) that 
questioned the realism of the costs estimates and traffic forecasts of the project 
promoters. Intrigued by this report, Daniel Ibanez – an experienced business 
consultant from the Savoie department –took part in the public consultations in 
the departments of Rhône, Isère and Savoie. He established contacts with the 
experts of the Italian opposition groups and collaborated with them to examine 
the studies (e.g. cost-benefit analysis, feasibility studies) prepared by the project 
promoters in support of LT. He re-elaborated some data about the traffic forecasts 
provided by the project promoters during a 2012 public consultation and came to 
the conclusion that these data were misleading. Moreover, he found some 
procedural errors in the application of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) procedure. Promoters’ irregularities in the conduct of the public 
consultation and EIA procedures frustrated local stakeholders who had the 
impression that the project was pre-determined before any public involvement. As 
a consequence, opponents claimed new studies on the impacts of LT and called 
for a new public debate on the public interest of the project where decision-
making procedures would be applied in a truly transparent way. The promoters 
considered these requests incompatible with the implementation status of the 
project which had already been gone through many EU decisions and 
international agreements, duly ratified by the French Parliament. Nevertheless, 
the protests did not stop and, in 2014, the project promoters responded by filing a 
claim for defamation against Daniel Ibanez. 
Italy  
Throughout the 1990s, local oppositions to the project emerged in the Susa Valley 
with the formation of the Committee Habitat in 1992. This was originally 
constituted by a small group of environmental activists coming from the 
association ProNatura. It rapidly grew and enlarged to 60 members including 
railway experts and professionals, medical doctors, factory workers, lecturers of 
the Turin polytechnic university, as well as mayors and civil servants from the 
local authorities of the valley. In 1994, after studies and discussions that lasted a 
few years, the Committee Habitat expressed a negative view of the project. Their 
core argument was that it was technically useless – because of decreasing traffic 
flows between Italy and France - and extremely impacting for the environment of 
the valley. As for the environment, their concerns were about the presence of 
uranium and asbestos in the mountains where the tunnel is to be bored. They were 
worried for the environmental risk associated with the construction of the tunnel 
and, more precisely, with the storage of excavated materials.  
Until the mid-2000s, the project promoters ignored these requests. In 2005, they 
sent expropriation letters to the residents of Venaus, a village in the Susa Valley 
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concerned by the construction of a geognostic tunnel. Vis-à-vis promoters’ 
obstinacy, Venaus residents occupied the construction site. As a response, the 
police violently evacuated them to let the promoters start the geognostic works. 
The images of this police operation circulated all around the country and, two 
days later, 30000 people assembled in Venaus, removed the enclosures from the 
construction site and occupied it again. Their request to the project promoters was 
to involve local communities and authorities in the decision-making of the project 
and open a debate on the technical reasons at the basis of LT.  
Vis-à-vis this mass mobilization, in 2006 the incumbent government created a 
new extraordinary body, the Osservatorio Torino-Lione (OTL). OTL’s objective 
was to establish a dialogue between LT proponents and opponents. The 
government presented it as a bi-partisan body where the most contested technical 
aspects of the project could be debated. Until the late-2000s, the OTL hosted 
many meetings during which the most controversial aspects of the project were 
debated. Proponents’ and opponents’ experts had diverging opinions on the 
forecasting methodology and the variables to be used in the estimation of the 
traffic flows between Italy and France. 
Because of existing divergent views, OTL’s technical talks were taking long and 
the construction of the base tunnel was delayed. As a consequence, in 2008 the 
Chairman of the OTL decided that it was time to stop debating the technical 
problems of the project and work constructively on the infrastructure design. 
Therefore, he unilaterally adopted a document – so called “Agreement of 
Pracatinat” – in the name of all OTL’s participants although Susa Valley 
representatives had not signed it.  This document imposed OTL members to shift 
the focus of their works from debating the project feasibility to project 
implementation. Additionally, as the deadlines to apply for a new EU financial 
support were approaching, the Italian government put pressure on the local 
authorities to tell their OTL experts to stop debating the technical feasibility of the 
project and start preparing the submission file to obtain the EU’s funds. The local 
authorities refused and, in 2010, the government publicly threatened to expel 
them from the OTL if they had not declared to support the implementation of the 
project 
Because the OTL was not able to assure any democratic participation, and 
because many technical issues remained unresolved, the local communities asked 
their experts to quit the OTL. The citizens of the Susa Valley, backed by their 
mayors, went back to the streets. A new season of protests and demonstrations 
started again. In 2011, as a form of protest the NOTAV activists occupied another 
construction site in Chiomonte where some geognostic works for the base tunnel 
were about to start. To prevent further delays, the government resorted to the 
police forces which evacuated the activists to let the promoters start the 
geognostic works. Faced with increasing protests, the same year the government 
approved Law 183 which declared LT a project of strategic priority to be realized 
in the name of national interest. In so doing, it created the juridical conditions to 
mobilize permanently the army in the Susa Valley and militarily occupy the site 
in order to discourage any future protest against the construction works.
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ANNEX VI – Interview guidelines 
 
 Individual level 
o Professional and/or personal background   
o Broad managerial function and/or individual role in relation to 
TEN-T and Lyon-Turin         
 
 Organizational level 
o Organizational affiliation and mission of the organization   
o General structure of the organization    
o Role of division/unit/group in the overall organization   
o Individual role in the organization  
o Prevailing collaborations and collaboration forms  
 
 TEN-T governance level 
o Mission of TEN-T program and brief background 
o General structure of the program governance  
o Positioning and role of his/her own organization in relation to the 
program governance    
o Individual role in relation to the program governance  
o Project management cycle of funded projects  
o Main dysfunctions in the project management cycle      
o Possible solutions (personal and/or professional opinion)  
 
 Lyon-Turin project 
o Project description: what/why and background   
o Specific individual function/role in relation to the project  
o Stakeholders’ relations duting the project implementation   
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o Difficulties related to Lyon-Turin implementation  
o Awareness of the opposition movement   
o Actions undertaken to deal with the opposition movement  
o Possible solutions to difficulties (personal and/or professional 
opinion)  
